JUDGMENT Surinder Sarup, J. (Oral): This appeal is directed against the concurrent judgments and decrees of the two courts below whereby the trial Court of Sub Judge 1st Class, Kandaghat, District Solan, by judgment and decree dated 8th July, 1991, passed a decree for vacant possession of the suit land measuring 1 biswa after ejectment of the defendants and removal of the material lying there belonging to them, and the appeal taken by the defendants was dismissed by the learned District Judge, Solan, by his judgment dated 21st July, 1992. 2. The plaintiff-respondents filed the suit for possession of land measuring 1 biswa comprising Khasra No. 753/670/111/1 in village Bohli, Tehsil and District, Solan, claiming to be its owners. It was pleaded that the Forest Department of the defendants i.e. the State of Himachal Pradesh through the Collector Solan and the Divisional Forest Officer, Solan, has constructed a hut in the said land in dispute. Earlier the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff-respondents i.e. Sant Ram had filed a suit for declaration against the defendants on the ground that he along with one Kapoor Singh also predecessor-in- interest of the other plaintiffs was owner in possession of land measuring 4 biswas comprising of Khasra No. 670/111, of which the land in dispute in the present proceedings forms a part. Consequential relief for permanent injunction was also prayed in the earlier suit for restraining the defendants from interfering with the possession of the then plaintiffs. That suit was decreed by the trial Court i.e. Senior Sub Judge, Solan, on 31st August, 1981. Declaration was granted that the predecessors-in-interest of the plaintiffs in these proceedings were owners of the suit land of the previous suit. At the same time it was found that they were in possession of only 3 biswas, out of 4 biswas claimed by them. The remaining 1 biswa was shown to be in possession of the defendants. Therefore, permanent injunction was only granted in respect of three biswas. An appeal was taken by the defendants against the decree of the trial court in the previous suit which was also dismissed by the Addl. District Judge, Solan, on 15.10.1982. 3. The remaining 1 biswa was shown to be in possession of the defendants. Therefore, permanent injunction was only granted in respect of three biswas. An appeal was taken by the defendants against the decree of the trial court in the previous suit which was also dismissed by the Addl. District Judge, Solan, on 15.10.1982. 3. The case of the plaintiffs of the present suit is that the defendants are in possession of the suit land as licensees and the licence having since been revoked, they have still failed to hand over possession to the plaintiffs, hence the suit for possession by ejectment of the defendants and removal of the hut in question. 4. In their written statement the present defendant-appellants took up the usual preliminary objections of estoppel, res judicata, want of cause of action on behalf of the plaintiffs and the suit not being properly valued for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction. On merits it was pleaded that the defendants were owners in possession of land measuring 4 biswas, including one biswa regarding which the present proceedings have taken place. It was further pleaded that the defendants are in possession of the said area since 1953-54 and have acquired proprietary rights under the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act. It was also admitted that a hut was constructed on the suit land. The factum of previous litigation between the parties was also admitted. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, the following Issues were framed: 1. Whether the Forest Department is occupying the land in dispute as a licensee, as alleged ? OPP 2. Whether the plaintiffs are estopped from filing the present suit by their act and conduct, as alleged? OPD 3. Whether the suit is hit by the principle of res judicata ? OPD 4. Whether the defendants are owners in possession of suit land, as alleged ? OPD 5. Whether the plaintiffs have a cause of action ? OPP 6. Whether the suit has been properly valued for purposes of court fee and jurisdiction? OPP 7. Relief. 6. Issues No. 1,5 and 6 were answered in favour of the plaintiff-respondents while Issues No. 2 to 4 were decided against the defendant-appellants. This resulted in the suit being decreed as already mentioned above. The first appeal having been dismissed has given rise to the second appeal. 7. The learned Addl. OPP 7. Relief. 6. Issues No. 1,5 and 6 were answered in favour of the plaintiff-respondents while Issues No. 2 to 4 were decided against the defendant-appellants. This resulted in the suit being decreed as already mentioned above. The first appeal having been dismissed has given rise to the second appeal. 7. The learned Addl. Advocate General on behalf of the defendant-appellants and the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondents have been heard at length. The records have also been examined. 8. It has first been argued on behalf of the appellants that the admitted case of the parties is that the defendants were put in possession of the suit land by the plaintiffs in the capacity of licensees. Further, it is common case of the parties that a super-structure in the form of a hut was raised on the suit land. That being the position, the licence could not be revoked by the plaintiffs in view of Section 60(b) of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, hereinafter to be called "the Act". 9. The aforementioned provision of the Act provides that a licence may be revoked by the grantor, unless the licensee, acting upon the licence, has executed a work of a. permanent character (emphasis supplied) and incurred expenses in the execution. In this connection the attention of this Court has been drawn by the learned counsel for the plaintiff- respondents to the statement of Jagat (DW1) who in his cross- examination has deposed that the roof of the hut in question has been blown off. No doubt, this statement was recorded in the year 1991 whereas the suit was filed in 1987. But the fact still remains that the Court would have to see the actual position as to existed on the spot at the time of passing of the decree. As forcefully argued by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondents, the hut in question was not a work of a permanent character as envisaged in Section 60(b) of the Act. 10. Moreover, there is no plea in the written statement to the effect that the possession of the suit lands was given to the defendant-appellants through the Forest Department in the. Capacity of a licensee. 10. Moreover, there is no plea in the written statement to the effect that the possession of the suit lands was given to the defendant-appellants through the Forest Department in the. Capacity of a licensee. Rather in para 4 of the written statement the plea taken is that the Forest Department is not a licensee on the suit land and has not constructed the forest guard hut with the consent of the plaintiffs. In this view of the matter the ruling of the Apex Court cited by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondents i.e. Chevalier I.I. Iyyappan and another v. The Dharmodayam Co. Trichur (AIR 1966 S.C. 1017) applies with full force to the facts of the present case. It has been laid down therein that a party cannot change its case at appellate stage. When a plea of licence or its irrevocability was not raised in trial court nor adjudicated upon, it cannot be raised for the first time in appeal (reference may be made to para 8 of the said report). 11. The learned Addl. Advocate General has drawn the attention of this Court to Section 52 of the Act which defines word "licence". The same runs as follows: "52. "Licence" defined. - Where on person grants to another, or to a definite number of other persons, a right to do, or continue to do, in or upon the immovable property of the grantor, something which would, in the absence of such right, be unlawful, and such right does not amount to an easement or an interest in the property, the right is called a licence." Laying emphasis on the expression interest in the property as incorporated in Section 52 ibid, the learned Addl. Advocate General has submitted that by installation of the hut, referred as forest guards hut in the written statement, an interest in the property in respect of the suit land had been created by the defendant-appellants. Therefore, the same would be outside the purview of licence as defined in Section 52 of the Act and would tantamount to a lease. 12. On the face of it, the submission of the learned Addl. Advocate General appears to be sound but when examined in depth in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case on record, it falls to the ground. 12. On the face of it, the submission of the learned Addl. Advocate General appears to be sound but when examined in depth in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case on record, it falls to the ground. First, no such plea was taken in the written statement nor raised either before the trial court or the first appellate court. Secondly, the evidence on the record shows that the hut in question was not a work of permanent character. In this view of the matter, in the considered view of this Court, it would not amount to an interest in the property so as to take it out of the purview of a licence as defined under Section 52 of the Act. 13. Lastly, the learned Addl. Advocate General has drawn the pointed^ attention of this Court to the impugned judgment of the learned lower appellate court. A perusal of the same, no doubt, indicates that the learned lower appellate court has dealt with the lis between the parties in a cryptic and perfunctory manner. Normally this would call for a remand of the case. However, since this Court has dealt with the merits of the case between the parties in second appeal at the instance of the defendant-appellants, such a necessity would not arise. 14. No other point has been urged. 15. For the reason recorded above, is no merit in this appeal. The same is accordingly dismissed. However, in view of the circumstances of the case and the contentious issues involved requiring examination of pure points of law also, there will be no order as to costs.