JUDGMENT Hegde, J.- The, true scope of section (3)(a)of the Employees’ Provident Fund Act (which we shall hereinafter refer to as the “Act”)comes up for consideration in this appeal. The facts are not in dispute in this case: The accused is the proprietor of Chandiram Mysore Silk mills in Bangalore City. He was running the mills in question when the Act came into force and at that time he was employing more than 50 persons in his Mills. Therefore he was required to contribute to the Employees Provident Fund (to be referred to as “Fund” hereinafter) and he contributed to that Fund till 1st February 1956. Thereafter he failed to contribute to the Fund. In the present case, the charge against him is that he failed to contribute to the fund from 1st June, 1956 to 1st February 1956 and failed to submit the necessary returns and therefore he is liable to be punished under Paragraph 76(a) and (c)of the Employees’ Provident Fund Scheme 1952. The accused has not denied the fact that he had failed to contribute to the Fund, during the period mentioned in the charge. The charge of failure to submit the necessary returns appears to have not been pressed in the Court below, nor was it pressed in this Court. The plea of the accused is that ever since 1st February, 1956, he has been engaging less than fifty persons in his factory-to be exact, in March 1956 he engaged 42 persons, in April 45 persons, in May 44 persons, in June 44 persons and in July 46 persons. The complainant admits these facts. But it is contended on his (complainant's) behalf that once the Act is made applicable to a factory, whatever number of employees may be employed thereafter, the owner of the factory continues to be liable to contribute to the Fund. Therefore, we have to see whether the liability of the accused continued even after the number of persons employed by him fell below fifty. section 1(3)(a)reads: “Subject to the provisions contained in section 16 it (the Act) applies (a) to every establishment which is a factory engaged in any industry specified in Schedule I and in which fifty or more persons are employed.” For our present purpose section 16 is not relevant. section 1(3)(a)reads: “Subject to the provisions contained in section 16 it (the Act) applies (a) to every establishment which is a factory engaged in any industry specified in Schedule I and in which fifty or more persons are employed.” For our present purpose section 16 is not relevant. The only point we have to consider is whether in the accused factory “fifty or more persons are employed.” Sri V.K. Govindarajulu, the learned counsel for the appellant, contends that the words “are employed” have reference to the state of things on the date when the Act was first made applicable to the factory in question, irrespective of what might have happened subsequently, whereas, according to Sri Ullal, the learned counsel for the respondent, the liability of his client to contribute to the Fund ceased the moment the number of persons employed by him fell below fifty. The two expressions, “is a factory” and “fifty or more persons are employed” found in section 1(3)(a) are important for our purpose. In both places, the Legislature has employed the present tense. If a grammatical construction is put on those words it is clear that before a person could be called upon to contribute to the Fund two requirements must be satisfied, i.e., (i) there must exist a factory; and (ii) fifty or more persons should be employed in that factory. If any one of these conditions fail then the liability would cease. To get over the plain meaning of the words the concept of social justice is pressed into service and we are asked to interpret the provision in such a manner as to avoid mischief and advance the cause of the downtrodden. Sri V.K. Govindarajulu contended that if we accept the grammatical construction, the employers may get round the Act and defeat its objective by reducing the number of persons employed. He says that it would be quite easy for the employers, at least in marginal cases, to so adjust their work-load as to reduce the number of persons employed to less than fifty persons and thus deprive the workers of the benefits of the Act. According to him we must get at the intention of the legislature by taking note of the avowed policy of the Government, the purpose behind that Act as well as its scheme. It is not the function of this Court to decide policy questions. According to him we must get at the intention of the legislature by taking note of the avowed policy of the Government, the purpose behind that Act as well as its scheme. It is not the function of this Court to decide policy questions. Our primary duty is to apply the law. But in so applying the law if we are faced with difficulties as regards the true intention of the Legislature then we have to proceed to interpret the provision according to well known rules. Rendering social justice is the function of the other organs of the State. That task is definitely that of the Legislature and we are quite sure that the ideas of social justice, their scope as well as the limitations to be placed on that concept must have been in the mind of the Parliament while enacting the statute in question. Ordinarily we have to find out the intention of the Legislature from the language used. As mentioned above, if there are ambiguities, we have to call into aid well known canons of interpretation. But if the language of the section is plain, as it appears to us in this case, then no question of interpretation arises and we will be transgressing our frontiers if we alter the law in the guise of interpreting it. To our mind, it appears to be clear that the Parliament stipulated the continued existence of two conditions before the employers are required to contribute to the Fund and. if any one of those conditions disappear, necessarily the employer is absolved from the liability to contribute to the Fund. If we accept Sri Govindarajulu's contention that the words “are employed”refer to the date on which the Act was initially applied to the factory, the same interpretation has to be placed on the words “is a factory”. If that is so, if a concern is once treated as a factory then it would continue to be a factory even if it is subsequently closed down. In other words, the employer's liability to contribute to the Fund would continue even if he closes down the factory and disbands the workers. Nothing so bad could have been intended by the Parliament. In other words, the employer's liability to contribute to the Fund would continue even if he closes down the factory and disbands the workers. Nothing so bad could have been intended by the Parliament. In Pamadi Subbarama Setty v.Mirza Sewar Ali1 a modified form of this very contention was negatived by his Lordship Hombe Gowda, J. In that case, the employers were contributing to the Provident Fund. But some time thereafter there was dissolution of partnership, and the machinery in the factory was divided between the partners. One of the partners started a new concern. But that concern employed less than fifty persons. It was argued in that case that the liability to contribute to the Fund gets impressed on the machinery whereever it is taken. The Court quite naturally rejected that contention as having no basis either in fact or in law. The true effect of the finding in that case is that he very factory which was in existence on the date of the initial application of the Act should continue to exist before the employer is required to contribute to the Fund. It for any reason that factory comes to an end its liability also ceases. This decision though not directly in point for our present purpose, its ratio is of immense assistance to us. For the reasons already mentioned, the expression “are employed” must be interpreted in the same manner as the expression “is a factory”. The conclusion arrived at by Hombe Gowda, J., as well as our own finds support from the decision of the Punjab High Court in Golden Silk Mills v.Central Provident Fund Commissioner2 Dulat,J. who wrote the leading judgment in that case, observed as follows: “The view that once the Employees’ Provident Fund Act, 1952, applies to a particular factory it continues to apply even if the number of persons employed in the factory falls below fifty cannot be accepted as correct. The ordinary rule is that as soon as conditions for the application fa statute cease to exist the statute itself ceases to apply. The intention of the Act is not to burden small factories employing less than fifty persons with liabilities imposed by the Act. The ordinary rule is that as soon as conditions for the application fa statute cease to exist the statute itself ceases to apply. The intention of the Act is not to burden small factories employing less than fifty persons with liabilities imposed by the Act. It follows that the liability would cease as soon as a factory falls out of the category of factories employing fifty or more persons.” Sri Govindarajulu placed strong reliance on the decision of the Bombay High Court in The State v.Hathimala Textile Mills & Others3. There is no doubt that this decision supports the appellant. The Punjab High Court in Golden Silk Mils Case,1 dissented from the view taken by the Bombay High Court. With great respect to the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court, who decided that case we are also unable to subscribe to the view taken by them for the reasons mentioned by Dulat, J. in Golden Silk Mills case.1 Further, the very basis of that decision is now removed by the deletion of the words “in the first instance” found in section 1(3) (a)before its amendment in 1956, though in our opinion even the unamended section did not lend itself to the interpretation put upon it by the Bombay High Court. We are of the opinion that the words “in the first instance” referred to the application of the Act to all the factories engaged in any industry specified in Schedule I in which fifty or more persons are employed, as distinguished from those to which it may be applied by the Government later. Those words had nothing to do with the conditions prescribed for the continued application of the Act. In the Bombay case above referred the Court observed: (As summarised in the head-note): “The contention that the statute being a penal statute the words ‘are employed’ in section 1 (3 should be strictly construed and a construction favourable to the employee should be adopted cannot) be accepted. It must be remembered in the first instance, that the Employees’ Provident Funds Act is a social legislation meant for the benefit of workers. Penal statutes like other statutes must undoubtedly be construed according to their plain provisions. It must be remembered in the first instance, that the Employees’ Provident Funds Act is a social legislation meant for the benefit of workers. Penal statutes like other statutes must undoubtedly be construed according to their plain provisions. But it is now well recognised that it is the paramount duty of the Courts to put upon the language of the Legislature honestly and faithfully its plain and rational meaning so as to promote the object of the Legislature. To hold that the Act would cease to apply whenever the factory employed less than fifty persons would expose the workers to constant peril of losing the benefits of the Act and leave a wide scope for evasion which the Court must try to prevent.” The principles above enunciated do not admit of any controversy. But the question of suppressing evil and advancing the cause in view, arises only if the words employed are ambiguous. The principles behind section 1(3)(a)are clearly discernible. The contribution is asked for from the proprietors of factories which employ fifty or more persons. Evidently the Legislature wanted to impose that liability only on factories of certain size, the demarcating line being the capacity to employ fifty or more persons, the assumption being that an employer in his own interest would work his factory to the maximum capacity. We do not share the apprehensions about the employer's propensities to harm the interests of the employees. In the first place, in most cases at least, in trying to harm the interests of his workers, he will be harming his owninterest. That apart, enough safeguard has been provided in the Act to protect the interest of the workers. It is open to the Government to bring any factory within the scope of the Act after going through certain preliminaries. That provision amply protects the workers. The question whether any fraud had been practised to deflect the purposes of the Act is a question of fact. If the Court comes to the conclusion on the material before it that by dishonest means the employers are trying to over-reach the employees, it may render justice between the parties by ignoring the change brought about as was done in Special C.A. No. 829 of 1956 on the file of the Bombay High Court. If the Court comes to the conclusion on the material before it that by dishonest means the employers are trying to over-reach the employees, it may render justice between the parties by ignoring the change brought about as was done in Special C.A. No. 829 of 1956 on the file of the Bombay High Court. But we wish to express no opinion on that point at present as we had no occasion to c insider that aspect in all its details. Viewed from any angle, we do not think that there is any justification for holding the respondent liable tor the contributions in question. In view of our above finding, it is not necessary for us to go into the remaining two grounds on which the learned Magistrate dismissed the complaint, though in passing we would like to say that the learned Magistrate was not right in opining that there is any need to establish mens rea before a person can be found guilty of contravening the provisions of the Act. The question of mens rea has no relevancy when contraventions of statutes of fiscal nature are complained of. Moreover the intention in this case is obvious if the contravention is otherwise illegal. The question of delay in instituting the complaint is of no significance on the facts of this case. In the result, this appeal fails and the same is dismissed. S.V.S.-----Appeal dismissed.