Order This Reference made by the Additional Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, adverts to an interesting and important question as to the ambit of powers of a Magistrate who exercised jurisdiction under section 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Eighth City Magistrate, Hyderabad, Srimathi Daya Devi, issued a search warrant dated 28th August, 1961 for discovery of one Fatima Begum and the same was executed by the police, who were empowered to conduct the search, on the next day, viz., 29th August, 1961. The Eighth City Magistrate also made an order after Fatima Begum was produced before her that she be released as, according to the learned City Magistrate, “no further action was required by her in the case.” Later, i.e., on 20th September, 1961, Criminal R.P. No. 472 of 1961 was filed questioning the legality of that order made by the Magistrate for discovery of Fatima Begum. The Additional Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, considered that the search warrant was issued illegally. He, therefore, made this Reference under section 438, Criminal Procedure Code, as, in his opinion, the order of the Magistrate needs to be set aside. The few short facts leading to the filing of the petition for discovery of Fatima Begum are the following: Fatima Begum, when she was about 20 years old, married Mohammed Ibrahim Ali. But sometime before the filing of the petition, the relations between her and her husband became strained. She was therefore living in the house of her brother Ahmed Bin Hussain and eking out her livelihood as a teacher in the Government Girls’ High School, Moosa Bowli. Alleging this fact, Ahmed Bin Hussain filed an affidavit dated 28th August, 1961 and mentioned that though his brother-in-law deserted his sister Fatima Begum, he however was intent upon getting qulla from his sister even by harassing her. He further alleged in that affidavit that the mother of his brother-in-law, Saheb Begum, approached his sister on 24th August, 1961 at the school and under the pretence of effecting reconciliation, took his sister to her house bearing No. 17-3-100, Imambada, outside Yakutpura, and detained Fatima Begum there. He further alleged in that affidavit that the mother of his brother-in-law, Saheb Begum, approached his sister on 24th August, 1961 at the school and under the pretence of effecting reconciliation, took his sister to her house bearing No. 17-3-100, Imambada, outside Yakutpura, and detained Fatima Begum there. The further allegation made by Ahmed Bin Hussain in this affidavit disclosed that his attempts made on 25th August, 1961, again on 26th August, 1961 and on 27th August, 1961 to interview his sister failed, because it was put off in the first instance from day to day and later on prevented. He also stated that he made a report of it at the Police-Station at Rain Bazaar and that when he went again to see his sister, he heard of the hue and cry of his sister coming out of the house of her mother-in-law. He stated that he believed that his sister was wrongfully confined with the object of extorting a qulla from her against her will. In amplification of his own allegations, he mentioned that his sister was prevented from attending school and the leave application which his sister sent was forced out of her. He definitely averred in that affidavit that his sister was in wrongful confinement and that he also apprehended danger 0 her life. On the petition filed with this affidavit as the basis, the Eighth City Magistrate, Hyderabad, passed the following order: “Dated 28th August, 1961. The affidavit and the petition perused. Considering the facts stated therein, it appears that there is an apprehension of an offence likely to be committed. Hence a search warrant be issued immediately and call for a report by 29th August, 1961. The search warrant be executed through the S.I. concerned.” As already observed, it is this order that enabled discovery of Fatima Begum and also necessitated the further order dated 29th August, 1961 setting Fatima Begum at liberty. Hence a search warrant be issued immediately and call for a report by 29th August, 1961. The search warrant be executed through the S.I. concerned.” As already observed, it is this order that enabled discovery of Fatima Begum and also necessitated the further order dated 29th August, 1961 setting Fatima Begum at liberty. The learned counsel reiterated the arguments advanced before the Additional Sessions Judge: firstly, that no notice of this petition was ordered to the respondent by the Magistrate; secondly, that an independent inquiry even for entertaining the plea that Fatima Begum was wrongfully confined should have been made by the Magistrate and the warrant should not have been issued basing upon the affidavit of the petitioner; thirdly, the Magistrate should have called for a report of the police; fourthly, that the Magistrate should have satisfied herself that an offence has been committed because of proved wrongful confinement of Fatima Begum; and lastly, that an order under section 100 of the Criminal Procedure Code should not be meant to be used for insulting a mother-in-law who had taken her daughter-in-law to her house and this provision should not be allowed to be misused for depriving a husband of the company of his wife. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, however, thought fit to accede to all these arguments and thought it also necessary that the order issuing the search warrant should be set aside. It will be convenient at first to take up the first question whether notice of this petition should be given to the other side and an order passed without notice is illegal. It must be observed in this connection that section 100, Criminal Procedure Code, makes net even a whisper that the issue of such a notice is a pre-requisite. It will be convenient at first to take up the first question whether notice of this petition should be given to the other side and an order passed without notice is illegal. It must be observed in this connection that section 100, Criminal Procedure Code, makes net even a whisper that the issue of such a notice is a pre-requisite. That section reads: “If any Presidency Magistrate, Magistrate of the First Class or Sub-Divisional Magistrate has reason to believe that any person is confined under such circumstances that the confinement amounts to an offence, he may issue a search warrant, and the person to whom such warrant is directed may search for the person so confined; and such search shall be made in accordance therewith, and the person, if found, shall be immediately taken before a Magistrate, who shall make such order as in the circumstances of the case, seems proper.” The absence of mention of notice to be issued to the other side when an application is filed for action to be taken under this section, could be said to be in consonance with the manner in which a Magistrate has to act in an emergency of that kind. Coming now to the inquiry urged also as a pre-requisite, the discussion may begin by pointing out that what a Magistrate has to satisfy himself is that, there is reason to believe that a person as alleged is confined; and secondly, that the confinement was under such circumstances that it amounts to an offence. Having regard to these two requirements which have alone been specified as the pre-requisites for the issue of a search warrant and also remembering that no notice to the other side is made compulsory, the Magistrate would then be expected to base the reason for the belief that a person is confined on the proof of a prima facie case afforded by the averments or allegations as are made available in the affidavit filed in support of the petition. If the particulars specified in the affidavit induce a belief that the movements of a person are restricted so as to amount to a confinement of the particular person, the reason for a Magistrate to believe that that person is confined cannot be taken to be without foundation. If the particulars specified in the affidavit induce a belief that the movements of a person are restricted so as to amount to a confinement of the particular person, the reason for a Magistrate to believe that that person is confined cannot be taken to be without foundation. In the instant case, Ahmed Bin Hussain, the brother of Fatima Begum, averred that Fatima Begum was attending to her duties as a teacher in the school and was going to the school from his house as she had come away from her husband's house on account of differences with her husband and living in his house, that Fatima Begum was taken away by her mother-in-law, Saheb Begum, on 24th August, 1961 from the school and thereafter Fatima Begum was forced to be absent from the school and all this was meant with a view to coerce Fatima Begum to execute a qulla. Ahmed Bin Hussain also stated in his affidavit that Fatima Begum was not allowed to see him or speak to him, but, on the other hand, he heard the cries of his sister which made him believe that there was danger to her life. Ordinarily, it would be expected that when the brother wanted to see the sister and ascertain what exactly were the facts that led her to be take a into her mother-in-law's house, the brother should not be prevented from interviewing his sister. On the other hand, when it is not even the case that the sister observed Ghousha in respect to her brother, but that brother has been prevented from seeing his sister and knowing the truth, it would raise the inference that the sister has been forcibly detained or prevented from seeing his brother. In such circumstances, a Court would certainly be induced to believe, even on those averments in the affidavit, that there is reason to believe that Fatima Begum was wrongfully confined. It is not further contemplated by section 100, Criminal Procedure Code, that what is so patent from the allegations in the affidavit should be also ascertained by means of further inquiry after giving notice to the other side. That such is the purport underlying this section could be said to have been laid down also in two decisions which are relevant to be noticed. That such is the purport underlying this section could be said to have been laid down also in two decisions which are relevant to be noticed. In Chepa Mahton v. Emperor1 Wort, J. had occasion to point out the difficulties to which a Magistrate or parties would be put to if that Magistrate had to try out, as it were, a case when he is required to act under section 100, Criminal Procedure Code. There, that learned Judge had to deal with the argument that the Magistrate who acted merely on the petition of the complainant cannot be said to have been in the position to believe that a person has been detained in circumstances which created an offence. The learned Judge repelled that contention and observed: “I, however, cannot accept that argument. Otherwise, in my judgment, it would necessitate almost in every case the Magistrate would have to try out a case before he could determine the question whether it was a bona fide application that was being made to him. The only question is whether the Magistrate was of the belief that a person had been detained and he may be of that belief by reason of the petition itself or for any other reason which may be brought before him.” In Rajendra Nath v. Anukul Chandra2 the observation of Debabrata Mookerjee, J., as to what would induce belief concerning wrongful detention of a person has been discussed. It is therein clearly pointed out that clear proof that an offence has been committed is not necessary and that it is sufficient if the confinement complained of amounts to an offence. After pointing out that the question whether the application is mala fide or bona fide should be to the subjective satisfaction of the Magistrate, it was observed: “A Magistrate when invited to take action under section 100, Criminal Procedure Code, has tosatisfy himself that there exist materials to induce his belief that the person is confined in such circumstances as to make the confinement amount to an offence. This is the requisite condition which must be fulfilled before action can properly be taken under section 100. The allegations need not reach that precision and particularity so as to establish definitely that the confinement is in fact an offence. It would be enough if there are materials for the Magistrate's satisfaction that he confinement amounts to an offence. This is the requisite condition which must be fulfilled before action can properly be taken under section 100. The allegations need not reach that precision and particularity so as to establish definitely that the confinement is in fact an offence. It would be enough if there are materials for the Magistrate's satisfaction that he confinement amounts to an offence. In my view, there is some difference between saying that circumstances establish confinement and circumstances making the confinement amount to an offence. There can be no doubt that wide words have been purposely employed by the Legislature to give adequate powers to the Magistrate to take effective action in appropriate cases.” These decisions in my view, clearly and forcibly pinpoint with particularity that it is enough if the gist of the allegations made by the complainant should be capable of inducing the belief in the Magistrate that a person is wrongfully confined. There is, therefore, no warrant in the language of that section or by reason of exigencies of situation which arise in such circumstances that notice should be given to the other side, or an inquiry should precede the entertainment of the belief by the Magistrate that a person is wrongfully confined. Next, it is relevant also to observe that if a Magistrate reasonably believes that there is wrongful confinement, it is not always necessary that such a Magistrate should again express that that unlawful confinement amounts to an offence. The requirements, of the section in order that the Magistrate may thereafter act and issue a warrant for search would be justified, in my view, if that wrongful confinement, which the Magistrate believes has been made, appears in such circumstances to amount to an offence. In the instant case, a further discussion on this latter aspect is indeed unnecessary. As already pointed out, the Magistrate herself has remarked that there is apprehension of an offence likely to be committed, which mean: certainly that the Magistrate considered the unlawful confinement in this case amounted to an offence. These reasons make it difficult for me to accede to the other contention that there should be a finding that an offence has been committed by the petitioner and that it is not enough that the Magistrate considers that the alleged unlawful confinement amounts to an offence. These reasons make it difficult for me to accede to the other contention that there should be a finding that an offence has been committed by the petitioner and that it is not enough that the Magistrate considers that the alleged unlawful confinement amounts to an offence. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, however, was inclined to rest his conclusion on some observations made in the decision reported in Mt. Khaliqan v. Emperor1. There, Ghulam Hasan, J. was considering the device employed by a husband for recovery of his wife by resort to section 100, Criminal Procedure Code. Having regard also to the absence of any allegation in that case that the woman was being confined against her will in a way as to amount to an offence, the learned Judge emphasized the necessity for Magistrates to exercise due caution and circumspection in taking action under section 100 on applications made by husbands who may wish to abuse those provisions. Therefore, this case which has been very much relied upon by the lower Court, in my view, does not help the petitioner as the facts disclosed in the instant case have no similarity whatsoever to those in that reported decision, and considerations which influenced that Court in that reported decision are not drawn to the instant case. Another decision reported in Lilabi Chandandal2, and relied upon by the lower Court has proceeded on different set of circumstances which have utterly no bearing on the point in issue in the instant case. The Indore Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court has pointed out in that decision that in the affidavit filed in support of the application for the issue of a search, warrant, there was no allegation that the girl was being confined under circumstances which would amount to an offence. The applicant therein alleged that his daughter, if allowed to be with the accused, would affect her reputation and that inasmuch as her statement would count in a case of kidnapping instituted against the person who detained her, her recovery or release is necessary. It was, in these circumstances that the Madhya Pradesh High Court ruled that in the absence of an inquiry, an order passed under section 100, Criminal Procedure Code, was not proper. It was, in these circumstances that the Madhya Pradesh High Court ruled that in the absence of an inquiry, an order passed under section 100, Criminal Procedure Code, was not proper. These two cases, which could be said to have influenced the lower Court in accepting the contentions of the petitioner, have, in my view, been misunderstood by the lower Court as supporting the petitioner's contentions. After a careful analysis of the facts of those decided cases, it is not possible, in my view, to hold that they are of any guidance in coming to right conclusions concerning the matters in the instant case. Having thus distinguished the facts of the present case from those found in the two decisions relied upon by the lower Court, the further reasons adduced by the lower Court, viz., that the issue of the warrant for discovery is in a way calculated to insult the mother-in-law or to deprive the husband of Fatima Begum of her company, should be set down as merely imaginary and have no bearing or relation to the actual facts when appreciated from the proper perspective. There was, therefore, no necessity for the Additional Sessions Judge to have been misled by such considerations which cannot be said to legitimately arise in this case. Before having done with this case, it is again necessary to revert to the fact that, in pursuance of the search warrant, Fatima Begum was produced before the Court of the Eighth City Magistrate and the final order thereafter passed stated that “ she is released for the reason that no further action is required by her’‘ which clearly means that Fatima Begum wanted to go back and live in her brother's house. The order so passed thus brings out that Fatima Begum had nothing to complain about the discovery and her discharge from the custody of Saheb Begum or her husband. In any case, Fatima Begum has nothing to complain about the action taken in the search made for her and in saving her from further unlawful confinement. The learned counsel for the petitioner, however, contended before this Court that the lower Court acted illegally in not passing any legal order after Fatima Begum was produced before the Court. But, in view of what has been just observed, it is hardly necessary to point out that there is any force in this contention. The learned counsel for the petitioner, however, contended before this Court that the lower Court acted illegally in not passing any legal order after Fatima Begum was produced before the Court. But, in view of what has been just observed, it is hardly necessary to point out that there is any force in this contention. From the above, it follows that the reference made by the learned Additional Sessions Judge should be rejected and the order issuing a search warrant and further orders on the production of Fatima Begum passed by the Eighth City Magistrate, Hyderabad, should be upheld. This revision case is, therefore, dismissed. A.B.K.-----Reference rejected; Revision dismissed.