Judgment These are two connected Revision Cases preferred against the convictions and sentences of the Additional First Class Magistrate, Coonoor, in S.T.R. Cases Nos. 1953 and 1954 of 1955 and confirmed in C.A. Nos. 66 and 67 of 1956 by the learned Sessions Judge, Coimbatore. The facts are: Gopal Motor Service, Limited, Mettupalayam, were permitted to run two buses Nos. 2849 and 6807 on two round trips, between Mettupalayam and Ooty during the period between 26th April, 1955 and 26th May, 1955 in connection with the racing season in Ooty. One of the conditions of this particular permit was that the buses should not run between 11 p.m. and 4 a.m. on these special trips. In S.T.R. Case No. 1953 of 1955 the subject-matter of the complaint was that on 8th May, 1955, bus No. 6807 was found at 3-35 a.m. proceeding from Mettupalayam to Ooty with a full complement of passengers. In S.T.R. Case No. 1954 of 1955 the complaint was that bus No. 2849 was checked at Burliar Outpost at 3-30 a.m. on 8th May, 1955, carrying a full complement of passengers from Mettupalayam to Ooty. So far as these buses are concerned the Manager of this Gopal Motor Service N. Ramamurthi who is in local charge of these buses has been prosecuted and he has been found guilty under section 42(1) read with section 123(1) of the Motor Vechicles Act for violations of the conditions of the permit issued under section 42(1) and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 250 in each case. The convictions and sentences have been confirmed by the learned Sessions Judge. The facts are not in dispute and the only point for consideration is whether this Manager Ramamurthi, can be convicted under section 123(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 42(1) lays down: “No owner of a transport vehicle shall use, or permit the use of, the vehicle in any public place save in accordance with the conditions of a permit granted…..” In C. S. S. Motor Service v. Madras State1, section 42 was attacked on the ground that it prohibited the carrying on of the business unless a permit was obtained and it was contended that the exercise of a fundamental right could not be made to depend upon the discretion of an administrative authority nor could previous restraint be imposed on it. It was held that section 42 was valid and was not repugnant to Article 19(1)(g)of the Constitution of India. The word “owner” in section 42 has been construed in several decisions. The word “owner” has been taken to mean what it ordinarily means viz., a person in whom the proprietary title vests. But this construction has led to some anomalies. In King v. Be Ba Sein2, the owner of a motor-bus which was found plying for hire without being registered was a boy of five years. Therefore the word “owner” which was not defined in the Motor Vehicles Act , 1914, was when the Act was re-drafted in the year 1939 defined in section 2(19) as meaning, where the person in possession of a motor vehicle is a minor, the guardian of such minor. In a Bombay case Goolbai Motabhai v. Pestonji Cowasji3, a person who had obtained a motor vehicle under a hire-purchase agreement and who was plying the car at the time of the accident was held to be the owner of the car, although the car was registered in the name of another person. In order to meet this defect the self-same section 2(19) defined “owner” as meaning in relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject of a hire-purchase agreement, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement. The best definition that has been given of an “owner” under the Motor Vehicles Act is by Niyogi, J., in Bhagwant Pathak, In re.4 It does not however appear that the Legislature by inserting this definition in the Act of 1939 intended to use the word “owner” occurring in the various sections of the Act in any sense other than the sense in which it is ordinarily understood. Ownership as opposed to possession implies title with the incidental right of transfer. A person may be in possession and control of a vehicle, nevertheless he might not have any title or right to transfer it. Thus the word “owner” in section 42 corresponds to the popular definition of the word “owner” viz., one who has the right to own; exclusive right of possession; legal or just claim or title; proprietorship. A person may be in possession and control of a vehicle, nevertheless he might not have any title or right to transfer it. Thus the word “owner” in section 42 corresponds to the popular definition of the word “owner” viz., one who has the right to own; exclusive right of possession; legal or just claim or title; proprietorship. The term owner will take in all the members of a partnership owning the vehicle and all of them will be jointly and severally liable for all the illegal acts, though it is not desirable to exact fine from all the owners separately. Bal Mukuno v. Emperor.5 Therefore, a person who is only an agent of the partnership firm and acts under the power-of-attorney executed by the partners, or a Manager of a limited Company acting under the control and directions of the Directors of the Company, (this qualification is often slurred over in the arguments at the Bar because it is neglected to be cleared up by the Magistrate at the outset itself) have been held not to be owners within the meaning of section 42 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Bhagwant Pathak, Inre.1 and Uma Shankar v. Rex.2But a person who is himself one of the owners as well as the Manager falls within the ambit of section 42(1). He is responsible for seeing that the conditions of the permit are carried out, and that if his employees fail to carry out their duties diligently, he is liable under section 42(1): Emperor v. Amduilal Chunnilal Mehta3. Having defined the word “owner” in section 42, we have to construe the verb “permit” used therein and which carried with it the meaning that the person actually or knowingly allows a thing to be done. Mere negligence such as not locking up his vehicle so that the driver could not take it would not amount to permitting of the use of the car. Abdul Salam Rowther, In re4. The term conveys the idea of an allowance, a sufferance, a toleration, an authorization. The word “consent” implies some positive action, while the word “permit” implies merely passivity. Webster, in referring to the words “permit”, “allow” and “suffer” says, “Permit” is the most positive, denoting decided assent. The words “permit” and “suffer” are pseudo-synonyms. There is a shade of difference between their meanings. The word “consent” implies some positive action, while the word “permit” implies merely passivity. Webster, in referring to the words “permit”, “allow” and “suffer” says, “Permit” is the most positive, denoting decided assent. The words “permit” and “suffer” are pseudo-synonyms. There is a shade of difference between their meanings. The word “permit” seems to convey the idea of affirmative action, more than the word “suffer”. As distinguished from “allow” or “suffer”, “permit” is more positive, denoting a decided assent, either directly, or by implication. “Allow” is more negative, and denotes only acquiescence or an abstinence from prevention. “Suffer” is used when our feelings are adverse, but we do not think best to resist. A duty is cast on the prosecution to prove either explicitly or by inference that the accused had permitted the use of vehicle. The accused is entitled to succeed when the prosecution has failed to prove all the ingredients of the offence with which he was charged. In Abdul Salam Rowther, In re.4the driver had taken the car to convey himself to the Magistrate's Court where he was being tried for driving without a licence, and back again. The owner was prosecuted and convicted under section 123(1) and section 42, Motor Vehicles Act, for permitting his motor vehicle to be used by the driver in a public place. It was held that (i) the use to which the vehicle was put was not one in the ordinary course of the petitioner's business; for the driver was using the vehicle to convey himself from the garage to the Court-house and back again and so the owner might not have known of the use to which his motor vehicle was being put; and (ii) as the prosecution failed to prove all the ingredients of the offence, the owner was entitled to be acquitted. Such knowledge can always be brought home by adducing circumstantial evidence — in fact as pointed out by Dr. Such knowledge can always be brought home by adducing circumstantial evidence — in fact as pointed out by Dr. Kenny at page 396 of his “Outlines of Criminal Law” (14th Edition), mens rea must necessarily be proved by circumstantial evidence alone (except where the accused actually confesses and, what is more in India, sticks to it and which is highly problematical); for example that the bus had just left the owners’ premises with a full complement of passengers: Devaraja Mudaliar, In re5, and that this would have put the owner or manager on their guard and which they had a duty to enquire as a high standard of vigilance and precaution is required of them: Clydebank Co-operative Society v. Binnie6 or having knowledge of the prevailing method they had connived at conduct which might well lead to the commission of the offence and had therefore “permitted” as permit may mean nothing more than a failure to take proper steps to prevent: Churchill v. Morris7 or drivers and conductors who if the manager or owner did not permit explicitly or impliedly, would have been punished by them for disobedience of rules were not so punished: Sidcup Estates v. Sidery1 and see Cex v. Sidery2. It is incumbent as pointed out in Viraj Lall v. King Emperor3, relying on a passage from Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume 9, page 235, that where a particular intent or state of mind is not of the essence of the offence a master can be made criminally liable for his servant's acts, if an act is expressly prohibited but not otherwise; and he cannot be so made liable if the Act provides for liability for permitting and causing a certain thing unless it can be shown that the act was done with the master's knowledge, express or implied. It may be useful to recall that, in establishing such guilty knowledge, actual or direct knowledge is not absolutely essential, there being no doubt that a person who deliberately shuts his eyes to an obvious means of knowledge is equally liable. Less certainty is felt in regard to negligence when used in the sense of blameful inadvertence. Thus interpreted, negligence describes the state of mind of a person who ought to have known, and is obviously not so reprehensible as the state of mind of a person who wilfully shuts his eyes to the obvious. Less certainty is felt in regard to negligence when used in the sense of blameful inadvertence. Thus interpreted, negligence describes the state of mind of a person who ought to have known, and is obviously not so reprehensible as the state of mind of a person who wilfully shuts his eyes to the obvious. Hitherto, strong objection has been voiced to basing criminal liability upon mere inadvertence. But where the phrase mens rea is used to denote a state of mind it is possible to argue that the only state of mind which is pertinent is the positive form known as advertence, i.e., realisation or foresight of consequences, in which event the ambit of mens rea is restricted to intention and subjective recklessness. Conversely, it is possible to argue that although inadvertence involves the negative form of absence of realisation or foresight of consequences, it too can justifiably be termed a state of mind and therefore, as forming, on certain conditions, part of the doctrine of mens rea. To those who would deny the validity of this conclusion it may come as a surprise as pointed out by Prof. Edwards on his valuable monograph “ mens rea in statutory offences” (English studies in Criminal Science Series, Volume VIII, page 205 and foll.) To realise that there exists a wide range of judicial dicta. Hearne v. Garton4, Croasdill v. Rateliffe5, Bosley v. Davies6, in which the view is expressed that if a statutory offence is based upon proof of knowledge such crimes can be committed negligently. I respectfully agree with Prof. Edward's conclusion at page 206 that so far as this particular field of criminal liability — Road Traffic Act offences is concerned, negligence or blameful inadvertence or failure to supervise may properly be designated as mens rea. Therefore, we must look to the qualifying words used in the statutes like “maliciously”, “wilfully” and “knowingly” which show that liability of a guilty mind should be based in the form of actual knowledge or connivance or the absence of any such qualifying words making out a case of absolute prohibition where the doing of the act prohibited could itself furnish the mens rea, or qualifying words like “permitting”, “suffering”, “causing” and “allowing” constituting the intermediate theory of liability based upon blameful inadvertence. Of course the acceptance of negligence as a sufficient degree of mens rea would be restricted to those statutory offences in which the Legislature intends to use the criminal law as a means of securing the maintenance of certain standards of behaviour in such matters as Road Traffic, Food and Drugs, Weights and Measures, Licensing and Public Health. It is therefore to these qualifying words or absence of words we must direct our attention in order to find out the mens rea requisite under the particular statute under examination. The terms “cause or permit”, “suffer or allow”, used in those group of offences described by American Text-book writers as “public welfare offences” or public torts or civil offences and by English Judges as cases in which although the proceeding is criminal in form it is really only a summary mode of enforcing a civil right or acts not criminal in any real sense - Per Wright, J., in (1895) 1 Q.B. 922 — or quasi-criminal offences — Per Channell, J., in (1902) 2 K.B. at II, or by Professor Glanville L. Williams, in his Criminal Law at page 155 as “quasi-civil wrongs ”, has been the subject-matter of much discussion in English Courts and English standard text-books. The fundamental principle of English criminal jurisprudence to use a maxim which has been familiar to English lawyers for nearly 800 years is actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea. An act does not make a man guilty without a guilty intention to do the guilty act which is made penal by the statute or common law. Allard v . Serfridge & Co., Ltd.1. But there is generally no room for the application of this doctrine in the Indian Penal Statutes as their terms are precise and contain within themselves the precise and particular elements that go to make up the offences referred to in those statutes. The Indian Penal Code is one of the most exhaustive Codes of Penal Laws and devotes a full chapter towards this interpretation clause while an equally large part of it is devoted for the general exceptions which withdraw acts which would otherwise be an offence from that category. Its elaborate paraphernalia has been designed, it is said, to prevent captious Judges from wilfully misunderstanding the Code and cunning criminals from escaping its provisions. Its elaborate paraphernalia has been designed, it is said, to prevent captious Judges from wilfully misunderstanding the Code and cunning criminals from escaping its provisions. So, in Indian Penal Statutes where the doctrine of mens rea is intended to come into operation and a guilty mind is deemed essential for the proof of an offence the Statute itself uses words like “knowingly”, “willingly”, “fraudulently”, “negligently” and so on. But there are now a large class of penal Acts created under the State as well as Central Acts, which are really not criminal but which are prohibited by the levy of a penalty in the interests of the public. To such a category belong offences against Revenue, Adulteration Acts, Forest Laws, etc., penalties directed against public nuisances, and cases in which though the proceedings are criminal in form they are only summary modes of enforcing civil rights. Of late years the tendency of the Courts is to attach less importance to mens rea in statutory offences. R. V. Wheat2, Hortton v. Guynne3, Cotterall v. Penn4, R. v. Leinster5, Hardinge v. Price6 (See eighty-eighth Edition of Stone's Justices Manual (1956), page 251). In such cases as pointed out by Dr. Kenny the prosecution need only prove the prohibited act and the defendant must then bring himself within a statutory defence. (Outlines of Criminal Law, 15th edition, page 48). But in determining whether an Act does create this absolute liability regard must be paid to the object of the statute the words used, the nature of the duty, the person upon whom it is imposed, the person by whom it would in ordinary cases be performed and the person on whom the penalty is imposed: Mousell Brothers, Ltd. v. L.N.W. Ry.7, Sherras8. Rusell on Crimes, 7th Edition, Volume I, page 102; D.A. Stroud mens rea (1914); Austin's Jurisprudence Lectures XVIII and XXVI; Stephen's History of Criminal Law, Volume II, pages 94-123. In these quasi-civil wrongs one of the commonest phrases used is “cause or permit” in the Road Traffic Acts and this has been the subject-matter of many English decisions. In Mcleod v. Buchanan9, it was held per Lord Wright: “The section is imperative. Intention to commit a breach of the statute need not be shown. The breach in fact is enough. To ‘cause’ involves some express or positive mandate, or some authol-rity. To ‘permit’ is a looser and vaguer term. In Mcleod v. Buchanan9, it was held per Lord Wright: “The section is imperative. Intention to commit a breach of the statute need not be shown. The breach in fact is enough. To ‘cause’ involves some express or positive mandate, or some authol-rity. To ‘permit’ is a looser and vaguer term. It may denote an express permission, general or particular, as distinguished from a mandate. The other person is not told to use the vehicle in the particular way, but he is told that he may do so if he desires. It includes cases where permission is merely inferred. If the other person is given control of the vehicle, permission may be inferred if the vehicle is left at the other person's disposal in such circumstancs as to carry with it a reasonable implication of a discretion or liberty to use it in the manner in which it was used.” In Goodbarne v. Buck10, it was held: Cause or permit are two different verbs. To make a person liable for “permitting” another person to use, he must be in a position to forbid the other person to use the vehicle i.e., where he is the owner of the car. In Churchill v. Norris1, it was held that the word “permit” may mean no more than a failure to take proper, steps to prevent. In Goldsmith v. Deakin2, it was held: “The dictionary definition of”to permit“is to give leave to; to allow; to afford means. The offence of”permitting user“arises where to quote the words of Lawrence, J.,”Although the respondent, may not have known affirmatively the way in which the vehicle was being used, if in fact allowed it to be used, and did not care whether it was being used in contravention of the statute or not, he did, in my view, permit its use under section 72 of the Road Traffic Act, 1930“. In Evans v. Dell3, it was held that as the respondent had no knowledge of the advertisement and had not deliberately shut his eyes to what was being done, he had not”permitted“. Per Goddard, J. Mens rea is an essential ingredient in offences under the Road Traffic Acts: See Bingham's Motor Claims Cases, (Second Edition), pages 472 to 476. In Evans v. Dell3, it was held that as the respondent had no knowledge of the advertisement and had not deliberately shut his eyes to what was being done, he had not”permitted“. Per Goddard, J. Mens rea is an essential ingredient in offences under the Road Traffic Acts: See Bingham's Motor Claims Cases, (Second Edition), pages 472 to 476. Wilkinson in his”Road Traffic Prosecution“(1953), at pages 7 and 8 has the following to say: ”The statement in Goodbarne v. Buck4, that the only person who can permit the use of a car in that he can forbid another person to use it, is the owner, is incorrect; any person who has control of a vehicle on the owner's behalf, e.g., a chauffeur or a manager of a company, can permit its use, Lloyd v. Singleton5, Morris v. Williams6. The Court ought to look at the subject of the statute and see whether the principal might be held liable for the conduct of his agent, although he himself was unaware of the statute being infringed. If the principal in effect hires out his coach, putting his servant in charge of it and a least leaving it to chance whether it would be used as a stage carriage or not, he permits it to be used as a stage carriage without a licence (Goldsmith v . Deakin2; Clydebank Co-operative Society v. Binnie7, a fortiori where he has been warned that it may be so used Osborne v. Richards8; Webb v. Maidstone etc., Services9. ‘Permit’ may mean no more than a ‘failure to take adequate steps to prevent’. But where the owner has no reason to know that his vehicle may be used without the necessary licence, or there are no circumstances which ought either to have aroused his suspicion or put him on his guard, he is not guilty of permitting use without a licence for express carriages (Newell v . Cook10, Phillips v. Autocars Services11. Nor is he guilty of permitting use as a stage carriage if he does not know that such use is proposed and does not deliberately refrain from making inquiries or shut his eyes to the obvious, Evans v. Dell3. An owner will be liable for permitting overcrowding on a bus when he has appointed a young and inexperienced conductor and has given him no instructions (cf. An owner will be liable for permitting overcrowding on a bus when he has appointed a young and inexperienced conductor and has given him no instructions (cf. Gough v. Rees12).“ Again at page 9: ”A corporation can ‘permit’ an offence for which disqualification is a punishment though not itself disqualifiable (Briggs v. Gibsons Bakery13);” Professor Edwards in his valuable monograph” Mens rea in Statutory Offences“, Volume 8, of English Studies in Criminal Science, edited by L. Radzinowicz devotes Chapter IV, page 98 and following for a survey of the statutory offences based on the word”permits“and points out: ”Where the word ‘knowingly’ is expressly inserted in a statutory offence, no doubt has ever been cast on the necessity for establishing mens rea. Where, on the other hand, the legislature has chosen to use the alternative expressions ‘permits’ or ‘permitting’, a careful analysis of the cases shows the inevitable cleavage of opinion among the judges as to the requirement of proof of a guilty mind. Earlier in this study several causes were tentatively suggested as underlying this constant divergence of views and it may, perhaps, be of assistance if they are restated. First, it is suggested, there is the trend of thought which happens to be current at the time a particular case is decided; secondly, there is the individual judge's attitude or approach to the wider question of the part to be played by mens rea in criminal law; and finally, there is the conflict which is created through the unreal meaning sometimes attributed to the phrase mens rea.“ Professor Edwards concludes this chapter”Permitting“as follows (pp. 118-19): ”The interpretation adopted in James & Sons Ltd. v. Smee1, is irreproachable and is in striking contrast with that followed in the ‘pigeon cases’ Cotterill v. Penn2, and Horton v. Gwynne3and in the ‘false invoice cases’ Korten v . West Sussex & Co.4, and Laird v. Dobell5. Furthermore, it is clear that the construction put forward in Lyons v . May6, is directly contrary to that placed in cases like Goldsmith v. Deakin7, Evans3 and Reynolds v. G.H. Austin Co., Ltd.8, upon the analogous offence, in section 72(10) of the same Act, of permitting a motor vehicle to be used as an express carriage without a road service licence. May6, is directly contrary to that placed in cases like Goldsmith v. Deakin7, Evans3 and Reynolds v. G.H. Austin Co., Ltd.8, upon the analogous offence, in section 72(10) of the same Act, of permitting a motor vehicle to be used as an express carriage without a road service licence. In proving the commission of the latter offence, as Devlin, J., explained in Reynolds v. Austin9 it is essential that the person who permits the user ‘will know of the facts which constitute the offence’. In other words, the condition of knowledge which is embodied in the epithet ‘permits’, must extend to allthe constituent elements in the statutory offence. “Those who would support the contrary view that the insertion in a statutory offence of the term ‘permits’ does not connote the need for proof of guilty knowledge of all the conditions of liability must content themselves with the support provided by these four cases. Korten v . West Sussex Co.4Laird v . Dobell5, Lyons v . May6, Morris v. Williams10 the dicta of Stephen, J., in Bond v. Evans11, which have already been shown to be open to a twofold interpretation, and the dicta of Lord Goddard. C J., in Browning v . J.H. Watson, Ltd.12 and in Shava v. Rosner13. Set up in opposition to this point of view . is the wide range of decisions covering a variety of statutory crimes and culminating with the recent decision in James & Son, Ltd. v. Smee1, in which the word ‘permits’ was recognised as a pointer to the requirement of mens rea throughout the whole definition of an offence. In view of the weight of authorities to the contrary, which it is realised involved different offences, it is respectfully submitted that the reasoning underlying the decisions in Korten v. West Sussex Co.1, Laird v. Dobell5Lyons v. May6and Morris v. Williams10cannot stand and should not, in any case, be extended beyond the confines of the criminal offences there involved”. In view of the weight of authorities to the contrary, which it is realised involved different offences, it is respectfully submitted that the reasoning underlying the decisions in Korten v. West Sussex Co.1, Laird v. Dobell5Lyons v. May6and Morris v. Williams10cannot stand and should not, in any case, be extended beyond the confines of the criminal offences there involved”. Professor Glanville L. Williams in his “Criminal Law” General Part, discussing theories of strict responsibility under which the doing of the forbidden act itself furnishes the mens rea and vicarious responsibility in that the master is held liable for even the unauthorised acts of his servant in Chapter 7, (page 238 and following) concludes: “It may be said that a person may properly be punished for the crime of his subordinate because the threat of such punishment may induce him and others to exercise supervision over the subordinate. Yet if this is the reason, it would seem better to phrase the rule as a duty to supervise; and it should be a defence to prove that due care was taken to supervise”. To sum up, where along with the term “permitted” the word “knowingly” is used, the onus is upon the prosecution to prove that the accused has either used, or permitted the use of vehicle. The accused is entitled to succeed when the prosecution has failed to prove all the ingredients of the offence with which he was charged. But when the term used is “permitted” only, the prohibition is more absolute though it would not be a case of absolute prohibition where mens rea can be supplied by the simple doing of the forbidden act. This would only alter the weight of the burden of proof to be adduced by the prosecution since in such a case the accused will have to show that he was not “permitting” and establish complete lack of knowledge on his part. The position cannot be better stated than in the words of Goddard, J., in Evans v. Dell8: “With the complexity of modern legislation, one knows that there are times when the Court is constrained to find that, by reason of the clear terms of an Act of Parliament, mens rea, or the absence of mens rea, becomes material, that if a certain act is done, an offence is committed whether the person knew or did not know”. But when one gets complete vindication of the accused, as in this case, so far as any knowledge of the wrong use of the coach, there was nothing in the Road Traffic Act that constrains the Court to hold that knowledge or no knowledge, he was guilty of the offence. Section 123 of the Motor Vehicles Act is much wider than section 42 (1). Section 42 (1) applies only to owners of transport vehicles, but section 123 applies to any one who drives a motor vehicle or causes or allows a motor vehicle to be used in contravention of the provisions of section 42 (1): Provincial Government of C.P. & Berar v. Mohan Lal1. This section uses the words “causes or allows” a motor vehicle to be used, whereas section 42 (1) speaks of permitting the use of the vehicle. This distinction is not without difference. The use of the words “cause” and “causing” as pointed out by Professor Edwards in Chapter VI (page 137 and following) in connection with statutory offences is of great antiquity. As early as 1267, in the Statute of Marlborough, we find it enacted that “no one from henceforth shall cause any distress……”. But as the learned Professor mentions, nothwithstanding the passage of seven hundred odd years during which the simple term “causes” has been appearing intermittently among the pages of the statute book, it was not until the beginning of the nineteenth century that the Courts apparently begin to be troubled with its exact meaning. It is unnecessary to refer here to the earlier English decisions which will be found set out by Professor Edwards and it is enough for is to know that judicial opinion while readily acquiescing in the doctrine that a person could be said to “suffer” or “permit” a thing to happen if, being in a position to stop it, he does nothing about it, refused to extend the same principle to statutory crimes involving “causing”. The need for proving positive conduct and not passive acquiescence in order to substantiate a charge of “causing” was emphasised in the House of Lords case of Houston v. Buchanan2, which was a civil action arising out of the familiar section 35 (1) of the Road Traffic Act, 1930. The need for proving positive conduct and not passive acquiescence in order to substantiate a charge of “causing” was emphasised in the House of Lords case of Houston v. Buchanan2, which was a civil action arising out of the familiar section 35 (1) of the Road Traffic Act, 1930. “To cause the user” said Lord Wright, “involves some express or positive mandate from the person ‘causing ‘to the person or some authority from the former to the latter arising in the circumstances of the case”. It is in this important respect that “causing” is to be distinguished from the word “permitting” which, according to Lord wright is “a looser and vaguer term”and“may denote an express permission, general or particular, as distinguished from a mandate”. Although none of the earlier cases like Harrison v. Leaper3, Small v. Warr4, Hardcastle v. Bielby5 and Goldsmith v. Deakin6 were apparently cited to the House of Lords, it will be observed that Lord Wright's interpretation follows closely the meaning attributed to the word “causing” in those cases by Cockburn, C.J., Crompton, Mellor, Field, Collins, JJ. and Huddles-ton, B., and, more recently, by Lord Goddard, C.J., Oliver and Byrne, JJ. in Rushton v. Martin7. To adopt Lord Wright's phrase, “a positive mandate” is necessary which presupposes knowledge on the part of the person charged with “causing” of the facts which constitute the particular offence. This necessity for proving mens rea was again approved in the case of Reynolds v . G.H. Austin & Sons Ltd.,8, which, was concerned with the offence of using or causing or permitting a’ motor vehicle to be used as an express carriage without the requisite road service licence. Therefore, Professor Edwards concludes his discussion by stating that the decision in Cox v. Sidery1 and the majority decision in Mitchell v. Morrison2, in no way minimise the principle accepted by an impressive majority of judicial opinion, that guilt in statutory offences based upon the words “causes” or “causing” is dependent upon proof, first, of guilty knowledge of all the elements contained in the offence, and, secondly, express authorisation of the forbidden event. The word “allows” in statutory offences is very much a newcomer. Earlier we have shown that “suffering” and “permitting” though often used in relation to different circumstances possess the same ingredients of liability, viz., knowledge of the particular event coupled with a power to prevent which is not exercised. The word “allows” in statutory offences is very much a newcomer. Earlier we have shown that “suffering” and “permitting” though often used in relation to different circumstances possess the same ingredients of liability, viz., knowledge of the particular event coupled with a power to prevent which is not exercised. Can it be said that the term “allows” or “knowingly allows” may be similarly definede Professor Edwards in his “ Mens Rea in Statutory Offences”, Chapter VII(page 156 and following) on the topic of “allowing” states: “At least two Chief Justices appear to have been prepared to accept this view. Thus, in Emary V. Nolloth3, in the course of an attempt to classify the different types of cases constantly arising under the Licensing Acts, Lord Alverstone, C.J. said: ‘Then comes the class of cases in which the licensee is charged with knowingly allowing, permitting or suffering an offence to be committed; in those cases knowledge is essential’. The main emphasis, it will be noticed, is placed on the common factor of a guilty mind, and this same connecting link prompted Lord Goddard, C.J., in the recent case of Ferguson v. Weaving4, to state: ‘There is no material difference between permitting or suffering something and knowingly allowing it to take place’, for, as was said in Somerset v. Hart5: ‘How can a man suffer a thing to be done when he does not know of it.” Both the Judges, it is true were equating “knowingly allowing” rather than “allowing” with the expressions “permitting” and “suffering”. But the correct view, it is suggested by the learned Professor, recognises the word “allows” as being in itself synonymous with the terms “permits” and “suffers”, because as pointed out by Darling, J., in Crabtree v. Fern Spinning Co., Ltd.,6 a man cannot be stated to allow that of which he is unaware or that which he cannot prevent. Professor Edwards concludes this discussion with the following remarks: “All the evidence available suggests that each and all of the epithets ‘permits’, ‘suffers,’ and ‘allows’ is designed to embrace the same conduct. Unless, therefore, some hidden meaning, known only to the legislature or the parliamentary draftsman, has yet to be realised, the hope might be expressed that in future legislation the numerous permutations which we have already examined might, with advantage, be considerably reduced”. Unless, therefore, some hidden meaning, known only to the legislature or the parliamentary draftsman, has yet to be realised, the hope might be expressed that in future legislation the numerous permutations which we have already examined might, with advantage, be considerably reduced”. Bearing these principles in mind if we examine the facts of these cases, we find that the conviction under section 42(1) read with section 123(1) is correct. The Manager, as the evidence stands at present, might not in terms be the owner contemplated under section 42(1) but would certainly be a person causing or allowing the motor vehicle to be used in contravention of sub-section(1) of section 42. The requisite mens rea is furnished by the circumstantial evidence. The buses were taken from the sheds under the control of the Manager and from which they could not be taken out without his knowledge and authority with a full complement of 28 passengers each at 3-35 a.m. during the racing season and no records, like the trip-sheet, etc., were deliberately kept, obviously to cover up this unauthorised trip. The drivers and conductors have not been punished, which would have been the case if the Manager was not a party to this user of these vehicles. It is unnecessary to multiply these details to show that the prosecution has established both guilty knowledge of all the elements contained in the offence and secondly, express authorization of the forbidden event as distinct from either guilty knowledge being equated with holding the position of responsibility or passive acquiescence. The convictions are, therefore, irreproachable and they are conformed. The sentences are by no means excessive and are affirmed. In the result, these Revision Cases are dismissed. K.S.-----Revision cases dismissed.