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1999 DIGILAW 2561 (MAD)

State v. Anjani

1999-11-30

H.HOMBE GOWDA, S.S.MALIMATH

body1999
Order This is a reference under section 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure made by the Additional Assistant Sessions Judge, Bangalore, in Bangalore Sessions Case No. 12 of 1956 in the following circumstances: — The accused Anjani was put on his trial for an offence under section 436 of the Indian Penal Code on the allegation that he intentionally committed mischief by setting fire to the dwelling house (hut) belonging to one Poojamma in A. K. Hatti attached to Thimmasandra village, Nelamangala taluk on 24th May, i1956, before the Additional Assistant Sessions Judge, Bangalore. The case was tried -with the aid of Jury. The Jury returned an unanimous verdict of not guilty. The learned Additional Assistant Sessions Judge disagreed with the verdict of the Jury. He was of the opinion that the accused was guilty and has therefore made this reference under section 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to this Court for such orders as this Court may deem fit in the circumstances of the cast. It may at once be stated that the reference made by the learned Additional Assistant Sessions Judge is not a proper reference as the letter of the learned Judge does not set out the grounds of opinion of the Judge. It is doubtless that a reference made under section 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be so complete and self-contained that it ought not to be necessary for this Court to refer to the evidence or charge to the Jury or to the order-sheet for passing suitable orders. In the letter of reference the learned Judge ought to have stared the facts of the case, the verdict of the Jury and also the ground or grounds on which he differed from the verdict of the Jury and found it necessary in the interests of justice to submit the case to this Court for suitable orders. He should have categorically stated what material portions of the evidence he believes to be true, his opinion about the credibility of witnesses examined in the case and his reasons for arriving at his conclusions so as to enable this Court to appreciate and give due weight to them. He should have categorically stated what material portions of the evidence he believes to be true, his opinion about the credibility of witnesses examined in the case and his reasons for arriving at his conclusions so as to enable this Court to appreciate and give due weight to them. He was bound to disclose the reasons for his opinion in as clear a manner as he would have done if the case had not been a jury case and he had to write out a judgment in the case. The order of reference of the learned Judge is abnormally short and is as follows: “I find no grounds to agree with the unanimous verdict of the Jury that the accused is not guilty. The charge delivered to the Jury warrants the verdict that the accused is guilty for offence under section 436, Indian Penal Code. I, therefore, disagree with the verdict for acquittal. The case in respect of the accused shall therefore be submitted to High Court under section 307, Criminal Procedure Code, for suitable orders”. It is clear beyond doubt that the order of reference made by the earned Additional Assistant Sessions Judge does not satisfy the requirements of the law. He has neither set out the facts of the case nor expressed his clear opinion as to the credibility of the witnesses and disclosed the grounds on which he holds that the verdict of the Jury is manifestly unreasonable. The result is, in the absence of the opinion of the learned Judge it is not possible for this Court to say that the verdict is against the weight of evidence without examining the evidence and the charge to the Jury. The verdict of the Jury particularly, when it is unanimous, should not be disturbed unless it can be demonstrated beyond a peradventure that it is manifestly perverse or unreasonable. Section 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is intended to provide against a clear case of miscarriage of justice at the trial and is not meant for indiscriminate use of over-zealous judges to make references. This power must be sparingly used. It is only in cases where the judge thinks that it is absolutely necessary for the ends of justice to submit the case to the High Court he must do so after recording the grounds of his opinion. This power must be sparingly used. It is only in cases where the judge thinks that it is absolutely necessary for the ends of justice to submit the case to the High Court he must do so after recording the grounds of his opinion. It is highly regrettable that the learned Judge has not understood the scope of section 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and has made this imperfect reference to this Court. It was suggested by Sri Shankara Chetty, the learned Additional Assistant Advocate-General for the State that the records may be remitted to the learned Additional Assistant Sessions Judge for making a proper reference in accordance with the provisions of Law and that the matter may be dealt with on merits by this Court after receipt of further reference in the matter. He urged that in the absence of proper reference this Court cannot go into the merits of the case or into the evidence or look into the charge to the Jury and arrive at any conclusion and that this Court was bound to remit the matter to the trial Court for the needful being done. He was unable to cite any decision in support of his assertion. We have carefully considered this argument. We are of the opinion that the circumstances in this case do not compel us to the necessity of remitting the records to the trial Court. No doubt, there are cases in which references of the type on hand were remitted to the trial Court by some of the High Courts for making proper references. There are also cases in which Courts have proceeded to pass final orders either accepting the verdict of the Jury or rejecting the verdict of the Jury even though the letter of reference was defective and was not in accordance with law, (viz., King Emperor v. Taribullah Shekh and others1, Emperor v. Irya Doddappa2, Emperor v. Chandra Krishna3, Dattatraya Sadashiv Karve and another v. Emperor4, Emperor v. Abdul Hossain Sikdar5 and Emperor v. Dyama Naik Annappa Naik6. So long as it is conceded that this Court has, when dealing with a reference under section 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure all the powers of an appellate Court and there is no specific provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure compelling the Court to remit the case to the trial Court whenever such defective references are made by the trial Judge, we feel that this Court can proceed to consider the entire matter as it is before us and pass necessary orders. We, therefore, proceed to pass orders on the materials before us. The charge delivered by the learned trial Judge to the Jury is full of misdirections and is almost in the nature of a direction to the Jury to return a verdict of guilt against the accused. It betrays the anxiety of the learned Judge to help the prosecution and his inexperience in the principles of criminal procedure. It is necessary in a case tried with the aid of a Jury that the learned trial Judge should present the evidence to the Jury in as dispassionate and impartial a manner as is expected of a presiding officer without expressing his personal opinion on questions of fact of which the jury are the judges or in any way indicating that they should return a particular verdict for or against the accused person. The charge in the present ease falls short of the standard prescribed. It is perhaps on the evidence of P.W. 8 Narasiah and P.W. 9 Hanumantha, the alleged eye witnesses that the learned Judge is of the opinion that it is the accused that set fire to the hut of P.W. 2 Poojamma on the night on 24th May, 1956. No doubt, the evidence of these two witnesses has remained unchallenged inasmuch as the accused who was undefended has not chosen to cross-examine them. But a careful scrutiny of the evidence of these two witnesses makes it clear that their evidence is interested, tutored and artificial. It is the version of these two witnesses that they were sleeping in the open yard of the house of P.W. 9 Hanumantha on the night of the incident and that after midnight they were able to observe the accused proceeding towards the hut of P.W. 2 Poojamma and striking a match stick setting fire to the dry sugarcane leaves on the roof of the hut. According to the version of P.W. 8 Narasiah, he called out to the accused ‘[* * * * ]‘and stood up and immediately P.W. 9 Hanumantha also got up and they both chased the accused who’ was running towards Vokkaligara Keri but yet could not catch him. It is interesting to. note that P.W. 9 Hanumantha has not stated in his evidence that P.W. 8 Narasiah called out the accused as to why he was setting fire when he was standing in front of P.W. 2 Poojamma’s hut. It is in evidence that the hut of P.W. 2 Poojamma is located in the heart of A. K. Colony of Thimmasandra village, Nelamangala taluk. Yet it is surprising that P.W. 8 and P.W. 9 did not make any attempt to wake up any of the persons in the locality by raising an alarm so as to help them to catch the accused person who was running away from the place. P.W. 8 and P.W. 9 state that they chased the accused for some distance and since they failed to overtake him or catch hold of him they came back to the place and found that the hut was ablaze and it is only then that they called out the inmates of the hut who were sleeping in it to come out of it. It is very difficult to believe the version ofthese witnesses in that they did not wake up the inmates of the house, who were sleeping in the hut immediately after they found the accused setting fire to the hut and thought of chasing the accused person to secure him before they cautioned the inmates of the hut to come out of the hut. The evidence of these two alleged eye witnesses does not appear to be creditworthy. There is no other evidence adduced by the prosecution to establish that it is the accused that was responsible for setting fire to the hut. It is very difficult to believe the version of the alleged eye witnesses that they were able to witness the occurrence a1 the dead of night and identify the accused as the very person that set fire to the hut. If the evidence of these two witnesses is rejected, there is no other evidence to establish the complicity of the accused. If the evidence of these two witnesses is rejected, there is no other evidence to establish the complicity of the accused. The gentlemen of the Jury in the circumstances were perfectly justified in coming to the conclusion that the accused is not guilty of the charge of which he was tried. Jurors are the judges of fact and so far as their findings of fact are concerned, they are entitled to weight. The unanimous verdict of the Jury in this case cannot be characterised as manifestly perverse or unreasonable so as to call for interference by this Court. The reference made by the learned Additional Assistant Sessions Judge, Bangalore is, therefore, rejected. The unanimous verdict of the Jury is accepted and the accused is acquitted and is directed to be set at liberty forthwith. S.V.S. ----- Reference rejected.