The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ansari, J.- This Letters Patent Appeal is against the judgment of Umamaheswaram, J., vacating by a writ of certiorari the order of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in Memorandum No. 98745F - 52/3, dated 18th March, 1953. The petition for the aforesaid Writ alleges that ever since 1949 the petitioner has been in Sivayijama occupation of Ac. 11/81 of assessed waste land in Manila village, Anantapur District, bearing S.No. 40/2-B; that he applied to the revenue authorities for the assignment of the said land; that the Tahsildar of Anantapur granted patta of the land to the second respondent, whereupon the petitioner preferred an appeal to the Revenue Divisional Officer, Anantapur, who cancelled the patta in favour of the second respondent, but refused to assign the land on patta to the petitioner; that an appeal against the order was filed before the Collector, who ordered assignment in favour of the second respondent; that a revision against the order was filed before the Board of Revenue, which was accepted, assignment in favour of the second respondent was cancelled and assignment of he land to the petitioner was ordered; that the Board further directed the Tahsildar to issue ‘D’ Form in the petitioner’s name and the assignment fee was paid on September 5, 1952. The petition further states that on the second respondent having moved the Government the order of March 18, 1953, was passed, which says that the Government were not convinced about the bona fides of the second respondent, and it further without any notice to the petitioner, set aside the order of the Board of Revenue, observing about the petitioner being old and not being likely to engage himself in direct cultivation. On the aforesaid facts, the petitioner asks for the Writ to vacate the Government’s Order. The learned Judge has held that three questions have arisen for decision in the case: the first being whether the Government is entitled to set aside the order of the Board of Revenue; the next whether the order of the Government was vitiated by omission to issue notice to the petitioner and the third whether the order of the Government was purely administrative and not liable to be quashed under Article 226 of the Constitution. His decision on the first question after considering the various paragraphs of the Darkhast Rules is that the Government is not authorised to interfere with the orders passed by the Board of Revenue. He then held that the third question should be dealt first, because, the second question would arise for consideration only if the jurisdiction, in whose exercise the impugned order was passed by the Government be found not to be administrative, but quasi-judicial. The decision of the learned Judge on the third question is that the several paragraphs of the rules abundantly make it clear that the powers exercised by the several officers are either judicial or quasi-judicial, and that the revenue authorities assigning the Government lands under the Darkhast Rules, exercise powers similar to the transport authorities granting permission under the Motor Vehicles Act. Having answered the questions in the above form, the learned Judge has consequently found that the Government had erred in not giving notice to the petitioner, the order was bad, and should be quashed under Article 226 of the Constitution. The first ground pressed before us for allowing the appeal is that the party aggrieved by the order of the Government has an adequate and equally efficacious remedy by way of suit and the writ petition should not have been allowed in the circumstances. In support of this argument the learned Government Pleader relies on the Secretary of State for India in Council v. Kasturi Reddy1, wherein it was held that civil Courts have jurisdiction to determine whether a grant of land alleged to have been made by an officer on behalf of the Crown is binding on the Crown and the mere fact that the alleged grant purports to have been made under the Darkhast Rules does not affect that jurisdiction. The aforesaid case has also been referred to by the learned Judge but for the different proposition of the exercise of the powers under the Rules not being subject to control other than those specifically provided by the Rules. It is true that the Courts are reluctant to interfere by certiorari, where an alternative remedy exists. But it is equally true that the existence of such a remedy does not oust the jurisdiction of the Court to issue the Writ in appropriate cases. It is true that the Courts are reluctant to interfere by certiorari, where an alternative remedy exists. But it is equally true that the existence of such a remedy does not oust the jurisdiction of the Court to issue the Writ in appropriate cases. It is a matter of discretion whether any particular case is fit for granting the relief or relegating the party to his ordinary remedy of suit. It follows that where a learned Judge in exercise of his discretion issues a Writ under Article 226, the decision should not be interfered with unless the appellate Court be clearly satisfied about the exercise of discretion being erroneous or improper. In this connection we need refer to Deputy C.T. Officer v. Comopolitan Club1. In the case, the Cosmopolitan Club, Madras, has been changed with tax under section 3 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, and the Secretary of the Club wrote to the Government requesting exemption of sales of refreshments by the Club to its members from liability to pay the tax. The Government negatived the request, whereupon the Club filed two petitions in the High Court asking for writs of mandamus and ceerticrari. Mack, J., who heard the petitions held that supply of refreshments by the Club to its members did not constitute a sale within the meaning of the Act, and accordingly he allowed the writ of mandamus. Because mandamus was allowed, he dismissed the application for a writ of certiorari. In the Letters Patent Appeal Balakmhna Aiyar, J., observed at page 1149: "The correct position appears to be this: where there is an alternative remedy and that remedy is adequate, this Court will ordinarily be very reluctant to interfere by the issue of a Writ. The existence of such a remedy does not however deprive this Court of its jurisdiction to act. The existence of such a remedy does not however deprive this Court of its jurisdiction to act. The existence of an adequate alternative remedy would be a strong dissuading factor; nevertheless if after taking into account all the relevant circumstances this Court reaches the conclusion that the case is an appropriate one in which the writ should go it has got authority to issue the Writ." Later the learned Judge says: "Finally, there is the fact that the discretion which inheres in this Court has been exercised in a particular manner by the learned Judge from whose decision this appeal has been preferred; and, before we interfere in such a matter we would have to be clearly satisfied that the exercise of the discretion was clearly erroneous or improper." Therefore, the important issue arising in this Letters Patent Appeal is whether the decisions of our learned brother, Umamaheswaram, J., on the three questions referred to earlier in the judgment are incorrect so as to vitiate the exercise of his discretion in the case. We would deal with the last question first, which is by far the most important issue in the appeal. It has been urged before the learned Judge and the argument has been repeated before us that the lands having vested in the Government, the rules framed for granting such lands must necessarily be of administrative nature, and orders passed in exercise of the powers thus conferred cannot be quasi-judicial. There is, however, the case of Wilson v. Esquimalt and Nanaimo Rly. Co.2, that where the Lieutenant-Governor of a Province has authority by a statute to issue grants upon "reasonable proof" of certain facts, his function is judicial, but he is not bound to follow the rules regulating the proceedings in a Court of justice, and if there is before him some proof of the necessary facts, it is within his discretion to determine that there is "reasonable proof"; Mr. Justice Duff delivering the judgment of the Privy Council observes at pages 211 and 212: "The statute of 1904 no doubt requires that before the authority to issue a Crown grant under section 3 is acted upon, the Lieutenant-Governor in Council shall decide the question Whether or not there is "reasonable proof" of "improvement" or "occupation" and of intention to reside; and their Lordships consider that the function of the Lieutenant-Governor in Council in deciding upon such questions is judicial in the sense that he must, to adapt the language of Lord Moulton...."Preserve a judicial temper" and perform his duties "conscientiously with a proper feeling of responsibility" in view of the fact that a decision in favour of the applicant must result in the transfer to the applicant of property which, but for the statute and but for the production of the necessary proof, the respondent company (or its successors in title) would have possessed an unassailable right; and it may be assumed for the purposes of this appeal that a grant issued in consequence of a decision arrived at through proceedings wanting in these characteristics would be impeachable by the respondent company (or its successors), as issued without authority or in abuse of the authority which the statute creates" The distinction between the judicial and administrative functions has also been drawn by May, C.J., in Regina v. Dublin Corporation1,: "In this connection the term ‘judicial’ does not necessarily mean acts of a Judge or legal tribunals sitting for the determination of matters of law, but for the purposes of the question of a judicial act seem to be an act done by competent authority upon consideration of facts and circumstances and imposing liability or affecting the rights of others." Lord Justice Slesser in King v. London County Council2, separates the four conditions and lays down that wherever any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects and having the duty to act judicially, act in excess of their legal authority, a writ of certiorari may issue. The test according to Kania, C.J., in Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas3, is, that when the law under which the Court is making a decision itself requires a judicial approach, the decision will be quasi-judicial and Patanjali Sastri, J., agreed with him. The test according to Kania, C.J., in Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas3, is, that when the law under which the Court is making a decision itself requires a judicial approach, the decision will be quasi-judicial and Patanjali Sastri, J., agreed with him. Das, J., observes at page 506: " In other words, while the presence of two parties besides the deciding authority, prima facie in the absence of any other factor, impose upon the authority the duty to act judicially, the absence of two such parties is not decisive in taking the act of the authority out of the category of quasi-judicial act, if the authority is nevertheless required by statute to act judicially." Therefore it becomes necessary to ascertain whether the several Dharkast Rules require of the officers when deciding the applications to preserve a judicial temper. Paragraphs 4 and 5 deal with the form of the applications for assessed lands and to whom they should be made. Paragraph 6 requires reports by village officers on the applications and prescribes the procedure to be followed by such officers when reporting. Paragraph 9 says that if there be only one applicant the land should be granted to him on his complying with certain conditions, and where there are more than one application, the Tahsildar should decide which of them is entitled to preference. Paragraph 10 particularly requires decisions between residents of a revenue village on principles of equity, and continues to provide: "A preferential claim shall be recognised in the case of a person who has occupied the land under sivayijama and has expended a material amount of labour or money in clearing the land of weeds, scrub or prickly-pear or otherwise fitting it for cultivation or improving it and also in the case of a person who holds trees on the land under the tree-tax system or who has been using the water of a well in the land for cultivation. Such a person should, if there is no other objection, be given the option of taking it subject to the conditions of a ryotwari grant." The procedure for hearing appeals in paragraph 17 particularly mentions that no order should be reversed without giving notice of the appeal to the respondent. The power of revision is conferred by para. 18 on the Collector and the Board of Revenue. The power of revision is conferred by para. 18 on the Collector and the Board of Revenue. Under the aforesaid para, the Collector within three years of the original or appellate decision, if satisfied about any material irregularity of procedure in it, or about the decision being grossly inequitable or passed under a mistake of fact or owing to fraud or misrepresentation, may set aside the decision if it be by an officer subordinate to him. The Revenue Board has similar powers over decisions of officers subordinate to it. Therefore, the form in which the applications are to be made, the requirement of observing principles of equity in making decisions, the hierarchy of several officers who are to hear the appeals and finally the exercise of the revising powers in the circumstances already mentioned, clearly indicate that officers in the words of Lord Moulton in Arlidge’s Case4, are to perform their duties "conscientiously with a proper feeling of responsibility" and the decisions in exercise of powers under the rules are judicial. That grant of lands to persons on satisfaction of certain conditions amount to discharge of judicial function, can hardly be doubted in view of Wilson v. Esquimalt and Nanaino Rly. Co.5, and the decision of our learned brother Umamaheswaram on the third question is, therefore, correct. The next question with which we will now deal, is whether the action of the Government in the case is without jurisdiction. Admittedly, the rules do not expressly provide revisory powers for the Government, and the case of Secretary of State v. Kasturi Reddi1, expressly decides that a grant in absence of circumstances vitiating contract made under the rules, is neither subject to any other control, nor can be annulled even by the Governor-in-Council. The aforesaid authority, therefore, excludes any residuary power in the Government for revising decisions on account of its being the last owner of the land. Moreover, the observation of the Full Bench in Nagarathnammal v. Ibrahim Saheb2, is decisively against such power. Balakrishna Aiyar, J., at page 216, observes: “But even with reference to matters not governed by statutory provisions or rules but governed only by the standing orders of the Board of Revenue, the passage we have extracted above is liable to be misunderstood. Moreover, the observation of the Full Bench in Nagarathnammal v. Ibrahim Saheb2, is decisively against such power. Balakrishna Aiyar, J., at page 216, observes: “But even with reference to matters not governed by statutory provisions or rules but governed only by the standing orders of the Board of Revenue, the passage we have extracted above is liable to be misunderstood. We are unable to subscribe to the view that where a rule already exists and provides for any specific matter, still when an individual case comes up before the Board, it is open to the Board, notwithstanding the existence of that rule, to decide that case in any manner it thinks fit, even in contravention of the existing rule. In other words, the Board cannot ignore the existing rule by treating the order made in that particular case as an amendment of the rule. That the Government or the Board has the power to amend the rule should make no difference; both are bound to dispose of the matters that come up before them in accordance with the rules at the time in force on the subject. . . what we have said about the Board also applies to the Government.” It cannot be said that because the case before the Full Bench was concerning statutory rules, the observation is obiter, which should not be followed. The insistance on following the existing rules is based on preserving the difference between legislative and judicial functions. It is also based on avoiding the charges of arbitrariness. There are, therefore, cogent reasons behind the observation, on which also the insistence on following statutory rules is based. It follows that because the rules vest no revisionary jurisdiction, the impugned order has been passed arbitrarily and without jurisdiction. Therefore, the judgment of our learned brother Umamaheswaram, J., on the first question is correct. The decision of the learned Judge on the second question is equally correct. Once the function of the tribunal, is found to be judicial under the Rules, it follows that they must observe the principle of audi alteram partem, i.e., nobody shall be condemned unheard. We find particular application of the principle in paragraph 9 of the Rules where notice is required in deciding question of preference. Similarly paragraph 17 requires notice to respondent in reversing orders in appeal. We find particular application of the principle in paragraph 9 of the Rules where notice is required in deciding question of preference. Similarly paragraph 17 requires notice to respondent in reversing orders in appeal. Finally Lord Selborne’s opinion in Spackman v. Plumstead Board of Works3, may be referred to: “No doubt, in the absence of special provisions as to how the person who is to decide is to proceed, the law will imply no more than that the substantial requirements of justice shall not be violated. He is not a Judge in the proper sense of the word; but he must give the parties an opportunity of being heard before him and stating their case and their view.” No such opportunity was afforded to the Writ-petitioner before the Government passed the impugned order and the order is consequently vitiated by the failure. The result is that the three conclusions of the learned Judge in the writ application are correct, and the appeal must, be dismissed with costs of the first respondent, which is fixed at Rs.100. A.B.K. ----- Writ Appeal dismissed.