JUDGMENT : - Bhagwan Din, J. This is a tenant's petition for quashing the order dated 14-10-1998 passed by the Judge, Small Causes Court, Meerut decreeing the suit of the landlord for recovery of arrears of rent and ejectment and for damages for use and occupation of the premises for the period from 21-10-1995 to 30-11-1995, and the order dated 27-1-1999 passed by XIIIth Additional District Judge, Meerut in S. C. C. Revision No. 543 of 1998. 2. THE petitioner is a tenant of the House No. 41-42/165, Dharmpuri, Sadar, Meerut at the monthly rent of Ps. 25 of which the Respondent No. 3, is the landlord. Earlier to the Respondent No. 3, his father, Gyan Chandra Garg was the landlord of the premises in dispute. In the year 1985, Gyan Chandra Garg refused to accept the rent from the petitioner. He, therefore, moved an application under Section 30 (1) of the U. P. U/ban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act No. 13 of 1972) in the Court of Munsiff, Meerut for permission to deposit the rent in the Court. THE landlord in response to the notice served on him, appeared in the Court and expressed his willingness to accept the rent. On this the Munsiff City passed an order on 9-10-1987 directing the petitioner to pay rent directly to the landlord. After some time, Gyan Chandra Garg again refused to accept the rent from the petitioner. Therefore, the latter filed a fresh application under Section 30 (1) of the Act No. 13 of 1972. THE Munsiff City by his order dated 5-8-1988 allowed the application and permitted the tenant to deposit the rent in the Court. There from the tenant has been depositing the rent regularly in the Court. THE previous landlord Gyan Chandra Garg died on 24-2-1990 leaving behind several heirs and legal representatives including the Respondent No. 3. But by virtue of the Will executed by Gyan Chandra Garg in his life time, the Respondent No. 3 became sole landlord of the premises in dispute. On 20-9-1995 he served a composite notice informing the petitioner that Gyan Chandra Garg, who had died on 24-2-1990, had bequeathed the premises in question exclusively in his favour and, therefore, he is alone the landlord.
On 20-9-1995 he served a composite notice informing the petitioner that Gyan Chandra Garg, who had died on 24-2-1990, had bequeathed the premises in question exclusively in his favour and, therefore, he is alone the landlord. By means of this notice he also terminated the tenancy of the petitioner on the ground of default in payment of rent from October, 1985 till the date of notice, demanded the arrears of rent and vacant possession of the premises within 30 days. THE petitioner sent reply to the notice communicating the Respondent No. 3 that he could know for first time on receipt of this notice dated 20-9-1990, that his father had expired on 24-2-1990 and that he has become the exclusive owner and landlord of the premises in question by virtue of a Will executed by his late father, that he has been depositing the rent from 1-8-1986 regularly in the Court of Munsiff City, Meerut in case No. 13 of 1987, Panna Lal v. Cyan Chandra Garg, and as per details of deposits given in reply, he is not the defaulter and liable to be evicted. On expiry of the period of notice, the Respondent No. 3 filed a suit R. E. No. 268 of 1995 before the Court of Judge, Small Causes Court, Meerut for recovery of the arrears of rent from 1-12-1992 to 28-10-1995 relinquishing claim of rent from October, 1985 to 30th November, 1992 and eviction of the petitioner and for damages for use and occupation after ser vice of the notice. THE petitioner contested the suit. In his written statement, he denied the assertions made in the plaint and pleaded that he had already deposited the rent in the Court according to the rules well within the knowledge of the plaintiff's lather, that in response to the notice served by the plaintiff on him he had in formed him about the deposits giving details thereof and thus, he is not defaulter and liable to be evicted. The Judge, Small Causes Court rejected the plea of the petitioner and decreed the suit for recovery of arrears of rent and eviction alongwith damages for use and occupation considering that the deposits made by the defendant in the Court arc not according to rules and, therefore, are invalid.
The Judge, Small Causes Court rejected the plea of the petitioner and decreed the suit for recovery of arrears of rent and eviction alongwith damages for use and occupation considering that the deposits made by the defendant in the Court arc not according to rules and, therefore, are invalid. Aggrieved of the judgment and order of the Judge, Small Causes Court the defendant-petitioner filed J. S. C. C. Revision No. 543 of 1998 but could not get favour of the Revisional Court. The Revisional Court upheld the judgment and order of the trial Court with the observation that the revisionist/ petitioner deposited the rent under Section 30 of Act No. 13 of 1972 without complying with the provisions of Rule (5) of the rules framed under Act 13 of 1972. He held that since the deposits under Section 30 of the Act of 1972 are invalid there fore, he is not entitled to the benefits of the provisions of Section 20 (4) of the Act 13 of 1972 and also that on receipt of the notice from the opposite party he has not deposited the entire rent due within a month or even on the first date of hearing, he is therefore, defaulter and liable to be evicted. 3. THE petitioner, has, therefore, filed the present writ petition seeking for a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the judgment and order dated 14-10-1998 passed by the Judge, Small Causes Court and the judgment and order dated 27-11-1999 passed by the XIIIth Additional District Judge and also for an order or direction which the Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case. 4. THIS petition is placed before me for admission on the nomination by the Hon'ble the Acting Chief Justice. Shri P. K. Jain put in appearance on behalf of the Respondent No. 3. By the consent of the parties' Counsel, the petition is heard finally at the admission stage. The petitioner does not contend that alter the death of earlier landlord, Gyan Chandra Garg, the Respondent No. 3 has become the landlord of the premises in question. However, it is asserted by him that he could not know about the death of Gyan Chandra Garg till date he received the notice from the Respondent No. 3.
The petitioner does not contend that alter the death of earlier landlord, Gyan Chandra Garg, the Respondent No. 3 has become the landlord of the premises in question. However, it is asserted by him that he could not know about the death of Gyan Chandra Garg till date he received the notice from the Respondent No. 3. Therefore, he continued to deposit the rent in the name of Gyan Chandra Garg and that he deposited the rent ever since up to 31-12-1995. Therefore, he was not defaulter on the date of service of the notice of termination of tenancy. He has further asserted that neither the earlier landlord nor thereafter the Respondent No. 3 expressed willingness to accept the rent directly from the petitioner. There fore, on account of the deposits made by him under Section 31 (1) under the order of the Court and also that in reply to the notice he has furnished the details of the deposits made in the Court, he is entitled to the protection of the provisions of Section 20 (4) of the Act and therefore, is not liable to be ejected. 5. IN support of the above assertions, Shri VK. Goel, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner relied on the observation of this Court made in the case of Shankar Lai Sharma v. Ram Adhar and another, 1985 (2) ARC 331, wherein it is held that "the provisions of Section 7-C of the Old Act and Section 30 (1) of the New Act clearly show that on the refusal of the landlord to accept the rent it would be competent and permissible for the tenant to deposit the rent in the Court as provided in law. The enactment of such a provision which is a piece of social legislation is manifestly meant for the protection of the tenants from reckless and frivolous eviction. While considering such provisions it is settled principle that the Court should adopt a beneficent rule of construction and such a construction should be preferred to fulfill the undertaking policy of the Act as is more beneficial to the persons for whose interest the statute has been brought to book. " 6.
While considering such provisions it is settled principle that the Court should adopt a beneficent rule of construction and such a construction should be preferred to fulfill the undertaking policy of the Act as is more beneficial to the persons for whose interest the statute has been brought to book. " 6. ADMITTEDLY, in the year 1985 the then landlord Cyan Chandra Garg refused to accept the rent from the petitioner, he therefore, under the order of the Munsiff City, Meerut deposited the rent under Section 30 (1) of the Act 13 of 1972 in the Court. Subsequently, the landlord showed his willingness to accept the rent directly from the petitioner. Therefore, the petitioner started payment of rent to him. In the year 1987 again the then landlord again refused to accept the rent, the petitioner moved an application, in the Court of Munsiff City, Meerut and with the permission of I he Court, started depositing the rent in the Court and has been continuously and regularly depositing the rent in the Court. The learned Counsel appearing for the respondent has con tended that in view of the decision rendered by this Court in the case of Choiey Lal v. XIVth Additional District Judge, Kanpur and others, 1994 (23) ALR 288, the deposits made by the petitioner under Section 30 of the Act 13 of 1972, in the Court are not valid because he did not comply with the provisions of Rules 21 (3) and (5). He is therefore, not entitled to benefits which he would have otherwise enjoyed. He asserts that both the Courts below have rightly refused to take the said deposits into consideration. His lordship in this case has held that "for treating the deposit under Section 30 as valid deposit to absolve the tenant from the risk of default in payment of rent the provisions of Rule 21 should have been complied with strictly. The provision of sub-rules (3) and (5) of the said rule are important. For the first deposit under Section 30, the tenant was required to take steps so that a notice about the deposit could have been served to the landlord. In subsequent deposit for continuation of depositing the amount of rent, fresh application was not necessary but process fee and the notice in Form 'f' was necessary and it is mandatory requirement. " 7.
In subsequent deposit for continuation of depositing the amount of rent, fresh application was not necessary but process fee and the notice in Form 'f' was necessary and it is mandatory requirement. " 7. THE Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jagat Prasad v. District Judge, Kanpur and others, 1995 (2) ARC 360, also has held that "law prescribes the procedure as to the deposit under U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. Such a procedure, if com plied with alone will be a valid defence to a petition for eviction on the ground of arrears of rent. Therefore, even accepting the defence the ultimate order of eviction passed against the tenant will have to be upheld." 1l. THE Courts below have concurrently held that the petitioner had not taken steps to serve the plaintiff-landlord a notice in Form 'f' of the continuation of the deposit of rent subsequent to the application under Section 31 of the Act 13 of 1972. In the case of Shankar Lai Sharma v. Ram Adhar and others (supra), also this Court held that it would be competent and permissible for the tenant to deposit the rent in the Court as provided in law. THE service of notice in Form 'f' is more essentially required in the set of circumstances of the present case particularly where on the death of previous landlord the new landlord has become landlord by succession. THE learned Counsel for the petitioner has failed to show that the provisions of Rule 21 (5) has been cam-plied with by the petitioner. To my mind if the deposits of the petitioner are not ac cording to law i.e. Rule 21 (5) has not been strictly complied with, the Courts below have committed no error in holding that the deposits are invalid. 12. THE next contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that in reply to the notice, the petitioner had furnished the details of the deposits made in the Court which the landlord has right to withdraw from the Court. THE reply to the notice is Annexure-3 to the petition. A perusal of this reply clearly indicates that the petitioner has furnished all the details of the deposits made by him from time to time in the proceedings in Misc. Case No. 13 of 1987 under Section 30 of the Act 13 of 1972.
THE reply to the notice is Annexure-3 to the petition. A perusal of this reply clearly indicates that the petitioner has furnished all the details of the deposits made by him from time to time in the proceedings in Misc. Case No. 13 of 1987 under Section 30 of the Act 13 of 1972. In the reply it is further indicated that the landlord may withdraw the same from the Court. 13. In Gyanchandra Prakash Sangal v. 1st Additional District Judge, Muzaffarnagar and others, 1986 (2) ARC 297, following the propositions laid down in Bhikha Lal v. Munna Lal, 1973 AWR 35, it was held that "where the tenant had deposited the rent in Court being the past arrears and while replying to the notice had clearly stated about such deposits and his willing ness to help the landlord in the withdrawal if required, the tenant would not be deemed to be a defaulter". In the case cited above there was no change of the landlord. THE old landlord continued till the end of proceeding. THE deposit was made in his favour and tenant could have helped him in the withdrawal if required. Whereas, in I he instant case, the tenant has deposited the rent in the name of Cyan Chandra Garg who had expired on 24-2-1990. Even after his death he continued to deposit for deceased's advantage. THE tenant, there fore, could not help the present landlord in withdrawal of the same and otherwise too the Respondent No. 3 may not apply to the Court for withdrawal of the rent deposited by the petitioner. THE deposits of the rent is always made under Section 30 of the Act 13 of 1972 to the advantage of the landlord and not with object to subvert the proceedings of eviction and save from liability of being evicted from the rented building. Therefore, in the instant case, the furnishing of the details of the deposits made in t he Court in t he name of a dead person will be of no avail to absolve the petitioner of the liability of eviction. It is further con tended that the Respondent No. 3 had filed a suit for recovery of the arrear so front with effect from 1 -12-1992 till 20-2-1995 and eviction.
It is further con tended that the Respondent No. 3 had filed a suit for recovery of the arrear so front with effect from 1 -12-1992 till 20-2-1995 and eviction. Since the petitioner has deposited the entire rent due from 1-12-1992 to 20-12-1995, on the first date of hearing he, there fore, cannot be classified as a defaulter and liable to be evicted as provided in Section 21 (4) of the Act 13 of 1972. 14. Sub-section (4) of Section 20 has been enacted to save the interest of the tenant who has defaulted in payment of the rent for the period of four months and also failed to pay the same to the landlord within one month from the date of service upon him a notice of demand determining the tenancy. It provides that in a suit for eviction on the ground mentioned in clause (a) of sub- section (2), if at the first hearing of the suit the tenant unconditionally pays or tenders to the landlord or deposits in Court the entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation of the building due from him together with interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent per annum and the landlord's cost of the suit in respect thereof, the Court may pass an order relieving the tenant against his liability for eviction on that ground. 15. In Ram Gopal and others v. Hari Shankar, 1985 (11) ALR 385, this Court has held that "the expression 'the entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation' found in Section 39 denotes such amount as is under the law due to the landlord. This is in contrast to the language employed in Order XV, Rule 5, Code of Civil Procedure viz, 'the entire amount admitted by him to be due'. If the legislative intention behind Section 39 had been to permit deposit of such amount as the tenant admits to be due, there is no reason why the same words would not have found place in Section 39 also. Section 20 (4) of the Act of 1972 expressly contains the words 'due from him' but the absence thereof in Section 39 is of little consequence because that same sense is conveyed by use of the word the entire amount of rent. . . . . . . . . . . " in unqualified terms." 16.
Section 20 (4) of the Act of 1972 expressly contains the words 'due from him' but the absence thereof in Section 39 is of little consequence because that same sense is conveyed by use of the word the entire amount of rent. . . . . . . . . . . " in unqualified terms." 16. On the force of the above proposition, the learned Counsel endeavoured to persuade the Court to hold that the petitioner is not liable to the ejectment. Admittedly, the earlier landlord, Gyan Chandra Garg died in the year 1990. THE rent deposited in the Court in favour of Gyan Chandra Garg may be considered valid up to the date of his death i.e. 24-2-1990. Therefrom the tenant was liable to pay the rent to the Respondent No. 3, which he did not. However, to gain the advantage of Section 21 (4) he deposited rent due from 1-12-1992 to 31-12-1995 on the date of hearing. Obviously he did not deposit the entire amount of arrears of rent, in other words he did not deposit the arrears of rent for the period from 24-2-1990 to 1-12-1992 on the assumption that the Respondent No. 3 has relinquished the rent for that period being time barred. THE Hon'ble Supreme Court in Khadi Gramodyog Mandal v. Ram Chandra Ji, 1977 ARC 326 , has held that "in order to take advantage of Section 20 (4) of the Act No. 13 of 1972 it is necessary for the tenant to deposit also the rent which has become barred by limitation. " THE same view has been taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Subhash Chand Jain v. 1st Additional District and Sessions Judge, Saharanpur and others, 1989 (15) ALR 300 (SC ). 17. This Court in Lakhan Singh v. Ram Shankar Gupta and another, 1997 (2) ARC 44, again held that "it is obvious that the claim for arrears of rent for the period relinquished for the reason that it has be come barred by limitation, shall not be only due to paid. THE tenant's obligation to pay the entire rent due in respect of the premises because the relinquishment does not have- any particular significance. It simply means an omission to sue for this amount." 18.
THE tenant's obligation to pay the entire rent due in respect of the premises because the relinquishment does not have- any particular significance. It simply means an omission to sue for this amount." 18. Admittedly, the petitioner has deposited on the first date of hearing the rent from 1-12-1992 to 31- 12-1995 and has not deposited the rent for the period from 24-2-1990 to 30-11-1992 and which was due on the date of hearing, therefore, he falls within the category of the defaulter. 19. In view of the above discussion the petition deserves to be dismissed. THE petition is accordingly, dismissed. Petition dismissed.