Order Wahid Ali was convicted of an offence under section 406, Indian Penal Code, by the Additional City Magistrate, Second Division, Hyderabad, and the Sessions Judge, Secunderabad, upheld the said conviction and sentence. He has therefore preferred this revision petition calling in question the correctness and propriety of the order passed by the Sessions Judge. The facts are that the complainant Eswarayya entrusted the accused with a sum of Rs. 3,000 on 20th February, 1954, and obtained a receipt from him wherein the petitioner-accused admitted the nature of the entrustment and promissed to re-turn the amount when required. Two months thereafter, the complainant demanded the return of the same. It is said that the petitioner evaded payment on promises, ultimately denied the receipt of the amount itself and called upon the complainant to return the receipt issued by him in his favour. After all his efforts to persuade the accused to return the amount had failed, the complainant got his complain filed in the Criminal Court, five witnesses were examined on his behalf and three witnesses were examined in defence. The trial Magistrate came to the conclusion that the accused was guilty of the offence under section 406, Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs.100 or in default imprisonment of two months. The order was upheld by the Sessions Judge. It is argued before me that the dispute between the parties is of a civil nature and the criminal remedy was therefore not proper and hence his conviction must be set aside. The other argument advanced is that immediately after framing the charge the accused was asked whether he would cross-examine any of the witnesses produced by the complainant. The learned counsel argues that this procedure is contrary to the mandatory provisions of section 256, Criminal Procedure Code and that this by itself should vitiate the whole trial. I do not agree there has been any noncompliance with the provisions of law as would vitiate the whole trial. It appears, after the framing of the charge, the hearing was postponed and during the course of the day the case was taken up again and the accused was put that question. I do not think that this procedure constitutes a clear contravention of the provisions of section 256, Criminal Procedure Code. It appears, after the framing of the charge, the hearing was postponed and during the course of the day the case was taken up again and the accused was put that question. I do not think that this procedure constitutes a clear contravention of the provisions of section 256, Criminal Procedure Code. The Magistrate could for reasons to be recorded put the question even immediately after the framing of the charge. He allowed some time to the accused to think over the matter so that he may express his desire with regard to cross-examination. This was sufficient compliance with the provisions. Inasmuch as the accused did exercise his right of cross-examination thereafter on the next day of hearing, it cannot be said that the accused was in any way prejudiced. The argument advanced in this regard is, in my opinion, void of force. On the merits of the case, it is clear from the receipt that the amount was not advanced to him as a loan but deposited with him on the understanding that it will be returned whenever required by the complainant. It was not the amount which the accused was permitted to convert to his own use and pay it at his leisure. When the amount was thus entrusted to him with a specific direction that it should be kept as a deposit and returned whenever required, the accused could not, in law, appropriate it to his own use. The complainant and the attesting witnesses have clearly deposed that the amount was entrusted to the accused and that he executed the receipt. That the receipt was executed is not denied even by the accused. All that he stated is that no amount was paid to him and that is the reason why he gave a notice to the complainant later on. P.Ws. 3 and 4 who have been examined clearly state that the accused when called upon to return the amount only wanted time to pay the same. P.W. 3 says that the accused wanted a fortnight’s time as the amount was deposited in the bank in the name of his wife and that it will be returned when she comes back from the village. P.W. 4 states that on the demand of the complainant the accused replied that he spent the money and promised to repay it by monthly instalments. P.W. 4 states that on the demand of the complainant the accused replied that he spent the money and promised to repay it by monthly instalments. P.W. 4 is certainly a disinterested witness and there is no reason why these witnesses should be disbelieved. It is argued before me that a witness examined on behalf of the accused, Mr. Aiyangar has deposed as to the falsity of the claim and the bogus nature of the receipt and also as to admission of the complainant before him that the receipt was without consideration. It is significant that the accused did not put a single question to the complainant as regards his admission before Mr. Aiyangar. Mr. Aiyangar’s signature does not find a place on the receipt. He is said to be a colleague of the accused and it is difficult to believe his sworn testimony which is replete with discrepancies. Both the Courts below have come to the conclusion that the amount was paid to the accused, that he admitted its receipt; but later on, having misappropriated or converted it to his own use, he kept on making promises for repayment and finally refused to pay. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the act of the accused does not come within the definition of the offence under section 406, Indian Penal Code. The criminal offence is thus made out. Merely because the complainant has a remedy to recover the amount through the civil Court, the criminal complainant cannot be thrown out. The plea of the accused therefore fails and this revision petition is dismissed. A.S.R. ----- Revision dismissed.