Judgment These are appeals preferred by the State against the acquittals by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Nagapattinam, in S.T.C. Nos. 58 and 59 of 1955. (2) The facts are: the accused in both these cases were carrying on business of firewood depot within the limits of Nagapattinam town. There is no dispute that this business, by virtue of a municipal notification which had been widely tomtomed and published, cannot be carried on without a licence granted by the municipality on that behalf as against the payment of the prescribed fee. The accused in these cases got licenses to run this firewood depot business from 1st April, 1954 to 31st March, 1955. These licenses expired on 1st April, 1955. (3) Section 249(5) of the District Municipalities Act lays down: “Applications for renewal of such licenses shall be made not less than thirty and not move than ninety days before the end of every year and applications for licenses for places to be newly opened shall be made not less than thirty and not more than ninety days before they are opened”. In other words, all these persons carrying on the business notified by the Municipality as requiring a license to be taken in that behalf have got to submit renewal applications with the prescribed fees within the prescribed time before the expiry of the license. In case such applications are made but no orders have been received from the municipality, apparently to relieve the business-people from hardships not of their own making, there is a provision in section 321(11) of the Act which lays down that when an application for renewal of the license has been made within the prescribed period and there has been no communication of the orders on that application, the concerned applicant awaiting the orders, will be entitled to act as if the license had been renewed. In these cases there is no dispute that no such applications for renewal within the prescribed period has been made and in fact the renewal applications in these cases have been filed on 3rd and 8th August. 1955. (4) This renewal application itself was in response to a notice issued by the municipality as early as 18th May, 1955, but we are not concerned here with what orders had been passed on that renewal application. 1955. (4) This renewal application itself was in response to a notice issued by the municipality as early as 18th May, 1955, but we are not concerned here with what orders had been passed on that renewal application. In so far as the license had not been renewed by means of an application within the time prescribed, the municipality has launched a prosecution against these persons. (5) The learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate by some process of reasoning which I must confess I am unable to follow has convinced himself that section 321(7) and 321(11) compelled him to acquit the accused. (6) I shall, therefore, examine these two provisions. section 321(7) of the Act states: “When any license or permission is suspended or revoked, or when the period for which it was granted, or within which application for renewal should be made, has expired, whichever expires later, the grantee shall for all purposes of this Act or any rule or bye-law made under this Act be deemed to be without a license or permission until the order suspending or revoking the license or permission is cancelled, or subject to sub- section (11) until the license or permission is renewed, as the case my be”. This section lays down that when an application for renewal of a license has not been made within the prescribed period then the person running the business will be deemed to be doing so uncovered by a license but only subject to sub- section (11) whereunder the licence or permission would be deemed to stand renewed, as the case may be. It is plain beyond all words that this section 321(7) would not help these accused persons, because it will be deemed by reason of their not having made an application within the time prescribed, that they were running the business after 1st April, 1955, without a license unless section 321(11) applies to their case. Then let us turn to section 321(11) of the Act. The operative words applicable to this case are: “…………but an applicant for the renewal of a license or permission or registration until communication of orders on his application be entitled to act as if the license or permission or registration had been renewed”. Then let us turn to section 321(11) of the Act. The operative words applicable to this case are: “…………but an applicant for the renewal of a license or permission or registration until communication of orders on his application be entitled to act as if the license or permission or registration had been renewed”. In other words, on the principle of nunc pro tunc if an application has been made as prescribed by this Act and within the time prescribed and which has been reproduced above, and no orders had been passed thereon and communicated to the businessman, then he will stand protected because it will be deemed as if the license had been-renewed. It stands to common-sense that a businessman who has complied with all the requirements of the statute cannot be victimised by reason of official incompetence or dilatoriness in the various offences. This does not mean that this applies to belated applications preferred after the date of the expiry of the preceeding license, and to which I shall refer to in the next paragraph The mere fact that a person has not renewed his license and his business has been run uncovered by license does not mean that he has disentitled himself forever to a renewed license. On the other hand, there is a provision for his applying for a license even after the expiry of the old period with an enhanced fee, as may be prescribed by the local by-laws and rules and on which suitable orders may be passed by the concerned corporation. It may be that his license will be renewed or it may be that his license is rejected. In any event, unless there is a special provision to the contrary, the renewal of the license would be only from the date on which it has been granted. The hiatus will stand uncovered by a license and for the period during which a business is run without being properly covered by a license. The person carrying on the business will be liable to be prosecuted and such a prosecution will be perfectly valid. But there can be special statutory provision as under the Motor Vehicles Act where orders passed on belated applications would be deemed to have been passed as on the date of the expiry of the previous license. The person carrying on the business will be liable to be prosecuted and such a prosecution will be perfectly valid. But there can be special statutory provision as under the Motor Vehicles Act where orders passed on belated applications would be deemed to have been passed as on the date of the expiry of the previous license. The re-dating back may be done as from the date of the expiry of the license notwithstanding that there was belated application and renewal was granted long after the expiry of the previous license. This has not been the case here. Therefore, I am unable to agree with the conclusion of the learned Sub-divisional Magistrate that the accused is not liable to be convicted by reason of the provisions of section 321(7) and 321(11) of the Act, and which conclusions were also presseed before me by the learned advocate for the respondents in this Court. In this Court reference was made to section 338of the Act. I am afraid I am unable to see how section 338 is applicable to this case unless it is based upon the argument that the notice for prosecution for failure to take out a renewal of the license in this case has been issued under section 338of the District Municipalities Act. This section speaks only of consequences on failure to obtain a license, etc., or breach of the same. It has nothing to do with the running of a business not covered by a license and failure to renew the same as prescribed by the statute. As I have come to the conclusion that under section 321(II) a belated application will not be construed as one made in accordance with law and on which orders of renewal as from the date of the expiry of the license can be passed, this section is not of any help to the respondents. In the result, I hold that as the accused had not applied for licenses before the end of the year as required under section 249(5) , the lower Court erred in accepting the defence of the accused that as he had paid the renewal fee of Rs. In the result, I hold that as the accused had not applied for licenses before the end of the year as required under section 249(5) , the lower Court erred in accepting the defence of the accused that as he had paid the renewal fee of Rs. 27-8-0 and the penalty and as he did not get a reply from the municipality he must be presumed to have obtained the license under section 321(11) of the Act which applies only to cases in which the license fee is paid during the prescribed time which will protect the accused from being prosecuted by virtue of section 321(11) of the District Municipalities Act. These appeals have got to be accepted and the orders of acquittal set aside. The orders of acquittal are accordingly set aside and the accused are convicted under Schedule VII to section 249 of the Act and under section 313of the Act and they are sentenced each to pay a fine of Rs. 50. R.M.-----Appeals allowed.