Order The simple question that arises for decision in this writ petition is whether a permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority can be suspended by the Regional Transport Officer. A Bench of this Court in Amaravathi Motor Transport Co., Amaravathi, by its President Mr. M. Hanumantharao v. The State of Andhra1, held that the order of the Secretary suspending the permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority is illegal. The learned Government Pleader invited my attention to an unreported decision of the Madras High Court, dated 11th August, 1952, in W.P. No. 87 of 1951, taking a contrary view and holding that the suspension by the Regional Transport Officer is valid. The decision of the Madras High Court was not referred to in the judgment of this Court. It is surprising that such an important decision was not reported in either the authorised or the unauthorised reports. In M. Subbarayudu and 30 others v. The State2, it has been held by a Full Bench of this Court that the decisions of the Madras High Court pronounced prior to 5th July, 1954, are binding upon this Court. In Seshamma v. Narasimharao1, Leach, C.J., observed at page 474, in the following terms: "The Division Bench is the final Court of Appeal in an Indian High Court, unless the case is referred to a Full Bench, and one Division Bench should regard itself bound by the decision of another Division Bench on a question of law................If a Division Bench does not accept as correct the decision on a question of law of another Division Bench the only right and proper course to adopt is to refer the matter to a Full Bench, for which the rules of this Court provide". If the Bench decision had been referred to the Bench of this Court, it would have either followed it or if it felt that it required reconsideration, it would have referred the matter to a Full Bench. But, unfortunately, it was not placed before the Bench of this Court which took a different view. As there are two conflicting judgments on the point, it is necessary that the question should be finally decided by a Full Bench. The principle laid down by Leach, C.J., that if this course is not adopted, the Courts subordinate to the High Court would be left without guidance, will apply equally to this case. As there are two conflicting judgments on the point, it is necessary that the question should be finally decided by a Full Bench. The principle laid down by Leach, C.J., that if this course is not adopted, the Courts subordinate to the High Court would be left without guidance, will apply equally to this case. The next question that has to be decided is whether I should refer the matter to a Bench for referring the matter to a Full Bench or whether I should place the papers before the learned Chief Justice for constituting a Full Bench. Rule 2 of the Appellate Side rules provides that if both Judges constituting the Bench agree that the determination involves a question of law, they may order that the matter or the question of law, should be referred to a Full Bench. Rule 6 enacts that notwithstanding anything in the foregoing rules to the contrary, the Chief Justice may direct that any application, petition, suit, appeal or reference shall be heard by a Full Bench as defined in these rules. There is no provision in the Appellate Side Rules enabling a single Judge to refer the matter direct to a Full Bench. The practice obtaining in the Madras High Court is for a single Judge to place the papers before the Chief Justice for a reference to a Full Bench, if there are conflicting Bench decisions on the same point. Vide Veerraju v. Narayanamma2,and In re Venkata Subrahamanyam3. But in Dr. K.C. Nambiar v. State of Madras4, Subba Rao, J., (as he then was) held at page 53 that the following procedure should be followed: "If there is a conflict of Bench decisions, he (i.e., a single Judge) should refer the case to a Bench of two Judges who may refer it to a Full Bench". In Subbarayudu v. The State5, the learned Chief Justice quoted with approval his own observations in Dr. K.C. Nambiar v. State of Madras4, and stated that the practice obtaining in the Madras High Court should be followed in this Court. Following his observations, I referred a Court-fee matter to a Bench in order that the matter might be placed before a Full Bench. The matter was heard by the learned Chief Justice and Satyanarayana Raju, J., and they referred the question to a Full Bench. That decision is reported in Eswaramma v. Seethamma6. Following his observations, I referred a Court-fee matter to a Bench in order that the matter might be placed before a Full Bench. The matter was heard by the learned Chief Justice and Satyanarayana Raju, J., and they referred the question to a Full Bench. That decision is reported in Eswaramma v. Seethamma6. At page 747, Bhimasankaram, J., delivering the judgment of the Full Bench, made the following observations: "In accordance therefore with the practice that obtained in the Madras High Court and which is to obtain in this High Court also as laid down by the Full Bench decision in Subbarayudu v. State5 the learned Judge directed that this matter should go before a Bench in the first instance, though strictly speaking in accordance with the observations of Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) in Dr. K.C. Nambiar v. State of Madras4 he might have referred it to a Full Bench himself." The observations of Subba Rao, J., (as he than was) and approved by the Full Bench in Subbarayudu’s case5, were, as already set out, as follows: "If there is a conflict of Bench decisions, he (i.e., a single Judge) should refer the case to a Bench of two Judges who may refer it to a Full Bench." and not that a single Judge should refer the matter to a Full Bench. It is not clear whether the later Full Bench decision in Eswaramma v. Seethamma", is to be understood as overruling the observations in Subbarayudu’s case1 and enabling a single Judge to refer the matter direct to the Full Bench. Though the practice obtaining in the Madras High Court is to direct the papers to the placed before the Chief Justice for a reference to a Full Bench, having regard to the fact that there is no rule enabling a single Judge to refer the matter to a Full Bench, direct and the observations of Subba Rao, J., (as he then was) approved by the Full Bench in Subbarayudu’s case1 are that I should refer the matter to a Bench in order to enable the Bench to post it before a Full Bench, I am directing this matter to be posted before a Bench under rule 1 of the Appellate Side Rules. This petition next came on for hearing before Mr. K. Subba Rao, C.J., and Mr. Bhimasankaram, J., in pursuance of the aforesaid order. This petition next came on for hearing before Mr. K. Subba Rao, C.J., and Mr. Bhimasankaram, J., in pursuance of the aforesaid order. *The Order of the Court was pronounced by Subba Rao, C.J.- Umamaheswaram, J. directed this matter to be posted before a Bench to enable the Bench, if necessary, to refer it to a Full. Bench. Before we state the facts, the rule of procedure pointed out by our learned brother Umamaheswaram, J., may be noticed. Umamaheswaram J., criticised the statement of Bhimasankaram, J., in Eswaramma v. Seethamma2, that a single Judge might refer the case to a Full Bench and observed that it was not supported by the Full Bench decision in Subbarayudu v. State of Andhra1. It is true that according to the Full Bench, a single Judge cannot directly refer a matter to a Full Bench. We understand that Bhimasankaram, J., made that observation on the basis of the practice obtaining in Madras High Court. Whatever may be the practice in Madras, we should strictly follow the rules of procedure laid down by the Full Bench of this Court. The question raised is whether by reason of Rule 134-A of the rules framed under the Motor Vehicles Act, the Regional Transport Authority which issued the permit can delegate its power to cancel or suspend it to a subordinate body, and if it did so, whether the order made by the subordinate authority cancelling the permit would contravene the provisions of section 60 (1) of the Act. A Divisional Bench of this Court in Amaravathi Motor Transport Co. v. State of Andhra3, held that section 60, being a special provision governing suspension of a permit by an authority which issued it, overrides the general rule empowering the authority to cancel an order made by a superior officer. In that view, the Divisional Bench held that an order of the Secretary suspending a permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority is illegal. In that view, the Divisional Bench held that an order of the Secretary suspending a permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority is illegal. The same question was raised before a Divisional Bench of the Madras High Court consisting of Rajamannar, C.J., and Venkatarama Ayyar, J., in Writ Petition No. 87 of 1951, and though this particular point was not raised in terms, the learned Judges held that the order made by the Regional Transport Officer cancelling the permit issued by a superior officer was valid and under Rule 134-A that power was validly delegated to him by the Transport Authority. This judgment, though delivered in August, 1952, was not reported either in authorised or unauthorised journals. We do not know whether the Judges who delivered the Judgment did not give permission for it being reported. Ordinarily, we should think that unreported judgments of other High Courts should not be a basis for referring points finally decided by a Divisional Bench of this Court to a Full Bench. But this judgment has been brought to our notice and was already considered by One of our learned brethren. We think it would be in the interests of the public that the question is finally decided by a Full Bench of this Court We accordingly refer the following question to a Full Bench: “Whether by reason of Rule 134-A (xi) of the Madras Motor Vehicles Rules, the Secretary, to whom the power to cancel or suspend a permit is delegated, can validly cancel or suspend the permit issued by the Transport Authority?”. The question referred as aforesaid came on for hearing before the Full Bench. The Full Bench delivered the following Judgments. Subba Rao, C.J.- I have had the advantage of perusing the judgments prepared by Ansari, J., and Jaganmohan Reddy, J., expressing conflicting views on the question referred to the Full Bench. The judgments disclose that two views can reasonably be taken on the question. In Amaravathi Motor Transport Co. The Full Bench delivered the following Judgments. Subba Rao, C.J.- I have had the advantage of perusing the judgments prepared by Ansari, J., and Jaganmohan Reddy, J., expressing conflicting views on the question referred to the Full Bench. The judgments disclose that two views can reasonably be taken on the question. In Amaravathi Motor Transport Co. v. State of Andhra1, a Division Bench of this High Court, of which I was a member, expressed an opinion consistent with the view taken by Ansari, J. After hearing the arguments of the Government Pleader more elaborately advanced than on the first occasion and after giving respectable attention to the reasons given by Jaganmohan Reddy, J., in his judgment, I do not feel any justification for changing my view already expressed in the earlier judgment. I, therefore, agree with Ansari, J., and answer the question in the negative. Ansari, J.- The question referred to this Full Bench is: “Whether, by reason of Rule 134-A (xi) of the Madras Motor Vehicles Rules, the Secretary, to whom the power to cancel or suspend a permit is delegated, can validly cancel or suspend the permit issued by the Transport Authority.” The aforesaid reference has arisen in a Writ Petition that seeks cancellation of three orders passed against the petitioner. He is the owner of the bus with a route permit between Parvathipur and Elwinpet in Srikakulam District. The Sub-Collector of Parvathipur had made a complaint that on March 30, ‘1953, the stage carriage M.D.V. 1959 was carrying 54 passengers as against its capacity of 33 persons and was also being dangerously driven at a speed of 35 -.0 40 miles per hour while the authorised limit was only 25 miles. The Regional Transport Officer, Srikakulam, thereafter called upon the petitioner to show cause why action should not be taken against him under section 60 of the Motor Vehicles Act (IV of 1939), and his permit suspended. The explanation offered denied any offence having been committed, stating that if an offence was committed the driver as well as the conductor would alone be responsible; and the owner could not be penalised. The Officer rejected the explanation and suspended the permit for a month and a half. On appeal to the Central Road Traffic Board, its Secretary reduced the period of suspension to one month. The Government in exercise of its revisionary powers has refused to interfere. The Officer rejected the explanation and suspended the permit for a month and a half. On appeal to the Central Road Traffic Board, its Secretary reduced the period of suspension to one month. The Government in exercise of its revisionary powers has refused to interfere. These orders are challenged in the writ petition as being illegal and unconstitutional. By an amendment two further grounds have been taken for vacating the orders. The first of these is that the Regional Transport Officer has no jurisdiction under law to take action against the permit and that his proceedings are void, and of no avail. The learned Judge hearing the writ petition referred it to a Division Bench, because of conflict of judicial views on the Secretary’s jurisdiction to suspend permits by Regionsal Transport Authority. As the decisions are of a Division Bench, the question already mentioned has been referred to this Full Bench. It would facilitate a better appreciation of the two views if the relevant statutory provisions and the Rules framed thereunder are given at the very beginning. They are contained in Chapter IV of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 42 requires owners to use in public places their transport vehicles in accordance with the conditions of permits granted or countersigned by the Regional or State Transport Authority. The State Government is empowered by section 44 (1) to constitute a State Transport Authority and Regional Transport Authorities for exercising and discharging the powers and functions conferred on them by the Chapter. Section 44 (5). is important and reads as follows: “The Provincial Transport Authority and any Regional Transport Authority, if authorised in this behalf by rules made under section 68, may delegate such of its powers and functions to such authority or person and subject to such restrictions, limitations and conditions as may be prescribed .by the said rules”. Under section 45, every application for permit is to be made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region or to one of the regions in which it is proposed to use the vehicle. Section 58 (1) provides the duration of a permit, other than one which is temporary, to be not less than three and not more than five years as the Regional Transport Authority may specify in the permit. Section 59 contains what conditions should attach to the permits. Section 58 (1) provides the duration of a permit, other than one which is temporary, to be not less than three and not more than five years as the Regional Transport Authority may specify in the permit. Section 59 contains what conditions should attach to the permits. It forbides transfer except with the permission of the Transport Authority which granted the permit. Sub-section (2) further enacts that the holder may with the permission of the Authority by which the permit was granted, replace his vehicle by another of the same nature, and capacity. The powers of cancellation and suspension of permit are given by section 60, which runs as follows: "60. (1) The Transport Authority which granted a permit may cancel the permit or may suspend it for such period as it thinks fit- (a) on the breach of any condition specified in sub-section (3) of section 59, or of any condition contained in the permit, or (b) if the holder of the permit uses or causes or allows a vehicle to be used in any manner not authorised by the permit, or (c) if the holder of the permit ceases to possess the vehicle or vehicles covered by the permit, or (d) if the holder of the permit has obtained the permit by fraud or misrepresentation: Provided that no permit shall be cancelled unless an opportunity has been given to the holder of the permit to submit his explanation. ****** Reference may also be made to section 61 which relates to transfer of permit on death of the holder and enables the person succeeding to the possession of the vehicle to use it for three months, subject to such a person within thirty days of the death informing the Transport Authority which granted the permit. There remains only section 68 which confers rule-making power on the State Government. Its relevant parts are as follows: "68. (1) A Provincial Government may make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of this Chapter. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, rules under this section may be made with respect to all or any of the following matters, namely: ****** (z-a) any other matter which is to be or may be prescribed." Only Rule 134-A need be mentioned out of the Rules framed in exercise of the power conferred by the section. Its part important for the purposes of this reference is the following: "The Board may for prompt and convenient despatch of business by general or special resolution delegate to the Secretary the following functions: * * * * * * (xi) power under section 60 of the Act to suspend a permit and the power under section 63 (3) read with section 60 of the Act to suspend counter-signatures of permits." Now, there are two Authorities of the Madras High Court that the rule is not ultra vires. The first of these is the judgment of the learned Chief Justice and Venkatarama Ayyar, J., in Star Transport Ltd., Kurnool v. Regional Transport Authority, Kurnool1. The petitioner in the case was the Managing Director of a Company owning a bus running on the route Nandyal-Jammalamadugu under a stage carriage permit by the Regional Transport Authority. The Regional Transport Officer, as the Secretary of the granting authority passed an order suspending the permit for two weeks on the ground of the bus having been overloaded. An appeal was preferred, which was dismissed. In the writ petition one of the grounds taken was that the permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority could not be suspended by the Secretary. It was argued that the power of delegation conferred by section 44 (5) should be construed as subject to the qualification that only powers and functions which were not judicial or quasi-judicial could be delegated and as suspension of a permit was a judicial function it could not be delegated. The contention was not accepted on the ground that there was nothing in the sub-section which restricted the power of delegation. The learned Judges observed: “Once a function is among those prescribed by the Rules, the delegation cannot be challenged”. The case in which a different view is taken is, Amaravathi Motor Transport Co, v. State of Andhra1. There were three writ petitions. In one the Regional Transport Officer, Guntur, had suspended the bus permit for six weeks on account of an unauthorised extra trip. In the second writ petition the same officer having found the bus to have taken 36 passengers as against the seating capacity of 33, had suspended the renewed permit for a month. In the third petition the permit was suspended also for overloading. In the second writ petition the same officer having found the bus to have taken 36 passengers as against the seating capacity of 33, had suspended the renewed permit for a month. In the third petition the permit was suspended also for overloading. It was held therein that the Secretary had no power to cancel the permit issued by the Regional Transport Authority, and his orders were without jurisdiction. His Lordship the Chief Justice delivering the judgment has observed at pages 290 and 291: .“. . . it is clear that rule 134-A (xi) is a general provision, and section 60 (1) is a special provision, overlapping each other to some extent in respect of the same subject-matter. Both provide for suspensing a permit already issued. While rule 134-A (xi) says that the Secretary can suspend a permit under certain circumstances, section 60 enacts that the Secretary can suspend a permit only if he has granted it. Section 60 being a special provision governing suspension of a permit by an authority which issued it, overrides the general rule empowering the authority 1o cancel a permit issued even by a superior officer. By so construing, we must hold that the order of the Secretary suspending the permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority is illegal”, This authority has not been followed in the decision of the Madras High Court in Dhanmull Sowcar v. Secretary, R.T.A.2. In the case, the petitioner held a permit by the Regional Transport Authority, North Arcot District, and on a report by the Assistant Motor Vehicles Inspector that the bus was overloaded the Regional Transport Officer, who was also the Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority, directed suspension of the permit for three months. The appeal was dismissed, but the period was reduced by the Government in exercise of revisional powers. The learned Judges held that the provision in section 44 (5) of the Motor Vehicles Act for the delegation of powers of the Regional Transport Authority, does not offend the well-recognised concept of jurisdiction that a judicial officer cannot delegate his functions to another. Rule 134-A of the Rules was also held as not ultra vires of the rule-making authority. Rajagopalan, J., at page 317 made the following observations concerning section 60: — “Section 60 of the Act conferred the power to cancel or suspend a permit on the Transport Authority which granted that permit. Rule 134-A of the Rules was also held as not ultra vires of the rule-making authority. Rajagopalan, J., at page 317 made the following observations concerning section 60: — “Section 60 of the Act conferred the power to cancel or suspend a permit on the Transport Authority which granted that permit. That was obviously to specify with precision which among the Regional Transport Authorities that were constituted by the State Government under section 44 (1) of the Act, should exercise the power, for which section’6o (1) of the Act made provision. . . . The learned Advocate-General was well-founded in his contention, that the qualifying phrase in section 60 (1)”which granted a permit“was not intended to make the power conferred by section 60 (1) of the Act one to be exercised virtuo officio that is, a right”personal“to the grantee, the Regional Transport Authority, within the meaning of the principle laid down by Lord Camden in Entick v. Carrington3,”a trust that that grantee cannot delegate to another“. We have already pointed out that the Act itself made express provision for delegation in section 44 (5).....To explain the scope of the qualifying phrase......in section 60 (1) the learned Advocate-General invited our attention to the provisions of sections 59 and 61 of the Act which provided for the transfer of a permit and vested that power in the Regional Transport Authority with a similar qualifying phrase” by which the permit was granted“or”which granted the permit“. We have dealt with this aspect only to emphasise that the specific provisions made in section 44 (5) for the delegation of powers of a Regional Transport Authority, inclusive of the power conferred by section 60 (1) of the Act, does not offend any well-recognised concept of jurisprudence.” The difference between the two views is obvious. One holds that because the power of suspension, etc., is vested under section 60 in the Regional Transport Authority, it can delegate such power under section 44 (5). The other view is that the statute having linked the power of suspension with the earlier exercise of the power of granting the permit, the State Government in framing the rules under the Act cannot disregard the link. No rule can, therefore, be framed or construed under which the power of suspension can be delegated to another who had not granted the permit. No rule can, therefore, be framed or construed under which the power of suspension can be delegated to another who had not granted the permit. With respect to the learned Judges who have taken the former view, I would follow Amaravathi Motor Transport Co. v. State of Andhra1. Obviously sections 59 and 60 vest certain powers in certain authorities. Such an authority is indicated in the sections by the phrase "which granted the permit" or "by which the permit was granted". It follows that the power of transference under section 59 or suspension under section 60 is exercisable only by the authorities which satisfy the qualifications. The proposition is not challenged. What is urged is that such an authority can under section 44 (5) delegate the power. The argument, however, overlooks the circumscribed power of delegation conferred by the Act. Section 44 "(5) expressly enacts that the jurisdiction delegated under the section must be according to the rules framed under the Act and subject to restrictions, limitations and conditions that may be prescribed by these rules. The State Government under section 68 is directed to make rules for purposes of carrying into effect the provisions of the Chapter. If the Act insists, and I have come to the conclusion that it does, on linking the power of revocation or suspension with that of having granted the permit, the rule-framing authority cannot disregard the link. No useful purpose will be served in citing authorities in support of the obvious proposition that if rules framed under the statute are in excess of the provisions of the statute they are ultra vires. It follows that any express rule conferring power of suspension of permit on any authority that has not granted the permit earlier, would be ultra vires. Notwithstanding such an express rule there can be no delegation of power under section 60 on one that has not earlier granted the permit. If that cannot be done by an express rule a fortiori it cannot be done by construing a rule however widely worded it may be. The result is that section 44 (5) cannot be invoked in support of the view mentioned earlier in the paragraph. The question is not whether there is personal trust conferred on the delegating authority. If that cannot be done by an express rule a fortiori it cannot be done by construing a rule however widely worded it may be. The result is that section 44 (5) cannot be invoked in support of the view mentioned earlier in the paragraph. The question is not whether there is personal trust conferred on the delegating authority. The point is that no rule according to which the authority can delegate can be framed or construed so as to enable the authority to separate and confer the cancelling power on one who had not granted the permit. It is also not clear why the phrase "which granted a permit" in section 60 should be construed as indicating only Regional Transport Authorities. The State Transport Authority under section 44 (3) (b) can perform the duties of Regional Transport Authority where there is no such Authority, and obviously section 60 would cover the case of such an Authority where it is discharging the functions. So also section 60 would cover the case of a person who is exercising the delegated power if the permit which is being suspended, has been granted by such delegation. It is clear that the phrase "which granted the permit" in section 60 links up the powers conferred by the section with the power of having granted the permit, whichever be the authority that has granted the permit. That is the rational reading of the several sections. For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the answer to the question is in the negative. Jaganmohan Reddy, J.- On a consideration of the relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and the Rules, I have come to a different conclusion. The following question has been referred to us: "Whether by reason of rule 134-A (xi) of the Madras Motor Vehicles Rules, the Secretary, to whom the power to cancel or suspend a permit is delegated, can validly cancel or suspend the permit issued by the Transport Authority." A division Bench of this Court presided over by the Hon’ble Chief Justice had in the case of Amaravathi Motor Transport Co. v. State of Andhra1, held that section 60 being a special provision governing suspension of a permit by an authority which issued it, overrides the general Rule 134-A (xi) empowering the authority to cancel a permit issued even by a superior officer in certain circumstances and consequently the order of the Secretary suspending the permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority was held to be illegal. In Star Transport Ltd., Kurnool v. Regional Transport Authority, Kurnool2, a Bench of the Madras High Court consisting of Rajamannar,C.J. and Venkatarama Ayyar, J., in a judgment delivered on the nth August, 1952, considered the question raised before them, namely, that the Regional Transport Officer had no jurisdiction to suspend the permit in his favour because under section 60 (1) it is the transport authority which granted the permit that can cancel a permit or suspend it. In that case it was the Regional Authority which granted the petitioner a permit while the secretary who was the Regional Transport Officer acting in exercise of the powers delegated under section 44 (5) of the Act passed orders suspending the permit in favour of the petitioner for two weeks on the ground that the petitioner had overloaded the bus. It was held that the Regional Transport Officer was acting well within the scope of the At in passing the orders of suspension. The contentions raised either before the Bench in Amaravathi Motor Transport Company’s case1, or before us do not appear to have been raised in that case. In order to appreciate the contentions urged before us, it is necessary to examine the several provisions of the Act and Rules. Act-Sections. "44. The contentions raised either before the Bench in Amaravathi Motor Transport Company’s case1, or before us do not appear to have been raised in that case. In order to appreciate the contentions urged before us, it is necessary to examine the several provisions of the Act and Rules. Act-Sections. "44. (1)- The Provincial Government shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute for the Province a Provincial Transport Authority to exercise and discharge the powers and functions specified in sub-section (3), and shall in like manner constitute Regional Transport Authorities to exercise and discharge throughout such areas (in this Chapter referred to as regions) as may be specified in the notification in respect of each Regional Transport Authority, the powers and functions conferred by or under this Chapter on such authorities: * * * * * * (3) A Provincial Transport Authority shall exercise and discharge throughout the Province the following powers and functions, namely: (a) to co-ordinate and regulate the activities and policies of the Regional Transport Authorities, if any, of the Province; (b) to perform the duties of a Regional Transport Authority where there is no such Authority and, if it thinks fit or if so required by a Regional Transport Authority, to perform those duties in respect of any route common to two or more regions; (c) to settle all disputes and decide all matters on which difference of opinion arise between Regional Transport Authorities; and (d) to discharge such other functions as may be prescribed. (4) For the purpose of exercising and discharging the powers and functions specified in subsection (3), a Provincial Transport Authority may, subject to such conditions as may be prescribed issue directions to any Regional Transport Authority and the Regional Transport Authority shall be guided by such directions. (5) The Provincial Transport Authority and any Regional Transport Authority, if authorised in this behalf by rules made under section 68, may delegate such of its powers and functions to such authority or person and subject to such restrictions, limitations and conditions as may be prescribed by the said rules. 45. (5) The Provincial Transport Authority and any Regional Transport Authority, if authorised in this behalf by rules made under section 68, may delegate such of its powers and functions to such authority or person and subject to such restrictions, limitations and conditions as may be prescribed by the said rules. 45. Every application for a permit shall be made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region or of one of the regions in which it is proposed to use the vehicle and, if the applicant resides or has his principal place of business in any of those regions, to the Regional Transpore Authority of that region: Provided that the Provincial Government may, by notification in the Fort St. George Gczette, direct that applications for such class of permits, and in such region as may be specified in the notification shall be made to the Provincial Transport Authority. 59. (1) Save as provided in section 61, a permit shall not be transferable from one person to another, except with the permission of the Transport Authority which granted the permit and shall not without such permission operate to confer on any person to whom a vehicle covered by the permit is transferred any right to use that vehicle in the manner authorised by the permit. (2) The holder of a permit may, with the permission of the authority by which the permit was granted, replace by another vehicle of the same nature and capacity any vehicle covered by the permit. (3) * * * * * 60. (1) The Transport Authority which granted a permit may cancel the permit or may suspend it for such period as it thinks fit- (a) on the breach of any condition specified in sub-section (3) of section 59, or of any condition contained in the permit, or (A) if the holder of the permit uses or causes or allows a vehicle to be used in any manner not authorised by the permit, or (c) if the holder of the permit ceases to possess the vehicle covered by the permit, or (d) if the holder of the permit has obtained the permit by fraud or misrepresentation: Provided that no permit shall be cancelled unless an opportunity has been given to the holder of the permit to submit his explanation. (2) Where a transport authority cancels or suspends a permit, it shall give to the holder in writing its reasons for the revocation or suspension. 61. (1) Where the holder of a permit dies, the person succeeding to the possession of the vehicles covered by the permit may, for a period of three months, Use the permit as if it has been granted to himself: Provided that such person has, within thirty days of the death of the holder, informed the Transport Authority which granted the permit of the death of the holder and of his own intention to use the permit. ***** (2) * * * * * * 63. (1) Except as may be otherwise prescribed a permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority of any one region shall not be valid in any other region, unless the permit has been counter-signed by the Regional Transport Authority of the other region, and a permit granted in any one Province shall not be valid in any other Province unless countersigned by the Provincial Transport Authority of that other Province or by the Regional Transport Authority concerned. (2) A Regional Transport Authority when countersigning the permit may attach to the permit any condition which it might have imposed if it had granted the permit, and may likewise vary any condition attached to the permit by the Authority by which the permit was granted. (3) The provisions of this Chapter relating to the grant, revocation and suspension of permits shall apply to the grant, revocation and suspension of counter-signatures of permits. (4) * * * * * 68. (1) A Provincial Government may make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of this Chapter. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, rules under this section may be made with respect to all or any of the following matters, namely: ******* (za) any other matter which is to be or may be prescribed. Rules: Rule 134-A.- The Board may for prompt and convenient despatch of business by general or special resolution delegate to the Secretary the following functions: (i) to (x). * * * * (xi) Power under section 60 of the Act to suspend a permit and the power under section 63 (3) read with section 60 of the Act to suspend counter-signatures of permits. * * * * (xi) Power under section 60 of the Act to suspend a permit and the power under section 63 (3) read with section 60 of the Act to suspend counter-signatures of permits. (xii) and (xiii) ***** In Amaravathi Motor Transport Company’s Case1, it was urged that Rule 134-A, particularly sub-rule (xi) is in excess of the rule-making power of the Provincial Government. The argument was that section 68 (1) does not apply as the rule is not only not inserted to carry into effect the provisions of that Chapter, but is also inconsistent with the express provisions of section 60 (1) that clause (z-a) of sub-section (2) of section 68 has no bearing as no power is conferred on any authority to make rules for delegating its functions. It was there held that setion 68 (1) authorises the Provincial Government to make rules empowering the Regional Transport Authority to delegate its functions and 68 (2) (z-a) enables it to make rules laying down conditions subject to which the said delegation can be made and that Rule 134-A (xi) is certainly within the scope of the rule-making power of the Government. The learned Chief Justice in the case of Star Transport Ltd.,2 observed that there was nothing in section 44 (5) which restricts the power of delegation and that it does not offend the well-recognised principle that a judicial or non-judicial officer cannot delegate his power to another, that the sub-section expressly indicates that the authority concerned may delegate such of its powers and once a function is among those prescribed by the rules, the delegation cannot be challenged. The question before us is not that the delegation cannot be made or is bad, but is whether the rule empowers the delegated authority to suspend a permit not granted by it. In other words, has the delegation been circumscribed by preserying the power of revocation or suspension in the authority which granted the permit. His Lordship the Chief Justice in Amaravathi Motor Transport Case1, put it on the basis that both Rule 134 -A (xi) the general provision and section 60 (1) the special provision overlap each other to some extent in respect of the same subject-matter. His Lordship observed at pages 290 and 291: "........Both provide for suspending a permit already issued. His Lordship the Chief Justice in Amaravathi Motor Transport Case1, put it on the basis that both Rule 134 -A (xi) the general provision and section 60 (1) the special provision overlap each other to some extent in respect of the same subject-matter. His Lordship observed at pages 290 and 291: "........Both provide for suspending a permit already issued. While Rule 134-A (xi) says that the Secretary can suspend a permit under certain circumstances, section 60 enacts that the Secre-, tary can suspend a permit only if he has granted it. Section 60 being a special provision governing suspension of permit by an authority which issued it, overrides the general rule empowering the authority to cancel a permit issued even by a superior officer. By so construing, we must hold that the order of the Secretary suspending the permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority is illegal". Learned Government Pleader relies upon the recent decision of the Madras High Court in Dhanmul Sowcar v. Secretary, Regional Transport Authority at Vellore2, which takes a contrary view. Rajagopalan, J., at page 320 after considering the case of Amaravathi Motor Transport Case1, observed: "........We are unable to discover any real basis for holding that section 60 is a special provision and that Rule 134-A (xi) should be construed as a general provision regulating the jurisdiction to cancel or suspend permits. Section 60 of the Act is the only provision in the Act itself, which provides for the exercise of the power to suspend or cancel a permit. It is that power that can be delegated under section 44 (5) of the Act. It was that power that was delegated to the Regional Transport Officer under Rule 134-A (xi). The validity of that delegation was upheld by the learned Judges and we have already held that Rule 134-A including item (xi) thereof is intra vires. The delegation under section 44 (5) is subject to any limitations or conditions that can be imposed by the rule-making power. Rule 134-A (xi) did not impose any condition either expressly or by necessary intendment that the operation of that rule was confined only to a permit granted by the Regional Transport Officer himself. The Authority to grant a permit was given to the Regional Transport Authority by the Act. Rule 134-A (xi) did not impose any condition either expressly or by necessary intendment that the operation of that rule was confined only to a permit granted by the Regional Transport Officer himself. The Authority to grant a permit was given to the Regional Transport Authority by the Act. Delegation of that power was permissible under section 44 (5) of the Act, and a limited power was delegated to the Regional Transport Officer by Rule 134. We have endeavoured to explain the scope of the qualifying phrase ‘ which granted a permit’ in section 60 (1) of the Act. In our opinion, section 60 (1) is the only statutory provision for the power to punish by suspension. Exercise of that power is further regulated by Rule 134-A (xi). The delegation of the jurisdiction to exercise that power is valid. Still, what has been delegated is only the power conferred by section 60 (1) of the Act. If the delegation is valid, it is that power, subject to the conditions and limitations imposed by Rule 134-A (xi) that vests in the Regional Transport Officer and that vesting is valid." The argument submitted by the learned Government Pleader centres round the interpretation of the qualifying words ‘which granted the permit’ in section 60 (1) of the Act. The contention simply put is that these qualifying words do not vest the power conferred by section 60 (1) of the Act in the Regional Transport Authority to be exercised virtuo officio in order to justify the conclusion that the power of revocation or suspension has been linked with that of the authority granting the permit. It is necessary therefore, to examine the true meaning and ambit of the qualifying words ‘which granted a permit’ occurring in section 60 (1). Are these words used merely to refer to the particular transport authority granting the permit out of the several transport authorities functioning in different regions as words of description or have they been inserted with the object of confining the power of cancellation or suspension of the permit only to the authority which granted the permit; that is, are they words of limitation? I now propose to examine the relevant provisions of the Act given above in order to ascertain the true import of the qualifying words used in section 60 (1). I now propose to examine the relevant provisions of the Act given above in order to ascertain the true import of the qualifying words used in section 60 (1). Section 44 specifies the transport authorities" which the Government by notification in the Official Gazette shall constitute for the Provinces (States) namely, Provincial Transport Authority and Regional Transport Authorities for each of the areas as may be specified in the notification. The functions of the Provincial Transport Authority are shown in sub-section (3) clause (b) which empowers the Provincial Transport Authority to perform the duties of a Regional Transport Authority where there is no such authority and if it thinks fit or if so required by a Regional Transport Authority to perform those duties in respect of any route common to two or more regions. Under section 45 every application for a permit is to be made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region or of one of the regions in which it is proposed to use the vehicle and if the applicant resides or has his principal place of business in any one of those regions to the Regional Transport Authority of that region. The proviso authorises the State Government by notification in the Gazette to direct that applications for such class of permits and in such region as may be specified in the notification shall be made to the Provincial Transport Authority. It may be noticed that a person has been given the option to apply for a permit to one or other of the Regional Transport Authority of the Regions in which it is proposed to use the vehicle or to one or other of the Regional Transport Authorities where the applicant resides or any one of those regions. Apart from the several regional authorities which are empowered to grant a permit in the case of an applicant who intends to use his vehicle in one or more regions the Government can also by a notification direct the applicant to apply for permits to the Provincial Transport Authority. Further under section 44 (3) (b) if the Regional Transport Authority is not functioning in any Region or if so lequired the Provincial Transport Authority can perform the duties of a Regional Transport Authority in respect of any route common to two or more Regions. Further under section 44 (3) (b) if the Regional Transport Authority is not functioning in any Region or if so lequired the Provincial Transport Authority can perform the duties of a Regional Transport Authority in respect of any route common to two or more Regions. From the aforesaid provisions it appears to me that where there are more than one authority which is empowered to grant a permit to the applicant the qualifying words ‘which granted the permit’ are used to identify the authority which actually granted the permit and naturally it can only be that authority which can cancel or suspend the permit and not any other authority which could have granted the permit. It is significant to note that the words in section 60 (1) are not Regional Authority, but merely the Transport Authority. The marginal note to section 44 uses the words Transport Authorities to denote both the Provincial Transport Authority as well as the Regional Transport Authorities. It appears to me, therefore, that when in section 60 (1) the words ‘Transport Authority which granted a permit’ are used, they are only intended to specify out of the several transport authorities empowered to grant a permit, the particular authority which has actually granted the permit. The authority which has actually granted the permit must necessarily cancel or suspend the permit. No other authority can do so even though the other regional authorities could have granted a permit to the applicant either on account of his residence or place of business, etc. In section 59 also which restricts transfer of permit from one person to another the permission to be sought for such transfer is of the Transport Authority ‘which granted the permit’. In sub-section (2) when dealing with the permission to be granted for replacing one vehicle by another of the same nature, the permission is to be of the ‘authority by which the permit was granted’. Section 63 states that a permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority of one Region is not valid in any other Region, unless the permit is counter-signed by the transport authority of that region, subject to such conditions which that regional authority when counter-signing, may attach in the same way as it would have imposed if it had granted the permit. Sub-section (3) applies the provisions in that Chapter relating to grant, revocation and suspension of the permits to the countersignatures of permits. The power of grant, revocation and suspension of the countersignature under this sub-section is not qualified by the words ‘by the Transport Authority which countersigned the permit’. In my view, this was not necessary because the Transport Authority counter-signing the permit has been sufficiently identified as the Transport Authority of the region where the permit is to be made valid. One other significant matter to which I wish to refer is that in the provisions relating to the making of applications, procedure for considering these applications and the power of restricting the permits and imposing conditions, etc., that is, in sections 47,48, 50, 51, 53 and 55 the indefinite article ‘A’ has been prefixed to the regional transport authority generally to denote any of the several regional authorities. It is only after the stage of the grant of permit has passed that the words of description ‘which granted a permit’ or ‘by which the permit was granted’ or ‘of that other region’ in sections 59 (1) and (a), 60 (1), 61 (1) and 63 (1) have been used to specify the particular transport authority granting the permit or counter-signing the permit. It is true that the power to cancel or suspend the permit is given to the transport authority of the region granting the permit; but that does not further make that a right personal to the grantee. Under section 44 (3) (b) it may be seen that the Provincial Transport Authority can perform the duties of a Regional Transport Authority where there is no such authority. If the argument that the right to cancel or suspend the permit is linked with the authority issuing the permit is accepted, that is, if it is a right personal to the grantor, then even after the regional authority for the area has been appointed, it cannot cancel or suspend the permits given by the Provincial Transport Authority. If the argument that the right to cancel or suspend the permit is linked with the authority issuing the permit is accepted, that is, if it is a right personal to the grantor, then even after the regional authority for the area has been appointed, it cannot cancel or suspend the permits given by the Provincial Transport Authority. That could not have been intended to be the result, because after the Regional Transport Authority is appointed, the Provincial Transport Authority can have no jurisdiction over the region except to the limited extent provided for under section 44; if so the Regional Transport Authority which is actually functioning cannot regulate the Motor Transport plying in its region by either cancelling a permit or suspending it. Once it has been held that a delegation of the power can be validly made and that is not the question before us, the exercise of that power cannot be deemed to be personal to the Regional Authority granting the permit. On the other hand, as I have ventured to show, the various provisions of the Act point to a contrary view. Sub-section (5) of section 44 authorises the delegation of any of the powers, that is, either the power to cancel or the power to suspend or both and once any on all of the powers are delegated the authority to which it is delegated becomes identified with the transport authority of the region granting the permit. Further the Secretary under Rule 134-A (xi) is only vested with the power to suspend the permit or to suspend the counter-signatures of permits. For exercising that power no limitations have been imposed to restrict it only to cases in which the Secretary has granted the permit or counter-signed it. If a limitation of that nature was intended it would have implied the delegation of the power to the Secretary to grant the permit. Otherwise it would tantamount to saying that the delegation of power to suspension alone would be invalid or at any rate otiose. But it has been held in the Amaravathi Motor Transport Company’s Case1, that Rule 134-A (xi) is certainly within the scope of the rule-making power of the Government and is therefore valid and as observed by Rajamannar, C.J.: “Once a function is among those prescribed by the rules, the delegation cannot be challenged”. With great respect I agree with this view. With great respect I agree with this view. My answer to the question, therefore, is in the affirmative. A.S.R. ----- Reference answered in the negative.