Judgment This is an appeal preferred against the acquittal by the learned Sixth Presidency Magistrate, Saidapet in C.C. No. 5320 of 1957. The dispute in this case relates to a room in No. 95/B of Arcot Road. There is no dispute that P.W. 1 the complainant, one S.N. Rangaswami, has been occupying a room upstairs and a room downstairs for his studio purposes. It is unfortunate that the relations between this Rangaswami and this landlord have been unhappy. In fact both of them seem to have looked upon each other as their sworn enemies and left no stone unturned in the Rent Controller's Court and elsewhere. The landlord's account is that as a matter of fact he did not lease out this room at all to this complainant, but to some other entity, one Shyamala Devi and that this complainant has sneaked in under the cover of that Shyamala Devi. The rent according to the landlord is Rs. 32 per month. It is stated that the complainant has been sending money orders for only Rs. 15. The landlord has naturally refused the money orders, because if he had accepted them that would be construed as the real rent. But subsequently he seems to have been accepting the money orders also because a bird in the hand was worth two in the bush and by accepting it under protest, he would not be also jeopardising his chance in the Rent Control Court. It is unnecessary to traverse the manifold litigations between the parties. We are concerned here only with an alleged trespass of this landlord into the room of this complainant, P.W. 1, and letting it out to D.W. 3. This trespass is said to have taken place on 29th November, 1957, taking advantage of his absence from the place and the landlord surreptitiously opening the lock put by this P.W. 1 and occupying it with the intent to intimidate, insult or annoy the complainant. The version of the landlord is different. He says that wearied by the constant troubles between them the tenant handed over the key of the room to himself in the presence of D.Ws. 1 and 2, and that thereafter he took possession of the room and let it out to D.W. 3. The version of the landlord is different. He says that wearied by the constant troubles between them the tenant handed over the key of the room to himself in the presence of D.Ws. 1 and 2, and that thereafter he took possession of the room and let it out to D.W. 3. Therefore shorn of all verbiage the point which had to be decided by the Magistrate was whether he believed the version of the complainant that taking advantage of his absence the accused sneaked into the room forcibly opening the lock put by him thereon and occupying it in order to intimidate, insult or annoy him; or whether be believed the version of the accused that the key of the room was given to him by this P.W. 1 in the presence of D.Ws. 1 and 2, and that therefore he opened the room and let it out to D.W. 3. The learned Magistrate who enquired into the matter came to the conclusion that he accepted unhesitatingly the testimony of D.W. 2 whom he characterised as a person who gave his answers in a straight forward manner, and that he had no motive to falsely say that this P.W. 1 had handed over the key to the accused. Therefore he acquitted this accused, taking this as well as the other circumstances into consideration. In an appeal against acquittal it has been laid down repeatedly by their Lordships of the Privy Council as well as the Supreme Court that this Court will not lightly interfere with an acquittal. They will pay due regard to the fact that the respondent comes to this Court with the original presumption of innocence fortified by the acquittal by the lower Court. This Court will also bear in mind that the lower Court had the advantage of seeing the witnesses in the box and was able to come to its conclusion on imponderable factors like the “feel” of the case, and which cannot all be translated into paper and on the record of evidence. In fact interference with an acquittal is an innovation in the Criminal Procedure Code and this Court will naturally exercise carefully that power to interfere with such acquittals and set it aside. This is sometimes expressed in another fashion, namely, that this Court will interfere for substantial and compelling reasons. In fact interference with an acquittal is an innovation in the Criminal Procedure Code and this Court will naturally exercise carefully that power to interfere with such acquittals and set it aside. This is sometimes expressed in another fashion, namely, that this Court will interfere for substantial and compelling reasons. In other words this Court will not interfere lightly and on unsubstantial grounds and what is more it will not interfere unless it is convinced that the interests of justice require that the acquittal must be set aside. These are the principles laid down by the Privy Council and the Supreme Court whatever the phrases which might be used, and which are not terms of art. The sum and substance of all that has been laid down by both the Privy Council and the Supreme Court is that you must have good and sufficient and cogent grounds to interfere and you must interfere only when the interests of justice manifestly require it: Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor1, Tulsi Ram In re2, Noor Muhammud, In re3, Wilyat Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh4, Surajpal Singh In re1, Ajmer Singh v. State of Punjab2, Trimbak Can this be said in this case? In this case the learned advocate Mr. Appu Rao who eloquently and at great length argued the case of the appellant was constantly reiterating whether it is probable that P.W. 1 would hand over the key to the accused. While many people do things which look improbable to us, that would not really make it improbable. The motive which operated in the minds of others cannot be readily perceived by us. Motives may be mixed and are often baffling. It has been well said that the devil himself knoweth not the thoughts of man. If the father of the evil itself cannot deduce what is passing in the mind of a person when he does an act or omits to do a thing, how can mere fallible Judges be able to deduce the same. They can only go by the record. To sum up this aspect of the case, it is mostly in criminal cases that the presence or absence of a motive is material and is canvassed to explain what sometimes looks apparently unaccountable. The existence of strong of motive is often an enlightening factor in a process of presumptive reasoning. They can only go by the record. To sum up this aspect of the case, it is mostly in criminal cases that the presence or absence of a motive is material and is canvassed to explain what sometimes looks apparently unaccountable. The existence of strong of motive is often an enlightening factor in a process of presumptive reasoning. In estimating the probabilities of a case, motive cannot be left out of account. Though proof of motive is not: essential, it is a material consideration. It may furnish strong corroboration. The practice of beginning with the evidence of motive and assigning to that branch of the case an exaggerated importance, is beginning at the wrong end and should be deprecated. The real motive may be invisible to all except the person influenced by it. 5. (1952) 1 MLJ. 426: (1952) S.C.J. 32: 1952 S.C.R. 193: A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 52 (S.C.). 6. A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 478. 7. A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 459. 10. A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 39. 11. (1954) S.C.J. 362: 1954 S.C.R. 1098: A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 322. 12. A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 637. 13. A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 585. 14. A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 807. 15. A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 425. 16. (1956) 1 MLJ. (S.C.) 135: (1956) S.C.J. 243: (1955) 2 S.C.R. 1285 : A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 217 (S.C.). 17. (1957) 1 MLJ. (Crl.) 765: (1957) S.C.J. 828: A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 877 (S.C.). 18. (1957) 1 MLJ. (Cr.) 478: (1957) S.C.J. 515: A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 589 (S.C.). 19. A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 643. Motives are so often deep seated as to be unfathomable; Devil itself knoweth not the mind of man. Motive has to be judged by reasonable standards, though what may appear insufficient for one may be a compelling spring of action for another A trivial motive which may not be strong enough to impel a normal person to act in a particular way or even the same person in the same way in different circumstances may be quite sufficient for an abnormal person to act or even the same person to act in a different way in altered circumstances. A clear distinction must be made between a man's intention and a motive which is the desire of the mind which induces a person to act and which desire may be founded in a belief which may be true or false. A clear distinction must be made between a man's intention and a motive which is the desire of the mind which induces a person to act and which desire may be founded in a belief which may be true or false. Mere advantage should not be confused with motive, because as Bentham instructively pointed out, the case of every child having something to gain by the death of his parents and yet how rarely on the death of a parent is parricide even suspected. Therefore, the proper procedure when the motive is not patent is to go by the positive evidence on record. These principles guiding the appreciation of motive evidence are set out in Public Prosecutor v. Rajulapati Basvayya1, Walli Mohammad Rao Circumstantial and Presumptive Evidence (Crl. Law Publications Gudur, (Nellore Dt.) Andhra Pradesh) for discussion on Motive evidence, Ch. III, p. 13 and foll.) In this case the learned Magistrate examined the testimony of D.Ws. 1 and 2who swore that the key was handed over by the accused to P.W. 1. The learned Magistrate after analysing the evidence said that even if the evidence of D.W. 1 cannot be said to be exceptionable there was no reason why he should not lave accepted the testimony of D.W. 2 as he impressed him as a straightforward man. Even a recalcitrant tenant as P.W. 1 might have sought to end the troubles of litigation because litigation is not a pleasurable pastime but an unmitigated misfortune. People get tired at a particular stage and are prepared to say let us have peace ‘let bygones be bygones’. It is possible that P.W. 1 might have thought that he might be let off with the rent of Rs. 15 he was remitting. It is possible that the complainant P.W. 1 might have been motivated by such reason. I do not say that is the reason which must have operated on the mind of the complainant. But that the handing over of the key is not so improbable as Mr. Appu Rao wants me to imagine. I can imagine circumstances where he could have done that. The net result of this analysis is that there are no grounds to interfere with this acquittal by the lower Court, and this appeal is dismissed. 2. 1949 M.W.N. 320 (Cr.) 88: A.I.R. 1949 P.C. 103. 3. 1936 M.W.N. 627 (Crl.) 111. 4. Appu Rao wants me to imagine. I can imagine circumstances where he could have done that. The net result of this analysis is that there are no grounds to interfere with this acquittal by the lower Court, and this appeal is dismissed. 2. 1949 M.W.N. 320 (Cr.) 88: A.I.R. 1949 P.C. 103. 3. 1936 M.W.N. 627 (Crl.) 111. 4. 1940 M.W.N. 963: 52 L.W. 689: A.I.R. 1941 Mad. 326. 5. (1913) 25 MLJ. 518: L.R. 40 I.A. 193: 1913 M.W.N. 806 (P.C.). 6. (1931) 61 MLJ. 608 : 1931 M.W.N. 1177 (Crl.) 245: 34 L.W. 128: A.I.R. 1931 Mad. 689. V.S. ----- Appeal dismissed.