Judgment The source of this revision petition is an application made by petitioner No. 2 in this revision petition (who was respondent No. 2 in the lower Court) under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act,1939 before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Shimoga, which will hereinafter be referred as the Claims Tribunal. In that application, petitioner No. 2 had claimed compensation of Rs. 2,700 on the ground that due to the rash and negligent driving of the vehicle belonging to the Block Development Officer, Chammagiri, he sustained injuries and also suffered damages. He claimed therein a sum of Rs. 500 as damages for expenses incurred by him during his treatment; Rs. 500 was claimed by him for mental and physical suffering; a sum of Rs. 1,500 was claimed for loss of earning for a period of six months; and a sum of Rs. 200 was claimed as the value of the bicycle which had been damaged. The Claims Tribunal, on the evidence produced before it, awarded compensation of Rs. 1,660 to petitioner No. 2. The Claims Tribunal was of the view that the claim of petitioner No. 2 in regard to loss of earnings in a sum of Rs. 1,500 was not factually true, and the petitioner No. 2 was entitled to get only a sum of Rs. 660 on the count, at the rate of Rs. 110 per month for six months. The petitioner No. 2 had claimed at the rate of Rs. 250 per month. The Claims Tribunal further found that the register marked Exhibit P-3 was a got up document which had been fabricated by petitioner No. 1 to support his evidence given before the Tribunal, which, according to the Claims Tribunal, was false evidence and accordingly, the District Judge, Shimoga, who was the Presiding Officer of the Claims Tribunal, recorded his finding against both the petitioners 1 and 2 under section 479-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It appears from the records that the District Judge who recorded that finding was transferred and he was succeeded by another District Judge. The succeeding District Judge directed that notice should be issued to the petitioners. The petitioners, thereafter, effected their appearance and submitted their objections. After hearing them the District Judge directed that a complaint should be lodged against petitioners 1 and 2 in the Court of competent jurisdiction. The succeeding District Judge directed that notice should be issued to the petitioners. The petitioners, thereafter, effected their appearance and submitted their objections. After hearing them the District Judge directed that a complaint should be lodged against petitioners 1 and 2 in the Court of competent jurisdiction. It is against that order that this revision petition is preferred in this Court. The learned Government Pleader raised a preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability of the revision petition. He argued that the order in revision is made admittedly by the District Judge who has taken action under section section 479-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He submitted that this Court, as a Court of revision, has no power to interfere under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He urged that the order being one made by the Claims Tribunal which is a civil Court, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure should be made applicable to the case and not those of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He further contended in this connection that it has been expressly laid down in section 110 (e) of the Motor Vehicles Act that the Claims Tribunal shall be deemed to be a civil Court for all the purposes of section 196 and Chapter XXXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore he urged that since the order in revision was made by the civil Court, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are attracted to this case, and consequently this revision petition which is filed under section 435 and section 439, Criminal Procedure Code, is maintainable. Though he has raised a preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability of this revision petition, he submits that to the instant case neither the provisions of the Civil Procedure could be made applicable and therefore this Court should have resort only to the inherent powers contained in section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and by resorting to the inherent powers contained in section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure this Court can exercise revision jurisdiction and try this petition as one arising on the criminal side. Mr. Mr. Deshpande, the learned Counsel for the petitioners, contends that the order in revision though might have been passed by the Civil Court, the fact remains that it was passed under section 479-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure bearing upon a criminal matter and so the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code alone would be applicable to the case. He strenuously argued that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be attracted to a proceeding which is of a criminal nature. There is no decision on the point either of this Court or of any other High Court nor of the Supreme Court. The matter had come up before the Supreme Court once in Kuldip Singh v. The State of Punjab1 wherein it was observed at page 399: “Mr. Kapur's order went up to the High Court in revision and the next question we have to determine is whether the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the revision and the extent of its powers. Keshardeo Chamria v. Radha Kissan2 and many cases from the High Courts were cited which shows that there is much difference of opinion about this but we are fortunately not called upon to decide that question because this is not a case where a Court with jurisdiction has acted under section 476, Criminal Procedure Code of its own motion or has acted as a Court of appeal under section 476-B.“ Thus the point was left open by the Supreme Court. In the cases cited by the parties in support of their arguments, order was made under section 476-B and the point for determination was whether such an order was an order revisable by the High Court under section 439 , Criminal Procedure Code or else under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. As a matter of fact both the learned Government Pleader and the Counsel for the petitioners Mr. Deshpande conceded during the course of arguments that there is no decision on the point, i.e., with regard to an order made under section 479-A, Criminal Procedure Code either of any High Court or of the Supreme Court. As a matter of fact both the learned Government Pleader and the Counsel for the petitioners Mr. Deshpande conceded during the course of arguments that there is no decision on the point, i.e., with regard to an order made under section 479-A, Criminal Procedure Code either of any High Court or of the Supreme Court. In the light of the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties the point for consideration is whether the order made by the Claims Tribunal ( i.e. District Judge) under section 479-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure was an order made by a civil Court so that the High Court's revisional powers are governed by section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure or, is an order made by a criminal Court or a Court exercising criminal power, and the power to revise such an order arises under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It must be mentioned straight away at this stage that there is much divergence of opinion between the different High Courts in India on this point. The view taken by the Calcutta, Madras and Allahabad High Courts is that the character of the Court which hears the appeal under section 476-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure is governed by the character of the Court which lodges the complaint, that is to say, when the complaint is lodged by a civil Court, the Court hearing the appeal must be regarded as a civil Court. On the other hand, the High Courts of Bombay, Punjab and the High Court of Patna in a recent decision Rampati Kuerv. Jadunandan Thakur1 have taken a contrary view. These High Courts have held that the provisions of section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would apply and not the provisions of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. As rightly observed in the Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court in Rampati Kuer v. Jadunandan Thakur1 that such diametrically opposite views expressed by some of the most distinguished Judges of the High Courts only show how difficult the matter under consideration is. Since the matter has been fully considered by the Full Benches of the various High Courts, it will serve no useful purpose to discuss and consider here the relative merits of the two opposing views. Since the matter has been fully considered by the Full Benches of the various High Courts, it will serve no useful purpose to discuss and consider here the relative merits of the two opposing views. I may however deal with the matter which provides a basis for the conclusion which I have arrived at with regard to the point under determination. The view taken by the High Courts is to the effect that the character of the Court which hears the appeal under section 476-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure is governed by the character of the Court which lodges the complaint and hence the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable to the case ant. therefore the High Court should exercise its revisional powers on the civil side. In other words, if the Court which made an order directing a complaint to be lodged in a civil Court, the Courts hearing the appeal under section 476-B must also be regarded as a civil Court. I should observe here that this is not expressly provided in that section viz., section 476-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Although in section 476-B a reference is made to sub- section (3) of section 195, Criminal Procedure Code, I think, that reference only determines the forum to which appeal lies and does not, in terms, determine the character of the Court. If the Court which hears the appeal is a civil Court, it seems to me that its procedure should be governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. If it is held by the Court that the procedure in such a case is governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure that must be on the basis that the Court is acting as a criminal Court and if it is acting as a criminal Court, I do not see any reason why the powers of revision should not be those conferred by section 439 , Criminal Procedure Code and not those conferred by section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, the determining factor, to my mind, should be the nature of the matter in which the order has been made. Therefore, the determining factor, to my mind, should be the nature of the matter in which the order has been made. It was argued on behalf of the State that the order in revision, has been made by the claims tribunal in this case which is, according to the provisions of sub- section (2) of section 110-C of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, deemed to be a civil Court for purposes of section 479-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was urged therefore, that the Court acting under section 470-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not a criminal Court as mentioned in section 6 and 6-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Although I am not prepared to say that section 6 and 6-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure are exhaustive, I am however, of the view that it is not essential to determine whether the Court which passes an order under section 479-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure is technically a criminal Court or not. Obviously, it is a Court which in exercising jurisdiction in a criminal matter. That being so, to my mind, an order passed by it can be revised by the High Court under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was submitted on behalf of the State that section 439 is controlled by section 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was contended that the words “inferior criminal Court” occurring in that section clearly show that in order to make the provision of section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure applicable, the order which is sought to be revised must be an order of the inferior criminal Court and since the order passed by the claims tribunal cannot be construed to be an order made by an inferior criminal Court, the provision of section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be made applicable to the instant case. I agree with the view that section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure must be read in connection with the sections which preceded it. Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure enable the High Court to interfere in revision, in the case of any proceeding, the record of which has been called for by itself or which has been reported for orders, or which otherwise comes to its knowledge. Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure enable the High Court to interfere in revision, in the case of any proceeding, the record of which has been called for by itself or which has been reported for orders, or which otherwise comes to its knowledge. Although section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be read in connection with the sections preceding it, section 439 , in my opinion, goes further than section 435 of other sections preceding section 439 because, it empowers the Court to call for record ‘in any preceding’. It was observed in a Full Bench decision reported in Rampati Kuer v. Jadunandan Thakur1 that: “I am definitely of the view that the ambit and scope of the powers under section 439 , Criminal Procedure Code are very much more comprehensive than the scope of sections 435 to 438, Criminal Procedure Code. On a careful scrutiny and analysis of the provisions of sections 435 to 439 , Criminal Procedure Code, it will appear that while under sections 435 and 436 , the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court or of the other Courts mentioned therein extends over all interior Criminal Courts for the limited purposes of ordering further enquiry into the complaint which has been dismissed under section 203 or sub- section (3) of section 204 , or into the case of any person accused of an offence who has been discharged, the powers of revision of the High Court under section 439, Criminal Procedure Code extend over all Courts subordinate to it which either ordinarily or otherwise exercise jurisdiction in regard to criminal matters. To read the whole of the provisions of section 435, Criminal Procedure Code, including the expression “inferior criminal Court situate within the local limits of its jurisdiction” into section 439 merely because the opening words of section 439(1) speak of the “case of any preceding the record of which has been called lor by itself” is in my opinion, unduly restrictive of the large powers conferred on the High Court under section 439, Criminal Procedure Code. It is significant to notice that while under section 435 and 436 , Criminal Procedure Code, the Sessions Judge and the District Judge have also been given powers along with that of the High Court to call for the records of any proceedings before any inferior Criminal Court for the purpose mentioned in section 436 , Criminal Procedure Code, it is only the High Court and no other Court which has been empowered to take action under section 439, Code of Criminal Procedure. Further, though the Legislature has expressly mentioned section 435 in sections 436 , 437 , 438 and 441 , it is, in my opinion, not without any significance that it has omitted to mention section 435 anywhere in section 439, Criminal Procedure Code and the expression in section 439(1) to the effect that “in the case of any proceeding the record of which has been called for by itself,” is only indicative of one of the methods by which the records of a proceeding might have come before the High Court which might be called upon to exercise its revisional powers under the different sub- sections of section 439 , Criminal Procedure Code its insertion by no means in my opinion, operates to restrict the amplitude of the revisional powers of the High Court under section 439, Criminal Procedure Code which powers are, however, restricted only by the restrictive provisions dealt with in the section itself.” With respect, I agree with the observations. Further, whether or not, in the present case, the order was technically made by an “inferior criminal Court”, I am clearly of the opinion that it was an order made by an” inferior criminal Court“exercising jurisdiction under section 479-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure in a criminal matter which can be revised by the High Court under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the provision of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure do not apply to such a case. The order in this case, as already mentioned above, was made by the Claims Tribunal which is deemed to be a civil Court under the provision of sub- section (2) of section 110-C of the Motor Vehicles Act. But the fact remains that the petitioner in this case has not at any time been proceeded against under the civil law. The order in this case, as already mentioned above, was made by the Claims Tribunal which is deemed to be a civil Court under the provision of sub- section (2) of section 110-C of the Motor Vehicles Act. But the fact remains that the petitioner in this case has not at any time been proceeded against under the civil law. The finding recorded against him by the Court is for perjury viz., for intentionally giving false evidence in a judicial proceeding and for intentionally fabricating false evidence for the purpose of being used in the said proceeding which is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code. That being so, the proceeding against him would be under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Codeand not under the civil Court (Claims Tribunal) has been empowered to take action, the provision of civil procedure cannot be attracted to the case. It is in reference to the nature of the proceeding that it must be determined whether there was an order made in a criminal cause or matter. It is the nature and the character of the proceedings which provides the test. “If the matter is one, the direct outcome of which may be the trial of the petitioner is punishable for an alleged offence by a Court claiming jurisdiction to do so, the matter is criminal.” This is the true effect of the two conditions formulated by Viscountcave in Re Clifford v. O'Sullivan1 Applying this decision, I have no doubt, that the recording of finding was in a criminal cause or matter. Lord Wright observed in the case of Amard v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs and another2 as follows: “The principle which I deduce from the authorities which I have cited and the other relevant authorities which I have considered is that, if the cause or matter is one which, if carried to its conclusion, my result in the conviction of the person charged and in a sentence of some punishment, such as imprisonment or fine, it is criminal cause or matter.” I respectfully agree with that view. But it was argued on behalf of the State that it is expressly laid down in sub-clause 2 of section 110-C of the Motor Vehicles Act, that the Claims Tribunal shall be deemed to a civil Court for all purposes of section. 479-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. But it was argued on behalf of the State that it is expressly laid down in sub-clause 2 of section 110-C of the Motor Vehicles Act, that the Claims Tribunal shall be deemed to a civil Court for all purposes of section. 479-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was urged that in view of the express provision of sub- section 2 of the section 110-C of the Motor Vehicles Act, the order made by the Claims Tribunal (in revision) cannot, therefore, attract the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sub- section 2 of section 110-C of the Motor Vehicles Act reads: “The Claims Tribunal shall have all the powers of a civil Court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of compelling the discovery and production of documents and material objects and for such other purposes as may be prescribed; and the Claims Tribunal shall be deemed to be a civil Court for all the purposes of section 195 and Chapter XXXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.” It is true that section 439-A is found in Chapter XXXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure. But if the construction is placed on the later portion of the sub- section 2 of section 110-C of the Motor Vehicles Act, as I am asked to place upon it by the learned Government Pleader, the earlier portion of the said sub-clause would become useless. If, according to him, the Claims Tribunal is construed to be a civil Court, then it was not necessary to confer powers on the Claims Tribunal for enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of compelling the discovery and production of documents and material objects, as envisaged in the first portion of sub- section 2 of section 110-C of the Motor Vehicles Act. Each part of the section should be so construed as to be consistent with the other part, removing if necessary, all pertinent inconsistency so far as it is possible and making the section or the purport of the whole section coherent and intelligible. The construction so put must be such as not to render the other part of the section absurd or superfluous. The construction so put must be such as not to render the other part of the section absurd or superfluous. Therefore, I find it difficult to place such a construction on the language used in the later part of sub- section 2 of section 110-C of the Motor Vehicles Act, as I am asked to, by the learned Government Pleader. It is clear from the language of the section that the deeming clause has been inserted in the later part of sub- section 2 of the section 110-C of the Motor Vehicles Act, in order to enable the tribunal to take action for the acts committed by a person as mentioned in section 479-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In other words, the Claims Tribunal gets jurisdiction to take action for the acts stated in section 479-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, by virtue of the deeming provision in the later part of sub- section 2 of section 110-C of the Motor Vehicles Act. That appears to me to be the intention of the Legislature in inserting the deeming provision in that sub-clause. It was next submitted by the learned Government Pleader relying upon Order 39 , sub- rule (3) of rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure that the action contemplated therein, resulted in penal consequences. Therefore, if the principle that it is the nature and character of the proceeding which would attract the provision of either Criminal Procedure Code or Civil Procedure Code is accepted, then the consequences of the action contemplated in sub- rule 3 of rule 2 of Order 39, being penal, the provision of the Criminal Procedure Code could be attracted to such a proceeding. It is not possible to accede to the contention advanced. The action envisaged in sub- rule (3) of rule 2 of Order 39, is purely of civil nature, the words “civil prison” occurring in the said sub- rule is clearly indicative of the fact that the action contemplated is of civil nature. Further it is expressly laid down in clause (r) of rule 1, Order 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure that an appeal shall lie from an order under rule 1, rule 2 rule 4 or rule 10 of Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Further it is expressly laid down in clause (r) of rule 1, Order 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure that an appeal shall lie from an order under rule 1, rule 2 rule 4 or rule 10 of Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If the action taken under sub- rule 3 of rule 2 of Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure was of a criminal nature, the provision for its appeal would not have been found in the Civil Procedure Code itself. It is clear that the provision of the Code of Civil Procedure will govern civil matters only and they are not applicable to criminal matters. The learned Government Pleader was unable to point out any reference to the provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure anywhere in Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This by itself furnishes a reasonable basis for a conclusion that the action contemplated by sub- rule (3) of rule 2 of Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure, are of civil character. Furthermore, if a civil Court passes an order under sub- rule (3) of rule 2 of Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure it cannot be said that such an order was made by the Court exercising jurisdiction under 1 he said clause in a criminal matter. Thus the contention advanced on behalf of the State seems to be unsustainable. That apart, any breach envisaged in sub- rule (3) of rule 2 of Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not an offence punishable under any of the provisions of the Indian Penal Code so as to make the provision of the Criminal Procedure Code applicable. The last contention advanced on behalf of the State by Mr. Havanur was that except the provisions contained in section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure no other provision could be made applicable to the case. In other words his argument amounts to this viz., for exercising its revisional jurisdiction under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure this Court should invoke its inherent powers recognised under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In other words his argument amounts to this viz., for exercising its revisional jurisdiction under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure this Court should invoke its inherent powers recognised under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. But the obstacle in the way of the learned Government Pleader is that having come to the conclusions that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are applicable to the case the question of the applicability of section 561-A cannot arise. The reason for enacting the provisions of section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the Amending Act of 1923 was that no legislative enactment dealing with the procedure could provide for all cases that may arise. Further, the maintainability of this revision petition under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is challenged on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It is well settled that section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not and cannot authorise a Court to assume any new jurisdiction. The Madras High Court in Rajah Parthasarathi Appa Row v. Raja Rengiah Appa Row1 observes: “It has to be borne in mind that there is an essential distinction between a Court's inherent power and its jurisdiction. I am not aware of any authority which supports the view that the inherent power of a Court could be invoked except for the limited purpose of preserving and enforcing order, securing efficiency and preventing abuse of process in the exercise of a jurisdiction with the Court otherwise possesses. I respectfully agree with the view expressed by Subrahmania Ayyar, J. in that decision. Therefore, on the reasons stated above, it is held that this revision petition from an order under section 479-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure passed by a civil Court ( i.e., the Claims Tribunal) to this Court should be heard and decided is accordance with the provisions of section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and hence it is maintainable. On the merits, Mr. Deshpande the learned Counsel for the petitioner concentrated his argument only on one contention. He strenuously argued that the learned Sessions Judge who made the order in revision has not applied his mind at all to the objection that had been put forth before him by the petitioners. On the merits, Mr. Deshpande the learned Counsel for the petitioner concentrated his argument only on one contention. He strenuously argued that the learned Sessions Judge who made the order in revision has not applied his mind at all to the objection that had been put forth before him by the petitioners. His grievance was that reading the order in revision as a whole, it becomes clear that the learned Sessions Judge found himself fettered by the findings recorded by his predecessor in office in the previous order. He contended that after considering the objections raised by the petitioners the learned Sessions Judge ought to have come to the conclusion whether the complaint should be filed as envisaged under section 479-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On the other hand, it was argued on behalf of the State that it is true that notice had been issued by the Sessions Judge to the petitioners, the object being to afford an opportunity to the petitioners to rebut: the findings recorded against them. Section 479-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure which prescribes the procedure in certain cases of false evidence reads: “479-A . (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in sections 476 to 479 inclusive, when any Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court is of opinion that any person appearing before it as a witness has intentionally given false evidence in any stage of the judicial proceeding or has intentionally fabricated false evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage of the judicial proceeding, and that, for the eradication of the evils of perjury and fabrication of false evidence and in the interests of justice it is expedient that such witness should be prosecuted for the offence which appears to have been committed by him, the Court shall at the time of the delivery of the judgment or final order disposing of such proceeding, record a finding to that effect stating its reasons there for and may, if it so thinks fit, after giving the witness an opportunity of being heard, make a complaint thereof in writing signed by the presiding officer of the Court setting forth the evidence which, in the opinion of the Court, is false or fabricated and forward the same to a Magistrate of the first class..” (The remaining portion of the section is not relevant for our purpose). It is thus clear from section 479-A that it is not incumbent on the Court to issue notice to the witness and the Court may record a finding straight away but however, after recording its finding, if the Court thinks fit, it may issue a notice to the witness affording him an opportunity of being heard with regard to the filing of the complaint, meaning thereby that the Court, after considering the objections if any put forth by or on behalf of the petitioner, will make an order whether an appropriate complaint should be filed against him in the Court of competent jurisdiction or not. Now, in the instant case it is clear that the learned Sessions Judge has depended mainly upon the finding recorded by his predecessor. The order made by him gives an impression, as rightly contended on behalf of the petitioners by Mr. Deshpande, that the Sessions Judge all through in his order found himself fettered by the finding recorded by his predecessor. In para. 5 of his order, the learned Sessions Judge states: “My learned predecessor has expressed the opinion that the evidence tendered by these two respondents is false and fabricated and that the document Exhibit P-3 is forged and it is produced before Court as evidence……..” Again in para 6 of his order, it is stated: “In the present case, my learned predecessor has in fact found that the document Exhibit P-3 is fabricated and it is forged document, it is produced before Court to show that P.W. 7 the present 2nd respondent was getting a higher salary. Thus it appears that my learned predecessor has found that both P.Ws. 6 and 7 that is the present respondents I and 2 have colluded with each other and fabricated the document Exhibit P-3 and have produced it before Court knowing that the document was a forged document or a false document.” These passages go in support of the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners to the effect that the learned Sessions Judge did not apply his mind and solely depended upon the finding recorded by his predecessor. It is true, as argued on behalf of the State, that in para 7 of the order the learned Sessions Judge has stated: “Therefore, I find that in the present case it is expedient to make a complaint against the respondents 1 and 2 before the competent Court……..” But the word “therefore” is full of meaning. It is suggestive of the fact that on the reasons stated by his predecessor, the Sessions Judge found that a complaint should be filed. Therefore the finding of the Sessions Judge is qualified by the word ‘therefore’ and consequently it cannot be construed to be an independent finding The next question for determination is what should be the proper order in this case in view of the circumstances stated above. The contention that has been raised before me was to the effect that the order made by the Sessions Judge was in contravention of the provisions of section 479-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure and this Court was called upon to set aside the said order. In the light of the argument advanced, obviously, the case cannot be remanded to the Court below for giving an opportunity of being heard to the petitioners. All that has happened in this case is that the Sessions Judge has made an order in breach of section 479-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That being so the proper order would be to set aside the order of the Sessions Judge. What further action could be taken in accordance with law, it is for the Sessions Judge to decide. In the result, this revision petition is allowed and the order passed by the Sessions Judge on 25th March, 1969, is set aside. S.V.S.-----Petition allowed.