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1999 DIGILAW 2602 (MAD)

C. Krishna Reddi v. State of Andhra (now Andhra Pradesh) by Secretary, P. W. and Transport Department

1999-11-30

SATYANARAYANA RAJU

body1999
Order This is a petition for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the Order of the Government in G.O. R.T. No. 284, dated the 20th of March, 1956, which confirmed the orders of the Subordinate Transport Tribunals suspending the petitioner's permit, for the alleged violation of some of its conditions. The petitioner is a Transport operator plying his vehicle A.D.A. 302 on the route Putlur to Yadiki in the Anantapur District. On the 25th of June, 955, the Regional Transport Officer, Anantapur, checked the bus and found that it was overloaded by 43 adult passengers beyond the permitted seating capacity of the vehicle and that it was tunning late by 20 minutes. The Regional Transport Authority, by a notice dated 11th July, 1955, called upon the petitioner to submit his explanation with regard to the alleged contravention of the condition is of the permit. On the 17th of July, 1955, the petitioner submitted his explanation, wherein he virtually admitted the fact that the bus was overloaded when the check was made, but he pleaded that certain accused persons in a rioting case who were proceeding to Tadpatri, forcibly got into the bus without heeding to the protest of the conductor. The Regional Transport Authority, at its meeting held on 28th July, 1955, considered the explanation offered by the petitioner, but having regard to the fact that the overload was abnormal directed the permit to be suspended tor a period of six weeks. The petitioner preferred an appeal against the order of the Regional Transport Authority to the Central Road Traffic Board. Before the Board, it was urged on behalf of the petitioner that the overload was unavoidable because 43 persons forcibly boarded the bus despite the protest of the conductor and that the lives of the conductor and the driver would have been endangered if they had refused to take them. The Board thought that what the petitioner stated might have been true but held that it could not exonerate the petitioner completely from the legal consequence of overload. They therefore confirmed the period of suspension ordered by the Regional Transport Authority. The Government, before whom a revision was filed by the petitioner confirmed the orders passed by the Subordinate Transport Tribunals. They therefore confirmed the period of suspension ordered by the Regional Transport Authority. The Government, before whom a revision was filed by the petitioner confirmed the orders passed by the Subordinate Transport Tribunals. They held that the fact that the bus was running late by 20 minutes was admitted and that non-adherence to the schedule of timings constituted violation of one of the conditions of the permit. Before the Government, it was urged for the petitioner that he was not present at the time when the bus was overloaded, but the Government held the fact that he was not present was of no avail. In the result, they confirmed the order of suspension. In this petition, Mr. Kulasekara Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the Transport Tribunals have found as a fact that 43 passengers made forcible entry into the bus despite the protest of the conductor and the driver threatening them with violence. He has argued that no offence was committed by the petitioner in view of the exception to section 94 of the Indian Penal Code read with section 40, that the Government did not at all consider this point though it was taken before it and that the order of the Government is vitiated by an error apparent on the face of the record. The short question, therefore, which falls for consideration in this petition is whether the contravention of the conditions of a permit under the Motor Vehicles Act is an “offence” as defined by section 40 of the Penal Code, which brings him under section 94 of the Code. In support of his contention, the counsel for the petitioner relied upon a decision of the Madras High Court in Jerome D'silva v. The Regional Transport Authority, South Kanara and another1. There it was held that a quasi-judicial Tribunal like the Regional Transport Authority or the Appellate Tribunal there from cannot ignore the findings and orders of competent criminal Courts in respect of an offence, when the Tribunal proceeds to take any action on the basis of the commission of that offence. The learned Judges there observed that as primarily the criminal Courts of the land are entrusted with the enquiry into offences, it is desirable that the findings and orders of the criminal Courts should be treated as conclusive proceedings before quasi-judicial Tribunals like Transport Authorities under the Motor Vehicles Act. The learned Judges there observed that as primarily the criminal Courts of the land are entrusted with the enquiry into offences, it is desirable that the findings and orders of the criminal Courts should be treated as conclusive proceedings before quasi-judicial Tribunals like Transport Authorities under the Motor Vehicles Act. There, the question as to whether the contravention of the conditions of a permit provided under the Motor Vehicles Act is an offence was not considered. That question has to be determined on a consideration of the material provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 60 of the Act provides for cancellation and suspension of permits. It reads as follows “Section 60 (1).-The Transport Authority which granted a permit may cancel the permit or may suspend it for such period as it thinks fit- (a) on the breach of any condition specified in sub- section (3) of section 59, or of any condition contained in the permit, or (b) if the holder of the permit uses or causes or allows a vehicle to be used in any manner not authorised by the permit, or (c) if the holder of the permit ceases to possess the vehicle or vehicles covered by the permit, or (d) if the holder of the permit has obtained the permit by fraud or misrepresentation Provided that no permit shall be cancelled unless an opportunity has been given to the holder of the permit to submit his explanation”. “Section 123 .-(1) Whoever drives a motor vehicle or causes or allows a motor vehicle to be used or lets out a motor vehicle for use in contravention of the provisions of sub- section (1) of section 42 shall be punishable for a first offence with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, and for a subsequent offence if committed within three years of the commission of a previous similar offence with a fine which shall not be less than one hundred rupees and may extend to one thousand rupees”. “Section 42.-(1) No owner of a transport vehicle shall use, or permit the use of, the vehicle in any public place, save in accordance with the conditions of a permit granted or counter -signed by a Regional or Provincial Transport Authority authorizing the use of the vehicle in that place in the manner in which the vehicle is being used”. “Section 42.-(1) No owner of a transport vehicle shall use, or permit the use of, the vehicle in any public place, save in accordance with the conditions of a permit granted or counter -signed by a Regional or Provincial Transport Authority authorizing the use of the vehicle in that place in the manner in which the vehicle is being used”. As has been pointed out by the learned Chief Justice and Krishna Rao, J., in In re Venkatarao1, section 60 is designed for the enforcement of effective and strict administrative control, whereas section 123 is intended for the prosecution of the owner or any other person using the motor vehicle in contravention of the rules. There is no conflict between departmental action and criminal prosecution. It is open to the authorities concerned instead of taking departmental action to resort to a criminal Court. Where the owner is prosecuted under section 123 of the Act he is prosecuted for an offence, whereas when action is taken against the permit-holder under section 60 of the Act, it involves only the exercise of departmental control. The suspension or revocation of a permit under section 60 of the Act for contravention of the conditions of the permit does not amount to a punishment for an offence. If this conclusion is correct, there is no question of the petitioner being entitled to the benefits of the exception provided under section 94 of the Indian Penal Code. The writ petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee Rs.100. A.B.K.-----Writ Petition dismissed.