Judgment :- The Order of the Court was as follows : Very same petitioner came to this Court on earlier occasions in W.P. No. 10729 of 1998 and also in W.P. No.70 of 1999. 2. Petitioner is a branch of Ramakrishna Mission with its Headquarters at Belur Math, Howrah District, West Bengal. Petitioner established an English Medium school known as 'Ramkrishna Mission English Medium School from L.K. G to V standard, in the year 1977. The school is functioning in the premises belonging to petitioner at Door No. 14, Griffith Road, T. Nagar, Chennai. Petitioner had also established and was administering Ramakrishna Mission Higher Secondary School in Burkit Road, known as South School and Ramkrishna Mission Higher Secondary School in Bazullah Road, T. Nagar, known as North School. Both the premises used for South and North Schools belong to petitioner which comprises of lands measuring about 40 and 79 grounds respectively with sufficient buildings and other infrastructural facilities. 3. Students strength in the north and south schools had dwindled down and taking into account the vast extent of lands available in south school campus, petitioner put up additional buildings in the south school campus and provided infrastructural facilities therein so as to have the north school merged with south school. Permission was also sought for merger and as per orders passed in May 1998, authorities also permitted merger of north school with south school at Burkit road. Various conditions are imposed and only after satisfying those conditions, merger took place with effect from 1-6-1998, and both north and south schools got merged. 4. Some of the teachers started agitation against the merger of north and south schools and the authorities passed orders in July, 1998 rescinding the earlier order passed in May 1998, without giving notice to petitioner. Therefore, petitioner came to this Court in W.P. No. 10729 of 1998 for quashing the order of school authorities and restoring the earlier order passed on 29-5-1998. That writ petition was allowed and petitioner have been continuing to run the merged school at Burkit Road, from 1-6- 1998. Government as well as Teachers Association have filed writ appeals against the order in W.P. No. 10729 of 1998, which are pending. Though interlocutory applications were filed in the writ appeals, no interim order was passed till date. 5. That writ petition was allowed and petitioner have been continuing to run the merged school at Burkit Road, from 1-6- 1998. Government as well as Teachers Association have filed writ appeals against the order in W.P. No. 10729 of 1998, which are pending. Though interlocutory applications were filed in the writ appeals, no interim order was passed till date. 5. Petitioner have been running English Medium school at 14 Griffith Road T. Nagar and imparting education only up to V Standard. Taking into account the demand of people of the area for a matriculation school and also taking into account the needs of students studying in the English Medium School run by them, they decided to upgrade the English Medium School into a Boys Matriculation School and locate the same in their premises at Bazullah Road. 6. Petitioner moved an application on 31-12-1997 to second respondent through third respondent for permission to upgrade the existing English medium school into a Matriculation School from the academic year 1998-99. The upgraded matriculation school was to be located in the premises belonging to petitioner at Bazullah Road, which comprises 79 grounds with various buildings. It is further averred that petitioner decided to allot 50 grounds out of 79 grounds with all buildings, play ground etc. for the use of matriculation school. Petitioner, along with the application also enclosed necessary particulars including the particulars of land provided for the buildings and other infrastructural facilities that are available for the proposed matriculation school. An inspection was made by Inspector of Matriculation Schools on 24-6-1998 and he had also submitted his report with his recommendations to 2nd respondent, and pending receipt of formal orders from respondent, petitioner also made admissions to Matriculation school for the academic year 1998-99 up to VIII standard. Since no orders have been passed up to the end of Dec. 1998, petitioner filed W.P. No. 70 of 1999 for considering their application dated 31-12-1997 and pass appropriate orders permitting upgradation of existing English medium school into a Matriculation School. The writ petition was disposed of on 6-1-1999 directing respondents to pass orders on the application of petitioner with notice to petitioner, within three weeks from the date of production of copy of the order. 7. Immediately after receipt of order in W.P. No. 70 of 1999, same was placed before second respondent for passing orders. The writ petition was disposed of on 6-1-1999 directing respondents to pass orders on the application of petitioner with notice to petitioner, within three weeks from the date of production of copy of the order. 7. Immediately after receipt of order in W.P. No. 70 of 1999, same was placed before second respondent for passing orders. A reminder was also sent and finally respondent has passed the impugned order. 8. As per the impugned order respondent has pleaded inability to pass orders in view of pendency of writ appeals. The same is challenged in this writ petition as irregular and it is said that pendency of writ appeal cannot be a ground for passing orders on the application of petitioner. 9. No counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents but learned Government Pleader argued the matter on written instructions. In the written instructions it is only said that since writ appeal is pending and only after disposal of writ appeal, orders could be passed on the application of management of petitioner institution. 10. Heard both sides. In my order in W.P. No. 70 of 1999, I directed respondents to pass orders on the application of petitioner with notice to petitioner, within three weeks from the date of production of copy of the orders. Refusing to pass orders on the application of petitioner, impugned order says that they are not in a position to pass orders. It amounts to disobedience of orders of Court. Even at the time when I disposed of the writ petition on 6 -1-1999, earlier writ appeals were pending and in spite of it, a direction was given to consider and pass orders on the application of petitioner. Hence, the present contention taken by respondents is barred by res judicata. Respondents cannot be heard about the so called inability in passing orders on the application of petitioner. 11. In this connection, how far the pendency of writ appeals has relevance in passing order dated 31-12-1997 is to be considered. 12. In (State of U.P. v. Mohammad Nooh), in paragraph 13 of the Judgment their Lordships held thus, "........ Respondents cannot be heard about the so called inability in passing orders on the application of petitioner. 11. In this connection, how far the pendency of writ appeals has relevance in passing order dated 31-12-1997 is to be considered. 12. In (State of U.P. v. Mohammad Nooh), in paragraph 13 of the Judgment their Lordships held thus, "........ In the next place, while it is true that a decree of a Court of first instance may be said to merge in the decree passed on appeal therefrom or even in the order passed in revision, it does so only for certain purposes, namely for the purposes of computing the period of limitation for execution of the decree as in Batuk Nath v. Munni Dei, 41 Ind App 104 : 1914 AIR(PC) 65, or for computing the period of limitation for an application for final decree in a mortgage suit as in Jowad Hussain v. Gendan Singh, 53 Ind App 197 : 1926 AIR(PC) 93. But as pointed out by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in delivering the judgment of the Privy Council in Juscurn Boid v. Pirthichand Lal, 46 Ind App 52 : ILR 46 Cal 670 at pp 678 and 679 : 1918 AIR(PC) 151 at pp 152-153, whatever be the theory under other systems of law, under the Indian Law and procedure an original decree is not suspended by the presentation of an appeal nor is its operation interrupted where the decree on appeal is merely one of dismissal. There is nothing in the Indian Law to warrant the suggestion that the decree or order of the Court or tribunal of the first instance becomes final only on the termination of all proceedings by way of appeal or revision. The filing of the appeal or revision may put the decree or order in jeopardy but until it is reversed or modified it remains effective. .............." (Emphasis supplied) 13. The filing of the appeal or revision may put the decree or order in jeopardy but until it is reversed or modified it remains effective. .............." (Emphasis supplied) 13. It is true in the decision reported in (S.S. Rathore v. State of Madhya Pradesh), the decision in the earlier cited case was distinguished and the same is clear from paragraph 10 of the Judgment, which read thus, "In Mohammad Nooh case, the question for consideration was whether the impugned order in the proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution before the High Court was an order prior to the Constitution and, therefore, the High Court could not exercise its jurisdiction or was it one pending at the commencement of the Constitution and the revisional order being after the Constitution came into force, the writ petition would be maintainable. The majority, as also Bose, J. who otherwise differed, agreed that jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution was not retrospective. The majority opinion, however, was that it would not be correct to say that the order of dismissal made on April 20, 1948 merged in the appellate order dated May 7, 1949, and both the orders in due course merged in the revisional order of April 22, 1950. The original order of dismissal was operative on its own strength. Bose, J., however observed (at pp 95-96 of AIR) : "I see no reason why any narrow or ultra technical restrictions should be placed on them. Justice should, in my opinion be administered in our Courts in a common sense liberal way and be broad based on human values rather than on narrow and restricted considerations hedged round with hair-splitting technicalities. The final order was passed after the Constitution on April 22, 1950. It is true that if it had been passed before the Constitution came into force on January 26, 1950, the petitioner would have had no remedy in the Courts. But the Constitution breathed fresh life into this land and conferred precious rights and privileges that were not there before. Why should they be viewed narrowly ? Why should not that which would have been regarded as still pending for present purposes, if all had been done after the Constitution, be construed in any different way when the final act, which is the decisive one for these purposes, was done after it ? Why should they be viewed narrowly ? Why should not that which would have been regarded as still pending for present purposes, if all had been done after the Constitution, be construed in any different way when the final act, which is the decisive one for these purposes, was done after it ? "The problem in Mohammad Nooh case therefore, was different from what was for consideration in Goel case." In that case the question was, how far the principle of merger will apply to an administrative order was the matter in issue. The fact that preferring an appeal alone will not amount to merger was not doubted. There is no decision taken by appellate authority or by the Division Bench. Till a decision is taken in an appeal, the order passed by this Court is effective and will have to be implemented, so long as its operation is not stayed. Under Order 41, Rule # 5 of Code of Civil Procedure, it is made clear that filing an appeal will not amount to stay. The same principle will apply in this case also. # So, respondents cannot take shelter under the guise of appeal filed against the order in W.P. No. 10729 of 1998. 14. Apart from the same , an inspection has also been made and report was already submitted. Counsel for petitioner submitted that there are 79 grounds available and even if the writ appeal is allowed, probably they may have to bring back north school also under the same compound. Even if the north school is coming back to its old place, there will be facilities for running Matriculation School. Taking into consideration these facts, I do not think the attitude of respondents could be justified. 15. The impugned order is therefore quashed and there will be a direction to respondents to immediately pass orders on the application of petitioner dated 31-12-1997 for upgrading the existing English Medium school known as 'Ramkrishna Mission English Medium School' for being upgraded as Matriculation School for boys. I direct respondents to pass orders within a period of ten days from today. I make it clear that respondents are not expected to rake up other issues and pendency of appeal also will not be taken into consideration, while passing orders. 16. The writ petition is allowed as above. No costs. Consequently, W.M.P. Nos. 3839 and 3840 of 1999 are closed. I make it clear that respondents are not expected to rake up other issues and pendency of appeal also will not be taken into consideration, while passing orders. 16. The writ petition is allowed as above. No costs. Consequently, W.M.P. Nos. 3839 and 3840 of 1999 are closed. Petition allowed.