Order Before the learned District Magistrate, accused 1, raised a preliminary objection. That objection was that although after he was communicated under the provisions of section 173(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure the action taken by the Circle Inspector of Police in respect of the complaint preferred by Sluvanna Hegde, he made an application for a week's time to file, what is described as a protest petition and that protest petition was actually presented by him on November 13, 1957, meanwhile, on November 11, 1957, a charge-sheet had been prematurely presented against accused 1 and 11 others. The contention urged by Mr. Raghunathan, learned advocate for the petitioners in this revision petition, is that the charge-sheet presented against the accused was premature for the reason that the enquiry into the protest petition was pending at the time when the charge-sheet was preferred on the file of the Additional First Glass Magistrate, Karkal, in S.T.C.No. 1290/57. Mr. Raghunathan contends that the fact that the charge-sheet was presented in that way rendered the entire proceedings now pending before the District Magistrate, invalid and therefore liable to be quashed. It is not disputed in the case that accused 1 actually presented his protest petition on November 13, 1957. It was also stated in the affidavit produced on behalf of accused 1 in this Court that that protest petition has been numbered as S.T.C. 1290/57 and is now pending before the Additional First Class Magistrate, Karkal. It is stated that that matter is now being tried under the provisions of Chapter XXII of the Code of Criminal Procedure. These statements are not controverted by the production of any counter-affidavit. The result, therefore, is that the truth of the charge made by accused 1 against Sivanna Hegde is being enquired into by the Additional First Class Magistrate, Karkal, on a protest petition which has to be regarded as a complaint presented by accused 1 within the time granted to him for that purpose. The result, therefore, is that the truth of the charge made by accused 1 against Sivanna Hegde is being enquired into by the Additional First Class Magistrate, Karkal, on a protest petition which has to be regarded as a complaint presented by accused 1 within the time granted to him for that purpose. Even before a finding was recorded in these proceedings that that charge made by accused 1 was false, the prosecution was started against him by the presentation of a charge-sheet on November 11, 1957, on the supposition that the information given by accused 1 on August 12, 1957, was false information, the giving of which rendered him liable to be punished under the provisions of sections 201 , 211 and 167 of the Penal Code and also under the provisions of section 44 of the Madras Police Act. It is well-settled law that in a case like this, where a person who is accused of having committed an offence by reason of his having given false information demands for a judicial investigation into the truth of the charge made by him, he is entitled to be given an opportunity to prove the truth of that charge. That demand for a judicial investigation was made by accused 1 in this case. That judicial investigation is now going on before the Additional First Class Magistrate, Karkal. It is also equally clear that during the pendency of such judicial investigation, into what should be regarded as a complaint made by accused I in this case, a prosecution against him on the supposition that the charge made by him was false, was unjustified. In Murugan v. Gutha Rami Naidu1 Jackson, J., in a case like this, expressed the view that I have taken in this case in the following words: “It would be a most extraordinary result if, while the Magistrate was still engaged in trying a complaint and possibly inclined to believe the complainant, the complainant could himself be put into the dock in another proceeding on the allegation that he had preferred a false charge to the Police.” That was also the view taken by their Lordships of the High Court of Calcutta in Sheikh Abdulla v. Emperor2 and in Shekandar v. Emperor3. That being the position, the proceedings now pending before the District Magistrate are therefore liable to be quashed. That being the position, the proceedings now pending before the District Magistrate are therefore liable to be quashed. They are liable to be quashed even in respect of accused 2. Even though the protest petition in this case was presented only by accused 1, it would, I think, lead to incongruous results if the proceedings are allowed to continue against accused 2. The result is that this revision petition succeeds and the proceedings now pending before the District Magistrate are quashed. I would, however, desire to add that if after the conclusion of the enquiry now pending before the Additional First Class Magistrate, Karkal, it is considered necessary to take proceedings against any of the accused in this case, the order which I have made in this revision petition would not operate as a bar to any such proceedings. S.V.S. ----- Petition allowed.