Order This is an application filed for cancelling the order made by the learned Sub-Magistrate of Thiruvaiyaru in P.R.C. No. 2 of 1957. The facts are: — The petitioner Varadaraja Mavaliar has been charge-sheeted by the Police for an offence under section 302, Indian Penal Code. Pending the preliminary enquiry the petitioner moved the Sessions Judge of West Tanjore in Crl.M.P. No. 57 of 1957 and the learned Sessions Judge released him on bail by his order, dated 17th April, 1957, which order does not show a consciousness on the part of the learned Sessions Judge of the restrictions on his powers to grant bail under section 497 (1), Criminal Procedure Code, viz., that the person charged shall not be released if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, subject to the proviso that the Court may direct that any person under the age of sixteen years or any woman or any sick or infirm person accused of such an offence be released on bail: Dharmayya, In re1, Belwant Singh, In re2, Abu Bakar, In re3, Srichand, In re4, Jamma Mullick, ln re5,Gul, In re6, Naga Sa Tain, In re7, Jhana, In re8, Bashuam In re9, Henderson, In re10. This section lays down that a person accused for heinous offence like murder shall not be released on bail if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of the offence with which he is charged. This section says nothing about taking into consideration the likelihood of the person absconding or other like considerations. All that the Court has to consider is whether there are reasonable grounds or not. The proviso constitutes the exceptions even in the case of heinous offences punishable with death or life imprisonment. This restriction cannot be got over by imposing conditions. Some Sessions Judges seem to salve their Judicial consciences when they grant bail in murder cases where there are reasonable grounds by imposing conditions. This will not save their orders from being deliberate violations of the statutory restriction imposed by section 497 (1). In this case the learned Sessions Judge imposed the condition that petitioner should not visit the village Umayal Arcot. Such restrictions no doubt can be imposed in suitable cases. This will not save their orders from being deliberate violations of the statutory restriction imposed by section 497 (1). In this case the learned Sessions Judge imposed the condition that petitioner should not visit the village Umayal Arcot. Such restrictions no doubt can be imposed in suitable cases. The cases on the subject are: Hutchinson, In re11, Joglekar, In re12, Narendra, In re13, Manikkam, In re14, Gulam Jilane, In re15, In re District Magistrate of Vizagapatam16, Appalakonda, In re17, Radha,ln re18, State v. Cauda19, contra, Janghbahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh20. At the time of commitment the learned Sub Magistrate in view of the fact that the accused did not produce the sureties before him for execution of the bonds and also of the fact that he stood charged for an offence which is punishable with death or imprisonment for life, committed the accused by warrant to the Sub Jail at Tiruvaiyaru under section 207-A (16), Criminal Procedure Code. The learned Sessions Judge has thereupon been moved in Cr.M.P. No. 60 of 1957 for enlarging the petitioner on bail and in the altered circumstances, viz., that the accused have been committed to sessions apparently the learned Sessions Judge refused to grant bail in an equally laconic and cryptic order “Both heard. I see no sufficient reason to grant bail. Petition is dismissed”. Hence the present application. The application resolves itself into three parts viz., (a) whether there are merits to grant bail; (b) whether the order of the learned Sub Magistrate committing the accused by warrant to the Sub Jail at Tiruvaiyaru is illegal and (c) whether this application has to be construed as invoking the revisional jurisdiction from the order of the Sub Magistrate or the second order of the learned Sessions Judge. Point (a).- On merits there are no grounds to grant bail. Far from there being reasonable grounds for not believing that the accused has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, the committal order shows a volume of evidence to the contrary. I am not satisfied that there are grounds for granting bail. On this short ground alone this application has to be dismissed. Far from there being reasonable grounds for not believing that the accused has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, the committal order shows a volume of evidence to the contrary. I am not satisfied that there are grounds for granting bail. On this short ground alone this application has to be dismissed. Point (b).- It is contended that when the learned Sessions Judge has granted bail without imposing any limits the committing Magistrate has no power while committing the accused to cancel the bail granted to the accused without any limitations by the Sessions Judge; for this position reliance is placed upon the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Seoti v. Rex1. In that decision its was held: “The committing Magistrate has no power, while committing the accused, to cancel bail granted to them without any limitation before they were committed by the High Court to some of them and by the Sessions Judge to others. The High Court has power to vary or rescind any order issued under section 498 by it. Such a power is included in powers to issue orders under section 498, in view of section 561-A”. But this decision has been the subject-matter, if I may say so respectfully, of careful analysis by a Special Bench of the Patna High Court in Sheobachan v. The State2, wherein the Patna Bench has dissented from the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court. I respectfully agree with the observations of the Patna Bench for two reasons. First of all, when the Sessions Judge is moved or bail in regard to a person against whom there is a committal enquiry, bail can be granted only for the duration of the enquiry. The Sessions Judge cannot at that stage predict whether the Magistrate would commit or throw out the case. No Court can pass orders in anticipation of an uncertain event. Grant of bail in anticipation or anticipatory bail is not permissible, Emperor v. Abubakar3, Amirchand v. The Crown4, Mohamed Abbas v. The Crown6, The State v. Hasan Mohammad6, Muzqfaruddin v. State of Hyderabad7, State v. Sajjan Singh8, State v. Dallu Punja9, Juhar Mal v. State10. No Court can pass orders in anticipation of an uncertain event. Grant of bail in anticipation or anticipatory bail is not permissible, Emperor v. Abubakar3, Amirchand v. The Crown4, Mohamed Abbas v. The Crown6, The State v. Hasan Mohammad6, Muzqfaruddin v. State of Hyderabad7, State v. Sajjan Singh8, State v. Dallu Punja9, Juhar Mal v. State10. (For a full discussion see page 1792 of Volume II of the M.L.J. Criminal Procedure Code, Third Edition by M. A. Krishnaswami (1956).) The conception of bail is that a person praying for bail is in custody and deserves freedom. Kailash, In re11, following Mazqfaruddin, In re7. (Two leading decisions deserving careful study by all Magistrates and Judges.) Secondly, when the Magistrate after enquiry holds that there are reasonable grounds for committing the accused to take his trial in the Sessions Court and remands the accused by warrant under section 207-A (16), Criminal Procedure Code, he is not cancelling the bail but as has been held by the Patna Bench he is only following the mandatory provision, viz., that where the Magistrate is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, he is bound when committing him under the provisions of section 220, Criminal Procedure Code, to commit him to custody and there can be no question of cancellation of any bail previously granted to such an accused. In this case as a matter of fact though the order of the Sessions Judge is not worded with that fullness which is expected of a judicial order of this nature, it cannot be construed to mean that the learned Sessions Judge directed the bail to enure even after the committal enquiry. It must be presumed that the order of the Sessions Judge was good up to the last stage of the commitment proceedings. The order in effect exhausts itself on the day when the enquiry ends. The bail bond on which reliance is placed by the learned advocate, viz., Form No. 46 is merely a comprehensive form covering all stages of proceedings. In other words, if the accused has not been committed to custody by a warrant of commitment or the bail is not cancelled, the bond originally executed would enure at all subsequent stages. The bail bond on which reliance is placed by the learned advocate, viz., Form No. 46 is merely a comprehensive form covering all stages of proceedings. In other words, if the accused has not been committed to custody by a warrant of commitment or the bail is not cancelled, the bond originally executed would enure at all subsequent stages. In fact a doubt was felt as to whether this bail bond would enure in other separate stages, viz., where a superior Court has transferred the case to any other Court and this doubt was cleared by suitably amending that form in High Court P. Dis. 473 of 1952. Point (c). - In this case the learned Sessions Judge who passed the order granting bail prior to the commitment apparently as he might have considered though he has not made it evident that there were no reasonable grounds for believing the accused to be guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life — the phrase must be read disjunctively as if it is an offence punishable with death or offence punishable with life imprisonment, King Emperor v. Nga San Htwa1, has refused to grant bail when he had been moved after the commitment to Sessions, on account of the altered circumstances. It is true that the mere fact that a committal order has been passed by itself does not afford a reasonable ground for the Sessions. Judge believing that the person so committed was guilty of the offence with which he has been charged, Nisar All v. Abdul Hamid2, Newad Ram v. Kishan3, see also Nandakumar v. State4. But the Sessions Judge will naturally respect the opinion of the committing Magistrate that there is a prima fade case against the accused under section 302, Indian Penal Code. (See the observations in Mohiuddin v. Emperor5), and would fortify himself by examining the records of the case and finding out whether there were no reasonable grounds to believe that the accused has committed an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. In this case the learned Sessions Judge has refused bail on the ground that there were prima facie grounds for believing the accused to be guilty of an offence under section 302, Indian Penal Code. In this case the learned Sessions Judge has refused bail on the ground that there were prima facie grounds for believing the accused to be guilty of an offence under section 302, Indian Penal Code. Once so satisfied he has no discretion left in view of the terms of the section which compels him not to release on bail such persons, Bishambharnath Tandon v. Emperor6. See also Hikayat Singh v. King Emperor7, Johana v. Emperor8., Sri Chand v. Emperor9. That is why in view of the express terms of this section it is laid down that it is not open to follow English decisions. Gul v. The Crown10, followed Narendra Lal Khan v. Emperor11. But see Nagendra Nath Chakravarthi, In re12Krishna Chandra Jagati v. King Emperor13Chapter XXXIX is exhaustive of the powers to grant bail. Lala Jairam Das v. Emperor14. This section is imperative, Emperor v. Joglakar15, Raghunandan Pan had v. Emperor16 The Amendment Act of 1923 limits rather than enlarge the powers in granting bail in non-bailable cases where the offence is punishable with death or life Imprisonment, H. M. Boudville v. King Emperor17, King Emperor v. Nga San Htwa1. In this connection it is interesting to note that in England bail is not granted in murder cases and it is only if the committal is for an offence other than the cases of murder a person committed to custody must be informed of his right to apply for bail to a Judge of the High Court in Chambers (Stone’s Justice’s Manual, 88th Edition 1956, page 45). In the U. S. A. either by constitutional provision or by statute the common law has been altered and the guarantee is “All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties except for capital offences where the proof is evident or the presumption is great”. (Orfield Criminal Procedure from Arrest to Appeal, page 107; 6 American Jurisprudence (Revised) (1950) Sec. 25, page 71). In such cases where the right to bail specifically except persons accused of capital offences it is only where the proof of guilt is not evident and the presumption thereof is not great a proper case for the grant of bail is presented. Indeed under such circumstances the accused has been regarded-as under our section 497 to bail as a matter of right. Indeed under such circumstances the accused has been regarded-as under our section 497 to bail as a matter of right. It has even been adjudged that a statute making admission to bail a matter of discretion in all cases where the punishment is death would conflict with the Constitution in so far as it affected cases other than those where the proof is evident or the presumption is great. In any event the Court should proceed with great caution in considering bail in capital cases. Whether bail is granted or refused judicial action is likely to be accompanied by embarrassment and perplexity and will always require careful conservative and fearless exercise of judgment in weighing the proofs so that both the rights of the prisoner and the interest of the public may be safeguarded. (6 Am. Jur. P. 71-72). The order should give some intelligible indications why the Court granted or withheld bail in cases involving sentences of death or imprisonment for life. Otherwise the High Court will not be in a position to satisfy itself whether the order of the Sessions Judge or Magistrate is sound and upholdable or not. But at the same time observations in an order of bail should not be such as are likely to influence the further trial of the case and also the mind of the trying Magistrate or Judge, Local Government v. Gulam Jilani1, and Hutchinson v. Emperor2. Therefore, looked at from any point of view, there are no grounds to interfere either with the order of the Sub Magistrate or the subsequent order of the Sessions Judge. This application is dismissed. R.M. ----- Application dismissed.