JUDGMENT 1. - The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the order dated 12-9-1985 Annx. 1 passed by the Additional Collector (Adm.), Sri Ganganagar and order dated 19-4-1989 Annex. 2 passed by the Board of Revenue, Ajmer affirming in appeal. 2. The aforesaid order passed by Authorised Officer in exercise of his power under the Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973 which is affirmed by Board of Revenue in appeal is being assailed before me on the ground that the Additional Collector (Adm.), Sri Ganganagar has committed manifest illegality in clubbing the land of Sucha Singh (Petitioner No. 2) and Mohar Singh (Petitioner No. 3) with Ajaib Singh. Judgment dated 19-4-1989 passed in appeal by Board of Revenue is also assailed on the same ground. 3. The brief relevant facts leading to the filing of the present writ petition may be noticed at the out set as follows. 4. The State Government, in the present case, under as powers conferred under Sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act of 1973') re-opened the case of late Ajaib Singh on 5-10-78 and in pursuance of that order, the Additional Collector (Adm.), Sri Ganganagar initiated proceedings against the petitioners' father late Ajaib Singh who expired after initiation of the proceedings. After death of late Ajaib Singh, the petitioners were taken on record and proceedings continued. The Additional Collector (Adm.) Sri Ganganagar (respondent No. 2) clubbed the land held by the petitioners Sucha Singh and Mohar Singh, who were major sons of late Ajaib Singh on the relevant date i.e. 1-1-1973. Both petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 were holding the land in their own names while living separately and cultivating the land held by them. It is borne out from the record that Sucha Singh was holding 60.14 Bighas of irrigated land in his name and Mohar Singh was holding 44.04 Bighas of irrigated land in his own name. It is further borne out from the averments made in the writ petition that on the relevant date, i.e. 1-1-1973, there were nine members in the family of Mohar Singh and seven members in the family of Sucha Singh but because of the non-service of Draft Statement, these two sons could not lead any evidence before the Additional Collector (Adm.), Sri Ganganagar. 5. 5. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that respondents Nos. 1 and 2 have committed manifest error of law in clubbing the separate unit of holdings of Mohar Singh and Sucha Singh who were indisputably major sons of Ajaib Singh on the relevant date i.e. 1-1-1973 whereas the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents has refuted the aforesaid arguments and supported the order passed by respondents Nos. 1 and 2. 6. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions raised at the Bar. It is evident that respondents Nos. 1 and 2 have not addressed themselves to the relevant provisions of the Act of 1973 in clubbing the separate Unit of petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 in the holding of their father Ajaib Singh after appreciating the evidence on record in correct perspective. 7. It is to be noticed that Section 2(f) of the Act of 1973 clearly defines "family" which means a fam ily consisting of husband, wife and their minor children but excluding married minor daughter. Under Section 2(j) of the Act of 1973 "person" has been defined which excludes within its fold any trust, company, firm or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not. Under Section 2(m) of the said Act "separate unit" has been defined which means an adult son and in case of his death, his widow and children, if any. It is to be noticed that under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the aforesaid Act, fixation of ceiling on land holdings has been defined, according to which, in the case of every person not being a family and in the case of every family consisting of five or less than five members (hereinafter referred to as "the Primary Unit" of family) the ceiling area applicable to such person or family is enumerated therein. A proviso is also added to sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the said Act which postulates that where members of a family exceed five, the ceiling area in relation thereto shall be increased by one-fifth for each additional member Section that the total ceiling area applicable to such family does not exceed twice the ceiling area applicable to a family consisting of five or less than five members. According to Second Proviso added to sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the said Act, it is further envisaged that if the ceiling area applicable to any person or family in accordance with this Section exceeds the ceiling area applicable to such person or family according to the provisions of law repealed by Section 40, in that case, the ceiling area applicable to such person or family will be the same as was under the provisions of the said repealed law. 8. It is contemplated under sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the Act of 1973, that a person may also opt to select land for a separate unit up to the ceiling area of the Primary Unit for each separate unit provided that where the separate unit also holds any land or share in the land, the same shall be taken into account for calculating the ceiling area. 9. A close scrutiny of the aforesaid provisions reveal that on the relevant date i.e. 1-1-1973, since both petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 were major sons, therefore, they were holding separate unit as major sons of late Ajaib Singh, hence, petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 cannot be included within the definition of either person or family of Ajaib Singh. Both the Courts below have correctly clubbed the land of petitioner No. 1 Smt. Kartar Kaur who was wife of Ajaib Singh and she falls within the definition of family of Ajaib Singh but as according to the findings recorded by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 both the sons of late Ajaib Singh namely; Sucha Singh and Mohar Singh petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 were major sons on 1-1-1973, therefore, they cannot be included either in the definition of person or family within the meaning of Sections 2(f) and 2(j) of the Act of 1973. Both petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 will fall within the definition of Section (m) "separate unit" which means an adult son and in case of his death, his widow and children if any. 10. In the present case both the Courts below have committed manifest error of law in clubbing the land belonging to petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 towards the holding of their father Ajaib Singh without taking into account the relevant provisions of the Act of 1973 as mentioned hereinabove and without appreciating the evidence on record. 11. 10. In the present case both the Courts below have committed manifest error of law in clubbing the land belonging to petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 towards the holding of their father Ajaib Singh without taking into account the relevant provisions of the Act of 1973 as mentioned hereinabove and without appreciating the evidence on record. 11. It is true that the separate units of petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 can be clubbed only when sub-section (2) of Section of the Act of 1973 is pressed into service by Ajaib Singh and he opts to select land for two separate units up to ceiling area of Primary Unit for each separate Unit. In that case, under proviso added to the aforesaid sub-section, the land of separate unit is to be clubbed for calculating the ceiling area. It goes without saying that in the present case, Ajaib Singh did not opt to select the land for two separate units of his two major sons namely Sucha Singh and Mohar Singh (petitioners Nos. 2 and 3) up to ceiling area of Primary Unit, therefore, the question of clubbing of their separate units in the holding of late Ajaib Singh their father becomes doubtful and it deserves to be decided afresh after reappraisal of evidence on record by Board of Revenue. Since appraisal of evidence is not permissible under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, hence, the present case is to be remanded back to Board of Revenue for decision afresh in accordance with law. 12. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, I consider it just and proper to remand the case to the Board of Revenue, Ajmer for deciding the controversy afresh between the parties in accordance with law keeping in view the mandatory provisions envisaged under Sections (f), 2(j), 2(m), sub-secs. (1) and (2) of Section of the Act of 1973 in the light of evidence on record with an observation that proviso added to sub-section (2) of Section of the said Act cannot be permitted by construction to defeat the basic intent expressed in the substantive provisions envisaged under sub-secs. (1) and (2) of Section of the said Act. (1) and (2) of Section of the Act of 1973 in the light of evidence on record with an observation that proviso added to sub-section (2) of Section of the said Act cannot be permitted by construction to defeat the basic intent expressed in the substantive provisions envisaged under sub-secs. (1) and (2) of Section of the said Act. It is to be imbibed that proviso added to sub-section (2) of Section of the aforesaid Act is something subordinate to the main Section and generally what is contained in the proviso is not to be imported by necessary implication into sub-section (1) of Section of the Act of 1973. 13. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, the impugned order dated 19-4-89 Annex. 2 passed by the Board of Revenue, Ajmer is hereby quashed and the writ petition is allowed with a direction to the Board of Revenue, Ajmer to decide the controversy between the parties afresh in accordance with law on merits after appraisal of evidence on record or pass any order which it considers just and proper in the circumstances of the case to meet the ends of justice. It is made clear that Board of Revenue is to decide the case afresh without being influenced by any observation made hereinabove on merits, decision of which depends on the appraisal of evidence. 14. Both the parties are directed to bear their own costs.Petition allowed. *******