JUDGMENT P. Govinda Menon, J.- This appeal is filed by the State against the order passed by the Sessions Judge of Kozhikode acquitting the accused who had been convicted by the District Magistrate of Kozhikode for an offence under section 19 (f) of the Indian Arms Act. On 16th January, 1960 P.W.1 a Head constable attached to Kodancherry police outpost proceeded for a prohibition raid. He searched the house of the accused and from inside the house an unlicensed gun M.O.1 was recovered. P.W. 2 was present at the time of the search and recovery and has attested Exhibit P-1. The Sub-Inspector after obtaining sanction from the Additional District Magistrate launched the prosecution against the accused. The learned District Magistrate accepted the evidence of P.W.1 regarding the recovery of the unlicensed gun and convicted the accused. In appeal the learned Sessions Judge was not prepared to accept the uncorroborated testimony of the Headconstable, P.W.2 having turned hostile. The learned Judge found that the prosecution had not succeeded in proving that the accused had in his possession or under his control M.O.1. He also held that sanction for the prosecution was not given by a competent authority as contemplated under section 29 of the Arms Act and that the trial was hence bad. The conclusions of the learned Sessions Judge on both these points have been challenged in this appeal. A valid sanction under section 29 of the Arms Act is an essential pre-requisite for the initiation of the proceedings and proceedings initiated without such a sanction will vitiate the entire trial and the defect of jurisdiction cannot be cured under section 537 Criminal Procedure Code. A valid sanction under section 29 of the Arms Act is an essential pre-requisite for the initiation of the proceedings and proceedings initiated without such a sanction will vitiate the entire trial and the defect of jurisdiction cannot be cured under section 537 Criminal Procedure Code. The argument raised by the learned counsel for the defence is that the Additional District Magistrate who had accorded sanction in this case cannot be considered as a Magistrate of the district who alone is authorised under section 29 to grant sanction and since such a person has not accorded sanction the whole trial is rendered illegal and the conviction and sentence cannot be maintained section 29 of the Arms Act reads as follows: “Where an offence punishable under section 19, clause (f) has been committed/,no proceedings shall be instituted against any person in respect of such offence without the previous sanction of the Magistrate of the district or, in a presidency town, of the Commissioner of Police.” We have now to see the provisions of section 10 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The relevant portion of section 10, Criminal Procedure Code is as follows: “(1) In every district outside the Presidency-towns the State Government shall appoint a Magistrate of the First-Class, who shall be called the District Magistrate. (2) The State Government may appoint any Magistrate of the first class to be an Additional District Magistrate and such Additional District Magistrate shall have all or any of the powers of a District Magistrate under this Code, or under any other law for the time being in force, as the State Government may direct. * * * * * * section 10(2), Criminal Procedure Code, distinctly shows that the State Government may appoint any Magistrate of the First Class to be an Additional District Magistrate who will have the power or any of the powers of the District Magistrate under the Criminal Procedure Code or under any other law for the time being in force as the State Government may direct. The Additional District Magistrate who granted sanction in this case has by notification been invested with all the powers as contemplated within the scope of sub- section (2) of section 10. Such a person so appointed could not only exercise the powers of the District Magistrate under the Criminal Procedure Code, but also under any other law for the time being in force. Such a person so appointed could not only exercise the powers of the District Magistrate under the Criminal Procedure Code, but also under any other law for the time being in force. The Indian Arms Act is a law in force at the time and therefore the Additional District Magistrate invested with the powers of a District Magistrate under section 10(2) could exercise the powers of the District Magistrate under section 29 of the Arms Act to accord sanction for prosecution. This question whether the Additional District Magistrate could grant sanction had come up for consideration in The State v. Hussain Mirdha1. In that case the sanction was accorded by the Additional District Magistrate and it was held that: “Arms Act comes within the range of expression”any other law“mentioned in section 10(2), Criminal Procedure Code. Authorisation of the Additional District Magistrate under section 10 , Criminal Procedure Code is therefore competent for the purpose of granting sanction under section 29 of the Arms Act. The District Magistrate is not a persona designata for the purpose of exercising that power.” Reference has been made in that decision to the unreported case in Panchu Gopal Ghosh v. The King2 decided by Roxburgh and Blank, JJ., where it was held that sanction under section 29 of the Arms Act given by the Additional District Magistrate authorised under section 10 of the Criminal Procedure Code to exercise powers of the District Magistrate under any other law for the time being in force is a valid sanction, the District Magistrate authorised to give sanction not being a persona designata. Another case to which reference may be made is the case in Abdur Rahiman v. Emperor3. There the point which arose for decision was whether an Additional District Magistrate could under section 10(2) , Criminal Procedure Code, exercise the powers of the District Magistrate as conferred under section 8 of the Child Marriage Restraint Act (XIX of 1929) to try a case under that Act. section 8 of that Act provides that notwithstanding anything contained in section 190, Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, no Court other than that of a Presidency Magistrate or a District Magistrate shall take cognizance of or try any offence under this Act. It was argued that no other Magistrate except the District Magistrate was competent to take up the case for trial. It was argued that no other Magistrate except the District Magistrate was competent to take up the case for trial. The contention was negatived and it was held: “Since in the above section there was mention only of section 190 , Criminal Procedure Code and not of section 10(2) , the operation of this sub- section was kept intact, which implied that an Additional District Magistrate so authorised could exercise the powers of the District Magistrate for the purpose of section 8, Child Marriage Restraint Act and the power of trial was not, confined to the District Magistrate alone.” So, under section 8 of that Act read with section 10(2), Criminal Procedure Code the Additional District Magistrate who has been given all the powers of the District Magistrate is empowered to try the case under the Child Marriage Restraint Act. Gyani Kartar Singh v. Rex4 is an other case where the same question arose for consideration. There an order under section 4 , Punjab Public Safety Act was passed by the Additional District Magistrate and for disobedience of that order the accused was convicted under section 19 of the Act. The contention raised was that the order could not have been issued by an Additional District Magistrate as the order under section 4 could be issued either by the Provincial Government or the District Magistrate and it was held: “By virtue of section 10(2) , Criminal Procedure Code, an Additional District Magistrate has powers to pass orders under section 4 of the Act.” Emperor v. Amar Singh1 is another case which could usefully be referred to That was a case of tendering pardon to an approver. The Head-note to the case is as follows: “The term”District Magistrate“in section 337(1) includes an Additional District Magistrate empowered by the local Government under section 10(2) to exercise all the powers of a District Magistrate and a pardon tendered under section 337(1) by such Additional District Magistrate without the sanction of the District Magistrate is not invalid. The Additional Magistrate in tendering such pardon, is not in any way affected by the Proviso to section 337(1) and is in his own right empowered under the law to tender the pardon. The Additional Magistrate in tendering such pardon, is not in any way affected by the Proviso to section 337(1) and is in his own right empowered under the law to tender the pardon. It was not the intention of the Legislature in using the definite article ‘the’ before the District Magistrate in section 337 to specify the District Magistrate appointed as such and not the Additional District Magistrate empowered as such.” The learned counsel appearing for the accused cited the decision in Thangjam v. Union Territory, Manipur2. In that case sanction under section 29 was accorded by the Additional District Magistrate. It was pointed out that the Additional District Magistrate who gave sanction did not have the powers of a District Magistrate for the purpose of section 29 of the Indian Arms Act. The notification produced in Court showed clearly that the sanctioning Additional District Magistrate was invested with the powers of the District Magistrate only under the Criminal Procedure Code and not under any other law, and it was on that ground that it was held that he could not exercise the powers of a District Magistrate under section 29 of the Indian Arms Act. That decision has no application to the facts of this case as the Additional District Magistrate here had been invested with all the powers of a District Magistrate including that under any other law in force. The learned counsel also cited the decision in Prabhulal Ramlal v. Emperor3. That case refers to the delegated powers and not to powers vested by virtue of legislative enactment. The Head-note reads: “The word”Law“in”any other law“occurring in section 10(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code is not meant to include an executive order but only legislative enactments, and rules, regulations or orders which have the force of law and consequently the District Magistrate, who acts for the Provincial Government under the powers conferred upon him by the Provincial Government by an executive order, cannot be regarded as acting under any” law “as such.” Similarly in Mulchand v. Emperor4 for the same reasons it was held that the Additional District Magistrate with powers under section 10(2) could not exercise the powers of a District Magistrate. I may in this connection refer to a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Central Talkies, Ltd., Kanpur v. Dwarka Prasad5. I may in this connection refer to a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Central Talkies, Ltd., Kanpur v. Dwarka Prasad5. In that case Their Lordships were considering the legality of a permission granted by the Additional District Magistrate under section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act: (III of 1947) to file a suit for eviction of a tenant. The contention was that the suit was incompetent because, the permission of the District Magistrate as required by section 3 had not been obtained. It was held: “An Additional District Magistrate who has been appointed as such by a notification under section 10(2) , Criminal Procedure Code, whereunder he is invested with all the powers of the District Magistrate under, that Code as well as under any other law for the time being in force is competent to deal with an application under section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act for permission to file a civil suit, without special authorisation from the District Magistrate. The provision in section 10(2), Criminal Procedure Code, is a specific provision to the contrary within the meaning of section I (2), Criminal Procedure Code and therefore an Additional District Magistrate must be regarded as possessing the powers of the District Magistrate under any other law including the U.P. Act III of 1947.” Their Lordships also held that a District Magistrate mentioned in section 3 of the U.P. Act is not a persona designata. The finding of the learned Sessions Judge in this case that an Additional District Magistrate appointed under section 10(2) with all the powers of the District Magistrate, cannot be said to have been invested with jurisdiction to accord sanction for prosecution under the Indian Arms Act is, therefore, not correct. The sanction Exhibit P-3 accorded by the Additional District Magistrate is, therefore, proper and the proceedings have been validly instituted. Now coming to the merits of the case the learned District Magistrate in spite of certain irregularities said to have been committed in the conduct of the search has chosen to believe the evidence of P.W.1 with regard to the recovery of the unlicensed gun from the house of the accused. The learned Sessions Judge, in appeal, rightly rejected the case put forward by the accused and disbelieved the witnesses examined in support of that case. The learned Sessions Judge, in appeal, rightly rejected the case put forward by the accused and disbelieved the witnesses examined in support of that case. The case set up by the accused is on the face of it absurd and fantastic. But in spite of this the learned Judge held that the prosecution has not proved by reliable evidence that P.W.1 made a search of the accused's house and took into custody M.O.1 from inside the house. In short the learned Judge was of the view that it would be unsafe to act on the uncorroborated testimony of the Head constable. Whatever might have been the view that I myself would have taken on the evidence, I see no reason, sitting in appeal against the order of acquittal, to differ from the conclusions of the learned Sessions Judge. The fact that on examining the evidence the appellate Court might have come to a different conclusion cannot justify its interference with an order of acquittal. It is only when there are substantial Or compelling reasons to interfere with the conclusions of the Judge that this Court would interfere. This is a case where the prosecution could have led other evidence to corroborate the evidence of P.W.1, but they did not choose to do so. The benefit of doubt should, therefore, go to the accused and in an appeal against acquittal the appellate Court must take into account the double presumption of innocence. For these reasons I feel that I would not be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal. The appeal filed by the State is dismissed. M.C.M.-----Appeal dismissed.