The controversy raised in this petition pertains to employment in a Corporation which arises in the following circumstances : The petitioner, Shri Sanakhya Ebotombi Haorokcham, was initially appointed as casual Officer on Special Duty (F) (OSD in short) of the Manipur Film Development Council (MFDC in short) on a consolidated pay of Rs.500 (Rupees five hundred) only per month for a period of three months by order dated 12.11.82. He was allowed to continue in the same capacity of course at a raised rate of salary till 1990. The services of the petitioner continued by means of extension granted from time to time and the last extension order was issued on 4.6.90 by the Managing Director, Manipur Film Development Corporation Ltd, which reads as follows: “No. MFDC/54-DA/87: The term of service of Shri Sanakhya Ebotombi, OSD (F) Contract Employee) is extended for a period of 6 (six) months wef 1.2.1990 at a consolidated pay of Rs. 1,0007-PM.” The term of service of the petitioner was not extended thereafter, instead, by an order passed by the MD, MFDC Ltd, it was stated that the services of the petitioner was not extended after 31st July, 1990, which is the subject matter of this writ application, challenged on the ground of being arbitrary. 2. The petitioner in this writ application stated that he possesses the general qualification of a Science graduate from the Gauhati University and engaged himself in acting and directing for a leading theatre group in Imphal. He joined the National School of Drama and completed his course in 1976 specialising in Direction. The petitioner has also narrated about his other qualifications like that of directing of Manipur Feature Films, etc. According to the petitioner, he was entitled to a fair treatment from the authority. That by the order dated. 12.11.82 under No. MFDC/16-EST/81-82, the petitioner was appointed as a casual OSD at a paltry amount of salary of Rs.500 per month, which amount was raised to Rs.1,000. But instead of making any genuine endeavour for regularisation of his service or upgrading his service to a higher post, he was kept in a precarious position by retaining him in that fashion. The Corporation is a Govt. Corporation /discharging public functions and owes a duty to act like a model employer, contended the learned senior counsel Mr. Th Ibobi Singh appearing on behalf of the petitioner. The Corporation is a Govt. Corporation /discharging public functions and owes a duty to act like a model employer, contended the learned senior counsel Mr. Th Ibobi Singh appearing on behalf of the petitioner. The learned senior counsel has submitted that the petitioner had no choice on his appointment. He came to the institution because of his love for the works involved and, therefore, he got himself involved in the activities of the Corporation and the Corporation utilised his services, but never made any genuine effort to improve his service career; instead, the Corporation showed him the door by snapping his term of appointment by not accepting his services beyond 31st July, 1990. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted in the facts and circumstances of the case, the aforesaid order dated 4.6.90, issued by the MD MFDC Ltd, was arbitrary, discriminatory and irrational. 3. The Corporation/respondent entered appearance and disputed the claim of the petitioner by way of submitting is affidavit. Mr. N. Pramod Chandra Singh, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Corporation, fairly produced all the records available and submitted that the petitioner was out and out a casual employee whose appointment itself was of casual nature. The learned senior counsel submitted that the petitioner was not appointed against any regular vacancy; nor was his appointment pursuant to any notification/advertisement. The petitioner was appointed to the post in question as a stop-gap arrangement and accordingly, the services of the petitioner continued as a casual employee which was extended from time to time. That the petitioner continued in the department as a casual employee on the strength of extension orders and the authority, when on overall consideration found that there was no necessity for further such engage­ment/appointment, the Corporation redeemed its right not to extend the service of the petitioner, more so when the institution was undergoing financial constraints. Mr. Ibobi Singh, the learned counsel for the petitioner, in course of his argument, further questioned the competence of the Managing Director to terminate the services of the petitioner and for taking the decision not to extend the services of the petitioner. since the Managing Director was not competent to pass any such order. In reply to the aforesaid contention, Mr. Ibobi Singh, the learned counsel for the petitioner, in course of his argument, further questioned the competence of the Managing Director to terminate the services of the petitioner and for taking the decision not to extend the services of the petitioner. since the Managing Director was not competent to pass any such order. In reply to the aforesaid contention, Mr. N. Pramod Chandra Singh, the learned counsel for the respondent/Corporation, submitted that the order of the Managing Director was ratified by the Executive Board of the Corporation and, therefore, no objection can be raised in that regard. The learned senior counsel for the respondent/Corporation submitted that the service of the petitioner was not up to the mark as expected by the Corporation and, therefore, his engagement as OSD was terminated. Therefore, according to the learned counsel for the respondents, the petitioner did not acquire any right to the post and there was no illegality on the part of the respondents in not extending the service of the petitioner in the facts and circumstances of the case. The learned counsel for the respondents, in support of his contentions, referred to two decisions of the Supreme Court in Director, Institute of Management Development, UP vs. Smti Pushpa Srivastava reported in AIR 1992 SC 2070 ; and in Committee of Management, Vasanta College for Women vs. Tribhuwan Nath Tripathi & others reported in (1997) 2 SCC 560 . 4. Before going to the respective contentions of the parties, it would be pertinent to look into some of the factual aspects that stares before me. Prior to the coming into being of the Manipur Film Development Corporation, the management of the affairs of the Corporation was done by the Manipur Film Development Council headed by the Chief Minister who happened to be the ex-officio Chairman of the Council. The Council in its 7th Executive Board Meeting by its resolution No.9, appointed the petitioner on casual basis as OSD (F) at the consolidated salary of Rs.500 per month. The Corporation came into existence on the 1st of May, 1987. All the Council files are not before this Court. However, from the Corporation files, it transpires that the petitioner' s service was extended from time to time on the basis of notes put up. The Corporation came into existence on the 1st of May, 1987. All the Council files are not before this Court. However, from the Corporation files, it transpires that the petitioner' s service was extended from time to time on the basis of notes put up. The last extension note, being note No. 38 dated 4.6.90, was put up before the Managing Director proposing extension of the term of office of three persons including the petitioner; and the Managing Director accordingly put his approval and ordered for extension of the service for six months. However, by resolution No.8 of the 9th meeting of the Board of Directors dated 16th August, 1991, the Board resolved as follows: “8. Case filed by Sanakhya Ebotombi, former OSD (F) to Gauhati High Court The Acting Managing Director placed a brief report to the Board and discussed it thoroughly. The Board approved the termination of services of Sanakhya Ebotombi as his appointment was purely as on contract basis.” From the above facts, it thus emerges that the decision for extension or non-extension of the service, of the petitioner was taken by Managing Director himself on 4.6.90. What was sought to be ratified is the post facto reference showing the termination of the petitioner from his service, after institution of the writ petition on February, 1991 and after the issuance of Notice of Motion by the High Court on 5.3.1991. Mr. N. Pramod Chandra Singh, learned senior counsel for the respondents, averred that no injustice was caused to the petitioner since he was given an opportunity for being considered in a regular post of higher cadre of the status of Film Officer and the petitioner in fact appeared before the Selection Board, but could not come out successful. The learned senior counsel for the respondents referring to the 16th Executive Board Meeting of the erstwhile Council held on 21.12.85, submitted that the said Board meeting approved the proposal of the Selection Committee for appointment of Shri Khundrakpam Joykumar Singh to the post of Film Officer vide resolution No.9. By the same resolution, the Board decided to retain the petitioner as OSD. By the same resolution, the Board decided to retain the petitioner as OSD. The learned senior counsel referring to a representation made by the petitioner questioning the appointment of Shri Khundrakpam Joykumar Singh which was turned down by the Board, submitted that the case of the petitioner was fairly taken into consideration and since he failed to come up successful for the post, question of discrimination or arbitrariness does not arise. It may, however, be stated that despite the above fact, the Executive Board Meeting dated 21.12.85 approved the retention of the petitioner as OSD while approving the appointment of Shri Khundrakpam Joykumar Singh as the Film Officer, which decision of the Board was never reviewed. 5. The decision referred to by Mr. N. Pramod Chandra Singh, the learned counsel for the respondents in Pushpa Srivastava (supra) is different on facts from that of the present case. In the aforesaid case, Smti Pushpa Srivastava was appointed as Research Executive at a consolidated compensation of Rs. 1,250 per month on ad hoc basis. By an order dated 18th July, 1988 her appointment was extended for a further period of three months with effect from 2nd August, 1988. By order dated 28.1.89, another office order was issued appointing Pushpa Srivastava as Training Executive on contract basis for a period of three months at a consolidated pay of Rs. 1,500 per month, purely on ad hoc basis. Again by an order dated 20th June, 1989 she was appointed to a newly created post of Executive at the pay scale of Rs.770-1,600 on ad hoc basis for a period of six months, terminable by one month's notice on either side. On 5th January, 1990 another ad hoc appointment was made for a period of three months. Though efflux of time, the appointment came to an end on 21st of March, 1990 yet she was continued beyond the prescribed period. Smti Srivastava submitted her resignation on 13.7.90 which was forwarded to the Director of the Institute who accepted the same vide order dated 31st July, 1990. But despite that, Smti Pushpa Srivastava requested the authority to let her continue in service for some more time and on her request, the Institute appointed her on a contractual basis as a Training Executive at a consolidated pay of Rs.2,400 per month, which was purely made on ad hoc basis. But despite that, Smti Pushpa Srivastava requested the authority to let her continue in service for some more time and on her request, the Institute appointed her on a contractual basis as a Training Executive at a consolidated pay of Rs.2,400 per month, which was purely made on ad hoc basis. However on the recommendation of a Committee constituted for going into the question of abolition of post, the post held by Smti Srivastava was also recommended for abolition as according to the Committee, the said post had become redundant and she was terminated from service. Smti Srivastava then preferred an application under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court and the High Court allowed the writ petition. On appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment and order of the High Court and observed that The appointment was purely ad hoc and on a contractual basis for a limited period. Therefore, by expiry of the period of six months, the right to remain in the post comes to an end.” In Vasant College (supra), the appointment related to the post of Lecturer in the college wherein the respondent, Tribhuwan Nath Tripathy initially appointed on ad hoc basis despite not having the requisite eligibility at the same time giving a specific time period for obtaining the required qualification/eligibility which the respondent failed to obtain within the given time. A fresh advertisement was issued calling for candidates with requisite eligibility to be appointed as Lecturer during the subsistence of the period of his appointment. Respondent challenged the advertisement. Meanwhile another person was appointed to the post after due selection who subsequently resigned. In the meantime, the respondent obtained his Ph. D. But again fresh advertisement was issued calling for applications for the post. By that time the ad hoc appointment of the respondent had come to an end. The Supreme Court in the case held that ad hoc appointees had no subsisting right to continue in service after the expiry of the period of such appointment and the case was dismissed. 6. Here in this case, the matter is not of similar nature. Here is a case where a person was allowed to hold a post for years together and the term of the appointment was extended from time to time. 6. Here in this case, the matter is not of similar nature. Here is a case where a person was allowed to hold a post for years together and the term of the appointment was extended from time to time. On the face of the decisions of the Supreme Court, the Managing Director of the Corporation was not justified is not extending the service of the petitioner. Each of the above two cases stand on a different footing. It is indeed true that in the strict legal sense a casual employee does not hold any right to a post. Here is a case where a person was allowed to continue for years together without there being any indication for non-extension of his service till the impugned decision was taken on 16th August, 1991. Apart from precedents, human considerations cannot be totally overlooked. In this context, it would be pertinent to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1991 SC 295 , which was referred to and relied upon in the case of Aswini Kumar vs. State of Bihar reported in AIR 1996 SC 2833 . Besides, the 16th Executive Board meeting of the Council held on 21.12.85, took a conscious decision to retain the petitioner as OSD (F) as usual. In the case in hand, the petitioner was allowed to work as an Officer on Special Duty. The appointment was shown as on contract. In private law, one can legitimately hold that such person does not acquire any right to the post hence termination cannot be faulted. The petitioner here has come for a public law remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. In determining the issue under the public law remedy, one cannot overlook the spirit of the Constitution embodied in the Preamble of the Constitution, the rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution and the positive aspects ingrained in the directive principles of State Policy like Article 39 (a), 41 - more particularly to the said principles. The decision of the Council on the strength of which the petitioner was continued in the service as OSD so long was neither questioned nor cancelled by the Board. The petitioner was allowed to continue in the post without any demur till abruptly the impugned decision was taken by the Managing Director without assigning any reason of whatsoever manner. The decision of the Council on the strength of which the petitioner was continued in the service as OSD so long was neither questioned nor cancelled by the Board. The petitioner was allowed to continue in the post without any demur till abruptly the impugned decision was taken by the Managing Director without assigning any reason of whatsoever manner. Further, in the affidavit, the respondents also dwelt with the efficiency of the petitioner wherein it was stated that the service of the petitioner was not up to the mark. No indication was given to the petitioner, till the impugned order was passed, as to the requirement of improving the service of the petitioner. Assuming the said allegation to be true, the above circumstances would have been relevant in the matter of promotion or upgradation of the post and not for extension of the service in the post. The respondent/Corporation is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and the aforesaid position was never in dispute at any stage. Action of the respondent/Corporation, therefore, is to conform to the Constitutional norms and the public law element. Order, therefore, cannot be upheld as just, fair and reasonable when tested on the anvil of Article 14 of the Constitution. In the aforesaid circumstances, the impugned order dated 6.8.90, accordingly is set aside. The petitioner is ordered to be reinstated. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the case in its entirety, there shall be no order for payment of the arrear of his salary. It is made clear that it would always be open for the respondents/authority to review the situation on the facts and circumstances of the case and to pass necessary orders for regular absorption of the petitioner in any suitable job commensurate within his qualification. The writ petition is accordingly allowed to the extent indicated. However, there shall be no orders as to costs.