Judgment :- This revision is filed under Article 227 of Constitution of India by third party against the order passed by learned Subordinate Judge, Ranipet in I.A. 271 of 1998 in O.S. 77 of 1991. 2. Material facts which compelled petitioner to come to this Court could be summarised thus : O.S. 51 of 1984, which is subsequently renumbered as O.S. 77 of 1991 on the file of Subordinate Court was a representative suit. Sixth respondent in the suit was one Ponnuswamy Mudaliar. Suit filed by plaintiffs was for a decree of permanent prohibitory injunction restraining defendants and their men and relatives from interfering with plaintiffs' right to administer the Vadapura Sangunathar Samudhayam and manage the properties of the Vadapuram Sengunathar Samudhayam described in the schedule of properties. 3. Written statement was filed by 1st defendant and finally on 27-11-1992, suit was decreed. 4. Along with the suit, plaintiffs filed I.A. 234 of 1984 for grant of interim injunction restraining respondents from interfering with the rights of plaintiffs to administer the said Samudhayam and manage its properties till the disposal of suit. An order was passed by learned Subordinate Judge on 10-5-1984 granting temporary injunction restraining respondents from interfering with the right of plaintiffs to administer and manage Samudhayam and its properties on condition that they should deposit the amounts got in the auctions held customarily in Samudhayam into Court and if amounts are required for meeting expenses of Samudhayam, they can approach Court for getting suitable orders. Pursuant to this direction an amount of Rs. 1,31,725/- was deposited in the Court on various dates. After the suit was decreed, request was made for release of those amounts as I.A. 72 of 1996. Court ordered notice to respondents. 5. With regard to notice to 6th respondent, i.e. Ponnusamy Mudaliar, the same was being returned from time to time and Court was also ordering fresh notices. In the suit, 6th defendant was set ex parte. 6. When attempt was made by Process Server to effect service on 6th defendant, petitioner herein, who is the President of local Panchayat seems to have made endorsement thus. (Vernacular matter omitted) On the basis of endorsement, Process Server returned the process as unserved on the ground that 6th defendant has gone out for two years. 7. 6. When attempt was made by Process Server to effect service on 6th defendant, petitioner herein, who is the President of local Panchayat seems to have made endorsement thus. (Vernacular matter omitted) On the basis of endorsement, Process Server returned the process as unserved on the ground that 6th defendant has gone out for two years. 7. Children of 6th defendant wanted to get themselves impleaded and one of the sons K. P. Kandasamy filed affidavit in I.A. 271 of 1998 alleging that the endorsement made by petitioner is false. According to him, plaintiffs in collusion with Jothi, who is petitioner herein has filed false certificate issued by Jothi to the effect that his father's whereabouts are not known. According to him, his father died two years back after prolonged illness and petitioner also attended the death ceremonies in his house. It is further averred that petitioner herein had made such endorsement solely with a view to receive the money lying in the Court deposit and the endorsement amount to fabricating false evidence and she is liable to be proceeded with under Sections 193 and 197 of Indian Penal Code. 8. In that application, petitioner filed a detailed Counter. Lower Court passed the following order : "....... It appears that the information given by the Tmt. Jothi amounts to certificate attracts Ss. 193 and 199, IPC and this Court can give complaint in writing under Section 199(b)(i), Cr.P.C. Hence I hold that the petition filed by the petitioner is maintainable. File if otherwise in order." It is this order that is challenged under Article 227 of Constitution of India. 8A. When the matter came up for admission, complaint had already entered caveat and after hearing both sides, operation of impugned order was stayed for a period. 9. After service is over, entire revision was heard. 10. In the impugned order, lower Court has found that petitioner is liable to be proceeded with under sections 193 and 199 of Indian Penal Code and information given by petitioner to Process Server amounts to Certificate. Learned counsel for petitioner submitted that sanction for penury should be allowed only in those cases where it appears to be deliberate and conscious that conviction is reasonable, probable or likely. Learned counsel for petitioner submitted that sanction for penury should be allowed only in those cases where it appears to be deliberate and conscious that conviction is reasonable, probable or likely. It is also submitted that if there is no reasonable foundation of charge and possibility of conviction is very remote, Court can exercise its powers under Article 227 of Constitution of India and set aside the order. 11. At this juncture, learned counsel for Caveator, i.e., complainant submitted that it is only show cause notice and at this stage. Court should not interfere. For the said purpose, he relied on the decision reported in AIR 1970 Ker 15 : (1970 Cri LJ 53), (Kunnummal v. Narayana). 12. In this case, the decision relied on by the learned counsel cannot be made applicable since I find that even before the impugned order, lower Court issued noticed to petitioner and his counsel was also heard. Petitioner also filed counter-affidavit opposing the ground for sanction and it is after hearing both sides, Court has passed the impugned order directing to file complaint. 13. Regarding jurisdiction of this Court, I only take guidance from the decision reported in 1998 (5) SCC 749 : (1998 Cri LJ 1), (Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate). In that case against the Directors of the Company, proceedings were sought to be initiated under Food Adulteration Act on the charge that they were manufactured and sold adulterated beverages. Preliminary enquiry did not show how Directors manufactured adulterated beverages. But summons were issued by Magistrate. The same was challenged before Honourable Supreme Court. When summons were issued they approached Honourable High Court of Allahabad. High Court declined to interfere and the matter was taken before Honourable Supreme Court. They want to quash the proceedings under Article 227 of Constitution of India. In paragraph 28 of the judgment, their Lordships said thus (at page 8; of Cri LJ) : "28. Summoning of an accused on a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. The Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused." In the earlier portion of the order, their Lordships considered that even though under section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code the charge could be quashed, that does not debar petitioner in approaching Court under Article 227 of Constitution of India. Their Lordships said that while exercising powers under Article 227 of Constitution of India, power of superintendence by High Court is not only of administrative nature but also of judicial nature. High Court has vast power to prevent abuse of process of law by inferior Courts and to see that the stream of administration of justice remains clean and pure. In paragraphs 21 to 26 of the judgment, their Lordships held thus (at page 7; of Cri LJ) : "21. The question which arise for consideration are if in the circumstances of the case, the appellants rightly approached the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and if so, was the High Court justified in refusing to grant any relief to the appellants because of the view which it took of the law and the facts of the case. We have, thus, to examine the power of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and Section 482 of the Code. 22. It is settled that the High Court can exercise its power of judicial review in criminal matters. We have, thus, to examine the power of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and Section 482 of the Code. 22. It is settled that the High Court can exercise its power of judicial review in criminal matters. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426, (1992) 2 JT (SC) 650): (1992 Cri LJ 527) this Court examined the extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution and also the inherent powers under section 482 of the Code which it said could be exercised by the High Court either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. While laying down certain guidelines where the Court will exercise jurisdiction under these provisions, it was also stated that these guidelines could not be inflexible of laying rigid formulae to be followed by the Courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. One of such guidelines is where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. Under Article 227 the power of superintendence by the High Court is not only of administrative nature but is also of judicial nature. This article confers vast powers on the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process of law by the interior Courts and to see that the steam of administration of justice remains clean and pure. The power conferred on the High Court under Articles 226 and 277 of the Constitution and under section 482 of the Code have no limits but more the power more due care and caution is to be exercised while invoking these powers. When the exercise of powers could be under Article 227 or Section 482 of the Code it may not always be necessary to invoke the provisions of Article 226. Some of the decisions of this Court laying down principles for the exercise of powers by the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 may be referred to. 23. When the exercise of powers could be under Article 227 or Section 482 of the Code it may not always be necessary to invoke the provisions of Article 226. Some of the decisions of this Court laying down principles for the exercise of powers by the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 may be referred to. 23. In Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215 ,: 1954 SCR 565 this Court considered the scope of Article 227. It was held that the High Court has not only administrative superintendence over the subordinate Courts and tribunals but it has also the power of judicial superintendence. The Court approved the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee, AIR 1951 Cal 193, where the High Court said that the power of superintendence conferred by Art. 227 was to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the sub-ordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting their mere errors. The Court said that it was, therefore, a case which called for an interference by the Court of the Judicial Commissioner and it acted quite properly in doing so. 24. In Bathutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarta (1975) 1 SCC 358 : AIR 1975 SC 1297 this Court again reaffirmed that the power of superintendence of the High Court under Art. 227 being extraordinary was to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases. It said that the High Court could not, while exercising jurisdiction under Art. 227, interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the subordinate Court or tribunal and that its function was limited to seeing that the subordinate Court or tribunal functioned within the limits of its authority and that it could not correct mere errors of fact by examining the evidence or reappreciating it. The Court further said that the jurisdiction under Art. 227 could not be exercised, "as the cloak of an appeal in disguise. It does not lie in order to bring up an order or decision for rehearing of the issues raised in the proceedings." The Court referred with approval the dictum of Morris, L.J. in R. v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal (1952) 1 All ER 122. 25. In Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commr. It does not lie in order to bring up an order or decision for rehearing of the issues raised in the proceedings." The Court referred with approval the dictum of Morris, L.J. in R. v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal (1952) 1 All ER 122. 25. In Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commr. of Hills Division, AIR 1958 SC 398 : 1958 SCR 1240 , this Court observed as under : "It is thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Art. 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasijudicial nature, are not greater than the powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Under Art. 226, the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Art. 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority." 26. Nomenclature under which petition is filed is not quite relevant and that does not debar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction which otherwise is possesses unless there is special procedure prescribed which procedure is mandatory. If in a case like the present one the Court finds that the appellants could not invoke its jurisdiction under Art. 226, the Court can certainly treat the petition as one under Art. 227 or S. 482 of the Code. It may not however, be lost sight of the provisions that exist in the Code of revision and appeal but some time for immediate relief S. 482 of the Code or Art. 227 may have to be resorted to for correcting some grave errors that might be committed by the subordinate Courts. The present petition though filed in the High Court as one under Arts. 226 and 227 could well be treated under Art. 227 of the Constitution." And finally in paragraph 30, their Lord-ships concluded thus, "......... It is certainly one of those cases where there is an abuse of the process of the law and the Courts and the High Court should not have shield away in exercising their jurisdiction. Provisions of Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution and S. 482 of the Code are devised to advance justice and not to frustrate it .........." 14. Provisions of Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution and S. 482 of the Code are devised to advance justice and not to frustrate it .........." 14. Now let me consider whether on the available materials i.e., on the basis of complaint and endorsement made by petitioner, whether any prima facie case has been made out asking petitioner to appear in the Court or whether there is material before lower Court when it ordered to file complaint. ? 15. In the order, it is said that information given by petitioner amounts to certificate attracting Ss. 193 and 199 of Indian Penal Code. The relevant portions of which I have to consider in this case are Ss. 191, 193, 197 and 199 of Indian Penal Code. 16. Section 191 of Indian Penal Code deals with giving of false evidence. Section 193 deals with punishment for giving false evidence. Section 197 deals with issuing or signing false certificate and S. 199 deals with false statement made in declaration which is by law receivable as evidence. 17. On going by these sections, I do not find that the case put forward by complainant falls under any of these provisions. Before a person can be proceeded under these provisions, it must be shown that petitioner was legally bound by an oath or by an express provision of law to state the truth; or it must be a declaration which he is bound by law to make, any statement which is false. For the essentiality of S. 191, petitioner must have been legally bound to speak truth or make a declaration and he must have stated or declared what is false. He must also know or believe what he has stated or declared is false or he has believed it true. If there is no compulsion to make any declaration as required by law. Section 191 will not have any application. The information given by him is not on any oath nor he was bound to give such information under any provision of Law. 18. If S. 191 will not apply, S. 193 immediately goes out of the picture since it deals with false evidence as stated in S. 191. Section 197 also will have no application since information cannot be treated as certificate as found by the Lower Court. 18. If S. 191 will not apply, S. 193 immediately goes out of the picture since it deals with false evidence as stated in S. 191. Section 197 also will have no application since information cannot be treated as certificate as found by the Lower Court. As per S. 197, Certificate contemplated therein is a certificate, which is required not to be given or signed for the use in the Courts administration of Justice. That means, certificate is issued as required by some law and it has some reference to some statutory requirements. Information given by petitioner to process server is that he has not heard about Ponnusamy Mudaliar for the last two years and his whereabouts are not known. That is not a certificate contemplated under any statute. Therefore, S. 197 also will have no application. 19. Section 199 also will not apply since the declaration contemplated under that section is in the nature of statement of fact in the form simply of a declaration, which for the purpose of proof of the fact declared to, has, by itself all the legal force of evidence given on oath or solemn affirmation. It must be a declaration which, having been made, is afterwards receivable as evidence of the fact declared. A declaration before it could be made the foundation of charge under S. 199 of Indian Penal Code, it is necessary that it must be admissible in evidence as proof of the fact declared under any law in consequence of which the Court is bound or authorised to receive it as such. 20. The information in this case is also not in the nature of an affidavit. There is also no sworn statement by petitioner. Process Server while he takes an information from the neighbours is also not expected to get a sworn statement from them. It is only an information which he has collected to show his bona fides that he made attempts to serve the notice on the party. If on the, request of process server if any such information is given that information cannot be treated as false evidence or fabricating evidence nor it could be treated as certificate nor a declaration under any of the provisions of this section. If on the, request of process server if any such information is given that information cannot be treated as false evidence or fabricating evidence nor it could be treated as certificate nor a declaration under any of the provisions of this section. Petitioner also is not bound by any law to give such statement and merely she happens to be the President of the Panchayat, Court cannot deviate from law and find that petitioner is liable to be proceeded with. 21. In AIR 1971 Supreme Court 1367 : (1971 Cri LJ 1096) (Chajoo Ram v. Radhey Shyam) in paragraph 7 of the Judgment, their Lordships said thus (at page 1100 of Cri LJ) :- "Prosecution for perjury should be sanctioned by Courts only in those cases where the perjury appears to be deliberate and conscious and the conviction is reasonably probable or likely. No doubt giving of false evidence and filing false affidavits is an evil which must be effectively curbed with a strong hand but to start prosecution for perjury too readily and too frequently without due care and caution and on inconclusive and doubtful material defeats its very purpose. Prosecution should be ordered when it is considered expedient in the interests of justice to punish the delinquent and not merely because there is some inaccuracy in the statement which may be innocent or immaterial. There must be prima facie case of deliberate falsehood on a matter of substance and the Court should be satisfied that there is reasonable foundation of the charge." 22. In AIR 1973 SC 2190 : (1973 Cri LJ 1176) (Santokh Singh v. Izhar Hussain), in paragraph 11 of the judgment, their Lordships held thus (at page 1180-1181 of Cri LJ) :- "............ Every incorrect or false statement does not make it incumbent on the Court to order prosecution. The Court has to exercise judicial discretion in the light of all the relevant circumstances when it determines the question of expediency. The Court orders prosecution in the larger interest of the administration of justice and not to gratify feelings of personal revenge or vindictiveness or to serve the ends of a private party. Too frequent prosecutions for such offences tend to defeat its very object. It is only in glaring cases of deliberate falsehood where conviction is highly likely, that the Court should direct prosecution ......." 23. Too frequent prosecutions for such offences tend to defeat its very object. It is only in glaring cases of deliberate falsehood where conviction is highly likely, that the Court should direct prosecution ......." 23. In this case, petitioner is not a party to any of the proceedings and what is the relevancy of his statement in the proceedings is not alleged. Proceedings has already been completed and what remains is only cheque application. Sixth respondent was also ex parte throughout the proceedings and in fact, there is no necessity to issue notice to any one and when the decree has become final. Impugned deposit is by plaintiff in that case and it was the very same plaintiff who wanted to withdraw the amount. Except the word 'collusion' between petitioner and plaintiffs, the same has not been elaborated in the affidavit. Lower Court also not taken other evidence on the affidavit before passing the impugned order. If there is no prima facie material, Court should not have directed the complaint to be filed. 24. In the result, the revision petition is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. There is no order as to cost. Connected C.M.P. No. 18570 of 1998 is closed. Petition allowed.