Judgment.- This is an appeal against the acquittal of the respondent for an offence under section 49-A(3) of the Madras City Police Act. On 17th August, 1956, the Sub-Inspector, P.W.1, found at about 6 p.m., the accused receiving bets on New York Cotton Price figures from another person who actually handed over cash to the accused and received in return a betting slip from the accused, but the place from which the accused was receiving the bets was from the pail of his house. The question is whether when a person who is the owner of the house was found gaming on any of the objects specified in sub- section (1) from the pail of his own house, he can be said to be gaming in any public street, or thoroughfare or in any place to which the public have or are permitted to have access. Section 49-A, clause (1)(a) is as follows: “Whoever being the owner or occupier or having the use of any house, room, tent, enclosure, vehicle, vessel or place opens, keeps or uses the same for the purpose of gaming, etc.” The respondent being the owner of the house, he was undoubtedly using his pail as a place for the purpose of gaming and that will certainly fall under clause (1) of section 49-A of the Act. But the respondent has been charged only under section 49-A, clause (3) on the ground that he was receiving bets from the public and though it is his private pail, he must be deemed to be found gaming in any place to which the public have or are permitted to have access. Clause (3) of section 45-A of the Act is as follows: “Whoever is found gaming on any of the objects specified in sub- section (1) in my public street or thoroughfare or in any place to which the public have or are permitted to have access shall be punishable, etc.” If a person owning the house, games from the pail of his house, notwithstanding the fact that he allows the public to have access and takes bets from him, then clearly the case will fall under section 49-A(1). It seems to me that the meaning to be given to the expression “in any place to which the public have or are permitted to have access”, should be ejusdem generis with public street or thoroughfare, that is to say, it must be a place to which the public have either a right of access or grant of access as per the definition of “public place” in the Act. The facts of this case will fall more properly under clause (1) and not clause (3). The prosecution is only for an offence under section 49-A (3). The lower Court was well justified in acquitting the respondent under that clause as the pail of a private house will not fail within the scope of clause (3) of section 49-A of the Act, notwithstanding the fact that the owner or user or occupier invites the public to come to the house and thereby makes use of the house or place. The acquittal by the lower Court, therefore, for an offence under section 49-A (3) cannot be said to be wrong. The prosecution being for an offence under section 49-A , clause (3) and the acquittal being justified, I do not think that it is fair to the accused to bring him here in appeal within the scope of section 49-A, clause (1) of the Act though the case against him may also fall within that provision. The definite case of the prosecution being negatived, very rightly, by the lower Court, the appeal has got to be dismissed and it is accordingly dismissed. R.M. ----- Appeal dismissed.