Judgment R. Pal, J. The petitioners are Statistical Assistants under Directorate of Employment Exchange, Labour Department, Government of West Bengal. Both the petitioners were directly recruited late in 1984. Their services were confirmed in 1989 but with effect from 1987. According to the relevant rules, six years after their appointment they became entitled to be promoted to the post of Employment Officer. Six years expired in 1990. The petitioners made several representations to the concerned authorities protesting against the promotional policy followed by the respondent authorities which provided that the post of Employment Officers would be filled 50 percent by direct recruits and 50 percent by promotion. The particular grievance is that the class of persons who had been clubbed together for the purposes of being considered within the 50 percent promotees was arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. According to the petitioners, Upper Division Clerks (UDCs) had been clubbed together with SAs wrongly. 2. There was no response to the several representations made by the petitioners and ultimately in July, 1987, the petitioners filed an application before the State Administrative Tribunal praying, inter alia, for a direction on the respondent authorities to set aside clause 3 of the relevant rules relating to the method of recruitment and to provide for separate classification between the Sas and UDCs for the purpose of promotion to the post of Employment Officers with effect from January, 1991. 3. An interim order was initially obtained by the petitioners. An application was made by the respondent authorities for vacating the interim order. The interim order was modified. The matter was ultimately taken up for hearing by the Tribunal and disposed of by dismissing the petitioners application. 4. In dismissing the application, the Tribunal held that the application was barred by limitation; that there was no relevant direction between SAs and UDCs and that the Court could not direct the authorities to change its policy based on its own view. 5. Before us, the petitioners have assailed the decision of the Tribunal by stating that there was, in fact, no question of limitation. The Tribunal wrongly proceeded on the basis that the cause of action accrued to the petitioners in 1976 namely the date of the recruitment rules which contained the offending clause. 5. Before us, the petitioners have assailed the decision of the Tribunal by stating that there was, in fact, no question of limitation. The Tribunal wrongly proceeded on the basis that the cause of action accrued to the petitioners in 1976 namely the date of the recruitment rules which contained the offending clause. It is also drawn to the attention of this Court that the Tribunal has proceeded on the basis that there was an order passed by which the petitioners were aggrieved. There was no such order. It is submitted that the petitioners had made several representations since 1991 and that the cause of action was a continuing one. Finally, it is submitted on a construction of section 19 read with section 21 of the West Bengal Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 that the issue of limitation is one which must be determined at a outset before attempting the application under section 19. Once the petition was admitted, as it was in this case, the issue of limitation could not re-opened. 6. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents conceedes that the provision of section 21 of the 1985 Act would not be applicable and that it could not be said that application was barred by limitation. However, it is submitted that the application was grossly delayed and that should be dismissed even if the period of limitation did not apply. Reliance has been placed on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1999 SC 517 para 6 (Union of India and Ors. vs. Kishorilal Bablani) as well as S.B. Mathur and Ors. vs. Hon'ble the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court and Ors., reported in AIR 1988 SC 2073 para 14) in support of this submission. 7. The principle that delay defeated equity might be application in a situation where no period of limitation is prescribed. Once the period of limitation is prescribed, the issues of delay becomes irrelevant. The 1985 Act clearly specifies a period of limitation. Section 21 of the Act debars a Tribunal from admitting any application if it is beyond the period of limitation. Sections 19, 20, 21 provide for the pre-conditions which must be fulfilled before an application is admitted. Once the period of limitation is prescribed, the issues of delay becomes irrelevant. The 1985 Act clearly specifies a period of limitation. Section 21 of the Act debars a Tribunal from admitting any application if it is beyond the period of limitation. Sections 19, 20, 21 provide for the pre-conditions which must be fulfilled before an application is admitted. In other words, the point of admission is a point at which a definite decision has to be taken by the Tribunal on the question of the existence of or absence of the pre-conditions subject to which the application is admitted. In the case, although the application was initially taken up exparte, and interim order passed on 23rd July, 1997, after the service of notice and hearing both sides, the application was admitted on 19th September, 1997 and fixed for hearing oil 7th January, 1998. It must be assumed that the Tribunal had, in admitting the petition, decided the pre-conditions for such admission including the pre-condition of section 21 had been fulfilled by the petitioners. No appeal has been preferred from the order of admission by the respondent authorities as far as the State Authorities are concerned. 8. The impugned Rule in this case is dated 2nd March, 1976. The notification which lays down rules regulating the recruitment to, inter alia, the posts of Employment Officer excluding the Employment Officer (Technical) provides for the method of recruitment. In terms of Rule 3 of these rules, recruitment can be made by selection or direct recruitment on the results of the W.B.C.S. (Ex.) and allied etc. examination and also by promotion from the following services and posts subject to the fulfilment of conditions for promotion :- (a) Junior Employment Officer; (b) Superintendent and U.D. Clerks of the Directorate of N.E.S., West Bengal; (c) Superintendent and U.D Clerks of the Regional Employment Exchanges and U.D. Clerks of the Sub-Regional and District Employment Exchanges; (d) Inspector of Statistics; (3) Statistical Assistants. On 6th July, 1976 the posts of Junior Employment Officers were deleted from the list set out above. 9. According to the petitioners, the UDCs could not be equated with them because their educational qualifications are different, the nature of jobs carried out by UDCs and SAs were different and the scales of pay enjoyed by UDCs and SAs were different. 9. According to the petitioners, the UDCs could not be equated with them because their educational qualifications are different, the nature of jobs carried out by UDCs and SAs were different and the scales of pay enjoyed by UDCs and SAs were different. It is submitted that the educational qualifications are relevant considerations for the purposes of clarification between groups. Several decisions have been cited in this context which will be considered subsequently in the judgment. It is also submitted that educational qualifications are relevant for the purposes of promotion to the post of Employment Officer and was clear from the fact that 50 percent of the direct recruits were eligible only subject to the passing the W.B. C.S. (Ex) examination. It is stated that as a fact UDCs were only required to have School Final qualification for the purpose of recruitment unlike SAs were required to have minimum qualification of a graduate degree with statistics, mathematics, physics or economics together with experience in statistical computation work for at least two years or higher qualification i.e. Masters Degree. 10. It is also submitted that apart from these, SAs carried out more eneous responsibilities than UDCs. The nature of the work has been set out to some extent in the application before the Tribunal. A chart has sought to be referred to setting out the nature of the duties between the SAs and UDCs. It is also submitted that this issue has been determined in an earlier writ application filed by the petitioners in connection with the grant of the higher scale of pay to SAs. That writ application had been decided in C.O. 10238 (W) of 1995 (judgment dated 5.7.95). It is also submitted that the specific averments as to the nature of the work carried out by SAs has not been denied by the respondent in their affidavits filed before the Tribunal. The Judgment dated 5th July, 1985 has also been relied upon for the purpose of showing that the SAs were entitled to higher scale of pay than UDCs. It is submitted that the UDCs are carrying on inferior work which should be said to the inferior that of the SAs both in responsibility and nature of work was established from the notification issued by the Government on 14th March, 1986 that the post of SAs would be filed inter alia by appointments from amongst officiating UDCs. 11. It is submitted that the UDCs are carrying on inferior work which should be said to the inferior that of the SAs both in responsibility and nature of work was established from the notification issued by the Government on 14th March, 1986 that the post of SAs would be filed inter alia by appointments from amongst officiating UDCs. 11. The final submission of the petitioners is that assuming that there was a proper classification for the purpose of promotion could not be made purely on the basis of seniority but was bound to be made on seniority-cum -merit basis. Merit of the petitioners involves educational qualifications apart from general competence. According to the petitioners, the respondents were making promotions purely on the basis of inter se seniority. Certain statements contained in the affidavits filed by the respondents before the Tribunal had been replied upon in this context. 12. Dealing with the last point first, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents has fairly conceded that the statements contained in the affidavits did not correctly spell out the policy in fact being followed by the respondents. According to the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State respondents the respondents had always followed seniority-cum-merit basis at the time of making promotion even to the post of Employment Officers. This particular relief must, therefore, be granted to the petitioners to the extent that the promotion must be made on the basis of seniority-cum-merit to the post of Employment Officer. As to what constitutes merit in a particular given case must be left to the discretion to the authorities concerned. It is possible for a person with high educational qualification to perform very poorly. Just it is possible for a person with lower educational qualification to perform the same extremely well. Furthermore, the class of SAs is compared not only by direct recruits who are required to have graduate degrees etc. but also on promotion from the post of inter alia, LDCs, who would not have the educational qualifications possessed by the petitioners at all. However, once they are promoted and they are all SAs, thereafter, the question of merit being assessed on the basis of educational qualification for the purpose of promotion would be to draw a distinction without the class. However, once they are promoted and they are all SAs, thereafter, the question of merit being assessed on the basis of educational qualification for the purpose of promotion would be to draw a distinction without the class. The observation of the Supreme Court in S.B. Patwardhan vs. State Maharashtra, reported in (1977) 3 SCR 775 , is to the effect that persons although drawn from two different sources namely direct recruits and promotees constitute in the instant case a single integrated cadre. They discharge identical functions, bear similar responsibilities and acquire an equal amount of experience in their respective assignments. No benefit can be given for promotion on the basis of the initial qualifications, once they form part of the same cader. These observations were approved again in B.C. Sharma and Ors. vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Ors., reported in AIR 1983 SC 881 at para 56. 13. In the case before us if one were to give precedence to the matter of promotion on the basis of educational qualifications then these SAs who are promotees would have to form a separate class. Similar submissions were rejected by the Supreme Court in B.C. Sharma's case in the following language. "Prayer No.1 is to declare the petitioners Graduate Engineers as a separate category amongst Junior Engineers and give them equal quota like the Diploma holders Junior Engineers out of the 50% quota for promotion as Assistant Engineers. This cannot be done except by carrying out two classes in the same category of Junior Engineers on the basis merely of their qualification which is not permissible in law though the creation of selection grade in the same category on the basis of merit and/or seniority is well-known and permissible." 14. The same reasoning is also applicable to the petitioners claiming separate classification on the basis of their educational qualification. This would mean a distinction between promotees SAs and direct recruit SAs. Clearly, this cannot be done. 15. The petitioners then claim that they are entitled to separate classification for the purpose of their higher scales of pay. The respondents have drawn up our attention to the fact as stated in their affidavits that all the feeder posts namely to the promotion of Employment Officers, Office Superintendents of Directorate of Employment Exchange, were getting higher scales of pay than that of SAs. The respondents have drawn up our attention to the fact as stated in their affidavits that all the feeder posts namely to the promotion of Employment Officers, Office Superintendents of Directorate of Employment Exchange, were getting higher scales of pay than that of SAs. Inspectors of Statistics were also getting higher scales of pay than UDCs and SAs. Therefore, a distinction merely on the basis of some difference in the scales of pay would not do. A substantial difference in the scales of pay coupled with a substantial difference in the nature of duties might be sufficient to justify a class by overlooking such a distinction. This appears to be the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1988 SC 2073 para-11 (S.B Mathur and Ors. vs. Hon'ble the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court), where the Supreme Court said that: "In appreciating this submission, it must be borne in mind that it is an accepted principle that where there is an employer who has a large number of employees in his service performing diverse duties, he must enjoy a certain measures of discretion in treating different categories of his employees as holding equal status posts or equated posts, as questions of promotion or transfer of employee, inter se will necessarily arise for the purpose of maintaining the efficiency of the organisation. There is, therefore, nothing inherently wrong in an employer treating certain posts as equated posts or equal status posts provided that, in doing so, he exercises his discretion reasonably and does not violate the principles of equality enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It is also clear that for treating certain posts as equated posts or equal status posts, it is not necessary that the holders of these posts must perform completely the same functions or that the sources of recruitment to the posts must be the same or it is essential that qualifications for appointments to the posts must be identical. It is also clear that for treating certain posts as equated posts or equal status posts, it is not necessary that the holders of these posts must perform completely the same functions or that the sources of recruitment to the posts must be the same or it is essential that qualifications for appointments to the posts must be identical. All that is reasonably required is that there must not be such difference in the pay-scales or qualifications of the incumbents of the posts concerned or in their duties or responsibilities or regarding any other relevant factor that it would be unjust to treat the posts alike or, in other words, that posts having substantially higher pay-scales or status in service or carrying substantially heavier responsibilities and duties or otherwise distinctly superior are not equated with posts carrying much lower pay-scales or substantially lower responsibilities and duties or enjoying much lower status in service." 16. The Tribunal has cryptically stated that it accepted the submission of the respondents without stating the reasons why the respondents' submissions was accepted. However, before us, the arguments have been made at length. Therefore, we proceed to give our finding in respect of the submissions of the petitioners. No doubt, the petitioners statement as to the work required to be carried out by SAs has not been denied by the respondents. The respondents have said that the work of the UDCs is similar with SAs and is "comprehensive" and divergent. In addition, the very material fact stated by the respondents which had not been disputed by the petitioners is that there are 73 Employment Exchanges in the State. There are, at present, 16 SAs. The work of SAs of the other exchanges is being carried out by the UDCs. Presumably, it falls within the UDCs scope of work and the UDCs are not discharging functions beyond their rightful duties. According to the petitioners, SAs are posted in the main employment exchanges whereas the UDCs were carrying out the work in the relatively smaller employment exchanges. 17. Thus difference is not a substantial one according to the formula prescribed in S.B Mathur's case. 18. According to the petitioners, SAs are posted in the main employment exchanges whereas the UDCs were carrying out the work in the relatively smaller employment exchanges. 17. Thus difference is not a substantial one according to the formula prescribed in S.B Mathur's case. 18. The decision on which great reliance has been placed by the petitioners namely a decision in C.O. No. 10238 (W) of 1995 appears to have proceeded on the basis that the Statistical Assistants working in different departments are entitled to the same scales of pay. There is no finding that the Statistical Assistants working in the employment exchange do work which is superior to the UDC in the same directorate or the same department. 19. According to the petitioners, the Statistical Assistant had at first been granted a higher scale of pay because their claims were that they did more enerous work that UDCs in their department. These facts are not before this Court and the judgment relied upon does not appear to reflect this. Assuming that SAs in one particular department get higher scales of pay because UDCs in that department do not discharge the same nature of work does not necessarily mean that UDCs in the Employment Exchanges discharge less responsible work than the SAs in this department. The comparison would not be correct without a substantive finding in this regard. 20. Having regard to the fact of the inter-dependence or interchangeability of the job, if nothing else, it must be held that the petitioners have been unable to establish the nature of the responsibility or the responsibility or their jobs are substantially superior those of the UDCs at all. 21. The point that the superiority of the work of the SAs must be taken to be concluded by the notification which was issued on 14th March, 1986 is unacceptable. The notification provides that the posts of SAs would be filled up on ad hoc basis by promotion not only from amongst the efficiating UDCs but also from confirmed LDCs. The post of LDCs is also a feeder post for UDCs. 22. For the aforesaid reasons, we dismiss the writ application by upholding the judgment of the Tribunal being for the reasons stated herein. There will be no order as to costs. 23. Urgent xerox certified copy of the above order, if applied for, be delivered to the respective forthwith. Writ application dismissed.