DIWAN CHAND v. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH — 1999 DIGILAW 273 (HP)

JUDGMENT R.L. Khurana, J.—The above noted two appeals, which have arisen against the judgment dated 16.8.1997, of the learned Sessions Judge, Bilaspur, in Sessions Trial No. 10 of 1990, are being disposed of together by this single judgment. 2. Diwan Chand, appellant, in Criminal Appeal No. 423 of 1997 and respondent in Criminal Appeal No. 265 of 1998, hereinafter referred to as the accused stands convicted by the learned Sessions Judge for the offence under Section 302, Indian Penal Code for having committed the murder of Shri M.L. Nahar, the then Additional District Magistrate, Bilaspur. Upon such conviction, he has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/-. In default of payment of fine, he has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years. 3. Criminal Appeal No. 423 of 1997 has been preferred by the accused assailing the conviction and sentence as imposed upon him by the learned Sessions Judge. While Criminal Appeal No. 265 of 1998 has been filed by the State of Himachal Pradesh under Section 377, Code of Criminal Procedure, seeking the enhancement of the sentence from life imprisonment to capital punishment. 4. Briefly stated, the prosecution story is this. In July 1990 the deceased Shri M.L. Nahar was posted as Additional District Magistrate at Bilaspur. On 10.7.1990, at about 5.30 p.m. when the deceased was sitting in his office in the Collectorate Building, Bilaspur, the accused entered his room armed with knife Ex. P-l. Immediately after entering the room, the accused started inflicting knife blows on the person of the deceased. As many as 21 blows were inflicted on various parts of the person of the deceased. The deceased, while being hit by the accused, raised shrieks "MAAR DIYA MAAR DIYA". On hearing such shrieks of the deceased, PW 1 Ram Lai, Peon, and PW 3 Hardyal Singh, Personal Assistant of the deceased, who were sitting in the adjoining room rushed towards the room of the deceased and saw the accused inflicting knife blows on the person of the deceased. They asked the accused as to what he was doing. They also shouted for help. Sarvshri B.S. Chandel, Advocate, R.R. Kaundal, M.L.A., Ram Dass and Joginder Singh Peons on hearing the shouts rushed towards the room of the deceased. The main gate of the first floor was closed. They asked the accused as to what he was doing. They also shouted for help. Sarvshri B.S. Chandel, Advocate, R.R. Kaundal, M.L.A., Ram Dass and Joginder Singh Peons on hearing the shouts rushed towards the room of the deceased. The main gate of the first floor was closed. The accused was seen coming out of the room of the deceased holding knife Ex. P-l in his hand. Shri R.R. Kaundal hurled a steel pipe at the accused, which hit him on his back. The accused in order to escape jumped down from the balcony of the first floor. He was, however, overpowered by the public who had in the meantime gathered there, and handed over to the police. 5. On the basis of the statement made by PW 1 Shri Ram Lai, Peon, to the police under Section 154, Code of Criminal Procedure, the present case came to be registered vide FIR No. 68 of 1990 (Ex. PW 10/A) at Police Station, Sadar, Bilaspur. The investigation of the case was taken up by PW 21, Inspector Sita Ram. The accused, at the time he was apprehended, while trying to escape, was carrying a raxine bag across his shoulder. During the search of such bag, the knife Ex. P-l besides other articles and papers were recovered, which were taken into possession vide memo Ex. PW 6/A. The bloodstained cloths, namely, Pant Ex. P-26, Shirt Ex. P-25, Vest Ex. P-27, wrist watch Ex. P-24, and currency notes worth Rs. 220/- Ex.P-23 were also taken into possession from the accused vide memo Ex. PW 6/B. 6. The dead body was sentfor post mortem which was conducted by PW 16 Dr. B.D. Sharma. As many as 21 incised wounds on different part of the body of the deceased out of which the following injuries were opined to be individually sufficient to cause death:— 1. Incised wound on the front of chest on left side 5 cm below the nipple. It was in vertical direction, 2 cm x 1 cm spindle shaped wound piercing the left lower lobe of the lung; 2. Incised spindle shaped wound on the left side of the chest 2.5 cm above the nipple. It was 2.5 cm long and 2 cm wide. The wound was penetrating the chest wall; 3. Incised wound in the right para sternal region. 2 cm right to the xiphisternum. Incised spindle shaped wound on the left side of the chest 2.5 cm above the nipple. It was 2.5 cm long and 2 cm wide. The wound was penetrating the chest wall; 3. Incised wound in the right para sternal region. 2 cm right to the xiphisternum. 3 cm long and 2 cm in breadth. The wound was communicating with right pleural cavity piercing the right middle and lower lobe of the lung. Right sided haemothorax and clotted blood was present; 4. Incised wound over right hypochondrium 2 cm x 1 cm below the costal margin in the right mid clavicular line penetrating the peritoneum; 5. Incised wound 2 cm x 1 cm obliquely placed in the left hypochondric region penetrating the peritoneal cavity; 6. Incised penetrating wound 2 cm x 1 cm about 2 inches above the umbilicus. The wound was penetrating the peritoneum; and 7. Incised wound 2 cm x 1 cm on the left side of abdomen in the left mid-clavicular line 10 cm below the left costal margin penetrating the peritoneum. 7. All the 21 injuries found on the person of the deceased were anti-mortem. The probable time between injuries and death was less than 30 minutes. 8. Upon the accused having been sent up for trial, an application came to be made on behalf of the accused under Section 329, Code of Criminal Procedure, for the postponement of the trial on the ground that the accused was of unsound mind and not capable of making his defence. An inquiry into the matter was held by the learned Sessions Judge and on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry vide order dated 28.9.1992 the accused was found to be a sane person and capable of making of his defence. The prayer for postponement of the trial was, therefore, rejected by the learned Sessions Judge. 9. The order dated 28.9.1992 of the learned Sessions Judge holding the accused to be sane and capable of making a defence was assailed by the accused before this court by way of a revision petition, being Cr. R. No. 97/92. The revision petition was allowed on 1 LI 1.1992 by a learned Single Judge. 9. The order dated 28.9.1992 of the learned Sessions Judge holding the accused to be sane and capable of making a defence was assailed by the accused before this court by way of a revision petition, being Cr. R. No. 97/92. The revision petition was allowed on 1 LI 1.1992 by a learned Single Judge. The order dated 28.9.1992 of the learned Sessions Judge was set aside and it was directed that the learned Sessions Judge should call for the report of the Psychiatrist, Mental Hospital, Amritsar and also to examine him in the court. The accused was referred to Mental Hospital, Amritsar and the necessary report was obtained. The psychiatrist was also examined in court. After holding such further inquiry in terms of the direction of this court in Cr. R. No. 97/92, the learned Sessions Judge vide order dated 13.9.1996 again came to the conclusion that the accused was sane and capable of making a defence. Such order was never assailed by the accused. The trial, therefore, proceeded against the accused. 10. The accused was charged for the offence under Section 302, Indian Penal Code, on 1.10.1996. He pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 11. The prosecution in support of its case examined as many as 21 witnesses in order to bring home the offence against the accused. After the closure of evidence of the prosecution, circumstances appearing against the accused were put to him as required under Section 313, Code of Criminal Procedure. As many as 37 questions were put to him. The accused kept mum and did not give answer to any questions put to him. However, on having been called upon to enter his defence, the accused examined four witnesses in his defence. 12. The learned Sessions Judge upon consideration of the material placed before him vide the impugned judgment dated 16.8.1997 convicted and sentenced the accused as aforesaid. 13. At the very out set it may be stated that during the course of hearing of the present appeal, the learned Counsel for the accused has not assailed the findings dated 13.9.1996 under Section 329, Code of Criminal Procedure, holding the accused to be capable of making a defence. Therefore, we refrain from going into the correctness or otherwise of such findings. 14. That the accused had killed the deceased Shri M.L. Nahar is not disputed. Therefore, we refrain from going into the correctness or otherwise of such findings. 14. That the accused had killed the deceased Shri M.L. Nahar is not disputed. The only point urged by Shri M.S. Chandel, who appears on behalf of the accused, is that the accused was a person of unsound mind and that he was not in a position to know or realise the nature of the act which he was committing and as such the accused is entitled to the benefit of Section 84, Indian Penal Code. Learned Counsel further argued that rnens rea being an essential ingredient of the offence with which the accused was charged, his conviction with respect to such an offence cannot be sustained for the simple reason that no intention to cause death or to cause any injury whether resulting in death or not could be possibly attributed to a person who, when he committed the acts, was insane. 15. Section 84, Indian Penal Code, one of the provisions contained in Chapter IV of the Indian Penal Code, which deals with "General Exceptions" provides as under:— "84. Act of a person of unsound mind.—Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law." 16. Section 105, Evidence Act, 1872, which deals with the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of the exceptions specified in the Indian Penal Code, provides:— "105. Burden of proving that case of accused comes within exceptions.—When a person is accused of any offence, the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of the General Exceptions in the Indian Penal Code (XLV of 1860), or within any special exception or proviso contained in any other part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence, is upon him, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances." Illustration (a) to the above section reads:— "A, accused of murder, alleges that by reason of unsoundness of mind, he did not know the nature of the act. The burden of proof is on A." 17. The burden of proof is on A." 17. Shri M.S. Chandel, the learned Counsel for the accused has by placing reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkarv. State of Gujarat [AIR 1964 Supreme Court 1563] followed by a Division Bench of this Court, of which one of us was a member. In Gian Chand v. State of H.P., [1996 (2) Sim. L.J. 1167] has contended that it is for the prosecution to establish the necessary rnens rea of the accused and that even though the accused may not have taken a plea of insanity or led evidence to show that he was insane when he committed an offence of which intention is an ingredient, the prosecution must satisfy the court that the accused had the requisite intention, 18. No doubt that the burden of proving an offence is always on the prosecution. But the State of mind of a person can ordinarily only be inferred from the circumstances of the case. Therefore, if a person deliberately strikes another with a deadly weapon, which is likely to cause an injury and sometimes even a fatal injury depending upon the nature, type and quality of the weapon and the part of the body on which it was struck, it would be reasonable to infer that what the accused did was accompanied by the intention to cause a kind of injury which in fact resulted from that act. In such cases the prosecution is deemed to have discharged the burden which rested on it to establish an essential ingredient of the offence, namely, the intention of the accused inflicting a blow with a deadly weapon. Undoubtedly, Section 84, Indian Penal Code, can be invoked by an accused to nullify the evidence led by the prosecution by-establishing that he was, at the relevant time of the commission of the alleged offence, incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law, It is not for the prosecution to show that the accused was incapable of knowing the nature of the act or of knowing that what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law. Every one is presumed to be sane and to know the consequences of his act(s). Every one is presumed to be sane and to know the consequences of his act(s). Similarly, everyone is presumed to know the law, Such facts are not to be proved and established by the prosecution. 19. Much reliance was placed by Shri M.S. Chandel, the learned Counsel for the accused, on the following passage of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Dahyabhai Chhaganbkai Thakkars case (supra):— "The doctrine of burden of proof in the context of the plea of insanity may be stated in the following propositions: (1) The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had committed the offence with the requisite mens rea; and the burden of proving that always rests on the prosecution from the beginning to the end of the trial. (2) There is a rebut table presumption that the accused was not insane, when he committed the crime, in the sense laid down by Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code; the accused may rebut it by placing before the court all the relevant evidence-oral, documentary or circumstantial, but the burden of proof upon him is no higher than that rests upon a party to civil proceedings, (3) Even if the accused was not able to establish conclusively that he was insane at the time he committed the offence, the evidence placed before the court by the accused or by the prosecution may raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as regards one or more of the ingredients of the offence, including mens rea of the accused and in that case the court would be entitled to acquit the accused on the ground that the general burden of proof resting on the prosecution was not discharged." 20. Relying on the above observations, it was contended that the legal position is otherwise than the one pointed out above. 21. Dealing with the passage (quoted above and relied upon by the learned Counsel for the accused), the Supreme Court in Bhikari v. The State of Uttar Pradesh [AIR 1966 Supreme Court 1] has observed:— "This passage does not say anything different from what we have said earlier. Undoubtedly it is for the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had committed the offence with the requisite mens rea. Once that is done a presumption that the accused was sane when he committed the offence would arise. Undoubtedly it is for the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had committed the offence with the requisite mens rea. Once that is done a presumption that the accused was sane when he committed the offence would arise. This presumption is rebut table and he can rebut it either by leading evidence or by relying upon the prosecution evidence itself. If upon the evidence adduced in the case whether by the prosecution or by the accused a reasonable doubt is created in the mind of the Court as regards one or more of the ingredients of the offence including mens rea of the accused he would be entitled to be acquitted. This is very different from saying that the prosecution must also establish the sanity of the accused at the time of commission of the offence despite what has been expressly provided for in Section 105 of the Evidence Act." 22. It was contended on behalf of the accused that there is evidence on the record from which it can be inferred that the accused was a person of unsound mind at the time of commission of the alleged offence. In support of his contention the learned Counsel for the accused referred to the medical and other evidence recorded during the course of inquiry under Section 329, Code of Criminal Procedure, in order to show that the accused was not sane and was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia and as such was not capable of knowing the nature of his act or that what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law. 23. The question which arises at this stage is whether the evidence recorded during the course of an enquiry contemplated by Section 329, Code of Criminal Procedure, can be looked into for the purpose of decision on the merits of the case? 24. Sub-section (2) of Section 329, Code of Criminal Procedure provides:— "(2) The trial of the fact of the unsoundness of mind and incapacity of the accused shall be deemed to be part of his trial before the Magistrate or Court." 25. 24. Sub-section (2) of Section 329, Code of Criminal Procedure provides:— "(2) The trial of the fact of the unsoundness of mind and incapacity of the accused shall be deemed to be part of his trial before the Magistrate or Court." 25. Learned Counsel for the accused by placing reliance on the said provision, contended that since the enquiry into the fact of unsoundness of mind and the incapacity of the accused is deemed to be a part of his trial, the evidence recorded during such enquiry can be looked into and considered even for the purpose of the merits of the case. 26. We do not find any force in the contention of the learned Counsel. Even though the enquiry into the fact of the unsoundness of mind and incapacity of the accused is deemed to be a part of the trial, it is significant to note that the enquiry as to the unsoundness of mind and incapacity of the accused under Section 329, Code of Criminal Procedure, relates only to the unsoundness of mind of the accused at the time of enquiry or trial, and not at the time of commission of the offence. [See: State of Maharashtra v. Sindhi alias Raman, AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1665]. 27. Dealing with the scope and ambit of Section 329(2), Code of Criminal Procedure, Honble Mr. Justice M.M. Punchhi of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana (as his Lordship then was) in Rajinder Kumar alias Jaggiv. The State of Haryana [1987 (2) C.L.R. 215], has held:— "......Now here the order as such is part of the trial, as is clear from the deeming provision of sub-section (2) of Section 329 of the Code. The occasion to determine such fact arises at the trial and a finding given by a Magistrate or a Court of Session after an inquiry into the unsoundness of mind and incapacity of the accused is a part of the trial. In one situation, the trial is stayed till the accused gains capacity to defend himself. In the other, the trial is not stayed on the premises that the accused has the capacity to defend himself. The finding so recorded being part of the trial is open to challenge by either side, i.e. by the prosecution as also the accused, when after the trial is finalised and a verdict of conviction or acquittal is recorded. In the other, the trial is not stayed on the premises that the accused has the capacity to defend himself. The finding so recorded being part of the trial is open to challenge by either side, i.e. by the prosecution as also the accused, when after the trial is finalised and a verdict of conviction or acquittal is recorded. If conviction is recorded, the finding of the court about the capacity of the accused to defend himself becomes open to review. And if the finding is reviewed, it would mean that the prosecution was unable to discharge the onus of proof regarding soundness of mind of the accused as also his capacity, and this may lead to the vitiation of the trial altogether. A lame defence by the Prosecutor in that regard would vitiate the conviction. Yet the order with regard to such capacity, as is clear to me, is presently interlocutory in nature and not revisable; it being a step to further the trial. It cannot be said that the order passed under Section 329 of the Code would for all times determine the question about the unsoundness of mind or capacity/incapacity of the accused to make his defence. The crucial word in the Section being appears imports a lesser degree of probability than proof. It is only when a doubt is raised in the mind of the court that an accused appearing before it is of unsound mind, it becomes obligatory on it to try the fact of such unsound-ness of the mind and capacity but only to facilitate and further the trial." 28. The evidence recorded during the course of enquiry, under Section 329, Code of Criminal Procedure, though a part of the trial can be looked into only when the findings recorded by the court as to mental capacity of the accused to make a defence are assailed in appeal against the verdict of conviction or acquittal. In case such findings as to the mental capacity of the accused are not assailed, the evidence recorded during the course of inquiry under Section 329, Code of Criminal Procedure, cannot be looked into and considered for the purpose of merits of the case. In case such findings as to the mental capacity of the accused are not assailed, the evidence recorded during the course of inquiry under Section 329, Code of Criminal Procedure, cannot be looked into and considered for the purpose of merits of the case. Even in case the findings as to mental capacity of the accused are assailed in an appeal against the final verdict of conviction or acquittal, the evidence recorded during the course of inquiry under Section 329, Code of Criminal Procedure, can be used only for the limited purpose of looking into the correctness of the findings as to mental capacity of the accused at the tiral, since the inquiry relates only to the unsoundness of mind of the accused at the time of inquiry or trial and not at the time of commission of the alleged offence. 29. As stated above, in the present case, the findings dated 13.9.1996 of the learned Sessions Judge, as to the mental capacity of the accused have not been assailed on behalf of the accused. Therefore, the evidence recorded during the course of inquiry under Section 329, Code of Criminal Procedure, cannot be looked into for the purpose of merits of the case. 30. It was next contended by the learned Counsel for the accused that since the copies of the statements of some of the witnesses examined during the course of inquiry under Section 329, Code of Criminal Procedure, have been tendered into evidence both by the prosecution as well as by the defence and received in evidence as Ex. PX/3 to PX/6 and Ex. DX, the same can be read and taken into consideration while determining the mental condition of the accused at the time of the commission of the offence. 31. Be it stated that the copies of statement of witnesses examined during the course of inquiry under Section 329, Code of Criminal Procedure, have not been proved in evidence in accordance with law. These are not per se admissible in evidence. Mere tendering them in evidence is of no effect. Before these statements can be read in evidence, the same were required to be proved in evidence in accordance with law. The accused had himself raised an objection to the admissibility of these statements in evidence while the copies were tendered into evidence by the prosecution as Ex. Mere tendering them in evidence is of no effect. Before these statements can be read in evidence, the same were required to be proved in evidence in accordance with law. The accused had himself raised an objection to the admissibility of these statements in evidence while the copies were tendered into evidence by the prosecution as Ex. PX/3 to PX/ 6 on the ground of want of mode of proof. 32. Since the statements Ex, PX/3 to PX/6 and Ex. DX have not been proved in evidence in accordance with law, the same cannot be looked into for the purpose of merits of the case. 33. It is in the evidence of DW 4, Naik Sumer Singh. Artillery-Record Office, Nasik Road, that the accused, who was in Army services, was discharged from Army service on 4.11.1988 on account of inability due to "Paranoid Schizophrenia”. The occurrence took place on 10.7.1990, that is, about one year and eight months after the discharge of the accused from Army. 34. To earn exemption under Section 84, Indian Penal Code, the accused has to prove insanity at the time of commission of the offending act. Behaviour antecedent, attendant and subsequent to the event may be relevant in finding the mental condition at the time of the event but not those remote in time. 35. The Honble Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Ahmadulla [AIR 1961 SC 998] has cited and followed the following observations of Reading C.J.:— "Every man is presumed to be sane and to possess sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his acts unless the contrary is proved. To establish insanity it must be clearly proved that at the time of committing the act the party is labouring under such defect of reason as not to know the nature and quality of the act which he is committing-—that is, the physical nature and quality as distinguished from the moral—or, if he does know the nature and quality of the act he is committing that he does not know that he is doing wrong." 36. To the similar effect are the observations in Dahyabhai v. State of Gujarat [AIR 1964 SC 1563] and in Bhikari v. State of U.P. [AIR 1966 SC 1]. 37. All that has come in evidence in the present case is that the accused was discharged from Army on 4.11.1988 due to "Paranoid Schizophrenia". To the similar effect are the observations in Dahyabhai v. State of Gujarat [AIR 1964 SC 1563] and in Bhikari v. State of U.P. [AIR 1966 SC 1]. 37. All that has come in evidence in the present case is that the accused was discharged from Army on 4.11.1988 due to "Paranoid Schizophrenia". Nothing has come on the record to show that the accused continued to suffer mental illness till the date or at least immediately before the occurrence. There is also no evidence as to the mental illness of the accused even after and subsequent to the occurrence. 38. All that DW 3 Nand Lal the brother of the accused has stated is that the accused was adamant and mentally ill since his childhood and that on 5.6.1990 he was called to the Police Station when the accused was handed over to him since the accused had been harassing the police throughout the night. The witness has further stated that he was advised by the police to get the accused treated at some mental hospital, At that time the accused was found wearing only under-garments. 39. DW 3, however, has admitted to the following facts:— (a) the accused has studied uptil 12th standard; (b) the accused served the army for about 11 years; (c) the accused is married having a daughter of about seven years of age; (d) the accused was mentally fit when he joined the army; (e) the wife of the accused has never complained about the behaviour of the accused; and (f) the accused never remained admitted in any mental hospital nor he was ever treated for such problem. 40. Though DW 3 has stated that the medicines for the accused were being taken from a "Vaid", he could not even give the name of such "Vaid", nor such "Vaid" has been eamined in the present case. 41. The learned Counsel for the accused has relied upon the following circumstances to show that the accused was insane at the time of commission of the act:— (i) Absence of motive; (ii) Number of injuries inflicted; (iii) Abnormal behaviour of the accused before and after the occurrence. 42. According to the prosecution the accused, who was facing proceedings under Section 107/151, Code of Criminal Procedure, was remanded twice to judicial custody in such proceedings by the predecessor-in-office of the deceased. 42. According to the prosecution the accused, who was facing proceedings under Section 107/151, Code of Criminal Procedure, was remanded twice to judicial custody in such proceedings by the predecessor-in-office of the deceased. The accused was having a grudge against the Magistrate remanding him to custody. However, in the meanwhile, the deceased came to be posted. The accused could not notice the change and caused the death of the deceased. Even if all this may not be true, the mere absence of motive cannot prove the mental incapacity of the accused. In Kannakunnummal Ammed Koya v. State of Kerala [AIR 1967 Kerala 92], it has been held that the standard of proof required by law of India under Section 84, Indian Penal Code read with Section 105, Evidence Act, is not any the less, and that a mere lack of proof of motive by the prosecution for the offence cannot be a substitute for the positive proof required of the defence. 43. As many as 21 stab injuries were found on the person of the decased. The learned Counsel for the accused contended that there was no reason for the accused to inflict as many as 21 blows of knife to kill an unarmed and undefended person. The number of injuries inflicted only goes to show that the accused was insane and he did not know what he was doing. 44. We dont agree with the contention raised on behalf of the accused. Many sane men give more than the necessary stabs to their victims. The number of blows given might perhaps reflect the revengeful mood of the accused or his determination to see that the victim had no escape. One doesnt count his strokes when he commits murder. [See: Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1964 SC 1563]. 45. Evidence has come on the record that the accused on the morning of the day of occurrence at about 11 a.m. had purchased the knife Ex. P-l from PW 8 Abdul Gaffur. This goes to show that the accused had fully planned to kill the deceased and as such he was fully in the know of and capable of understanding his acts. 46. P-l from PW 8 Abdul Gaffur. This goes to show that the accused had fully planned to kill the deceased and as such he was fully in the know of and capable of understanding his acts. 46. In so far as the third circumstance pointed out by the learned Counsel for the accused is concerned, no concrete and cogent evidence has come on record with regard to the abnormal behaviour of the accused either immediately before or after the occurrence. On the contrary, evidence coming on the record shows that the accused had made the necessary preparations for the offence in the morning of the day of occurrence inasmuch as he had purchased the knife Ex. P-l and after committing the murder in order to escape he jumped down from the first floor on to a projection and then he had jumped down to the ground below. In this process, he even sustained the fracture of both calcaneum. PW 15 Dr. Mahinder Singh has categorically opined that the injuries found on the person of the accused could be possibly caused while jumping from a height. The acts of the accused in purchasing the knife Ex. P-l and the effort made by him to escape clearly point out that the accused was fully capable of knowing his acts or that whatever was done by him was wrong and against law. 47. Looking at the case from any angle, the accused has not been able to bring out a defence within the ambit of Section 84, Indian Penal Code. He, therefore, stands rightly convicted by the learned Sessions Judge. The State has preferred an appeal seeking enhancement of sentence from life imprisonment to that of capital punishment. Suffice to say, that the present case cannot be termed as rarest of rare cases in which the imposition of capital punishment is called for. We are, therefore, of the view that imposition of life sentence as imposed by the learned Sessions Judge is adequate and no enhancement therein is called for. Resultantly, both the appeals fail and are dismissed accordingly. The conviction and sentence imposed upon the accused by the learned Sessions Judge are affirmed and maintained. Appeal dismissed.