Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, J.-For having caused the murder of one Alagirisamy and causing injuries to P.Ws. 2, 3 and 4 the three appellants before us have been convicted under section 302, read with section 34, Indian Penal Code and sentenced to life imprisonment by the learned Sessions Judge of Madurai Division m Sessions Case No. 77 of 1956. There were four charges for which the three appellants were tried. The first charge was against appellants 1 to 3 for the murder of Alagirisamy punishable under section 302 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code. The second and third charges were against the first appellant for voluntarily causing grievous hurt by a deadly weapon to P.W. 3 punishable under section 326, Indian Penal Code and also causing hurt to P.W. 4 punishable under section 324, Indian Penal Code. The sentences against appellant 1 for these two offences were three years rigorous imprisonment under section 326, Indian Penal Code and one year rigorous imprisonment under section 324, Indian Penal Code. The fourth charge was against the third appellant for voluntarily causing hurt with a deadly weapon to P.W. 2. The offence was punishable under section 324, Indian Penal Code and the sentence imposed was one year rigorous imprisonment. The occurrence is said to have taken place on the 30th March, 1956, in the village of Arasapatti in the morning at 7-30. The scene of offence is just opposite the house of P.W. 1. The prosecution story is that there was family quarrel between the appellants and the family of P.W. 3 and the feelings were bitter as confessed toby P.W. 1 herself. The appellants as well as P.Ws. 1 to 4 areall related. The second and third appellants are brothers of the husband of P.W. 1. The first appellant aged about 18 to 20 is the cousin’s son of P.W. 1. The deceased was the younger brother of P.W. 1. P.W. 3 is the father of the deceased. P.W. 2 is the mother of the deceased and also P.W. 1. P.W. 4 is another brother of the deceased. The first appellant is said to have used a vel-stick when he stabbed the deceased. The third appellant is said to have been armed with a spade. The second appellant is also said to have been armed with a spear. P.W. 2 is the mother of the deceased and also P.W. 1. P.W. 4 is another brother of the deceased. The first appellant is said to have used a vel-stick when he stabbed the deceased. The third appellant is said to have been armed with a spade. The second appellant is also said to have been armed with a spear. On 30th March, 1956, at about 7-30 a.m. when P.W. 1 sent for her younger brother the deceased and directed him to water the bulls which belonged to her and which were tied in the kottam opposite the house, the third appellant is said to have first attacked the deceased when he was in a bent position on the nape of the neck with a spade and caused an injury which is said to be simple according to the doctor, who gave the post-mortem certificate. Alarm was then raised by P.W. 1 who was an eye-witness to the occurrence. Then the first appellant is stated to have come when the deceased had fallen down having received the injury from the third appellant and the first appellant is said to have caused a spear injury on the chest of the deceased. This injury is opined by the doctor to have proved to be a fatal one. The further prosecution story is that the second appellant then came to the scene from another side and when the deceased turned having already fallen down he caused an injury on the left flank with a spear. This injury is also stated by the doctor P.W. 5 to be a grievous injury. No doubt P.W. 11 would have it that this injury was caused by the second appellant when the deceased was just moving in a staggering fashion after he received the injury from the first appellant. We shall advert to the evidence of P.W. 11 at a later stage. The evidence is that all these injuries were caused to the deceased when he was just outside the house of P.W. 1 near a tub when he was Watering the cattle among which was included a goring bull. We shall advert to the evidence of P.W. 11 at a later stage. The evidence is that all these injuries were caused to the deceased when he was just outside the house of P.W. 1 near a tub when he was Watering the cattle among which was included a goring bull. Reference to this goring bull seems to be necessary in view of the fact that the case of the appellants was it was the goring bull that caused the injuries to the deceased as a result of which he died and not that they used any weapon which caused the injuries which ultimately resulted in his death. After receiving the injuries, the deceased got up and ran into the house of P.W. 1 and there he fell down. According to P.W. 1 and P.W. 11 the Village Munsif was sent for. He came to the scene of occurrence and saw the corpse and recorded Exhibit P-1 at about 9 a.m. But according to the Village Munsif, P.W. 1 accompanied by P.Ws. 3 and 11 and 4 went to the Village Munsif’s house and there Exhibit P-1 the first information report was recorded. After the first information was recorded the police were duly informed and they arrived on the scene at about 2-30 p.m. They made the necessary arrangement for the inquest and also sent the body for post-mortem examination and made the necessary investigation and charge-sheeted the appelllants. No weapons were recovered and no blood-stained clothes either were recovered from the appellants. It is also the prosecution story that the first appellant caused three injuries to P.W. 3 and of the three injuries the second injury on the finger is stated to be grievous by the doctor. The first and third injuries stated in Exhibit P-3, the wound certificate issued for P.W. 3, were simple ones. They might have been caused by a vel-stick was the opinion of the doctor. According to Exhibit P-4 issued for the injuries found on P.W. 2, there was only a contusion and it was stated to be simple. When the doctor examined this P.W. 2 he was informed that the injury was to due to violence with the handles of a vel-kambu. The evidence is also to the same effect in the Sessions Court. This injury is stated to have been caused by the third appellant. When the doctor examined this P.W. 2 he was informed that the injury was to due to violence with the handles of a vel-kambu. The evidence is also to the same effect in the Sessions Court. This injury is stated to have been caused by the third appellant. There is some doubt as to what exactly was the weapon with which this injury could have been caused to P.W. 2. The evidence is that the third appellant had a spade when he attacked the deceased. But it is deposed that when he attacked P.W. 2 he had gone away and came back with another weapon. Though nothing much turns upon this conflicting version still the learned Judge has found that the third appellant must have been possessed only with one weapon, namely, the spade with the handle throughout the occurrence. P.W. 1 is also said to have been injured during the occurrence, but no charge was framed in respect of the injury caused to her, which was alleged to have been caused by the third appellant by the use of a spade. Exhibit P-6 is the wound certificate issued for the injury said to have been caused by the first appellant to P.W. 4. This again is a simple injury said to have been caused with a vel-stick on the right heel of P.W. 4. How exactly the injury could have been caused on the right heel of P.W. 4 and in what circumstances is not made clear by the evidence. In the Committal Court, the only eye-witness examined was P.W. 1. P.W. 11 who also claimed in the Sessions Court to have been an eye-witness, was not examined in the Committal Court. In considering the examination of this witness in the Sessions Court, a strange view has been taken by the learned Sessions Judge, as could be seen from paragraph 19 of his judgment. We are constrained to observe that the observations made by him are not quite warranted. Nor could it be said that the reference to section 173, Criminal Procedure Code, is quite relevant in the context. It has been well-settled that simply because a witness is not examined in the Committal Court the prosectuion is not precluded from examining that witness in the Sessions Court. Such being the case, the observations made by the learned Sessions Judge are unintelligible to us. It has been well-settled that simply because a witness is not examined in the Committal Court the prosectuion is not precluded from examining that witness in the Sessions Court. Such being the case, the observations made by the learned Sessions Judge are unintelligible to us. He has gone to the extent of saying that if this fact had been brought to his notice earlier, he would not have permit ted the examination of that witness before the Sessions Court and for these observations he has relied upon section 173, Criminal Procedure Code. The real section that should have been referred to in this connection was section 207-A, clause (4). But the learned Sessions Judge has not made any reference to that section. We do not want to make any further observations in this regard with reference to the views expressed by the learned Sessions Judge in paragraph 19 of his judgment. The prosecution case depends mostly on the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 4 and P.W. 11 and Exhibit P-1 the first information report. Taking Exhibit P-1, the first information report, in the first instance, as already observed, it was recorded at 9 a.m. when the occurrence had taken place at 7-30 a.m. When it was recorded by the Village Munsif P.W. 13 it transpires that P.W. 3, the father of P.W. 1, P.W. 4 another brother of P.W. 1 and P.W. 11, who is said to be a disinterested witness, were all present. After narrating what all appellants I and 2 did to the deceased and to P.Ws. 2, 3 and 4, Exphibit P-1 records the names of the three witnesses, namely, Muthukaruppi, Perianachi and Kandaswami Thevar who are said to be witnesses to whom the occurrence is known. No doubt Exhibit P-1 also stated that some cithers also knew. But no other names were given except the names of these three witnesses as eye-witnesses the occurrence. Strangely enough, even during the course of the investigation by P.W. 14, Muthukaruppi and Perianachi did not mention anything about the occurrence. They were absolutely of no use as witnesses to the occurrence. Kandaswami Thevar mentioned only, during the course of investigation, as to what he saw the first appellant did to P.W. 4. But when examined in the Commital Court he went back even on that statement and he was treated as hostile in that Court itself. They were absolutely of no use as witnesses to the occurrence. Kandaswami Thevar mentioned only, during the course of investigation, as to what he saw the first appellant did to P.W. 4. But when examined in the Commital Court he went back even on that statement and he was treated as hostile in that Court itself. The result was that in the Sessions Court none of these three witnesses whose names were very prominently given in Exhibit P. 1 were put forth by the prosecution. Therefore the only witnesses that were available to establish the prosecution case were P.Ws. 1 to 4 all of whom are said to have received injuries in the occurrence is addition to P.W. 11. Another feature which is worth noticing with regard to Exhibit P-1, the first information report, is the manner in which it was recorded. We have already observed that there is considerable doubt as to the exact place where it was recorded. The witnesses are not uniform in regard to the place of its recording. But that is not a very serious matter and nothing turns upon the place as to where Exhibit P-1 was recorded, except to show that the witnesses are not speaking the truth when they were contraditicting each other. P.W. 13 was positive when he stated that Exhibit P-1 was recorded in his house; and when questioned as to why P.Ws. 1 and 3 were stating to the contrary, he stated that they must be doing so out of foregetfulness. But the more serious thing that has to be stated in connection with the recording of Exhibit P-1 is that notwithstanding the denial of P.W. 11 and P.W 1, P.W. 13 was positive when he stated that when P.W. I came to report to him and when Exhibit P-1 was about to be recorded, P.Ws. 11 and 3 and others came there. He went on to say further that when he went inside his house to bring paper, pen and ink, to write the reports and came out, he saw P.Ws. 1, 3 and 11 talking to each other and that when P.Ws. 3 and 11 wanted to supply information to P.W. 1 in giving the report, he dissuaded them from giving the report as he had started writing Exhibit P-1 saying that P.W. 1 alone should give information about the occurence. Not merely this. 1, 3 and 11 talking to each other and that when P.Ws. 3 and 11 wanted to supply information to P.W. 1 in giving the report, he dissuaded them from giving the report as he had started writing Exhibit P-1 saying that P.W. 1 alone should give information about the occurence. Not merely this. He asserted in cross-examination that P.Ws. 3 and 11 prompted P.W. 1 to implicate the second appellant and that it was at that stage that he warned them that they should not suggest anything to P.W. 1. Till Exhibit P-1 was written up P.Ws. 3 and 11 were there. A suggestion was made to P.W. 13 that there was a preliminary report taken at the instance of P.W. 1 and that it was not found suitable and thereafter it was destroyed, and another report was made up. P.W. 13 no doubt repudiated this suggestion when it was made to him. Whatever that may be, the fact that when Exhibit P-1 was recorded, P.Ws. 3 and 11 prompted P.W. 1 to implicate the second appellant, apart from the supply of information to make up that report, is sufficient to reject this Exhibit P-1 as not representing the true state of affairs as they occurred. This Exhibit P-1 cannot be of any great value. If P.Ws. 3 and 11 could go to the extent of prompting P.W. I to implicate a person who was not really an offender, and if P.W. 1 were a party to such prompting we can attach very little weight to such record as Exhibit P-1 in the present case. Nor could we attach much weight to the evidence of a person like P.W. 3 or P.W. 11 for the matter of that. If witnesses could go to the length of involving an innocent person in a serious offence like murder, we should certainly be very chary of attaching any weight to the testimony of such witnesses. Apart from this, P.W. 11 is a person whose testimony can hardly go in as representing the truth. He stated that the deceased was attacked by the first appellant even as he was walking into the house in a staggering fashion after he received the blow from the third appellant. But this is not supported by the other witnesses. Apart from this, P.W. 11 is a person whose testimony can hardly go in as representing the truth. He stated that the deceased was attacked by the first appellant even as he was walking into the house in a staggering fashion after he received the blow from the third appellant. But this is not supported by the other witnesses. On the other hand, the other witnesses would say that the deceased was attacked by the first appellant when he was in a lying posture and when he attempted to turn. It has been elicited from this witness in cross-examination that he stood along with Perianachi and Muthukaruppi at about 15 to 20 feet away from the scene and watched the appellants attacking the deceased and the other P.Ws. We have already referred to the two other witnesses referred to in Exhibit P-1 and who were not available at all for the prosecution as eye-witnesses to the ocurrence, even from the very early stage. It transpires further that P.W. 11 was once convicted in a murder case and was transported for life. He lived in the Anadamans and was released. Though he stated that there was no enmity between him and the first appellant and denied 1 hat there was any intimacy between his sister and the first appellant and also denied that he was a police informant, we do not think that it would be safe to place anyreliance upon the evidence of such witness. He is nephew of P.W. 3 and there is contradiction between what he has stated in the course of the trial and what he stated earlier before the investigating officer as recorded under section 162, Criminal Procedure Code. As already observed, he was one of those who went to the length of prompting P.W. 1 to implicate the second appellant. His evidence is therefore worthless and here can he no weight attached to his evidence. P.Ws. 2, 3 and 4 do not speak to the attack on the deceased. They would speak at best only to the injuries received by them at the hands of the first and third appellants. His evidence is therefore worthless and here can he no weight attached to his evidence. P.Ws. 2, 3 and 4 do not speak to the attack on the deceased. They would speak at best only to the injuries received by them at the hands of the first and third appellants. In the background that has been disclosed by the evidence in this case, namely, longstanding enmity between the accused’s family and the families of the prosecution witnesses on the one hand and of the deceased on the other, we are not impressed with the evidence of the witnesses in the case, even with regard to the attack on them by the accused. Apart from being interested in the deceased they are also inimically disposed towards the accused. They do not impress us as truthful witnesses at all. What remains to be considered is the evidence of the sole eye-witness, P.W. 1 who is no other than the sister of the deceased. As already observed she has lent herself to be prompted by P.Ws. 11 and 3 and she also stated that at the time when Exhibit P-1 was being recorded P.W. 4 was already there. We have carefully considered the evidence of P.W. 1 and she does not impress us as a woman who speaks the truth. She is quite young aged only about 32 and no lapse of memory could be attributed to her to justify the various inconsistent statements she has made in the course of her examination before the learned Sessions Judge. Even granting that she is speaking the truth and speaks to what she saw in regard to the offence of the accused I to 3 against the deceased, we do not think that it would be safe to place any reliance upon the evidence of this witness in the circumstances that emerge in this case and in the back ground that has already been referred to above. We are, therefore, constrained to observe that for lack of proper, reliable and trustworthy evidence, the case for the prosecution has to fail and the murder has to go unavenged. We cannot help this. We are, therefore, constrained to observe that for lack of proper, reliable and trustworthy evidence, the case for the prosecution has to fail and the murder has to go unavenged. We cannot help this. On a consideration of the entire evidence in the case and taking into account the circumstances referred to above, we are of the opinion that we will not be on safe ground if we act upon the sole testimony of P.W. 1 even granting that she was speaking the truth in convicting the accused of the offence of murder and imposing the penalty prescribed by the law. We, therefore, hold that in the circumstances of the case the accused are entitled to the benefit of the doubt and we accordingly give this benefit of the doubt, set aside the convictions and sentences against the accused and direct that they be set at liberty forthwith. Somasundaram, J.-I entirely agree with my learned brother both in his conclusions and as well as, in his reasons for arriving at those conclusions. I also agree with the comment made by my learned brother on the observations made by the learned Sessions Judge in paragraph 19 of his judgment. The learned Public Prosecutor brings to my notice that a judgment of mine in V.S. Ramanathan v. State1, is being wrongly construed and that perhaps has given rise to the view taken by the learned Sessions Judge. The learned Judge does not refer to any case. Granting for the moment that as the learned Public Prosecutor thinks, the above judgment of mine was perhaps in his mind, still I must point out that the decision cannot be interpreted in the way the Sessions Judge has done. That is a case in which the prosecution did not cite in the charge-sheet certain witnesses whom they wanted to examine subsequently. It is in that context, I had to interpret section 173 of the Criminal Procedure, Code. Section 173 (4) as amended enjoins on the prosecution when a charge-sheet is filed, to furnish to the accused copies not only of the first information report but also copies of statements under sections 162 and 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code and such other documents on which the prosecution proposes to rely. Section 173 (4) has nothing to do with the examination of witnesses in Court. Section 173 (4) has nothing to do with the examination of witnesses in Court. It relates only to furnishing of copies of documents to the accused on which the prosecution proposes to rely. As my learned brother has pointed out, the relevant section which applies to the examination of witnesses is section 207-A (4) which merely states that the Court shall examine witnesses produced by the prosecution as witnesses to the actual commission of the offence alleged. There is no statutory obligation under the provisions of section 207-A (4) that the prosecution shall examine witnesses produced by the prosecution as witnesses to the actual commission of the offence. If the prosecution does not produce all the witnesses to the actual commission of the offence, there is no statutory obligation cast on the Court to compel the examination of those witnesses, though in its discretion it may do so. The spirit of the section is that it is better that all the witnesses to the occurrence are examined. I would even add that it is necessary that all the witnesses to the comission of the offence are examined. But certainly there is no statutory duty cast on the prosecution to examine all the eye-witnesses to the occurrence at the preliminary stage itself, so that the failure to examine any witnesses to the occurrence, cannot prevent that witness being examined in the Sessions Court. In any event section 173 (4) which is referred to by the learned Judge has nothing to do with the examination of witnesses. The learned Sessions. Judge’s view that an occurrence witness who has not been examined in the Committing Court should not be examined in the Court of Session does not arise on the construction of section 173 (4) and how he puts this construction is not clear. The decision in V.S. Ramanathan v. State1 which is said by the learned Public Prosecutor to have been wrongly construed by several subordinate Courts, has nothing to do with the examination of witnesses who have been cited in the charge-sheet and not examined. It refers only to witnesses who have not been cited in the charge-sheet but whom the prosecution wanted to examine subsequently. It refers only to witnesses who have not been cited in the charge-sheet but whom the prosecution wanted to examine subsequently. What I have said in that decision is that the spirit of the amendment is that the accused should have an over-all picture of the case against him before the commencement of the enquiry or trial, so that he may deal with the witnesses in the light of the case against him as disclosed by the statements furnished to him. I have thought necessary to add these words to the judgment of my learned brother in view of the statements of the learned Public Prosecutor that my decision in V.S. Ramanathan v. State1, has given rise to several wrong constructions. The learned Judge will do well to look at the section before he refers to it in the judgment. K.S. ----- Appeals allowed.