Judgment :- K.K. Usha, J. Revision Petition is at the instance of the judgment debtors in O.S.1037/89 of the Sub Court, Thrissur. Respondent-decree holder applied for sale of 30 cents of land comprised in Sy. No. 81/1 of Nedumpura village of Thalappilly Taluk in execution of the money decree. Judgment debtors filed objection to the notice under O. XXI R.66 CPC, contending that the property sought to be sold is not liable to be sold since the property is that of a school. The above objection was disposed of by the Execution Court with the direction to incorporate the objection in sale paper. Upset price was fixed and sale was posted on 23.9.1996. The above order is under challenge in the revision petition. 2. It is contended by the revision petitioner that 30 cents of land which was directed to be sold in court auction is part of 99 cents of land belonging to Sree Narayana L.P. School, Vettikkattiri. S.6 of the Kerala Education Act, 1958 contains a bar for sale, mortgage, lease, pledge, charge or transfer of possession of any property of an aided school. Therefore, according to the revision petitioners, the order directing sale of the property is unsustainable in law. An interim order of stay granted by this Court was vacated on 8.10.1996 and the execution court was allowed to proceed with the execution. 3. C.M.A. 27/98 is filed by the decree holder in O.S.1037/89 before the Sub Court, Thrissur, who is the respondent in E.A. 247/97 and petitioner in E.P. 906/92. The judgment and decree in O.S.1037/89 was under appeal in A.S.92/92. In C.M.P. 978/ 92. this Court had passed a conditional order of stay on 10.10.1995 directing the appellants judgment debtors to furnish security for the decree amount within one month. Since the above direction was not complied with, stay was vacated. The property having an extent of 30 cents in Sy. No. 81/1 in Vettikkattiri desom, Nedumbura village, Talappilly taluk, Trichur district which was under attachment before judgment, was proclaimed for sale. As mentioned earlier, judgment debtors approached this Court by filing C.R.P. 1928/96 challenging the order passed on their objection to notice under 0. XXI R.66 CPC. Since the order of stay granted in the C.R.P. was vacated on 8.10.1996, the property was sold on 25.1.1997 and it was purchased by the decree holder. 4. As mentioned earlier, judgment debtors approached this Court by filing C.R.P. 1928/96 challenging the order passed on their objection to notice under 0. XXI R.66 CPC. Since the order of stay granted in the C.R.P. was vacated on 8.10.1996, the property was sold on 25.1.1997 and it was purchased by the decree holder. 4. Respondents judgment debtors thereupon filed E.A. 247/97 under O. XXI R.90 CPC for setting aside the sale on the ground that since the property belongs to an aided school, it cannot be brought to sale in view of the provisions contained in under S.6 of the Kerala Education Act. The application was allowed by order dated 14.10.1997 and the sale was set aside. Aggrieved by the above, decree holder has filed the above appeal. 6. It was submitted by both sides that the only question to be decided in the revision petition as well as in the appeal is whether the provisions of S.6 of the Kerala Education Act imposing restriction on alienation of property of aided school would apply to a court sale. Since the issue involve disinter pretation of S.6oftheKeralaEducationAct,1958, and since a decision on the above issue in these two cases would have general application, we issued notice to the Advocate General on 10.2.1998. The case was then adjourned on several occasions for the convenience of the learned Advocate General and ultimately, on 11.1.1999, this Court passed an order directing the cases to be posted on 18.1.1999 and if, on that day, learned Advocate General was not available, learned Addl. Advocate General to appear to assist the Court. Thus we heard learned counsel appearing for parties in these two cases as also Sri. T.M. Mohammed Youseff, learned Addl. Advocate General. 7. S.6 of the Kerala Education Act reads as follows: "6. Restriction on alienation of property of aided school:- (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law for the time being in force, no sale, mortgage, lease, pledge, charge or transfer of possession in respect of any property of an aided school shall be created or made except with the previous permission in writing of such officer not below the rank of District Educational Officer, as may be authorised by the Government in this behalf. The officer shall grant such permission applied for unless the grant of such permission will, in his opinion adversely affect the working of the school. The officer shall grant such permission applied for unless the grant of such permission will, in his opinion adversely affect the working of the school. (2) Any person aggrieved by an order of the officer refusing or granting permission under sub-s.(1) may in such manner and within such time as may be prescribed, appeal to the Government. (3) Any transaction made in contravention of sub-s.(1) or sub-s.(2) shall be null and void. (4) If any educational agency or the manager of any school acts in contravention of sub-s.(1) or of an order passed under sub-s.(2) Government may withhold any grant to the school." The contention raised by learned counsel for the appellant in C.M. A. 27/98 is that the provisions of S.6 have no application to court sale. It applies only to voluntary transactions. According to learned counsel, just like a court sale being taken out of S.52 of the Transfer of Property Act by S.2(d) of the same Act, S.6 of the Kerala Education Act, 1958 has to be understood as not covering transfer of property in execution of a decree or order of the court. Referring to 1986 KLT 919 (Maroli Balan v. Maroli Dannu & Ors.) it was submitted that this Court has held that a partition suit is not barred by S.6. Reliance was also placed by the learned counsel on two other decisions of this Court, Kesava Kurup v. State of Kerala & Ors., 1987 (2) KLT 801 and Thankamma Kunjamma & Ors. v. Gopalakrishnan Unnithan and Ors., 1992 (1) KLJ 415. 8. Learned Addl. Advocate General contended that the provisions under S.6 are enacted to see that the conduct of the school shall not be adversely affected by alienation of the property of the aided school. Referring to R.1 in Ch. IV of the Kerala Education Rules, 1959, it was pointed out that a minimum area as specified under the Rule is required for establishment of the schools. As far as Lower Primary Schools and Upper Primary Schools, with or without Lower Primary Section, are concerned, the required area of the site is 0.4 to 0.8 hectares, for Secondary Schools (High schools) with or without Primary Section, it is between 1.2 to 2 hectares, for Higher Secondary Schools with or without Primary Section, 1.2 to 2 hectares and for Training Schools with or without Model Schools, 1.2 hectares. These statutory provisions are made for the proper functioning of the schools. Therefore, if by any mode of alienation the area required for the schools is reduced, it will certainly adversely affect the interest of the school. Learned Addl. Advocate General submitted that proper functioning of the school is necessary to protect the interest of the student community at large. Kerala Education Act and the Rules made thereunder being special law, it would over-ride the provisions of Transfer of Property Act. In support of the above contention, reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Narcotics Control bureau v. Kishan Lai & Ors. (1991) 1 SCC 705. It is further contended that S.6 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 itself provides that the property of any kind may be transferred except as otherwise provided by that Act or by any other law for the time being in force. Therefore, there is no conflict between the provisions contained in S.6 of the Kerala Education Act with the provisions of the T.P. Act. Sub-s.(1) of S.6 itself provides that the officer authorised shall grant permission for alienation of the property of the aided school, if in his opinion, such transfer will not adversely affect the working of the school. Therefore, in cases where the aided schools are having large areas of property, it may be permissible to alienate a portion of the same without adversely affecting the interest of the school. Learned Addl. Advocate General submitted that even in execution court can consider the question whether the property against which execution is taken is saleable. O. XXIR. 64 would show that the property which can be brought to sale by the court, must be one liable to sale. Reliance was placed by learned Addl. Advocate General on a decision of the Madras High Court in Mohan Ram (minor) & Ors. v. T. L. Sundamramier & Ors. O. XXIR. 64 would show that the property which can be brought to sale by the court, must be one liable to sale. Reliance was placed by learned Addl. Advocate General on a decision of the Madras High Court in Mohan Ram (minor) & Ors. v. T. L. Sundamramier & Ors. AIR 1960 Madras 377 where it was held that the alienation of service mainland's is prohibited on the grounds of public policy either by statute or under the general law and where, in spite of such prohibition, the holder mortgages his property and allows a mortgage decree to be passed against him without setting up the inalienability of the lands but raises the objection to their salability for the first time in the executing court, it is open to the executing court, on being satisfied that the lands are service imam lands and therefore, not saleable, to stay its hand. Learned Addl. Advocate General therefore, contended that S.6 of the Kerala Education Act can be given only one interpretation, namely, that it prohibits all kinds of alienation including court sale. 9. Sri. K. Divakaran Nair, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents in C.M.A. 27/98 and the petitioner in C.R.P. 1928/96 referring to the provisions contained under S.60 of the C.P.C. 1908, submitted that the property of the judgment debtor that can be brought to sale in execution of a decree must be a property over which the judgment debtor has disposing power. In the light of the prohibition contained under S.6 of the Kerala Education Act, Manager of the school has no disposing power over the property of the school. If that be so, such property is not liable to be brought to sale through court in execution of a decree. 10. On an anxious consideration of the contentions raised by both sides, we do not find impossible to understand the prohibition on alienation of the property of aided school brought under S.6 of the Kerala Education Act as one which would not take into its fold a court sale. The decision relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant in support of his contention are not directly applicable to the issue raised in the appeal. The decision relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant in support of his contention are not directly applicable to the issue raised in the appeal. In 1986 KLT 919 supra, the question that came up for consideration was whether a suit for partition of a school and its properties is barred by S.6(1) of the Kerala Education Act. A Bench of this Court took the view that it will not, for the reason that partition of a family property is not an alienation or a transfer in the strict sense. It is relevant to note that this Court upheld the view taken by the trial court that the suit property being a school the land appurtenant thereto, cannot be partitioned by metes and bounds without adversely affecting running of the school. In order to avoid that contingency, trial court had directed to auction the suit properties between the plaintiffs and the 1st defendant and then apportion the sale proceeds in proportion to the shares of the respective shares. While upholding the view taken by the trial court, this Court observed that it was so done in order to see that the partition does not adversely affect running of the school as such. This decision will not help the appellant; on the other hand, it would show the necessity of a provision like one in S.6 of the Kerala Education Act not to permit alienation of the properties belonging to the school, if it would adversely affect the running of the school. 11. In 1987 (2) KLT 801 supra, it was a transfer of the entire school and its properties. There was no transfer of the property of the school separately. Following an earlier decision of this Court in P. V. John v. Director of Public Instruction & Ann, ILR 1975 (2) Ker. 604, it was held that when the entire school, along with its property is transferred, such a transfer will not fall within the mischief of S.6 of the Act. In 1992 (1) KLJ 415 supra, the school itself was transferred along with its property by way of gift deeds. The contention that the transfer was hit by S.6 was rejected by the learned Single Judge of this Court. In 1992 (1) KLJ 415 supra, the school itself was transferred along with its property by way of gift deeds. The contention that the transfer was hit by S.6 was rejected by the learned Single Judge of this Court. It was held that S.6 restricts alienation of property of a school because in such a case, the working of the school will be adversely affected, if the property of the school goes into the hands of the third parties. When a school is transferred as a going school, this difficulty will not arise and hence the restriction under S.6 cannot apply to such a transfer. 12. We do not find any reason to hold that the ban under S.6 will not be applicable to court sale. There is no merit in the contention raised by counsel for the appellant quoting analogy of S.52 of the Transfer of Property Act. S.52 of the Transfer of Property Act prohibits transfer of any right in the immovable property, pending suit relating thereto. This section does not apply to court sales which are involuntary sales in view of the provisions contained under S.2(d) of the Transfer of Property Act. But, Courts are taking the view that eventhough the Section as such is not applicable to involuntary sales, the principles of lis pendent applies to such alienations also (Samarendm Nath Sinha & Ann v. V. Krishnakumar Nag. 1967 (2) SCR. 18). 12-A. Learned counsel for the appellant referred to Law Lexicon by Ramanatha Iyer, page 5 3 and relied on the following: "'Alienation' differs from'descent' in this, that' alienation is effected by the voluntary act of the owner of the property, while, 'descent' is the legal consequence of the decease of the owner, and is not changed by any previous act of volition of the owner". Burbank v. RockinghamMut. F. Ins. Co., 57 Am. Dec. 300". He contended that since court sale is not a voluntary sale, it will not come within the term 'alienation'. He pointed out that the title to S.6 is restriction on alienation of property of aided school. Therefore, according to him, a court sale, which is not a voluntary sale, would not come within S.6. We do not find any merit in this contention. The paragraph quoted by the learned counsel from Law Lexicon is with reference to difference between alienation and descent. Therefore, according to him, a court sale, which is not a voluntary sale, would not come within S.6. We do not find any merit in this contention. The paragraph quoted by the learned counsel from Law Lexicon is with reference to difference between alienation and descent. The distinction is not between a voluntary transfer and an involuntary transfer. In the same page of Law Lexicon, the meaning of the word 'alienation' is given as 'transfer of ownership'. 'Alienation' is as much to say, as to make a thing another man's or to alter or put the possession of lands, or other things, from one man to another. We find, nowhere it is mentioned that alienation would take in only voluntary transfer. On the other hand, in Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Volume 3 while referring to the scope of different meanings of the term alienation, it is shown that an execution and sale also would come within the term 'alienation'. At page 165 the following reference is made: "A sheriffs execution sale was an "alienation" of land so as to bar wife who was not a party to the judgment and sale from maintaining suit for assignment of dower more than three years after husband's death. Code 1923,$.7450. Edmondson. Snodgrass, 187 Ss. 191, 192, 237 Ala. 426 the word "alienation" includes sale of the property of the husband on execution against him alone. Buder v .Fitzgerald, 61 N.W. 640,641,43 Neb.192,27L.R.A. 252,47 am.st. Rep. 741." Apart from the above, we find that in the body of S.6 the word used is 'sale' which would take in both voluntary and involuntary sale. 13. We are inclined to accept the contention raised by the learned Addl. Advocate General that the legislative intent behind the ban under S.6 is the well maintenance and proper conduct of the aided schools which is absolutely essential in public interest. Taking into consideration the object of the restriction on alienation brought about by S.6 of the Kerala Education Act, namely the well being of the schools, we are of the view that there is no reason to exclude court sale from its area of operation. When Kerala Education Act, which is a special law imposes such ban, it will have over-riding effect on the provisions of Transfer of Property Act, as was contended by the learned Addl. Advocate General. 14. When Kerala Education Act, which is a special law imposes such ban, it will have over-riding effect on the provisions of Transfer of Property Act, as was contended by the learned Addl. Advocate General. 14. We therefore hold that the court below was fully justified in allowing E.A. 247/ 97 in E.P. 906/92 holding that the sale of the property belonging to the school conducted in execution of the decree in O.S.1037/89 is vitiated and is liable to be set aside. In the result, C.M.A. 27/98 stands dismissed. 15. As mentioned earlier, the revision petition is at the instance of the judgment debtors challenging the order in E.P. 906/92 dated 25.7.1996 proceeding with the sale in spite of the objection raised by the judgment debtors under R.66 of O. XXI contending that the property of the school is not liable to be sold in view of the prohibition of S.6 of the Kerala Education Act. For the reasons stated by us in the earlier portion of this judgment, we set aside the order impugned in C.R.P. 1928/96 and allow the revision petition. There will be no order as to costs.