ORDER: This is a Criminal Revision Petition filed by the accused Muniswamappa alias Chikkapillappa alias Thimmaraya against the conviction under section 19(f) of the Indian Arms Act. The learned First Magistrate, Bangalore, convicted him under that section and sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs. 25. The two main points of law urged before this Court against the conviction and sentence are: (1) that the Additional District Magistrate, Bangalore, who sanctioned the prosecution is not the proper authority to do so and hence, the very sanction is defective. Thus a question of jurisdiction is raised in this Revision; and (2) that in any case the sanction is improper and illegal as the order of sanction does not disclose that the facts of the case were placed before the sanctioning authority. In other words, it is contended, that there was no sufficient compliance of section 29 of the Indian Arms Act. The facts of the case are very simple. The accused was found in possession of a gun without the requisite licence therefor. It is not denied that he did possess a licence for that gun. A person who is in possession of such a weapon without the requisite licence contravenes the provisions of section 19(f) of the Indian Arms Act and is punishable as per the provisions of the said Act. The relevant portion of section 19(f) reads as follows: “Whoever commits any of the following offences (namely): ………… (f) has in his possession or under his control any arms, ammunition or military stores in contravention of the provisions of section 14 or section 15 ;” Section 15 is not relevant for the purpose of this case. Section 14 states that: “No person shall have in his possession or under his control any cannon or fire-arms, or any ammunition or military stores, except under a licence and in the manner and to the extent permitted thereby.” In other words, it emphasises that the person possessing a fire-arm should also have the requisite licence therefor. The learned Magistrate after considering the evidence in the case has come to the conclusion that the accused-petitioner in this case, has committed the offence punishable under section 19(f) of the Indian Arms Act. I have no reason to differ from that finding. The learned Magistrate after considering the evidence in the case has come to the conclusion that the accused-petitioner in this case, has committed the offence punishable under section 19(f) of the Indian Arms Act. I have no reason to differ from that finding. It is strenuously contended by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that the sanctioning authority was only the District Magistrate and, therefore, the sanction so obtained from the Additional District Magistrate is improper and without jurisdiction. In this connection a reference is to be made to section 29 of the Indian Arms Act which contemplates the obtaining of a sanction by the competent Magistrate as a pre-requisite for proceedings under section 19(f) of Indian Arms Act. The relevant portion of that section runs as follows: “Where an offence punishable under Section 19, clause (f), has been committed … no proceedings shall be instituted against any person in respect of such offence without previous sanction of the Magistrate of the district or, in a presidency town, of the Commissioner of Police.” It is urged that the Magistrate of the District connotes the District Magistrate and not the Additional District Magistrate. For the definition of the Magistrate one has to go back to the Criminal Procedure Code. Section 3(2) of Criminal Procedure Code defines the Magistrate of the District as “the District Magistrate”. Hinging his argument on this, the learned Advocate for the petitioner contends that the person that is competent to give sanction is only the District Magistrate and none else. It is necessary to refer to section 10 of the Criminal Procedure Code as well and it runs as follows: “10. (1) In every district outside the presidency-towns the State Government shall appoint a Magistrate of the first class, who shall be called the District Magistrate.” (2) The State Government may appoint any Magistrate of the first class to be an Additional District Magistrate and such Additional District Magistrate shall have all or any of the powers of a District Magistrate under this Code, or under any other law for the time being in force, as the State Government may direct.” As per this clause of section 10 of Criminal Procedure Code the State Government has the power to invest all or any of the powers of the District Magistrate to any Magistrate of the first class or the Additional District Magistrate. The phrase “under any other law for the time being in force” indicates that the State Government could invest powers to the Additional District Magistrate to act no1 only under the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Indian Penal Code but also other Penal Laws like the Indian Arms Act. In this case the Government has specifically authorised the Additional District Magistrate by a notification in G.O. No. 1438-57-CTS. 18-56-4 dated 29th May 1956 to give requisite sanction under section 29 of the Arms Act. Hence, the sanction given by the Additional District Magistrate cannot be challenged to be illegal, as contended by the learned Advocate for the Petitioner. The only other point that remains to be considered is whether the Additional District Magistrate before he exercised his powers of sanction had the facts of the case before hime In other words, did he exercise his powers judicially or in an haphazard manner without bringing to bear his mind on the facts of the case. The law on the point has been well-settled not only by the Privy Council but also by a series of cases of the Supreme Court. The leading case on the subject is of Gokulchand Dwarkadas Morarka v. The King, (1948) 1 MLJ. 243 : L.R. 75 I.A.30: A.I.R. 1948 P.C. 82 where it has been held as follows: “A sanction which names the person to be prosecuted and specifies the provision of the order which he is alleged to have contravened is a sufficient compliance with clause 23 of the said order. In order to comply with the provisions of clause 23, it must be proved that the sanction was given in respect of the facts constituting the offence charged. It is plainly desirable that the facts should be referred to on the face of the sanction, but this is not essential, since clause 23 does not require the sanction to be in any particular form, nor even to be in writing. But if the facts constituting the offence charged are not shown on the face of the sanction, the prosecution must prove by extraneous evidence that those facts were placed before the sanctioning authority. The sanction to prosecute is an important matter; it constitutes a condition precedent to the institution of the prosecution and the Government have an absolute discretion to grant or withhold their sanction. The sanction to prosecute is an important matter; it constitutes a condition precedent to the institution of the prosecution and the Government have an absolute discretion to grant or withhold their sanction. They are not concerned merely to see that the evidence discloses a prima facie case against the person sought to be prosecuted. They can refuse sanction on any ground which commends itself to them, for example, that on political or economic grounds they regard a prosecution as inexpedient. Where facts are not referred to on the face of the sanction nor is it proved by extraneous evidence that they were placed before the sanctioning authority, the sanction is invalid, and the trial Court would not be a Court of competent jurisdiction. This being so the defect cannot be cured under section 537 , Criminal Procedure Code, as a defect in the jurisdiction of the court can never be cured under section 537.” Emphasis in this case is laid on two points; (1) the order of sanction should be explicitly clear and contain the relevant facts to show that the sanctioning authority did judicially exercise its mind on the facts of the case and after being satisfied granted the sanction. To put it in otherwords, the order should be what is called a “Speaking Order.” But their Lordships go a step further and state that if that is not possible, by extraneous evidence placed before the sanctioning authority it should be clear that the requisite materials were before him and on the consideration of which the sanction was given. Sufficient facts were placed in the instant case before the sanctioning authority. I find that they were set out in Exhibit P-2 the report, by the Police Sub-Inspector sent through the Superintendent of Police to the District Magistrate, tor granting sanction. It mentions the brief facts of the case as to how the accused was found in possession of a gun without the requisite licence. It also states the offence that was said to have been committed by the accused, and he prays for sanction. Perusing Exhibit P-2 with care I find that the necessary materials were before the learned Additional District Magistrate before he exercised his powers of sanction to prosecute the accused. As a result thereof, Exhibit P-3 has come into existence and that is the order granting the sanction to prosecute the accused. Perusing Exhibit P-2 with care I find that the necessary materials were before the learned Additional District Magistrate before he exercised his powers of sanction to prosecute the accused. As a result thereof, Exhibit P-3 has come into existence and that is the order granting the sanction to prosecute the accused. Hence, the contention of the learned Advocate for the Petitioner that the sanction is invalid is without force. The order of sanction of prosecution should be read along with Exhibit P-2 the report requesting for sanction and if that is done there can be no doubt that the Additional District Magistrate has judicially exercised his powers. A brief reference is required to a few decisions that have been cited by the learned Advocate for the Petitioner. Much reliance is placed by him on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Jaswant Singh v. The State of Punjab, 1958 MLJ. (Crl.) 316: (1958) S.C.R.762: 1958 S.C.J. 355. That case relates to sanction in respect of an offence under Prevention of Corruption Act. There also the sanction is considered to be pre-requisite for the prosecution and it is laid as follows: “The sanction under the Act is not intended to be nor is an automatic formalit y and it is essential that the provisions in regard to sanction should be observed with complete strictness. The facts of that case indicate that the request for sanction related to section 5(1) (d) of the Prevention Corruption Act for accepting illegal gratification of Rs. 50 while he was charged and convicted for an offence under section 5(1)(d) as well for the graver offence of habitually accepting bribes under section 5(1)(a) of the Act. Hence, it was held that sanctioning authority had considered the facts relating to the receiving of the illegal gratification and the accused could only be validly tried and convicted for that offence. There is another case reported in the same volume of the Supreme CourtIndu Bhusan Chatterjee v. The State of West Bengal, 1958 MLJ. (Crl.) 448: (1958) S.C.R. 999: 1958 S.C.J. 581. That also related to prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act. In that case the evidence placed before the Court disclosed that the sanctioning authority went through all the relevant papers before according sanction. (Crl.) 448: (1958) S.C.R. 999: 1958 S.C.J. 581. That also related to prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act. In that case the evidence placed before the Court disclosed that the sanctioning authority went through all the relevant papers before according sanction. A statement was prepared by the Police and was put before him by the personnel branch of his office and he did not merely put his signature on a ready made sanction presented by the Police. Under such circumstances, the sanction granted under section 6 was held to be perfectly valid. In this case Exhibit P-2 the report was before the sanctioning authority before he exercised his jurisdiction. A later case of the Supreme Court is also to the same effect and that is the case of P.C. Joshi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1961 MLJ. (Crl.) 395: A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 387: (1961) 2 S.C.J. 48 whore it is held: “Mere production of a document which sets out the names of the persons to be prosecuted and the provisions of the Statute alleged to be contravened, and purporting to bear the signature of an officer competent is grant the sanction where such sanction is a condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction does not invest the Court with jurisdiction to try the offence. If the facts which constitute the charge do not appear on the face of the sanction, it must be established by extraneous evidence that those facts were placed before the authority competent to grant the sanction and that the authority applied his mind to those facts before giving sanction.” In that case the Home Secretary was the person who was authorised to sanction a complaint for defamation of a Minister of the Government of Uttar Pradesh. The evidence clearly disclosed that the Home Secretary had applied his mind to all the materials before him and then granted the sanction. Hence, it was held that the sanction was a valid and proper one. The two decisions relied upon by the learned Advocate for the Petitioner-(1) Gopi Nath v. The State, A.I.R. 1953 Bilaspur 12 and (2) Chand Singh v. The State, A.I.R. 1954 Pepsu 132 are inapplicable to the facts of this case. Hence, it was held that the sanction was a valid and proper one. The two decisions relied upon by the learned Advocate for the Petitioner-(1) Gopi Nath v. The State, A.I.R. 1953 Bilaspur 12 and (2) Chand Singh v. The State, A.I.R. 1954 Pepsu 132 are inapplicable to the facts of this case. In the former case all that was mentioned in the application was that the Petitioner had committed an offence punishable under section 19(f) of the Indian Arms Act and hence the sanction to prosecute was sought. The District Magistrate automatically allowed the application granting sanction. Those facts arc far different from those of the present case and discussed by me supra. So also in the latter Pepsu case. All hat was stated in the application was that the Arms specified therein had been recovered from the possession of the petitioner (accused), which prosecution fell within the provision of section 19(f) of the Indian Arms Act. The learned District Magistrate ordered sanction. These are not the circumstances in the present case. Hence, both these decisions are inapplicable. In the result this petition is dismissed. S.V.S.-----Petition dismissed.