This case has got a chequered history. In the year 1993 a notice was issued for a contract of Excise Warehouse at Jorhat for 3 years. The United Assam Company the present writ petitioner submitted tender quoting rate at Rs. 15.25 per LPL. The present respondent No. 4 Chavelier Enterprises also submitted d tender quoting rate at Rs.13.20 per LPL. On 30.4,94 the contract was awarded to the writ petitioner at the rate of Rs. 15.25 per LPL. On 2.5.94 the respondent No. 4 moved a civil rule being CR 1601 of 1994 before this Court to quash that tender. On 29.1.96 this Court dismissed the writ petition. There was a writ appeal being WA No. 80 of 1996 filed by respondent No. 4 and the Division Bench of this Court set aside the contract in favour of petitioner and direction was issued e for fresh settlement (1997 (1) GLJ 316). This is Annexure A to the affidavit-in-opposition. On 27.1.97 the State Govt cancelled the prder dated 30.4.94 and settled the warehouse in favour of respondent No.4 upto 30.4.97 at the rate of Rs.9.45 LPL whereas the petitioner was running the said warehouse at Rs.15.25 LPL. On 30.1.97 the respondent No. 4 filed a civil rule being CR 414 of 1997 for enhancement of the rate at this quoted rate and further prayed that settlement be made in his favour for a full term of 3 years. Respondent No. 4 also filed a representation before the Chief Minister I/c Excise Department at that point of time. On 13.2.97 the petitioner filed review application being RA No. 2 of 1997 and that review application was dismissed . On 1.3.97, agreement was entered into between the respondent No. 4 and the State Govt. On 31.3.97 sealed tenders were invited for supply of potable alcohol/rectified spirit to Jorhat Excise Warehouse stating the term of the contract for 3 years with effect from 11.4.97 or from the date of settlement. Pursuant to the tender notice the petitioner and others including respondent No. 4 submitted tenders. On 30.4.97 a letter was issued by the Under Secretary to the Govt of Assam te the Commissioner, Excise Department directing him to privately negotiate with respondent No. 4 for continuing supply of rectified spirit. This is Annexure B to the affidavit in Misc Case No. 31 of 1999. On 30.4.97 a letter was issued by the Under Secretary to the Govt of Assam te the Commissioner, Excise Department directing him to privately negotiate with respondent No. 4 for continuing supply of rectified spirit. This is Annexure B to the affidavit in Misc Case No. 31 of 1999. On 15.5.97 the term of the contract was extended for one year with effect from 1.5.97 in favour of respondent No. 4 but at the rate of Rs.9.45 LPL. The petitioner filed two civil rules being CR 493 of 1997 against a letter dated 30.4.97 and another being CR 2106 of 1997 against order dated 15.5.97. One Eastern Engineers Endowment also filed a civil rule being CR 2066 of 1997 against letter dated 30.4.97. The rate for supply of potable alcohol/rectified spirit to other warehouses were enhanced. This is Annexure F to the affidavit-in-opposition and at that point of time respondent No. 4 filed civil rule being CR 1215 of 1998 for enhancement of rate and for extension of the terms. The petitioner filed civil rule being CR 1899 of 1998 for a direction to finalise the tender. On 5.5.98 all these civil rules came up for hearing and this Court disposed of the same directing the State Govt to consider the tender as well as application for extension submitted by respondent No. 4 in accordance with Assam Excise Act and Rules made thereunder in a fair, reasonable and just manner in the light of the decision of the Apex Court, reported in 1997 (2) GLT (SC) 1 (Dutta Associates Pvt Ltd vs. Indo Merchantiles Pvt Ltd & others). That was an appeal before the Apex Court with regard to settlement of a warehouse and in para 7 of the judgment the Apex Court pointed out as follows: “We reiterated that whatever procedure the Govt proposes to follow in accepting the tender must be clearly stated in the tender notice. The consideration of the tenders received and the procedure to be followed in the matter of acceptance of a tender should be transparent, fair and open. The consideration of the tenders received and the procedure to be followed in the matter of acceptance of a tender should be transparent, fair and open. While a bonafide error or error of judgment would not certainly matter, any abuse of power for extraneous reasons, it is obvious would expose the authorities concerned, whether it is the Minister for Excise or the Commissioner of Excise, to appropriate penalties at the hands of the Courts, following the law laid down by this Court in Shiv Sagar Tiwari vs. Union of India (In re, Capt Satish Sharma and Sheila Kaul.” 2. In pursuance of the direction of the High Court vide order dated 5.5.98 (Annexure 2 to the writ petition) on 2.7.98 a decision was taken by the Govt to settle the contract in favour of the petitioner with effect from 1.1.99 and the rate was stated to be at Rs. 10.57 per LPL. It is disputed that the rate quoted by the petitioner was not lowest and the order of settlement in his favour is also not transparent, fair and open. I have pursued the order of settlement which is Annexure 2 to the writ petition. That order is quoted below : “Government of Assam, Excise Department No. Ex. 176/97/449 Dated Dispur, the 2nd July'98 From: Shri SL Chakraborty Under Secretary to the Govt of Assam Excise Department, Dispur, Guwahati-6 To : M/s United Assam Company, Jorhat Sub: Acceptance of contract for supply of rectified spirit (GradeI) to the Jorhat Excise Warehouse for the year 1999-2000 (December) Ref: Your tender dated 21.4.97. Sir With reference to your tender cited above and in view of judgment order passed by the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court in the Civil Rule 1899 of 1998,1 am directed to say that Govt have decided to settle the contract for wholesale supply of rectified spirit (Grade I) to the Jorhat Excise Warehouse for the period 1999-2000 in favour of M/s United Assam Company, Jorhat at the rate of 10.57 per LPL with effect from 1.1.1999. Kindly inform us your acceptance of the offer made, if agreed, necessary deposits as required may be made to the Treasury and copies of challan be submitted to the Govt for further necessary action in this matter. Yours faithfully Sd/- Illegible Under Secy to the Govt of Assam, Excise Department.” 3. Kindly inform us your acceptance of the offer made, if agreed, necessary deposits as required may be made to the Treasury and copies of challan be submitted to the Govt for further necessary action in this matter. Yours faithfully Sd/- Illegible Under Secy to the Govt of Assam, Excise Department.” 3. That order does not show how many persons submitted tenders, what was the rate of others and how it was justified to give the settlement/contract in favour of the petitioner and that also at the rate not quoted by the petitioner, but at a different rate. The petitioner in his tender quoted the rate at Rs. 11.78 per LPL, but it was settled with the petitioner at Rs. 10.57 per LPL as will be seen from the order. On 3.7.98 vide Annexure 3 to the writ petition the petitioner claims to have accepted the offer. This Annexure 3 requires to be quoted as argument has been advanced on behalf of respondent No. 4 that this is not an acceptance as required under the Contract Act. That Annexure 3 is quoted below : “To, The Secretary Govt of Assam, Deptt of Excise, Dispur, Guwahati 6 Sub : Acceptance of contract for supply of rectified spirit (Grade I) to the Jorhat Excise Warehouse for the year 1999-2001 (December). Ref: Your letter No. EX. 176/97/449 dated 2nd July, 1998. Sir, I am very much thankful to the Govt for offering me the above mentioned contract at the rate of Rs. 10.57 per LPL as against my tendered rate of Rs. 11.18 per LPL. Here I agree to accept the contract at the rate of Rs. 10.57 per LPL and at the same time request you kindly to consider the following conditions favourably. That Sir, the contract rate is dependent on many factors such as cost price at source, excise duties of the exporting State, transportation charge and either miscellaneous expenses. Therefore, prevailing price of the above items at the time of taking charge of the contract will have to be taken into consideration and the rate will have to be enhanced accordingly under kind and special consideration thereby enabling to ensure steady and regular supply of spirit without affecting the Govt revenue. It may be mentioned here that the contract rate of the present contractor has been enhanced to Rs. 15 per LPL from Rs. 9.25 per LPL. It may be mentioned here that the contract rate of the present contractor has been enhanced to Rs. 15 per LPL from Rs. 9.25 per LPL. On your kind assurance, I am ready to accept the contract as and when wanted by your kind honour. Yours faithfully Sd/-Illegible United Assam Co Proprietor.” 4. Thereafter on 3.8.98 the authority vide Annexure 4 agreed to do the required agreement on the basis of acceptance of the petitioner in due course. Thereafter on 10.11.98 vide Annexure 5 the petitioner requested the authority to take necessary action in terms of Annexures 2 and 3 quoted above. 5. From the record, it is seen that there were many tenderers and there is no bid for Rs. 10.57 per LPL by any of the tenderers. It is not understood how the lower bid is ignored. 6. In 1997 (2) GLT (SC) 1 (supra) the Apex Court pointed out in para 4 of the judgment as follows: “The tenders are all hard headed businessmen. They know their interest better. If they are prepared to supply rectified spirit at Rs 11.14 per LPL or so it is inexplicable why should the Govt think that they would not be able to do so and still prescribe a far higher viability range.... .... ,...” 7. They know their interest better. If they are prepared to supply rectified spirit at Rs 11.14 per LPL or so it is inexplicable why should the Govt think that they would not be able to do so and still prescribe a far higher viability range.... .... ,...” 7. In the meantime, the authority vide Annexure 6 the following order is passed and that is quoted below : “Sub : Extension of contract period in respect of Jorhat Excise Warehouse Sir, I am directed to say that in view of the judgment and orders dated 20.12.96 passed by the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court in Writ Appeal No. 80 of 1996 and combined orders dated 5.5.98 passed by the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court in Civil Rule No. 1399 of 1998 (CRNo. 493 of 1996,414 of 1997,2026 of 1997,2106 of 1997 and 1215 of 1998) and after consideration of the representations made by Shri Don Ayengia Prop M/s Chavelier Enterprise, Guwahati for extension of contract period in the light of the conditions of the tender notice, the Governor of Assam is pleased to extend the term of contract period of M/s Chavelier Enterprise, for supply of country spirit for a further period of one year two months (14 months) writ effect from 1.1.99 to 29.2.2000 to complete a full term ie 3 years as provided under Rule 94 of the Assam Excise Rules, 1945 under the same terms and conditions as agreed upon earlier vide agreement dated 1.3.97 in between the firm and the State Govt. The rate for supply of country spirit for this extended period would be same as in force in this day for M/s Chavelier Enterprise. Yours faithfully, Sd/- Illegible Deputy Secy to the Govt of Assam Excise Department, Dispur.” 8. While granting extension in favour of respondent No. 4 for a period of 14 months vide Annexure 6 quoted above it was stated that the rate for supply of country spirit for this extended period would be same as in force and thereafter vide Annexure 6A another period of one years is extended with effect from 1.3.97 and again vide Annexure 6B terms has been extended for 8 months wef 1.5.98. 9. 9. The authority vide order dated 1.3.99 the following notification issued regarding refixation of rate which is quoted below : “Govt of Assam, Excise Department Orders by the Governor Notification Dated Dispur the 1 st March, 1999 No. EX. 193/96/Pt 1/208 : The existing contract sale price of country spirit in respect of the issue from the Excise Warehouse of North Lakhimpur, Nazira, Silchar, Tinsukia and Jorhat are required to be reviewed as per provision contained in the respective contract deeds of agreement during the period of contract. Now, therefore, Govt in Excise Department after careful consideration of all aspects of the matter and in pursuance of the relevant provision of the contract Deed of Agreement fix the contract rates of country spirit per LPf^ effective from 1.3.99 in the following Excise Warehouse as shown below : Name of the Excise Warehouses Existing rate per LPL Rate refixed now 1. North Lakhimpur Excise Warehouse Rs. 14.84 22.03 2. Nazira Excise Warehouse Rs. 14.64 16.92 3. Silchar Excise Warehouse Rs. 25.00 26.90 4. Tinsukia Excise Warehouse Rs. 15.22 17.48 5. Jorhat Excise Warehouse Rs. 15,00 21.63 Sd/-lllegible Under Secy to the Govt of Assam” 10. This Court stayed the operation of the order dated 4.12.98, but nothing in substance happened because of the stay order as the respondent No. 4 is running the warehouse. A contempt petition also has been filed and that also is pending. 11. I have heard Mr. BK Sharma, learned counsel for petitioner, Mr. C. Baruah, learned counsel for respondent No. 4 and Mr. HN Sarma, learned Addl Senior GA for respondents 1,2 and 3. Records also has been produced before me by the learned GA. Mr. BK Sharma, learned Advocate makes the following submissions: 1. The extension could not have been granted in favour of respondent No. 4 by way of private negotiation which is contrary to the judgment at Annexure 1 and also the judgment of the Apex Court referred to above. 2. There is no provision under Assam Excise Act and Rules framed thereunder for granting any extension and here the extensions have been granted after expiry of the earlier lease period and as such no extension could have been made. 3. 2. There is no provision under Assam Excise Act and Rules framed thereunder for granting any extension and here the extensions have been granted after expiry of the earlier lease period and as such no extension could have been made. 3. The contract with the petitioner as indicated above has not been cancelled and or withdrawn and that still holds the field and in view of that fact no extension could have been given to the petitioner after 1.1.99. 4. Respondents 1, 2 and 3 acted in an unfair manner in granting extension in favour of respondent No. 4 even by incurring loss of Govt revenue. 5. As per NIT clause 2 (ii) and 2 (iii), the tenderer is required to furnish a document that there is no legal suit (Bakijai of any kind) pending against him or its financial involvement in any matter. 12. It is stated that a Bakijai proceeding is pending as against respondent No. 4 being case No. 14 of 1993 before Deputy Commissioner, Karnrup at Gu wahati and the amount due in that proceeding is Rs. 5,42,496.61 and out of it, following amount have been paid: 2.9.94 10,000 14.2.95 55,000 5.2.95 4,000 12.9.95 5,000 7.10.95 4,000 March, 1999 7,000 and even now a huge amount is pending as against respondent No. 4 and there may be addition of interest at the rate of 6.25 PA from the date. In this connection, Mr. Baruah, learned counsel for respondent No. 4 submits that Bakijai proceeding is pending against the partnership firm and respondent No. 4 is only a partner of that partnership firm. It is the duty of the authority to find out what is the correct position with regard to that. But it is also the bounden duty and obligation on the part of the respondent No. 4 to disclose all these things as after all-it is a matter of good faith and trust and if a person is found defaulter regarding payment of Govt revenue his case may not be considered apprehending that he may again make default in making payment. The performance of the respondent No. 4 is also not up to the mark as will be evident from Annexure 7 to the writ petition wherein it was stated that the warehouse has gone dry since 30.11.98 and the Govt was requested to take immediate action to prevent loss of Govt revenue. The performance of the respondent No. 4 is also not up to the mark as will be evident from Annexure 7 to the writ petition wherein it was stated that the warehouse has gone dry since 30.11.98 and the Govt was requested to take immediate action to prevent loss of Govt revenue. Annexure 7 to the writ petition is a communication from Deputy Commissioner, Jorhat to the Excise Commissioner, Silpukhuri at Guwahati wherein it has been stated as follows : “Kindly refer this office WTMSGJEX10/97/260DTD12/11/98 AAA the excise warehouse has gone dry from 30.11.98 AAA required direct spirit contractor to replenish stock immediately to prevent loss of Govt Revenue AAA”. Of course in para 23 of the affidavit-in-opposition filed on behalf of respondents 1,2 and 3 this allegation has been denied stating that the authority have not received any complaint from any quarter. 13. On the other hand, Mr. C. Baruah learned counsel for respondent No. 4 makes the following submissions: 1. There was no contract in favour of petitioner and as such he is not entitled to file this writ petition. 2. The matter is governed by non-statutory contract and as such this writ petition is not maintainable; 3. By quashing an order in the discretion in exercise of the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the High Court cannot restore an illegal order as that will give a person the benefit to which he is not entitled. The short submission of Mr. Baruah on this count is that the contract in favour of petitioner is not a valid one and that benefit should not be restored to him. 4. A person does not have any fundamental right and/or legal right to come to the Court against the action of the authority by which he is not affected and as such the Govt has the absolute power to do so. 14. Mr. C. Baruah, learned counsel submits that there is no arbitrariness and/or infirmity in the order of the authority in granting the extension inasmuch as the provision of extension is given in Rule 178 (4) of the Assam Excise Rules, 1945. 15. Now let us take up these questions at seriatum ie submission Nos 1,2, 3 and 4. 16. There is a specific clause in the tender notice at clause 2 (ii) and 2 (iii) which reads as follows : “2. 15. Now let us take up these questions at seriatum ie submission Nos 1,2, 3 and 4. 16. There is a specific clause in the tender notice at clause 2 (ii) and 2 (iii) which reads as follows : “2. (ii) Tenderer must furnish documents relating to the financial soundness, supported by documents like profit and loss accounts of last three financial years to establish his business and financial potentiality. In case of a person and if he is a businessman, his financial soundness for a particular year out of the required three financial years should reflect business transaction worth Rs. 10 (ten) lakh in the minimum in a financial year. Rest for 2 years the same standard of financial soundness shall be required to establish their claim of financial soundness. Certificate from Bank indicating soundness on unspecified amount shall not be acceptable. The same certificate shall also be applicable for registered firm and registered company- (iii) Tenderer whether a person/firm/company should furnish such documents that there is no any legal suit (Bakijai of any kind) pending against him/its financial involvement in any matter.” 17. It is not known whether in this particular case documents with regard to the financial soundness of respondent No. 4 were furnished. Further, clause 2 (iii) quoted above shows that there must be a declaration that there is no any legal suit (Bakijai of any kind) pending against him/its financial involvement, in any matter. As indicated above, already a Bakijai proceeding is pending as against respondent No.4. It is not the case whether he is a partner of that partnership firm, but the question is that, if he gave declaration with regard to that, the authority would have taken a different decision. After all it is a settlement which involves huge amount of Govt revenue and if a person is found defaulter at any point of time, the natural expectation will be that lie may default in future also. Non­disclosure of this thing naturally vitiated the settlement in favour of respondent No. 4 and it is the duty of respondent No. 4 to disclose all these things in view of the specific clause mentioned in tender notice quoted above. 18. The submission with regard to extension is that the extension was not made in terms of the decision of the Apex Court reported in 1997 (2) GLT (SC) 1. 18. The submission with regard to extension is that the extension was not made in terms of the decision of the Apex Court reported in 1997 (2) GLT (SC) 1. The Apex Court categorically has pointed out that the settlement must be transparent, fair and open. Here is a case where earlier a settlement was made in favour of the petitioner (whether that settlement with the petitioner is proper or not that will considered at a later point of time), but without cancelling and/or rescinding it, extension is given to respondent No. 4. That also appears to be ^ arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power. 19. The private negotiation only with respondent No. 4 with regard to extension is against the tenor of fair, just and reasonable procedure. The authority may enter into private negotiation. There is no doubt power with regard to that, but at the same time that private negotiation must be made with all eligible persons and for that purpose one cannot be picked up as blue eyed boy as has been done in the instant case. The word 'extension' has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary as "existence of something to be extended." That also is the law laid down by the Court 1992 (1) GLJ 240 (Tanuram Toyeng vs. State of Assam & others). That was of course a case under the Assam Panchayati Raj Act, 1972 for exten­sion of fishery. In para 17 of the judgment this Court has pointed out as follows: “17. From a plain reading of the Panchayati Raj Act, it does not appear that the Legislature intended that any authority shall have power of extension of settlement since no such power is provided in the statute, no authority has power to give extension of settlement. Learned counsel for petitioner does not rely on provisions of any other statute such General Clauses Act to support his contention.” 20. In para 18 of that judgment relying on (1985) 2 GLR 38 (Jagannath Urang vs. State of Assam) this Court pointed out as follows : “.... .... held that when the original settlement is not in existence, authority cannot have any power to grant extension inasmuch as the word 'extension' means existence of something to be extended. In para 18 of that judgment relying on (1985) 2 GLR 38 (Jagannath Urang vs. State of Assam) this Court pointed out as follows : “.... .... held that when the original settlement is not in existence, authority cannot have any power to grant extension inasmuch as the word 'extension' means existence of something to be extended. After the expiry of the period of settlement, there would be no settlement in existence and the question of extending such lease which is not in existence, does not arise.” 21. In this particular case also under the Assam Excise Act and Rules, there is no power to grant extension. Rule 93 of the Assam Excise Rules is the power of the Govt to grant licence to any person. Rule 93 and 94 are quoted below : 93. Right of Provincial Govt to grant licence to any person. The Excise Commissioner shall forward the tenders with his recommendations to the Provincial Govt which reserves to itself the right to accept any tender. If none of the tenders are accepted by the Provincial Govt on the ground that none of them, on due consideration; appear to be satisfactory they reserve also the right to grant the licence to any person who has not tendered and is considered suitable in all respects: Provided that when the licence is cancelled or suspended during the currency of the licence, the Provincial Govt further reserves the right to grant the licence to any one without calling tenders. 94. Period of licence. The licence granted to a contractor shall be in the prescribed form, and shall ordinarily be for a period of three years; but in exceptional cases a longer term, not exceeding five years, or an shorter term, may be fixed.” 22. This aspect of the matter regarding section 19 of the Act and Rule 93 came up for consideration in (1989) 2 GLR171 (Kuladhar Dutta vs. State of Assam & others) (1989 (2) GLJ 146) wherein a Division Bench of this Court has pointed out as follows : “To sum up we hold the State Govt is entitled to restrict consideration to the persons recommended by the Excise Commissioner in the first circle as it is shown in the instant case. If persons recommended are not to be accepted persons who did not submit tenders may fall in for consideration which we call the third circle. If persons recommended are not to be accepted persons who did not submit tenders may fall in for consideration which we call the third circle. Persons who fall in the second circle are those that are covered by the second sentence of Rule 93 and as long they are not eliminated as not satisfactory negotiation with the third circle persons cannot be held. It is not necessary to consider the decision of the Apex Court in AIR 1972 SC 2281 M/s Produce Exchange Corporation Ltd vs. Commissioner of Excise in this regard as in that case it is interpreted the State Govt can negotiate simultaneously with persons in the second and third circle with a view to augment their revenue. That is not the issue which we have considered in this case.” 23. In this particular case also once this settlement was made with the petitioner there could not have been any extension in favour of respondent No. 4 Learned Govt Advocate relies on Rule 178 (4) of the Rules 1945. That Rule 178 (4) is quoted below: “(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the said rule, the State Govt may extend the term of the licence of any wholesale or retail sale of intoxicant for a period not exceeding three months at a time under such circumstances as the State Govt consider necessary.” 24. That gives the power of extension regarding licence of a person, but that also only for a period of 3 months and not beyond that. That also just be within the validity of the lease. But that is done in the instant case after expiry of the lease period. Once the licence came to an end, the State Govt does not have any power whatsoever to extend the period of lease as has been done in the instant case. If that sort of power is allowed, the liquor shops and/or warehouse would be settled with a period by the authority according to its own whims and sweet will without resorting to tender process. By that process the Assam Excise Act and Rules made thereunder shall be set at naught as has been done in the case in hand by showing undue favour to somebody. In this case extension was given to respondent No. 4 again and again after expiry of the lease. So, this a submission of the learned GA has no force. 25. In this case extension was given to respondent No. 4 again and again after expiry of the lease. So, this a submission of the learned GA has no force. 25. Before we came to other submissions, let us have a look at the submission made by Mr. BK Sharma, learned counsel for petitioner that the extension was given to respondent No. 4 again and again in a most unfair manner. This submission of Mr. Sharma, learned counsel has force. But I do not want to decide the submission regarding loss of Govt revenue, but prima facie there also appears to be some force. 26. Let us come to the submissions made by the learned counsel for petitioner along with submissions made by learned counsel for respondent No. 4. Mr C. Baruah, learned counsel for respondent No. 4 submits that there was no acceptance of the tender as required under the Contract Act and if there was not valid contract with petitioner, the authority has the power to grant extension c with respondent No. 4 without cancelling the contract with petitioner. Mr. Baruah, learned counsel places reliance on the following : 1. AIR 1970 SC 706 (Badri Prasad vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh & another) where the Supreme Court by quoting section 2 (a), (b) of Contract Act, 1872 held that mere invitation to make offer to the party is not a contract if there is no unconditional acceptance. The offer made by a person must be accepted unconditionally and if conditions are mentioned therein that will amount to an offer and in such a case no contract will come into existence in the eye of law. 27. Mr. Baruah, learned counsel contends that in this particular case the offer was made by the Govt to the petitioner to accept the award of the contract at Rs. 10.57 per LPL and the petitioner accepted it by imposing certain condition that his case for enhancement of the rate must be considered by the authority and as such in the eye of law this is not a contract between the Govt and the petitioner. 2. AIR 1987 Allahabad 329 (Chhotey Lal Gupta (Deceased by LRS) vs. Union of India) where in para 21 of the judgment the Court held as follows: "The offeree must unreservedly assent to the extent terms proposed by the offerer. 2. AIR 1987 Allahabad 329 (Chhotey Lal Gupta (Deceased by LRS) vs. Union of India) where in para 21 of the judgment the Court held as follows: "The offeree must unreservedly assent to the extent terms proposed by the offerer. If while purporting to accept the offer as a whole, he introduces a new term which the offerer has not had the chance of examining he is in fact merely making a counter offer. The effect of/this in the eye of law is to destroy the original offer.” 3. AIR 1991 Allahabad 343 (Sri Satya Prakash Goel vs. Ram Krishan Mission & others) wherein the earlier judgments were considered and in para 18 it has been pointed out as follows : “In Halsbury. Vol XXIX, p. 237, paras 321 and 322: An acceptance must be absolute and unqualified. There is no completed contract if the acceptance is subject to a formal contract being prepared and signed by both parties as approved by their solicitors; or simply subject to contract; or where it otherwise appears that all th&terms of the contract are not definitely settled or that additional terms are to be agreed to and inserted in the formal contract. On the other hand if it appears that the parties have agreed upon the essential terms of the sale a mere intimation of a desire that the agreement shall be embodied in another document of a more formal nature, or the expression of what is necessarily a condition, not of the acceptance, but of the contract itself, does not prevent the agreement being enforceable. It is a question of construction whether the parties have come to final agreement, though they intend to have a more formal document drawn up.” 28. I respectfully agree with the decision of the Allahabad High Court as laying down the correct principle of law and accordingly it must be held that there was no acceptance vide Annexure 3 as the last .sentence of that letter reads as follows : “On your kind assurance, I am ready to accept the contract as and, when wanted by your kind honour.” 29. So, no contract came into existence on 3rd of July 1998, the matter does not end there. So, no contract came into existence on 3rd of July 1998, the matter does not end there. A further offer was made by Annexure 4 where it was stated that the Govt is going to do the required agreement on the basis of your acceptance due to course and that was accepted vide Annexure 5 to the writ petition. There was unconditional acceptance. On 10.11.98 a valid contract came into existence. 30. Mr. Baruah, learned counsel further submits that this being a contractual matter, this writ Court should not exercise its jurisdiction and in this connection he places reliance on the following: 1. (1981) 3 SCC 238 (Divisional Forest Officer vs. Biswanath Tea Co Ltd). That case need not be discussed inasmuch as that case does not support the submission of Mr. Baruah as that aspect to the matter was not considered in that particular matter. 2. (1994) 3 SCC 552 (State of Gujrat & others vs. Meghji Pethraj Shah Charitable Trust & others). Mr. Baruah relies particularly on para 22 wherein the Supreme Court held as follows : “... if the matter is governed by a contract the writ petition is not maintainable since it is a public law remedy and is not available in private law field e.g. where the matter is governed by a non-statutory contract.... ....” 31. That aspect of the matter was kept open there and that was not decided by the Supreme Court, rather at a later point of time in (1994) 4 SCC 104 (Assistant Excise Commissioner & others vs. Issac Peter & others) the Supreme Court held that doctrine of promissory estoppel and estoppel by conduct, legitimate expectation and fairness and reasonableness not attracted in matters governed by contract arrived at by tender system or by negotiation meaning thereby that a writ Court can interfere in such a matter if those things are lacking in that process. So, the contention of Mr. Baruah stands rejected. 32. Mr. Baruah submits that quashing the order of extension will mean restoration of an illegal order in favour of the petitioner and that should not be done by the writ Court. So, the contention of Mr. Baruah stands rejected. 32. Mr. Baruah submits that quashing the order of extension will mean restoration of an illegal order in favour of the petitioner and that should not be done by the writ Court. In AIR 1966 SC 828 (Gadde Venkateswara Rao vs. Govt of Andhra Pradesh & others) para 17 of the judgment the Supreme Court held that a writ Court by quashing an order should not-brin.g to existence an illegal order because that will amount to give a wrongful benefit to a person who does not deserve it and in such a situation the Court must mould the relief to do the justice. 33. In 1991 (1) GLJ 78 (Shri Haren Hazarika vs. State of Assam & others) wherein a Division Bench of this Court pointed out that if the impugned order is quashed, it would restore an illegal order and in such circumstances the extra-ordinary discretionary power under Article 226 would be refused. 34. It is further settled law that extension can be made for once and thereafter it cannot be extended. If any authority is required for this proposition, one may have a look at Kaliabor Kaiborta Min Samabai Samity Ltd vs. State of Assam, CR 4751 of 1995 date of order dated 28.4.99). That is with regard to extension of fishery. 35. In AIR 1996 SC 2410 (Shangrila Food Products Ltd & another vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India & another) the Supreme Court pointed out that if there is any unfair advantage gained by any party before invoking jurisdiction of High Court, can make that party to shed it before granting relief. 36. In AIR 1997 SC 645 (Air India Statutory Corporation vs. United Labour Union & others) wherein the Supreme Court in para 59 it has been pointed out as follows : “The founding fathers placed no limitation or fetters on the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution except self imposed limitations. The aim of the Court is long enough to reach injustice wherever it is found. The Court as sentinel in the qui vive is to mete out justice in given facts.” 37. The aim of the Court is long enough to reach injustice wherever it is found. The Court as sentinel in the qui vive is to mete out justice in given facts.” 37. That being the position, this writ petition shall stand disposed of as follows: (1) All the orders at Annexure 6 dated 4.12.98 granting extension in favour of respondent No. 4 wef 1.1,99 to 29.2.2000 of Jorhat Excise Warehouse shall stand quashed in view of the fact that the authority does not have the power to extend the period of lease save and except the power under Rule 178 (4) and that also only for a period pf 3 months and within the period of lease itself and not beyond it. In this case it is more shocking in view of the fact that extension was given to a particular person number of times earlier. 2. The settlement order in favour of the petitioner also is bad in law inasmuch as he was not the lowest bidder and he was given the lease on a different rate than that was quoted by him and it is none of the business of the authority to do so in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Dutta Associates Pvt Ltd (supra). 3. In view of that matter, I direct that within a period of 1 (one) month from today, the settlement of Jorhat Excise Warehouse shall be made by inviting fresh tender and also taking-into account the tenders floated earlier. It is made clear that those who have submitted their tenders earlier, there may not be any necessity for them to submit tender afresh. 4.'The authority is directed to examine whether any Bakijai proceeding is pending as against respondent No. 4 and if so, respondent No. 4 shall not be given the settlement. If it is done it will be violative of the clauses in the tender notice. 38. With this observation and direction, this writ petition stands disposed of. However, fof this period of 1 (one) month, the authority may make necessary arrangement to run the warehouse.