Order The accused in Calendar Case No. 45 of 1959 on the file of the Court of the Sub Divisional Magistrate at Hospet having filed a Revision Petition before the District Magistrate of Bellary questioning the legality of an order made by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate under section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the District Magistrate has made this reference recommending that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate's order may be quashed. The said order was made by the trial Magistrate allowing an application of one Shanthawa that she may be permitted to give evidence in the case on the ground that she was in possession of material facts relevant to the decision of the case before him. The proceedings before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate arose out of information lodged with the District Superintendent of Police, Bellary by the District Registrar of that District which related to an alleged false impersonation at the registration of a sale deed on 4th November. 1957 in the Office of the Sub-Registrar of Kudligi. The sale deed purports to have been executed by Revappa, the husband of the aforesaid Shanthawa. On 8th January, 1958 Revappa himself had written to the Sub-Registrar of Kudligi that he had not executed the said sale-deed and that the accused had conspired to bring into existence and got registered the said sale-deed by forging his thumb impression. He had also made a formal complaint in that respect to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate's Court at Hospet. Subsequently, he allowed the complaint to be dismissed for default and wrote to the Sub-Registrar at Kudligi not to take any action on his previous letter to him, dated 8th January, 1958. As stated above, the Sub-Registrar did not accept this suggestion of Revappa with the result that the above Calendar Case came to be filed before the Sub Divisional Magistrate Hospet. Revappa was examined as P.W.11 in that case. He deposed that he had himself executed the sale deed in question. The application by Shanthawa came to be presented to the trial Magistrate after the evidence on behalf of both the prosecution and the defence had been closed. It was strenuously opposed by the accused. Revappa was examined as P.W.11 in that case. He deposed that he had himself executed the sale deed in question. The application by Shanthawa came to be presented to the trial Magistrate after the evidence on behalf of both the prosecution and the defence had been closed. It was strenuously opposed by the accused. They alleged that she had been set up by their enemies to come in as a voluntary witness at a late stage in the case in order to cause prejudice to the accused and that the very fact that she was neither interrogated in the course of the investigation by the police nor cited as a witness for the prosecution indicated that her claim of being in possession of material facts was not bona fide. They also stated that her application did not make it clear whether she was at all in possession of any material facts and if so, what those facts were. In view of these objections, the Advocate for Shanthawa filed a memo, giving a list of documents in the possession of his client Shanthawa. Thereafter, the Sub Divisional Magistrate heard the arguments on behalf of Shanthawa as well as the accused and made the order now in question on the 7th September, 1960 in which he considered the arguments and contentions advanced before him and recorded his opinion that Shanthavva's evidence was necessary for the just decision of the case before him. He also added that she would be examined as a Court witness and that the accused would be allowed to let in evidence in rebuttal of her evidence. In his reference to this Court the District Magistrate does lot state that there was no basis whatever for the trial Magistrate's opinion that Shanthavva's evidence is necessary for a just decision of the case, nor does he himself express an opinion to the contrary. Because the witness was one suggested neither by the prosecution nor by the defence, the District Magistrate thinks that it is ‘rather a peculiar procedure’ to have permitted her to give evidence at her own instance. Stating that her husband Revappa who gave evidence as P.W.11 has not bee 1 treated as hostile and the evidence sought to be given by his wife is likely to contradict his evidence, the District Magistrate ‘wonders whether such a thing is permissible under the law’. Mr. Stating that her husband Revappa who gave evidence as P.W.11 has not bee 1 treated as hostile and the evidence sought to be given by his wife is likely to contradict his evidence, the District Magistrate ‘wonders whether such a thing is permissible under the law’. Mr. Murlidhara Rao, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the accused, in support of this reference has cited several decided cases on the scope of section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is unnecessary to make any detailed reference to these several cases cited by the learned counsel because all the Huh Courts are agreed that by the very nature of the subject dealt with by the said section, the action to be taken by the Court thereunder must necessarily depend upon the facts of each case and that it is not possible to formulate a general rule applicable to all cases determining when and under what circumstances the power under the section should be exercised. It is necessarily so because the provisions of that section are intended to subserve the interests of justice and not the interest of either the prosecution or the accused before the Court. If this high purpose of the section is borne in mind, one cannot fail to appreciate the reason for the Legislature having employed language giving the widest amplitude to the power which it conters upon the Court. What is just in a given set of facts and circumstances may be clearly unjust in another set of facts and circumstances. Any attempt, therefore, tolimit the amplitude of the power or to formulate rules to govern the exercise of the Court's discretion in respect of it can never be totally free from the possibility of its making the Court powerless to render justice in the peculiar circumstances of a particular case. The only limitations which can be placed on that power are those which the judicial conscience of the Court may prescribe in the facts and circumstances actually before it. It should be remembered that when the Court comes to entertain an opinion that the evidence of any person is essential to the just decision of the case, the section itself makes it obligatory for the Court to summon an 1 examine that person. It has no doubt been argued by Mr. It should be remembered that when the Court comes to entertain an opinion that the evidence of any person is essential to the just decision of the case, the section itself makes it obligatory for the Court to summon an 1 examine that person. It has no doubt been argued by Mr. Murlidhara Rao or the basis of decided cases that a person, who is essentially a witness for the prosecution but whom the prosecution has for some reason or other omitted to cite and examine as a witness on its behalf, is not a person who could properly be examined by the Court in exercise of its power under section 540 and that such power ought not to be exercised for the purpose of what is described as filling up the loopholes or the lacunae in the prosecution evidence. These arguments, in my opinion, are of relevance only if the matter is to be examined from the point of view of the conduct of the prosecution or persons in charge of the prosecution and can scarcely be available when one considers the exercise in the interest of justice of its powers by the Court which can never be described as a partisan of either the prosecution or the defence. The exercise of the power by trial Court under section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the extent it affects its ultimate decision of the case is undoubtedly open to correction in appeal or revision as the case may be. In the majority of cases, the question whether such power has been rightly or wrongly exercised by the trial Court can be fully and properly examined and correctly decided after the conclusion of the trial rather than at an interlocutory stage. Now, in the case before me, the detailed order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate discloses that he has applied his mind, considered both sides of the matter presented to him on behalf of Shanthavva as well as the accused and has come to entertain a definite opinion that her evidence is essential to the just decision of the case. It is not possible at this stage for a Court sitting in revision to entertain a different opinion and still be quite certain that the interests of justice will not suffer. The reference is rejected.