JUDGMENT M.R. Verma, J.-Plaintiff Corporation has instituted a suit against the defendant company and two others for recovery of Rs. 1937603/- with future interest. The defendants moved the present application under Section 151, Order 7 Rule 11 (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provision) Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for dismissal of the suit as not maintainable. It is claimed that once an Industrial Company has been declared sick by the Board, no suit shall lie against such company in view of the provisions of Section 22 of the Act. 2. The application has been contested by the plaintiff on the grounds that the application is vague and not accompanied by relevant documents, that the application is merely dilatory, that the plaintiff had already taken over and sold the assets of the defendant company and provisions of Section 22 of the Act are not attracted in this case. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the records. 4. It was contended for the applicants/defendants (hereinafter referred to as the defendants) that the defendant-company has already been declared sick vide proceedings dated 4.12.1998, therefore, the suit could not be instituted thereafter against defendant-company in view of the created by Section 22 of the Act, therefore, the suit having Instituted on 5.12.1998 without the consent of the Board is liable to dismissed as not maintainable. 5. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the plaintiff has Intended that the plaintiff had no knowledge of the proceedings dated 4-12-1998 and instituted the suit on 5.12.1998 without such knowledge, therefore, the suit having been instituted prior to the knowledge of the affairs of the defendant company, at the most further proceedings in the suit can only be kept in aneyance. 16. To properly appreciate the legal position applicable to the case in mi it is expedient to refer to the relevant portion of Section 22 of the act which reads as follows :- "22. Suspension of legal proceedings, contracts, etc. 16. To properly appreciate the legal position applicable to the case in mi it is expedient to refer to the relevant portion of Section 22 of the act which reads as follows :- "22. Suspension of legal proceedings, contracts, etc. (1) Where in respect of an industrial company, an inquiry under Section 16 is pending or any scheme referred to under Section 17 is under Reparation or consideration or a sanctioned scheme is under implementation or where an appeal under Section 25 relating to an industrial company is pending, then, notwithstanding anything contained in the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), or any other law or the memorandum and articles of association of the industrial company or any other instrument having effect under the said Act or other law, no proceedings for the winding up of the industrial company or for execution, distress or the like against any of the properties of the industrial company or for the appointment of receiver in respect thereof and no suit for the recovery of money or for the enforcement of any security against the industrial company or of any guarantee in respect of any loans or advance granted to the industrial company shall lie or be proceeded with further, except with the consent of the Board or, as the case may be, the Appellate Authority." 7. In view of the above-quoted provisions of Section 22 of the Act, lit for recovery of money shall lie or be proceeded with further against an industrial company without the consent of the Board established under Ion 4 of the Act or Consent of the Appellate Authority constituted under Section 5 of the Act as the case may be, in the following circumstances :- (i) When inquiry under Section 16 of the Act is pending or (ii) When any scheme under section 17 of the Act is under consideration or preparation or (iii) When sanctioned scheme is under implementation or (iv) When an appeal under Section 25 of the Act is pending. 8. The words "shall lie" evidently refer to the presentation stage and the words "be proceeded with" to post presentation stage of a suit. 8. The words "shall lie" evidently refer to the presentation stage and the words "be proceeded with" to post presentation stage of a suit. Thus, during the existence of any of the circumstances (i) to (iv) above, the law prohibits presentation of a new suit and also prohibits proceeding further with a suit already presented without the consent of the Board1 or the Appellate Authority as the case may be. 9. Out of the proceedings enumerated as circumstances (i)to(iv) supra, the pendency of an enquiry under Section 16 of the Act is tin earliest stage which bars the institution of the suit as aforesaid, Therefore, the question which calls for determination is as to what should be the starting point of inquiry under Section of the Act from which the laying of the suit shall not be permissible without the requisite consent. The Honble Supreme Court in case Real Value Appliances Vs. Canara Bank and other AIR 1998 SC 2064, while dealing with a similar question held s under "27. The above question is depends upon what is meant by the word Inquiry used in Section 16(1) of the Act. According to the New Standard Dictionary, the word inquiry includes investigation into facts, causes, effects and relations generally; to enquiry, according to the same dictionary means to exert oneself to discover something, Chambers 20th Century Dictionary lays down that the meaning of the term inquiry is given as ; "search for knowledge; Investigation; J a question." 28. Inasmuch as under the latter part of Regulation 19(5) It I necessary that simultaneously with the registration of the reference, information/documents are to be called for from the informant -the inquiry must, in our opinion, be deemed to have connected under Section 16 of the Act at that stage itself, namely, at stage of the second part of Regulation 19(5) and it is no longer permissible say that such a stage is reached only when the BIFR issued notices and starts an inquiry under Regulation 20 calling for additional-information in relation to the inquiry or only when orders are passed by the BIFR under Regulation 21, read with Section 16(1). The result is that strictly speaking, after the amendment of Regulation 19(5) on 24-3-1994 the latter part of Regulation 19(5) falls into Chapters III and IV of the Regulations which are referable to inquiries under Section 16 of the Act, rather than into Chapter II which deals with References under Section 15. The Chapter headings cannot, in our opinion, be treated as rigid compartments, of the Regulations 29. There can, therefore, be no difficulty in holding that after the amendment to Regulation 19 w.e.f. 24-3-1994, once the reference i is registered and when once it is mandatory simultaneously to call for information/documents from the informant and such a direction is given, then inquiry under Section 16(1) must - for the purposes of Section 22 - be deemed to have commenced. Section 22 and the prohibition contained in it shall immediately come into play...." 10. Thus the starting point for application of the bar created by Section 22 of the Act shall be the registration of the reference. 11. In this case, the copy of the letter dated 22.9.1998 at page 18 of the paper book addressed by the Registrar of the Board to defendant No. 1 slates that the reference was received by the Board on 17.9.1998 and was registered as case No. 751/98. Thus the reference was registered on or before 22.9.1998, the date of issue of the aforesaid letter. Therefore, after 22.9.1998 no suit could be laid against the defendant company without the consent of the Board. Therefore, the present suit instituted on 5.12.1993 has been instituted after commencement of inquiry under Section 16 of the Act. 12. There is no dispute that the suit in hand has been presented without the consent of the Board. Thus, the suit is barred in view of the provisions of Section 22 of the Act, hence not maintainable. 13. The next question which now arises is as to whether the further proceedings in the suit are to be kept in abeyance or it is to be dismissed as not maintainable. 14. The contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiff is that the suit was instituted on the next day of the date of the defendant Company (laving been declared sick and the plaintiff had no knowledge of such declaration. 14. The contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiff is that the suit was instituted on the next day of the date of the defendant Company (laving been declared sick and the plaintiff had no knowledge of such declaration. Therefore, having come to know of the defendant having been declared sick only after the institution of the suit, further proceedings are to be kept in abeyance as such a course will not cause any prejudice to the defendants nor put the plaintiff to any advantageous position. 15. The contention does not hold good for the reason that it is immaterial whether plaintiff has or has no knowledge of the commencement > and pendency of the inquiry under Section 16 of the Act before the Board1. Once the inquiry has commenced under Section 16 of the Act, the bar created by Section 22 of the Act is attracted automatically. It is also immaterial that keeping the further proceedings in abeyance will or will not cause any prejudice to he defendant company. Law has to be applied as it is. 16. The contention of the learned counsel for the defendant-Company that suit should be dismissed is also not reasonable. In view of the provisions I of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the proper course I appears to reject the plaint than to dismiss the suit. 17. In view of the above, it is held that the suit does not lie in view of the bar created by Section 22 of the Act. 18. As a result this application is allowed and the plaint (C.S.No. 95 of 1998) is ordered to be rejected.