ORDER This revision petition raises an interesting point, namely, whether an appeal lies in regard to the award of compensation for illegal seizure or detention under section 22 of the Cattle Trespass Act. It is now well-settled that since the word “offence” as defined by section 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure includes an act in respect of which a complaint may be made under section 20 of the Cattle Trespass Act a person against whom an order under section 22 is made is a person “convicted on a trial” within the meaning of this section and an appeal against the conviction lies, therefore, under section 407, Criminal Procedure Code. The case-law on the subject may now be briefly summarised. In the matter of Ponnuswami1, a Bench of this Court consisting of Benson and Moore, JJ., after the amendment of the Cattle Trespass Act, held that by section 4(o) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the word “offence” includes an act in respect of which a complaint may be made under section 20 of the Cattle Trespass Act; and a person against whom an order under section 22 of the Cattle Trespass Act is made is a “person convicted on a trial” and is entitled to appeal under section 407 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In Barthol Duming Rodricks v. Papa Dada2 it was held that a person who is directed to pay compensation under section 22 of the Cattle Trespass Act can be said to be convicted of an offence, but the compensation awarded against; him, though recoverable as a fine, is not a “fine” within the meaning of the Penal Code, and therefore, an appeal against his conviction lies under section 408 of the Criminal Procedure Code and does not fall within the restrictive provisions of section 413 of that Code. This was a Bench decision of the Bombay High Court consisting of Sir Norman Macleod, C.J. and Shah, J. In King Emperor v. Ml Hart Ma3, it was held that where on a complaint being made under section 20 of the Cattle Trespass Act to a Second Class Magistrate, the Magistrate ordered the payment of a certain sum as compensation and refund of the amount of court-fees paid by the complainant, that section 4(o) of the Criminal Procedure Code defining an offence as including an act in respect of which a complaint may be made under section 20 of the Cattle Trespass Act, and clause (v) of the same section of the Code defining a summons case as a case relating to an offence and not being a warrant case, the case under consideration was a summons case; and section 241 of the Code prescribing that the procedure set out in Chapter XX shall be observed by Magistrates in the trial of summons cases, and sections 243 , 245 and 246 providing for convicting the accused, the trying Magistrate's order in this case must be regarded as a conviction within the meaning of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that section 407 enacting that any person convicted by a Magistrate of the Second Class may appeal to the District Magistrate, the reasonable conclusion is that an appeal lies to the District Magistrate. On this construction it is now pointed out under section 22 in the commentaries on the Cattle Trespass Act (section 22, Khagendranath Mitra, page 55) that the rulings in Queen Empress v. Raja Lakhma4, In re Ganesh Prasad5, Dhiku v. Denonath Deb6, Queen Empress v. Lakshmi Nayakan7, Madras High Court Proceedings. 27th November, 1879, No. 21138 in so far as they decide that no appeal will lie against a sentence or order under section 22 is no longer good law, as a person so sentenced would come within section 407, Criminal Procedure Code. In the well-known and exhaustive A.I.R. commentaries on the Code of Criminal Procedure, Vol. II, 4th Edition at page 2211, it is stated: “It follows that a decision in which an offence is not involved is not a conviction on a trial. In the well-known and exhaustive A.I.R. commentaries on the Code of Criminal Procedure, Vol. II, 4th Edition at page 2211, it is stated: “It follows that a decision in which an offence is not involved is not a conviction on a trial. Before the change introduced in 1898 in section 4(1)(o), an illegal seizure of cattle did not amount to an”offence“and an order under the Cattle Trespass Act, 1871, for compensation for illegal seizure was held not to amount to a conviction on trial and not appealable”. (In addition to the above rulings in foot-note 3 the following additional rulings are cited: Raghu Singh v. Abdul Wahab9: In re Khader Khan10, Queen Empress v. Sadhashiv11 Empress v. Baksh1, In re Ganesh Pershad2, See Shama v. Lechhu Sheikh3, Bhagirathi v. Gangadhar4. “Such an order now amounts to a ‘conviction on a trial’ and is appealable”. See also for similar views Sir John Woodroffe's Criminal Procedure in India (Thacker Spink & Co.), (1926) citing Ponnuswami, In re.5 and B. B. Mitra's Code of Criminal Procedure, Twelfth Edition, (1954) Vol. II at page 1576, citing Rodricks v. Papa Dada6; S. Ranganadhiyar's Code of Criminal Procedure, Seventh Edition (1954) Part II at page 1513; “The word ‘offence’ in section 4(1)(o) includes an act of which a complaint may be made under section 20 of the Cattle Trespass Act and a person against whom an order is made under section 22 of the said Act is made a person convicted on a trial.” See Rodricks v. Papa Dada6;Bhagirathi v. Gangadhor4, Bhudhan Mahto v. Issur Singh7; Emperor v. Vishvanath Vishnu8 in this connection. When such a trial is by a Second or Third Class Magistrate an appeal lay against that conviction; Ponnuswami, In re5 and Dr. S. Swaminathan's Commentaries on the Code of Criminal Procedure (Published by Addison & Co., Mount Road, Madras) (1910) at page 670: “A complaint under section 20 of the Cattle Trespass Act is now included in the term offence; Seesection 4, Clause (o), Criminal Procedure Code; therefore a person against whom an order is made under section 22 of the Act is a person convicted on a trial; and an appeal lies from an order of a Second Class Magistrate awarding compensation for illegal seizure of cattle. Ponnuswami, In re.5 The rulings in Queen Empress v. Rajalakshmi9, Khadar Khan, In re 9-a, 9-b and 9-c are not superseded.” SeeMadras High Court Proceedings 27th November, 1879, No. 21139-d. G. P. Boys’ (later Justice) The Code of Criminal Procedure (Butterworth & Co., (India) Ltd., Vol. II (1914) at page 57. “The second paragraph of the definition of ‘offence’ was new in the Code of 1898 and makes the following cases to be of authority in so far as it was held in them that the illegal seizure of cattle under colour of Act (I of 1871) was not an offence Ketabai, In re10, Pitchai v. Ankappa11, Kottallanada v. Mulkaya12, Kala v. Gudadhur13, Nedaram v. Joonab14, Raghu v. Abdul15, Meghai v. Sheobhik16. See now Budhan v. Issur7 and Ponnuswami, In re5. Now that the illegal seizure of cattle under colour of Act (I of 1871) has been declared to be an offence, it would seem that the”compensation“allowed by section 22 of that Act must be regarded as a ‘fine’ or at any rate as a ‘punishment’.” The same observations are also made in Ratan Lal's Criminal Procedure Code 2nd Edition, at page 343 citing and relying on Ponnuswami, In re8 and Budhan Mahto Seco v. Issur Singh7. Sohoni's Criminal Procedure Code, Twelfth Edition page 25: “It follows from the definition that a person against whom an order is made under section 22 of this Act is a ‘Person convicted on a trial’ and an appeal lies against such conviction under section 407 In the matter of Ponnuswami5.” In Appendix at page 1, it is stated “The rulings in Queen Empress v. Raja Lakshmi1, Khadar Khan, In re 2, SeeMadras High Court Proceedings 27th November, 1879, No. 21132-a, Ratanlal 520, Dhiku v . Deonath Deb3 Shama v. Lechhu Sheikh4, Kottalanada v. Muthaya5 and Queen Empress v. Lakshmi Nayakan6 must be regarded as no longer law.” Rodricks v. Papa Dada7 is relied upon for holding that the restrictive provisions of section 413, Criminal Procedure Code, do not apply. Deonath Deb3 Shama v. Lechhu Sheikh4, Kottalanada v. Muthaya5 and Queen Empress v. Lakshmi Nayakan6 must be regarded as no longer law.” Rodricks v. Papa Dada7 is relied upon for holding that the restrictive provisions of section 413, Criminal Procedure Code, do not apply. That is why in the recent A.I.R. Publication “The 50 years’ Criminal Digest, 1904-1953” which is a veritable encyclopaedia of Indian Criminal Law the cases which are held by the commentaries to be no longer good law have not been digested and only Matra Udaisingh v. Dhune Lal8, Nainsukhdas v. Gowardhandas9, Bachoo10, Parameswaran Pillai, In re.11 have been digested under “Proceedings under section 22-Nature of” at page 230 of Volume 1. The position is summed up in Ramanatha Iyer's Commentaries on the Criminal Procedure Code, 2nd Edn. Vol. I, 1956, an MLJ, publication at page 44 as follows: “Complain wider section 20, Cattle Trespass Act.-The last portion of section 4 , Clause (o) is probably due to certain rulings viz., 9 M. 102; 9 M. 374; 18 A. 353, which laid down that an action in respect of which a complaint could be laid under section 20 was not an offence. But now a complaint of wrongful seizure of cattle under section 20 is an offence; 29 M. 517; 34 C. 926; 44 Bom. 42”. As against these decisions we have a Bench decision of the Nagpur High Court in Ghulbe Lahana v. Emperor12 decided by Hidyatullah, J. and a decision by a single Judge of this Court in Venkatesa Reddiar v. Veeraswaml Mudali13, where it was pointed out that a person held liable under section 22 of the Act is not an accused nor is he convicted of the offence, and that under section 22 only compensation together with fines and expenses can be ordered against the person who is adjudged liable. I am indebted to Shri N. T. Raghunathan's very useful All India Digest, 1951-1955, for examining a latter decision of the Nagpur High Court reported in Matra Udesingh v. Dhune Lal8, where Sen, J. lays down that a person against whom a complaint is made under section 20 is not an accused; the result of enquiry is not acquittal or conviction. Hence setting aside an order for compensation does not amount to an acquittal. But in this recent decision of Somasundaram, J., the Bench decision of Benson and Moore, JJ. Hence setting aside an order for compensation does not amount to an acquittal. But in this recent decision of Somasundaram, J., the Bench decision of Benson and Moore, JJ. was not brought to his notice and I am bound, sitting singly, by the Bench decision of this Court apart from the fact that this construction appears to be the better opinion as will be evident from the extracts of the standard text book writers on the subject reproduced above. Therefore, I hold that an appeal lies. But having come to the conclusion that an appeal lies on the facts there are, however, no merits to justify interference and the compensation of Rs. 100 awarded and concerning which alone a reduction was pressed for, is certainly not excessive. This Revision is dismissed. R.M.-----Revision dismissed.