M. R. CALLA, J. ( 1 ) IN all these 13 Special Civil Applications common questions based on identical facts are involved in the matter of challenge to the acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act and, therefore, we proceed to decide all these 13 Special Civil Applications by this common judgment and order as under:- ( 2 ) PETITIONERS herein are the land owners of villages Navagam and Vadnagar of Taluka Kodinar, District - Amreli (now in Revenue District Junagadh ). The lands of these land owners were sought to be acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 at the instance of the Company - respondent No. 3. The particulars of the lands concerned in these Special civil Applications are as under:- ( 21 ) WHILE citing 1995 (2)G. L. R. 1733 ( Zaverchand Popatlal Sumeria v. State of Gujarat) Mr. Patel has fairly pointed out that this decision was reversed by the Supreme Court in the case of Reliance Petroleum Ltd. Vs. Zaver Chand Popatlal Sumaria, reported in (1996)4 SCC 579 on an additional ground as the court did not express any opinion on the question of law. In this regard it has been submitted that in cases where a decision of a court has been reversed by higher court on any ground, the decision, which has been reversed, may not be binding jurisprudentially, but it did not losses its importance altogether, it is not deprived of its significance. Even if an authority is over ruled, it still remains an authority for the Court. He has made reference to Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th Edition pages 26 and 27. The relevant portion is reproduced as under:-"it sometimes happens that a decision is affirmed or reversed on appeal on a different point. As an example, suppose that a case is decided in the Court of Appeal on ground A, and then goes on appeal to the House of Lords, which decides it on ground B, nothing being said upon A. What, in such circumstances, is the authority of the decision on ground A in the Court of Appeal? As an example, suppose that a case is decided in the Court of Appeal on ground A, and then goes on appeal to the House of Lords, which decides it on ground B, nothing being said upon A. What, in such circumstances, is the authority of the decision on ground A in the Court of Appeal? Is the decision binding on the High Court, and on the Court of Appeal itself in subsequent cases?""it is submitted that the true view is that a decision either affirmed or reversed on another point is deprived of any absolute binding force it might otherwise have had; but it remains an authority which may be followed by a court that thinks the particular point to have been rightly decided. "he has also made reference to Dias Jurisprudence, 5th Edition Page 144. The relevant portion is reproduced as under:-"a case may be reversed on appeal. The effect of reversal is normally that the first judgment ceased to have any effect at all. The situation is different if the case is affirmed or reversed by an appellate court on a different point from that on which the decision in the lower court was based. In one case, a Master of the Rolls said that in such a situation the previous decision will be of no effect at all. This probably goes too far, and in another case it was said that the first judgment remains binding. The truth seems to be that in such a situation a later court has freedom to deal as it pleases with the earlier decision. "on that basis the submission is that the later court is free to deal with the earlier decision as it pleases, even if the decision has been reversed on some other point. Mr. Patel made a pointed reference to para 6 at page 581 from (1996)4 SCC 579 (Reliance Petroleum Ltd. V/s. Zaver Chand Popatlal Sumaria) and paras 7,12,17,25,26 and 27 of 1995 (2) GLR 1733 (Supra ). On this very aspect of the matter Mr. Raval has also made reference to Salmond on Jurisprudence (P. J. Fitzgerald) 12th Edition (Reprint Tripathi) in the Chapter 5 relating to Precedent page 141 at page 147. The relevant portion is reproduced as under:-"a precedent overruled is definitely and formally deprived of all authority. On this very aspect of the matter Mr. Raval has also made reference to Salmond on Jurisprudence (P. J. Fitzgerald) 12th Edition (Reprint Tripathi) in the Chapter 5 relating to Precedent page 141 at page 147. The relevant portion is reproduced as under:-"a precedent overruled is definitely and formally deprived of all authority. It becomes null and void, like a repealed statute, and a new principle is authoritatively substituted for the old. "at the same time on the question of meaning of consultation Mr. , Patel has referred to 1993 Edition of Daulat Ram Prems Judicial Dictionary (Bharat Law Publications, Jaipur) at page 394 - and has also referred to the 1993 decsion of the Supreme Court in Judges Case i. e. (1993)4 SCC 441 (S. C. Advocates On Record Association v. U. O. I. ). He has also made reference to 1947 Vol. 2 of All England Law Reports Page 680 Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation, and read out the following passage from Page 685 thereof:"i do not wish to repeat what I have said, but it might be useful to summarise once again the principle, which seems to me to be that the court is entitled to investigate the action of the local authority with a view to seeing whether it has taken into account matters which it ought not to take into account, or, conversely, has refused to take into account or neglected to take into account matters which it ought to take into acount. Once that question is answered in favour of the local authority, it may still be possible to say that the local authority, nevertheless, have come to a conclusion so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it. In such a case, again, I think the court can interfere. The power of the court to interfere in each case is not that of an appellate authority to override a decision of the local authority, but is that of a judicial authority which is concerned, and concerned only, to see whether the local authority have contravened the law by acting in excess of the powers which Parliament has confided in it. " ( 22 ) WE have considered the submissions, as have been made before us, in the light of the Scheme of the Act and on the basis of the record which has been produced by the learned A. G. P. The facts established on record in these cases obviate the need to discuss and deal with the cases which have been cited by the parties. There is sufficient material to hold that the inquiry under S. 5a had been held and it is also settled and clear position of law that the inquiry under S. 5a is only an inquiry of administrative nature. Merely because the learned counsel has argued that it would have been preferable had the copy of the inquiry under S. 5a would have been made available, it would not vitiate the acquisition proceedings. It is also factually incorrect to say that there is no inquiry at all under S. 40. The record shows that the inquiry under S. 40 had been held as contemplated under the law and it is also clearly born out from the facts and record of this case that the Government had given the consent after arriving at the satisfaction based on the report of the Collector under S. 5a with due regard to the purposes mentioned in S. 40 (1) (aa ). Such inquiry had also been held by the Officer who was competent to hold the inquiry. In the light of the facts and circumstances obtaining in these cases and on examination with reference to the records, we find that there is no substance in the argument that there is no inquiry under S. 40. ( 23 ) EVEN with regard to the contention that there was no proper inquiry under Rule 4 of the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, there is sufficient material on record and it stands established that the Land Acquistion committee as contemplated under Rule 3 had been constituted, views of this committee were obtained, same were duly considered and it is only after the proper consultation that the Government was satisfied that the acquisition may go ahead. In such matters, we find that while the constitution of the Land Acquisition Committee is a must, it is not necessary that in every case there must be a formal meeting of the Land Acquisition Committee. In such matters, we find that while the constitution of the Land Acquisition Committee is a must, it is not necessary that in every case there must be a formal meeting of the Land Acquisition Committee. It may be sufficient and substantial compliance if the views of the members of the Committee are obtained. No law has been cited before us to indicate that there must be a formal meeting of such a Committee and only thereafter the report is to be made. It is provided in Rule 3 (4) itself that the Committee may regulate its own procedure and it is this Committee which has to advise the appropriate Government on matters relating to or arising out of the acquisition of land under part 7 of the Act. The affidavit dt. 4. 5. 99, which was filed during the course of arguments on behalf of the Government alongwith the documents, furnish a documentary proof of contemporaneous nature that there was an effective consultation and the decision was arrived at after such consultation and in the instant case the requirements of affording the opportunity of hearing had also been fully complied with and, therefore, the decision of the Supreme Court in case of State of Gujarat v. Chaturbhai (Supra) is of no avail to the petitioners. Thus, we do not find any substance in the argument raised on behalf of the petitioners that there was no proper inquiry under Rule 4. ( 24 ) SO far as the contention that inquiry under S. 5a, S. 40 and Rule 4 are separate, independent and distinct inquiry is concerned, it may be observed that the scope and object of these inquiries is very clear from the language of these provisions. The objects which were sought to be achieved through such inquiries have been fully achieved in the facts of the present case. Even if it is found that these three inquiries are separate, independent and distinct, in the facts of this case we do not find that any of the provisions or part of any inquiry has been scuttled at any stage in any manner and, therefore, even if we hold that these are separate, independent and distinct inquiries, in the facts of the case the objection of the petitioners does not impinge upon the validity of the acquisition proceedings as such and, therefore, the proceedings cannot be held to be invalid. The learned counsel has also argued that inquiry under Rule 4 and S. 40 must precede the issue of the Notification under S. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. In this regard it may be straightaway pointed out that in the Scheme of the Act and the provisions, which we have quoted herein-above, such proposition is not at all discernible that inquiry under Rule 4 and S. 40 must be held as a condition precedent or prerequisite to the issue of the Notification under S. 4. All that can be said on the basis of Rule 4 (4) is that the statutory requirement is that no declaration has to be made by appropriate Government under S. 6 of the Act unless the appropriate Government has consulted the Committee and has considered the report submitted under this Rule as also the report, if any, submitted under S. 5a of the Act and that the agreement under S. 41 of the Act has been executed by the Company. In the facts of this case, we find that all these steps have been taken prior to the issue of the Notification under S. 6 of the Act and this factual position, that all these steps had been taken prior to the issue of the Notification under S. 6, has not been disputed even on behalf of the petitioners by Mr. Patel. Therefore, this contention raised on behalf of the petitioners fail. ( 25 ) NOW coming to the question with regard to the public purpose as referred to in S. 40 (1) (aa) of the Act and Gujarat Amendment, even if we read S. 40 (1) (aa) after the deletion of the words, "either on the report of the Collector under S. 5a sub-clause (2) or" as occurring in S. 40 (1), we find that the purpose on which the stress has been laid is fully covered by S. 40 (1) (aa) because the acquisition has not to be necessarily for construction of some building, it may be for the work of company, which is engaged or is taking steps for engaging itself in any industry or work, which is for a public purpose. Now it cannot be said that the work with regard to the manufacturing of cement by a Company like respondent No. 3 and the requirement of land for extension of such a Unit is not a public purpose. Now it cannot be said that the work with regard to the manufacturing of cement by a Company like respondent No. 3 and the requirement of land for extension of such a Unit is not a public purpose. Cement is a material which is used in large number of Projects undertaken by such public sector Companies, which have now become part and parcel and at par with the State enterprises. In the State of Gujarat there are large number of water and irrigation projects in which cement is a very essential material and the acquisition of the land for a Company which is engaged in the production of cement cannot be said to be an acquisition without any public purpose as contemplated under S. 40 (1) (aa ). In this regard, we may also put on record the facts pointed out by Mr. Raval appearing on behalf of the respondent - Company that the cement industry has been recognised as an industry of public utility under Industries Development Act, 1951. So far as the grievance which has been raised to compare the two public purposes so as to struck a balance between the public purpose of production of cement or other agricultural produce from the lands, which may be useful even for the purpose of sugarcane factories etc. and the public purpose of Companies engaged in the activities like that of production of cement is concerned, we may point out that it is for the Government to consider as to at what point of time which particular purpose must be given preference. It is for the functionaries of the Government acting under the relevant provisions of the Act to assess as to at what particular point of time which public purpose should get preference over the other public purposes. At a given point of time agricultural produce may be the first priority of the Government, at another point of time the production of cement may be the preference of the Government. It will depend upon the exigencies and the requirements of the execution of the policies and projects which are sought to be undertaken. At a given point of time agricultural produce may be the first priority of the Government, at another point of time the production of cement may be the preference of the Government. It will depend upon the exigencies and the requirements of the execution of the policies and projects which are sought to be undertaken. Government has its own programmes to undertake the various types of developmental activities and it has to be agreed on all hands that so far as the courts are concerned, they have very little say on these aspects of the matter so as to strike a balance between the two public purposes. If the functionaries of the Government had taken the view that at this given point of time the public purpose with regard to the production of cement was preferable, we cannot substitute our opinion on the opinion of the Government. In such cases, even if two views are possible that cannot be a subject matter of judicial review by the Court that the Government ought to have preferred one public purpose over the other public purpose. It is not the field or arena of the Court to take upon itself to decide the preference with regard to the public purposes, lest, it would be a case of crossing the defined limits of judicial review. The purposes and the objects to which Mr. Patel has made reference is a part and parcel of the orientation and approach of making difference between the purposes when the land is sought to be acquired for Companies and when the land is sought to be acquired for the purpose of the Government itself and here we may observe that as the law stands and as the provisions in question have been interpreted in various decisions, to which reference has already been made herein-above, it is not possible for this court to enlarge the scope of the existing provisions and the interpretation thereof. Law itself is the limit with which we are bound. The approach and commitment with which Mr. Law itself is the limit with which we are bound. The approach and commitment with which Mr. Patel has made the submissions devoted to the cause of the land owners may be the submissions with very laudable objects, but it would be better if they are advanced and taken care of by those, who are charged with the responsibilities under the Constitution to enact the law and not to the Courts, which have the duty to interpret the provisions of the law as they exist. ( 26 ) IN any case, having considered the entire scheme of the Act and various contentions, which have been raised at the Bar and which have been dealt with as herein-above and having gone through the record, which had been produced before us,we are satisfied that the relevant provisions of law have been fully complied with and there is no scope of any interference with the acquisition, as has been made in the instant case and there being no scope for any interference by this Court, the acquisition of land, which is challenged in these petitions, does not warrant any interference. ( 27 ) ACCORDINGLY we do not find any merit in any of these 13 Special Civil Applications and the same are hereby dismissed. Rule is discharged in each of the petitions. No order as to costs. .