Order This application is filed by the Union of India owning the Central Railways, to revise the orders passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Secunderabad, who, acting under section 520, Criminal Procedure Code, directed delivery of certain iron flats concerned in C.C. Nos. 162 and 163 of 1952 on the file of the Special Magistrate for Railways. The respondent and another Chintala Rama Reddi were charged for an offence of theft under section 379 , Indian Penal Code, but they were acquitted on 31st October, 1952, by the Special Magistrate for the Railways who also passed an order on the same day under section 517, Criminal Procedure Code, to deliver the property to the complainant. The matter was taken before the Sessions Judge, Secunderabad, in Criminal Appeal No. 162/6 of 1953-54. The learned Sessions Judge has on 18th May, 1953, set aside the order of the Special Magistrate and, acting under section 520, Criminal Procedure Code, ordered the delivery of articles to the respondent, as he found that the accused had been acquitted and the iron flats for which is the scramble for possession, is not made out to be the subject-matter of the offence. The respondent herein has set up the plea that these articles came into his possession because the other absconding accused gave them to him. The respondent, therefore, could not be found guilty though he was in possession of those articles. It may also be pointed out that the allegation of theft made by the complainant-railway remains to be determined so far as the absconding accused is concerned and that, therefore, the charge of theft cannot be said to be baseless, till it is found that the other absconding accused is also not guilty. Be that as it may, the fact that the case is pending against the absconding accused would not preclude a Court to pass an order either under section 517 or 520, Criminal Procedure Code, when the trial of the accused present before the Court is concluded. In this view there is no gainsaying that orders under section 517 or 520, Criminal Procedure Code are called for. After that order passed by the learned Sessions Judge on 18th May, 1953, Crl. R.C. No. 227/26 of 1956 was filed by the petitioner herein in the High Court of Hyderabad, which dealt with it and remanded the matter for rehearing. After that order passed by the learned Sessions Judge on 18th May, 1953, Crl. R.C. No. 227/26 of 1956 was filed by the petitioner herein in the High Court of Hyderabad, which dealt with it and remanded the matter for rehearing. On that occasion a point was taken before the High Court of Hyderabad that since the accused who was tried by the Court had been acquitted and an appeal against the acquittal lay only to the High Court, the Court of Sessions, Secunderabad, was not competent to pass orders under section 520, Criminal Procedure Code. It was also urged that no notice of the proceedings before the learned Sessions Judge was given to the Railways. The High Court of Hyderabad held that there was no substance in the first contention but remanded for rehearing of the matter after giving an opportunity to the Railways to be heard in the proceedings before that Sessions Court. After remand, the Court of Sessions, Secunderabad, again passed an order on 13th February, 1957, directing delivery of the rods to the respondent herein and this is the order now under revision. Mr. Srivatsava for the petitioner again raised the same plea that the Court of Sessions at Secunderabad, to which no appeal against an order of acquittal lay, is incompetent to deal with this matter under section 520, Criminal Procedure Code. But I hold that with reference to the same parties now before this Court, the earlier order in Crl.R.C.No. 227/26 of 1956 should be said to be conclusive. For this reason this plea cannot be allowed to be re-agitated. However, since the matter had been argued at length I would refer to this only to point out that the order of the High Court of Hyderabad was not incorrect having regard to the law and state of authority on the point. section 520, Criminal Procedure Code, states: “Any Court of appeal, confirmation, reference or revision may direct any order under section 517 , section 518 , or section 519, passed by a Court subordinate thereto to be stayed pending consideration by the former Court, and may modify, alter or annul such order and make further orders that may be just”. On a plain reading of the section it is indisputable that the powers under this section are conferred on any Court of appeal, confirmation, reference or revision. On a plain reading of the section it is indisputable that the powers under this section are conferred on any Court of appeal, confirmation, reference or revision. But the orders by such Court must be in relation to those passed by a Court subordinate there to. It is not possible, therefore, to read any more or further limitations into the language of the section, such as the one, viz., that that Court of appeal, etc., must be the Court which has entertained an appeal, etc., against the particular order, or is capable of entertaining any such appeal, etc. against that particular order; for, if the latter limitation is also applicable, then it would necessarily mean that no Court before which an appeal, revision, etc., is not pending or is seized of, could pass an order under this section. But the commonest thing that has been happening all along and which has been recognised and approved of in the Full Bench decision in Maria Pillai v. Ramanathan Chettiar1 would point the course of procedure not objected all along as also the appropriate and legal one to be adopted in these cases. In that Full Bench case an accused was charged with theft before the Sub-Magistrate of Pudukottai, but was acquitted. The complainant moved the High Court against the acquittal unsuccessfully. The Sub-Magistrate then ordered under section 517, Criminal Procedure Code., the property in dispute to be handed over to the accused. An appeal was preferred by the complainant to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, who has ordered the property to be delivered to the complainant and thereafter the matter was taken in revision, before the High Court. The Full Bench considered that it was a typical case in which the question was whether independent of preferring an appeal against the order of acquittal or conviction, proceedings under section 520, Criminal Procedure Code will not lie. The Full Bench answered in the affirmative. The further question as to which Court those proceedings will lie has also been answered. Waller, J., with whom the other learned Judges concurred, though they rendered separate judgments held that if, however, there is no appeal except against the order under section 517, then the proper forum is the Court of the District Magistrate. The further question as to which Court those proceedings will lie has also been answered. Waller, J., with whom the other learned Judges concurred, though they rendered separate judgments held that if, however, there is no appeal except against the order under section 517, then the proper forum is the Court of the District Magistrate. In U Po Hia v. Ko Po Shein2 the Full Bench was considering the question whether in a case of acquittal by the trial Court, the Sessions Judge or the District Magistrate as a Court of revision has power under section 520, Criminal Procedure Code, to interfere with the order of the trial Court passed under section 517 regarding the disposal of the property in respect of which offence was committed. The learned Judges followed the view of the Madras and Calcutta High Courts in preference to that of Bombay and Allahabad High Courts and held that it is not correct to put a narrow interpretation on the terms of section 520, Criminal Procedure Code. In Walchand v. Hari3 a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court were interpreting the words “any Court of appeal, confirmation or revision” in section 520 and were also concerned with another aspect of the matter as to the powers of the Court of revision while dealing under section 439, Criminal Procedure Code. That Court was inclined to the view that substantive orders could be passed under section 520 by any Court which has powers of appeal, confirmation or revision in respect of the trial Court which is subordinate to it. The other aspect of the matter, viz., whether while such Court was exercising revisional powers, could a particular procedure be adopted, though dealt with in that decision, is not necessary to be discussed here as that question does not arise in this case. The Allahabad High Court held a different view as could be seen from the decision reported in Emperor v. Debi Ram4 but later on it had also to conform to the view of the other High Courts as is clear from the decision reported in Ram Dhial v. Badri5. At present the correct view according to that Court is that “any Court of appeal, etc.” in section 520, Criminal Procedure Code, refers to Courts to which ordinarily appeal, etc., lay from the order of the Magistrate passed under section 517. At present the correct view according to that Court is that “any Court of appeal, etc.” in section 520, Criminal Procedure Code, refers to Courts to which ordinarily appeal, etc., lay from the order of the Magistrate passed under section 517. It is not necessary to multiply authorities. It is enough to lay stress on the importance of the condition laid down in section 520 that the order under sections 517, 518 or 519 should have been passed by a Court subordinate to that Court of appeal, etc. If as argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it is that Court of appeal to which alone an appeal lay from a particular order is meant, this aspect of subordination of the Magistrate who passed order under section 517, etc., need not form part of the terms of that section. This, in my view, affords an additional reason for rejecting any narrow interpretation of the section. As has been pointed out by Jackson, J., in Maria Pillai v. Ramanatham Chettiar1 the disposal of the property regarding which any offence appears to have been committed need not be made the responsibility of the High Court alone in cases of acquittal. I, therefore, find that there is no substance in this plea raised on behalf of the petitioner. The next question is whether the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge on 13th February, 1957, has considered all aspects of the matter arising in the case. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that as the complaint was laid against two accused and one of them alone was tried and the other absconding, it cannot be said that the allegation of theft is untrue but the determination of this question would depend upon the result of the trial of the other accused. It is also pointed out that the accused who has been acquitted pleaded that he got those iron flats from the other accused and that such a plea does not altogether shut out the possibility of these flats being concerned in the criminal case which is kept pending as against the other accused. The learned counsel, therefore, urged that the property could not be given away to the respondent herein and so kept out of the reach of the complainant. The learned counsel, therefore, urged that the property could not be given away to the respondent herein and so kept out of the reach of the complainant. It is also submitted by the learned counsel that these flats had been delivered to the consignees as they were bound to do so as bailees. The situation that has thus arisen is relied upon for urging upon this Court to pass such orders as may be necessary to preserve the property without being wholly lost to the complainant and at the same time to give effect, if necessary, to the orders already passed under section 520, Criminal Procedure Code. I consider that this point is not without force. If the respondent had pleaded that the iron flats were not got from the other accused, then, indeed there is no justification for modifying the order of the learned Sessions Judge dated 13th February, 1957. But when this aspect has not been taken into consideration by the learned Sessions Judge, it is necessary to modify the order, so as to be appropriate to the occasion. I, therefore, consider that the petitioner should deposit the value of this property into Court and the same will remain in deposit till such time the case against the absconding accused is disposed of. The withdrawal of the amount by the respondent would be dependent upon the result of the trial of the absconding accused. The Order of the Court of Sessions will accordingly be modified. A.S.R. ----- Order modified.