Order The applicant T. S. Krishnamurthi has been convicted under section 120-B , read with section 467 , section 467 read with section 471 and section 420 , Indian Penal Code and under five separate counts each under sections 467 , 467 read with section 471 and 420, Indian Penal Code and sentenced to concurrent sentences of imprisonment totalling five years, by the learned Sessions Judge of Madras sitting without a Jury in Sessions Case No. 45 of 1956. The applicant has preferred an appeal and has also filed this application for suspension of sentence of imprisonment and his enlargement on bail. The short point for determination is whether in the circumstances of this case bail can be granted. This applicant was a Clerk in the personnel branch of the Engineering Section, Southern Railways, Madras. The case against him was that during the period between 22nd May, 1952 and 18th May, 1955, he prepared, in conspiracy with accused-2, a temporary peon in the employ of the railway with whom we are not concerned here, and with the intention of cheating the railway, several false supplementary salary bills and false travelling allowance bills in the names of payees who were actually not in the employment of the railway and got the bills cashed and paid out the amounts to various persons by falsely identifying them as the employees mentioned in the bills and entitled to receive the amounts. The amount of which the Railway Company has been so defrauded and discovered upto now is Rs. 64,185-2-0. The prosecution established these facts through 24 witnesses examined by them and Exhibits P-1 to P-155. The case for this applicant was: It is true that he prepared, initialled and certified all the supplementary salary and T.A. bills. But in so initialling and certifying he was not expected to identify the payees. In certain cases where he has not initialled in individual cases and only certified the payments, the bills were sent to him by a peon by the cash department and in cases where he wrote the certificate of payment, it has been signed either by the Head Clerk or by the Sub-Head Clerk and the payments were made in their presence. In some cases he witnessed the payment. In some cases he witnessed the payment. In the case of salary bills they are brought to the section and paid, and the Head Clerk used to ask him to initial or to write out the general certificate of payment. P.Ws. 9 to 12 cannot have correct information that the payees shown are not in employment and the bills referred only to surveys and works belonging to special staffs. There is ill-feeling between him and P.W. 17. If he happened to be on leave on dates of payment, he would certify the payments subsequently as if he had witnessed the payments. As to the evidence of P.Ws. 21 and 22 of his undertaking to produce the payees in Exhibit P-138 is concerned, he says that he only promised to produce the office copies of the bill and the journals relating to the bill, that P.W. 22 refused to take notice of it and took a signed statement from him, So also P.W. 10 took a signed statement from him. He attended the office on 26th, 28th, 29th and 30th June and 1st of July, and signed in the attendance register, but he was not allowed to work and his initials in the attendance register were scored out and P.W. 1 removed all the bills in his presence in spite of his protests. The learned Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that the prosecution had affirmatively and satisfactorily proved their case against this accused and that these swindles were unfortunately facilitated by the lack of supervision and defects in supervision and in regard to which he has also made suggestions for improvement in paragraph 31 of his judgment. Finally the learned Sessions Judge has stated: “The case is a voluminous one, several records being involved. It is creditable to the Investigating Officers, Sri Vincent and Sri Ranganathan that they were able to investigate the case thoroughly and to place the necessary evidence clearly before Court. They deserve to be complimented for the thorough investigation done. The learned City Public Prosecutor handled this case though cumbersome in a neat and efficient manner. The learned defence counsels also co-operated and rendered considerable assistance to the Court in the trial of this case”. The principles governing enlargement on bail by appellate Courts and incidentally revisional of convicted persons who have preferred appeals or revisions are unfortunately the subject-matter of sparse case law. The learned defence counsels also co-operated and rendered considerable assistance to the Court in the trial of this case”. The principles governing enlargement on bail by appellate Courts and incidentally revisional of convicted persons who have preferred appeals or revisions are unfortunately the subject-matter of sparse case law. The result is that sentences are being suspended or not suspended and convicted persons are being enlarged and not enlarged on bail on distractingly discordant principles, or to be more accurate, on no principles. Therefore, the subject invites some exposition and resorting to the principles governing the grant of bail for convicted persons under the English and American systems of Criminal Jurisprudence. The principles as can be deduced from the sparse case law on this subject are set out in the following two extracts from B. K. Basu's Bail and Recognizance in Criminal Cases, 1932, page 47, and the MLJ. commentaries on the Code of Criminal Procedure, third edition, Volume II, at page 1805: “After conviction, even if the offence be bailable, the accused is not entitled as of right to be released on bail, the matter being left entirely to the discretion of the Appellate or the Revisional Courts. After conviction, the Appellate or the Revisional Courts have powers under sections 426 , 437 , 438 and 498, Criminal Procedure Code to release a convicted person on bail, but “it is not to be presumed that the right of appeal or revision carries with it the right of release on bail pending the decision of the appeal or revision”. The principle which should necessarily guide a Court of Appeal or Revision, in determining the question of bail after conviction, is whether there are good prima facie grounds for supposing the convicted person to have been guilty of the offence he is charged with, Sk. Karim, In re1. When after conviction by a Court of competent jurisdiction, an application is made by the appellant or by the Petitioner to be released on bail, the main questions to be considered are (i) first, whether, upon perusal of the judgment or the record, and the petition of appeal or revision, a prima facie ground is disclosed for substantial doubt regarding the conviction or sentence or (ii) secondly, whether the circumstances beyond the control of the appellant are likely to delay the decision of the appeal for an unreasonable time. Re Md. Rahamat Ally1. Re Md. Rahamat Ally1. But In re Clive Durant2, the Bombay High Court went to the length of holding that the possibility of the conviction being wrong on some unimportant technical ground, is no ground for admitting a convicted person to bail. The amended section 497has no application after conviction. Sk. Karim In re,3. “(Basu's Bail and Recognizance in Criminal Cases). “Where the High Court is concerned with men who have been actually convicted, the principle which will necessarily guide the High Court in granting bail will be whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that the convicts committed the offences in question. The mere respectability of a man is per se no sufficient ground for giving bail when he has been convicted of a criminal offence, Sk. Karim, In re3. When an accused person had been convicted for a non-bailable offence by a competent Court after regular trial, the Court of Appeal should not ordinarily release the accused on bail unless there is an error of law or a mistake or a misstatement of fact apparent on the face of the record or for any of the reasons mentioned in the proviso to section 497 (1), Gul v. Emperor.4 But bail should not be refused on the ground that the accused has been sentenced to a long term of imprisonment or the granting of the bail has a tendency to increase the number of appeals and of protracting the appellate proceedings Gul v. Emperor4. See also Emperor v. Masuria.5 Conviction depending on technical point no ground for bail. Where the accused relies merely upon a technical ground against the propriety of his conviction, he should not be admitted to bail: Rat. 480. “(Commentaries on the Code of Criminal Procedure, 3rd Edition, Volume 11, MLJ. 1956 page 1805). A reference to the monumental encylopaedic A.I.R. Publication Fifty Years’ Criminal Digest, 1904-1953 by V.V. Chitaley and S. Appu Rao wherein no reported decision has been omitted shows that the aforesaid three decisions cited in the extracts above, viz., Slate of Cutch v. Aher Vasta Hadhu6; Gul v. Emperor4 and Sk. Karim v. Emperor3, constitute the sole repository of principles regulating bail pending appeal. The English law on the subject is found in Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edition (Simonds) 1955 at page 526. Karim v. Emperor3, constitute the sole repository of principles regulating bail pending appeal. The English law on the subject is found in Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edition (Simonds) 1955 at page 526. Section 967has the following to say: “On the application of an appellant, he may be admitted to bail by the Court pending the determination of his appeal if the Court thinks fit to do so, but there must be exceptional circumstances. R. v. Newbery and Elman7: R. v. Stewart8. Notice of an application for bail must be given to the prosecution, R. v. Ridley9. If the Court of Criminal Appeal admits an appellant to bail pending the determination of his appeal, the Court must specify the amount of the recognizances and may direct before whom they are taken; but if the Court does not give such a direction, the recognizances of the appellant may be taken before a justice of the peace who is a member of the visiting committee of and at the prison in which the appellant is then confined or before the Governor thereof, and the recognizances of any surety or the appellant may be taken before any petty Sessional Court. The appellant must be ordered, by the order admitting him to bail, to be present personally at each and every hearing of his appeal, and at the final determination thereof. The order for bail may be varied or revoked at any time when the appellant is before the Court. If a surety suspects that the appellant when he has been released on bail is about to depart out of England, or in any manner to fail to observe the conditions of his recognizances, the surety may take steps for the arrest of the appellant. On breach of the appellant's recognizances the Court may order them and those of lis sureties to be escheated. If the appellant is not admitted to bail, he is, pending the determination of his appeal to be accorded special treatment”. The American Law on the subject is set out in 6 Corpus Juris, at page 965: “After conviction in general. On breach of the appellant's recognizances the Court may order them and those of lis sureties to be escheated. If the appellant is not admitted to bail, he is, pending the determination of his appeal to be accorded special treatment”. The American Law on the subject is set out in 6 Corpus Juris, at page 965: “After conviction in general. As a general rule, the conviction of the accused does not deprive the Court of the power to admit him to bail pending an imposition of sentence; but its allowance continues a matter of judicial discretion until the accused is finally committed in execution; and in some jurisdictions this power is expressly regulated by constitutional or by statutory provision. There is however, no constitutional right to bail, after conviction; and, although in cases of mis-demeanour this discretionary power is exercised freely in its favour, in cases of felonies bail after conviction should be allowed with great caution and only where the extraordinary or peculiar circumstances of the case render it right and proper. It has been held that it is a matter of discretion with the Supreme Court on Habeas Corpus, notwithstanding an inflexible rule of the trial Court, not to admit any person convicted of felony to bail; and that a prisoner may be admitted to bail after conviction to appear and abide the sentence of the Court in cases not capital, where the record of conviction is not made up and the Court has nothing before it on which to proceed for sentence; or where the execution of the sentence is suspended; and that this discretion may be exercised after conviction of an infamous offence. But bail will not be granted in any such cases as a matter of right; not after conviction of murder where the statute so prohibits; nor in capital cases. Upon Mistrial.-A mistrial does not give one accused of a capital offence an absolute right to bail, although it may, in connection with other circumstances, constitute proper matter for the exercise of the Court's discretion as to allowing bail. Where the judgment is arrested for some defect in the indictment, or the indictment has been adjudged bad on demurrer, and it appears that an indictable offence has been committed, the Court may order the prisoner to recognize for his appearance to answer to a new indictment. Where the judgment is arrested for some defect in the indictment, or the indictment has been adjudged bad on demurrer, and it appears that an indictable offence has been committed, the Court may order the prisoner to recognize for his appearance to answer to a new indictment. The disagreement of the jury on the trial of the accused does not establish per se that the proof of guilt is not evident nor the presumption great, and that the prisoner is entitled to bail, although it bears on such question; but it is still a matter for the discretion of the Court, and bail has sometimes, under such circumstances, been allowed, especially where two disagreements have occurred, where appeal, error or motion for new trial is pending. The decisions are not in harmony as to the admission to bail pending an appeal, or Writ of error etc., and it is difficult to deduce any general rule of value, for the reason that the nature of the offence and the constitutional and statutory provisions governing the particular case should be considered, involving, as they necessarily must do, the construction and validity of enactments relating to such proceedings. But, under most constitutional or statutory provisions and rules of Court, the granting or refusing of bail pending an appeal after a conviction is generally within the discretion of the Court, and depends largely upon the circumstances of the particular case. Thus under some provisions the granting of bail pending an appeal from a conviction for a felony is a matter of discretion, except in cases of infamous or capital offences, and should not be exercised in favour of the accused, especially where the appeal is frivolous and taken merely for delay, unless there are special or extraordinary circumstances making it right and proper to grant it. But bail is usually allowed pending appeal, in cases of minor offences, such as misdemeanours; and under some provisions bail is demandable as a matter of right upon an appeal from a conviction for a misdemeanour, or even for a felony”. But bail is usually allowed pending appeal, in cases of minor offences, such as misdemeanours; and under some provisions bail is demandable as a matter of right upon an appeal from a conviction for a misdemeanour, or even for a felony”. 6, American Jurisprudence, revised edition, 1950, has the following to say: “Although there is some authority to the contrary, the Courts quite uniformly take the view that constitutional guarantees of the right to bail refer only to cases in which the accused has not yet had a trial, and do not confer a right to bail after a conviction and pending an appeal there from. The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail should be granted only where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent of the crime charged, and that such uncertainty is removed by conviction, the presumption of innocence existing upon application before conviction being rebutted. Another reason for denying bail after conviction is that the probability of ultimate punishment is so enhanced that the accused is much more likely to attempt to escape if liberated on bail than before conviction. On the other hand, constitutional provisions relative to bail are not regarded as prohibiting an allowance of bail after conviction and pending appeal, the matter generally being left 10 the sound discretion of the Court in the absence of a statutory provision to the contrary. In other words, the common-law discretionary power to admit to bail continues, notwithstanding the inapplicability of the constitutional guarantee of the right to bail. It is a power, however, that should be exercised with great caution. In the exercise of such discretion, the burden is placed upon the accused to show error in the conviction. The discretion of the Court to grant or deny bail after conviction and pending appeal is exercised according to the circumstances of each particular case. In determining whether or not to grant bail pending appeal, the Court should also consider whether or not under all the circumstances, the accused will be present 10 abide his punishment if his conviction is affirmed, as well as any other pertinent matters beyond the record of the particular cause wherein the application is made such as the record, character, and reputation of the applicant. Where the right to admission to bail pending an appeal from a conviction rests in discretion of the Court, bail will generally be allowed where it is shown that the petitioner is in poor health and his life endangered by his confinement. Reasons for appeal.-It is generally held, that where bail is allowed pending an appeal from a conviction, the appeal must be one which is taken in good faith, and not for frivolous reason, and must be one for which there is probable cause. However, where, among other reasons for denied bail, it appears that there is no doubt of actual guilt of the accused on the facts, bail may be denied notwithstanding the fact that substantial questions of law are in good faith raised on the appeal. Nature of case and punishment for offence generally:-The discretion of the Court to grant or deny bail after conviction and pending an appeal is exercised freely in favour of bail in cases of misdemeanour, but in felonies bail is allowed with great caution and only where the peculiar circumstances of the case render it right and proper. The severity of punishment may also affect the question. Capital and homicide cases.-Statutes specifically conferring a right to bail pending an appeal from conviction generally contain an exception as to an appeal from a conviction imposing capital punishment. Indeed, the reasons for denying bail after conviction are most strongly applicable in cases of capital offences. Under the usual constitutional provision, one accused of such an offence must show that the proof against him is not evident, nor the presumption great, in order to entitle him to bail; this cannot, of course, be done after conviction, except under unusual conditions.” Bearing these principles in mind, if we examine the materials available we find that there are no grounds whatsoever to suspend the sentence of imprisonment and enlarge the petitioner on bail pending disposal of the appeal. The application is dismissed. R.M.-----Application dismissed.