M. Balasubramanian v. The Management of T. V. Sundaram Iyengar and Sons Limited and another
1999-12-01
M.KARPAGAVINAYAGAM
body1999
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER: M.Balasubramanian, the petitioner herein, through this writ petition is seeking for the issue of a writ of certiorari calling for the records of the Presiding Officer, Principal Labour Court, Madurai, the second respondent herein, in his order dated 16.8.1991 in award I.D.No.34 of 1986 published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, Part II, Sec.II, dated 2.10.1991 and quash the same. 2. The facts that are required and relevant for the disposal of this writ petition could be summarised as follows: “(a) The Management of T.V.Sundaram and Sons Limited, Madurai, the first respondent Company is a dealer in automobiles including automobiles manufactured by Ashok Leyland. The petitioner joined the services of the said company on 5.8.1959 as a Clerk. On 12.6.1982 he was posted at Pondicherry as an Assistant. Subsequently, on 18.3.1983 he was retransferred to Madurai. With reference to the irregularities stated to have been committed by the petitioner while he was at Pondicherry, he was issued a show cause notice dated 23.5.1983 with the following charges: (i) He was receiving money from customers unauthorisedly; (ii) He was indulging in acts which are against the interests of the company; and (iii) He was acting subversive of the discipline of the company. (b) In the show cause notice, it is alleged that the reports were received from the beginning of 1983 from the customers that he was receiving more money from the customers on the ground that the said money was required to be given to the Motor Vehicles Inspector for registration. On 28.5.1983, the petitioner submitted his explanation to the Management. Since the Management was not satisfied with his explanation, it was decided to hold a domestic enquiry. So, enquiry notice dated 27.6.1983 was issued to him to participate in the enquiry on 30.6.1983. Accordingly, he participated. The enquiry was conducted on various dates and it was concluded on 12.6.1984. (c) After considering the materials placed by the delinquent as well as the Management, the Enquiry Officer sent a report dated 19.9.1984 holding that all the charges levelled against the delinquent employee stood proved and he was found guilty of the same. On receipt of the enquiry report, the Management sent a second show cause notice for the proposed punishment of discharge from service on 13.10.1984. In reply to the second show cause notice, the petitioner sent his further explanation to the Management on 29.10.1984.
On receipt of the enquiry report, the Management sent a second show cause notice for the proposed punishment of discharge from service on 13.10.1984. In reply to the second show cause notice, the petitioner sent his further explanation to the Management on 29.10.1984. On consideration of this reply, the Management passed an order dated 6.12.1984 discharging the petitioner from service. (d) Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner raised industrial dispute, which was referred for adjudication by the Government, to the Presiding Officer, Principal Labour Court, Madurai, as per the G.O.Ms.No.197, Labour Department, dated 31.1.1986. Questioning the said reference, the Management filed a writ petition in W.P.No.2570 of 1986 before this Court. The said petition was dismissed on 7.4.1986. The Management filed an appeal in W.A.No.563 of 1986 and the same also was dismissed on 8.3.1989. Thereafter, before the Principal Labour Court in I.D.No.34 of 1986, the validity of the domestic enquiry was raised as a preliminary point for consideration. The Management filed Exs.M-1 to M-44. However, the parties have not let in any oral evidence. (e) On the basis of the submissions and the materials, the Principal Labour Court framed two issues as points for consideration which are as follows: (1) Whether the domestic enquiry conducted by the Management is fair and proper? (2) Whether the principles of natural justice have been adhered to? Ultimately, the Labour Court passed an order on 31.10.1990 answering the points for determination referred to above involving the preliminary issue raised holding that the domestic enquiry conducted by the Management is fair and proper and the principles of natural justice have been adhered to. (f) Through the very same order, the parties were directed to let in oral evidence and produce their documents, if any, for consideration of other issues in the main matter inclusive of punishment under Sec.11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. Then, during the further enquiry, the petitioner delinquent was examined as W.W.1 and Exs.W-1 to W-4 were marked. Thereafter, the other issues for consideration in the main matter were framed in the light of the further arguments made by the parties. The points for consideration are as follows: (1) Whether the petitioner is a workman under Sec.2(s) of the I.D. Act? (2) Whether the punishment of dismissal is proper and correct? (3) Whether the petitioner is entitled to claim benefit under Sec.11-A of the I.D. Act? (4) To what relief?
The points for consideration are as follows: (1) Whether the petitioner is a workman under Sec.2(s) of the I.D. Act? (2) Whether the punishment of dismissal is proper and correct? (3) Whether the petitioner is entitled to claim benefit under Sec.11-A of the I.D. Act? (4) To what relief? (g) After considering the evidence let in before the Labour Court as well as the materials placed before the Enquiry Officer and the enquiry report, the Labour Court held that the petitioner is not a workman as defined under Sec.2(s) of the I.D.Act. It further held that the materials available on record disclosed that the petitioner was acting as a broker to collect money from the customers for and on behalf of the Motor Vehicles Inspector as well as for himself and that the non-employment of the petitioner is justified and consequently, he would not be entitled to claim benefit under Sec.11-A of the I.D. Act, through the award dated 16.8.1991. Subsequently, the said award was published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette dated 2.10.1991.“ 3. Having aggrieved over this award, the petitioner has filed this writ petition seeking for the issue of a writ of certiorari by quashing the said award published in the Gazette. 4. Mr.Prakash, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr.Balasubramanian for the first respondent-Management have been heard at length. 5. Though several grounds are raised in the affidavit which accompanied the writ petition, Mr.Praksh, the learned counsel for the petitioner would vehemently argue with reference to the violation of principles of natural justice by having denied the right to have the assistance of a lawyer to defend the case of the petitioner during the course of enquiry. 6. The gist of the arguments in relation to the above point is extracted below: ”The first presenting officer is Mr.K.B.Radhakrishnan, M.A. B.L., the Personnel Manager and the subsequent presenting officer is Mr.K.Manivannan, M.A., B.L., the Deputy Personnel Manager. Both the persons pitted against the workman are well qualified. The petitioner asked for the assistance of a lawyer before the commencement of the enquiry. But, this was not recorded by the Enquiry Officer in the enquiry proceedings. In any event, in the explanation sent by the petitioner to the second show cause notice, the petitioner specifically stated that he was prevented from engaging a professional man in the enquiry, in violation of law.
But, this was not recorded by the Enquiry Officer in the enquiry proceedings. In any event, in the explanation sent by the petitioner to the second show cause notice, the petitioner specifically stated that he was prevented from engaging a professional man in the enquiry, in violation of law. This aspect of the explanation to the second show cause notice has not been controverted in the discharge order dated 6.12.1984 passed by the Management. The Labour Court also did not consider this aspect, while dealing with the validity of the domestic enquiry. In any event, assuming that the petitioner did not make such a request, the Enquiry Officer has a duty to inform the petitioner about his right to engage a counsel when he very well knew that his superiors who acted as presenting officers were Law Graduates. This failure in giving such an opportunity to engage a professional man or inaction of the Enquiry Officer in this regard is fatal to the proceedings. Consequently, the writ petition has to be allowed.“ 7. Mr.Balasubramanian, the learned counsel appearing for the first respondent Management would urge the following contentions by way of reply: ”The petitioner never asked for the assistance of a lawyer either before the commencement of the enquiry or during the enquiry proceedings. Rule 19(a) of the Standing Orders for Employees of T.V.Sundaram Iyengar and Sons Limited would provide for the procedure to be followed, while conducting the enquiry against the delinquent with regard to his misconduct. Under Rule 19(a)(vi), no outsider will be permitted to take part or help the person charged in the enquiry. However, if the employee charged desires and makes a request, the Enquiry Officer shall permit the assistance of any other employee of the company. As per this rule, in the present case, the Enquiry Officer asked at the time of commencement of the enquiry, whether he would require the help of any co-worker or any official of the Union during the course of enquiry and the petitioner replied that he did not require the service of anybody and he himself would conduct the enquiry. After recording this statement, the Enquiry Officer commenced the proceedings and allowed the delinquent to cross-examine all the witnesses produced by the Management. Furthermore, the charges are simple and as such, the assistance of a lawyer is not necessary.
After recording this statement, the Enquiry Officer commenced the proceedings and allowed the delinquent to cross-examine all the witnesses produced by the Management. Furthermore, the charges are simple and as such, the assistance of a lawyer is not necessary. In the absence of any rule providing for the assistance of an outsider, that too, a lawyer and in the absence of any specific request regarding the same, the contention of the counsel for the petitioner that the assistance of a lawyer was not given and therefore, the entire proceedings would be vitiated, cannot be considered to be a valid submission. Moreover, this aspect also has been considered by the Management by referring about the same in the discharge order and the same was elaborately dealt with by the Labour Court in the order dated 31.10.1990. Therefore, the contention of the counsel for the petitioner has to fail. Both the Enquiry Officer and the Labour Court considered the materials and held that the charges are proved. This factual finding may not be disturbed by this Court by invoking Art.226 of the Constitution.“ 8. The counsel for both parties would cite several authorities in support of their respective pleas. 9. In the light of the rival contentions, it has to be decided as to whether the petitioner has been given proper opportunity to defend his case in accordance with the relevant rules and settled law in the light of the judgments of various High Courts and the Apex Court in relation to the adherence of the principles of natural justice. 10. Before we launch discussion over this aspect, it would be appropriate, at this stage, to reiterate few facts, which would be more relevant. 11. The petitioner during the relevant time was working as an Assistance in the Sales Department of the Pondicherry Branch of the first respondent, the Management. He was responsible for helping the customers in taking delivery of the vehicles from the Regional Office of M/s.Ashok Leyland Limited and giving them assistance for registering the vehicles. For rendering such assistance, he was not expected to receive any money other than the actual registration charges and quarterly tax from the customers. 12. Reports were received even in the beginning of 1983 that he was receiving extra money from the customers in the guise of registration purpose, contrary to the prescribed procedure.
For rendering such assistance, he was not expected to receive any money other than the actual registration charges and quarterly tax from the customers. 12. Reports were received even in the beginning of 1983 that he was receiving extra money from the customers in the guise of registration purpose, contrary to the prescribed procedure. On receipt of complaints from several customers, the Deputy Sales Manager, Head Office, Madurai, was sent to Pondicherry to investigate the matter. Accordingly, he went and found that the petitioner was receiving extra money in the guise of registration expenses from the parties. 13. In his report, the said Manager stated that the petitioner told him that the quantum of Rs.1,000 which was to be given to the Regional Transport Office for each vehicle was reduced to Rs.500 at his instance. Therefore, he was warned against receiving extra money and his role was only to help the customers for getting the registration of the vehicles in the normal course. But, still further complaints were received by the Management. Therefore, one T.Deenan, Assistant of the Vehicles Sales Department, was sent for investigation. The said person went and investigated and gave the report stating that the petitioner was continuing to receive extra money. Therefore, he was posted to Madurai. 14. On the basis of the complaints from several customers regarding his bad conduct at Pondicherry, charge memo was issued to him framing charges for having received money from customers unauthorisedly, thereby acting against the interests of the Company. 15. On receipt of the charge memo dated 23.5.1983, he sent a reply dated 28.5.1983 denying the charges. Thereafter, domestic enquiry commenced on 27.7.1983. The said enquiry went on several hearings and ultimately, concluded on 12.6.1984. During the course of enquiry, six witnesses produced by the Management were examined and seven exhibits were marked on their side. 16. Before the commencement of the enquiry, the charge memo was read over to the petitioner and the procedure of enquiry was explained to him. He admitted having understood the same. Thereafter, the enquiry officer asked as to whether he requires the help of any co-worker or any official of the Union to help him during the course of enquiry. For that, he replied that he himself would conduct the enquiry and would not require the service of anybody. This question and answer was recorded on 27.7.1983. The following is the relevant extract.
For that, he replied that he himself would conduct the enquiry and would not require the service of anybody. This question and answer was recorded on 27.7.1983. The following is the relevant extract. 17. Thereafter, the six witnesses produced by the Management were examined and cross-examined on various dates. E.R.Kittu Krishnan, Sales Manager of T.V.S. Vehicles Sales Department, Madurai who was examined as W-1, was examined in chief by the Management representative on 5.9.1983. He was cross-examined by the petitioner on 5.9.1983 and 7.9.1983 at length. W-2, S.Rangarajan, Deputy Sales Manager was examined in chief on 14.9.1983. He was cross-examined on 19.9.1983 by the petition in detail. T.Dheenan, Assistance Vehicles Sales Department of Madurai Branch was chief examined as W-3 on 26.9.1983. He was subjected to thorough cross-examination by the petitioner on 29.9.1983. One G.V.Sethuraman, Sales Officer, Salem Branch, who was W-4 was examined in chief on 12.10.1983. He was cross-examined by the petitioner on 18.10.1983 at great length. W-5, one Chellamuthu, Proprietor of K.M.S. Transport, Bhavani was examined in chief on 31.10.1983. He was cross-examined by the petitioner on 25.11.1983. The next witness one Ramachandran, who was examined as W-6 was examined in chief on 13.3.1984. He was also thoroughly cross-examined on 15.3.1984 by the petitioner. After the Management side is over on 15.3.1984, on 17.4.1984, the petitioner was examined in chief. He gave deposition on 17.4.1984, 18.4.1984, 2.5.1984, 3.5.1984, 9.5.1984, 30.5.1984 and 7.6.1984. Ultimately, the enquiry was closed on 12.6.1984. After finishing the enquiry, the Enquiry Officer sent a report dated 19.9.1984. 18. I have gone through the enquiry proceedings and the enquiry report. 19. As per the endorsement dated 27.7.1983, contained in the enquiry proceedings, it is seen that a specific question had been but by the Enquiry Officer as to whether he would require help of co-employee or any other person from Union to assist him in the enquiry, as provided in Rule 19(a)(vi) of the Standing Orders for Employees of T.V.Sundaram Iyengar and Sons Limited. He would specifically state that he did not require any help and he himself would conduct and defend his case. 20. The further reading of the enquiry proceedings upto closure of the enquiry would not reveal that any such request was made by the petitioner seeking for the assistance of a lawyer or a professional man to help him.
He would specifically state that he did not require any help and he himself would conduct and defend his case. 20. The further reading of the enquiry proceedings upto closure of the enquiry would not reveal that any such request was made by the petitioner seeking for the assistance of a lawyer or a professional man to help him. As a matter of fact, all the six witnesses produced by the Management have been cross-examined by the petitioner at length in a most meticulous way. 21. The perusal of the proceedings would further reveal that during the course of enquiry, the petitioner wrote letter to the Enquiry Officer, namely, Exs.M-12, M-14 and M-16, requesting for production of various documents. In these letters also, no such request was made. As indicated above, the enquiry went on for a period of one year. During this period, the petitioner has never asked for the assistance of a lawyer. 22. But, it is seen from the records that only in the reply dated 29.10.1984 to the second show cause notice, in pursuance of the enquiry report, the petitioner in the last para incidentally would refer as follows: “I was also prevented from engaging a professional man in violation of law.” In the earlier paragraphs numbering 55, he never whispered anything about this aspect. 23. On a perusal of the lengthy cross-examination and the contention raised in the reply dated 28.5.1893 for the first show cause notice and the reply dated 29.10.1984 for the second show cause notice would clearly show that the petitioner is experienced in trying to meet every one of the points mentioned in the show cause notices and the enquiry report. But, it is quite unfortunate to raise before this Court that this aspect has not been controverted by the Management in the discharge order, while this is factually incorrect. 24. The relevant portion of the discharge order referring about this aspect is given below: “Your further contention that you were prevented from engaging a professional man is also not true. As per the enquiry proceedings, it is seen that you had not asked for or availed the assistance of any professional man in the enquiry. The contention is merely an after thought.
As per the enquiry proceedings, it is seen that you had not asked for or availed the assistance of any professional man in the enquiry. The contention is merely an after thought. As a matter of fact you have categorically stated at the commencement of the enquiry that you do not want the assistance of anybody else and that you shall defend yourself.” 25. Similarly, it is mentioned in the grounds of the writ petition that this aspect has not been taken into consideration by the Labour Court, which is again incorrect, inasmuch as the Labour Court has considered this aspect elaborately and held against the petitioner in the order dated 31.10.1990. 26. One more vital feature, at this stage, shall be noticed. The main point urged by the counsel for the petitioner relating to the failure to give opportunity to engage a lawyer for assistance is the point of issue raised before the Labour Court and on the basis of which, the Labour Court was requested to take it as a preliminary point, in order to decide whether the domestic enquiry was conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice. 27. Therefore, even before going into the credibility of the materials, the Labour Court would deal with this aspect and pass an order on 31.10.1990 holding that the request to engage a lawyer stated to have been refused was not at all made and in fact, the petitioner had been permitted to engage a co-employee or any official from the Union to assist him and therefore, the enquiry was conducted in a fair manner by adhering to the principles of natural justice. 28. Though separate order has been passed dealing with this question as early as 31.10.1990 the petitioner has not chosen to challenge this order. On the order hand, on the very same date, that is, on 31.10.1990, the Labour Court adjourned the matter to 29.11.1990 for producing further materials for considering the other issues raised in the main matter and thereafter, the petitioner examined himself as W.W.1 and market Exs.W-1 to W-4 and after conducting further enquiry, the Labour Court passed a final award on 16.8.1991. 29. On the basis of this award, the Government, published the award in Gazette on 2.10.1991. This writ petition is only against the order dated 16.8.1991 published in the Gazette dated 2.10.1991.
29. On the basis of this award, the Government, published the award in Gazette on 2.10.1991. This writ petition is only against the order dated 16.8.1991 published in the Gazette dated 2.10.1991. But, even then in this writ petition, the main point urged, as already indicated above, is with reference to the failure to give opportunity to the petitioner to get the assistance of a lawyer. 30. As a matter of fact, all the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner have been referred to and considered by the Labour Court, which would conclude that those decisions would not be of any use to the petitioner, in the light of the facts of the present case, by the order dated 31.10.1990. 31. On the strength of the very same decisions, the learned counsel for the petitioner would reiterate before this Court that he had asked for the permission to engage a lawyer before the Enquiry Officer, who refused and failed to record the same and that even assuming that the petitioner has not made such a request, the Enquiry Officer had a duty to inform the petitioner about his right to engage counsel when the Presenting Officers were Law Graduates and that the failure on the part of the Enquiry Officer in his duty to inform the petitioner about his right would vitiate the enquiry proceedings, in the light of the decisions cited by him. 32. Let us now refer to the decisions. 33. In Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, (1983)2 L.L.J.1, the Supreme Court would observe as follows: “If the Department had appointed a Presenting Officer, if a co-delinquent had an officer to defend him, to afford appellant, a CLass IV semi-literate Forest Guard, a reasonable opportunity to defend himself, justice and fair play demand that the Inquiry Officer should have enquiry from the appellant whether he would like to engage someone to defend him. Rules permit such permission being asked for and granted in such circumstances.” 34. In the above case, the Supreme Court would clearly hold that the Inquiry Officer, as per rules, should enquire from the delinquent whether he would like to engage someone to defend him. In the present case, as required by the rules, the Enquiry Officer on 27.7.1983 asked the delinquent the very same question.
In the above case, the Supreme Court would clearly hold that the Inquiry Officer, as per rules, should enquire from the delinquent whether he would like to engage someone to defend him. In the present case, as required by the rules, the Enquiry Officer on 27.7.1983 asked the delinquent the very same question. However, as pointed out, the delinquent/petitioner said that he would himself conduct his case. 35. The Supreme Court in the above division would further observe as follows: “If after this information is conveyed to the delinquent Government servant, he still chooses to proceed with the inquiry without obtaining assistance, one can say there is substantial compliance with the rules.” 36. Therefore, in the light of the above observations, in the present case, the relevant rule has been substantially complied with. 37. In Board of Trustees, Port of Bombay v. Dilipkumar, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 109, the Apex Court would hold thus: “Where in an enquiry before a domestic tribunal the delinquent officer is pitted against a legally trained mind, if he seeks permission to appear through a legal practitioner the refusal to grant this request would amount to denial of a reasonable request to defend himself and the essential principles of natural justice would be violated.” 38. This is a case where the delinquent asked for permission to engage a lawyer which was refused by the Enquiry Officer, even though the legally trained persons are the presenting officers. In the instant case, the first Presenting Officer one K.B.Radhakrishnan, Personnel Manager working in the Head Office conducted the Management side till his date of retirement and from 25.11.1983 one K.Manivannan, Deputy Personnel Manager took over the same in the enquiry. There is no material to show that they were legally trained minds. 39. Furthermore, the petitioner, who had finished his school final in 1958, joined the service in the Management in 1959. Admittedly, both the Presenting Officers were working in the Department. If the delinquent felt that he was pitted against the legally trained minds, he should have asked for permission to engage a layer. 40. On the contrary, as noted above, he stated before the Enquiry Officer, he did not want anybody and he himself would conduct his case.
Admittedly, both the Presenting Officers were working in the Department. If the delinquent felt that he was pitted against the legally trained minds, he should have asked for permission to engage a layer. 40. On the contrary, as noted above, he stated before the Enquiry Officer, he did not want anybody and he himself would conduct his case. As stated above, the way in which the petitioner gave detailed reply to the show cause notice and the manner in which all the six witnesses have been cross-examined at length clearly show that the petitioner is so experienced, thorough in case particulars and an effective cross-examiner. Therefore, the above decision also would not be of any use. 41. In Pushpa Iyengar v. Indian Airlines Corporation and others, (1988)1 L.L.J. 385 , the following observation has been made: “If a delinquent employee is unable to get the assistance of a co-employee to defend him/her, there is no use of relying on the Standing Order 32 which allows such representation. At times of distress, it may be difficult to get a single friend. Inability to get a friend to defend and to match the presenting officers appointed by the employer would create an imbalance and result in violation of Art.14 of the Constitution of India. If in a given case the delinquent has no friends in the Corporation, as will happen to a newly recruited person, or is unable to secure a person who would be a match to the presenting officer appointed by the Corporation, then the delinquent should be given permission for representation by a lawyer to be defended in the domestic enquiry.“ 42. In the said case, the delinquent employee was unable to get the assistance of a co-employee. Therefore, when the delinquent requested for a lawyer, the permission should be given for representation through a lawyer to be defended in the domestic enquiry. The facts of that case would not apply to the present case because the specific question was asked whether he would require assistance from a co-employee and he said no assistance is required from anybody. 43.
The facts of that case would not apply to the present case because the specific question was asked whether he would require assistance from a co-employee and he said no assistance is required from anybody. 43. Moreover, in the said decision, paragraph 17 would give answer for the contention urged by the counsel for the petitioner, which is as under: ”Hence, if a rule has been enacted prohibiting participation of a outsider (legal practitioner), but at the same time extending an opportunity of being defended by a co-employee, then it cannot be said that there is a denial of principles of natural justice (sic.) if what are contemplated occasion, when enquiries are held.“ 44. Therefore, the above decision also would not, in any way, help the petitioner and on the other hand, it supports the view of the Labour Court. As stated above, since the opportunity afforded by the Enquiry Officer as per the rules was not availed of, it cannot be said that there is a denial of principles of natural justice. 45. Now, let us refer to the other decisions cited by the counsel for the respondent-Management with reference to the above aspect. 46. In A.Veeman v. Paramakudi C.U.B. Ltd. and another, (1990)1 L.L.J. 395 , this Court would hold as follows: ”In a domestic enquiry, the workman could not, as of inherent right, insist on taking the assistance of a legal practitioner though it is to be ensured that he does not stand a disadvantage and there is no breach of the rule of fair play.“ 47. In H.Srivastav v. UCO., Bank and another, (1997)2 L.L.J. 620 , it is held thus: ”As per Rule 19.12 of the Bi-Partite Settlement, the permission to defend himself with the assistance of the Advocate is one of the options to be given by the Bank. We have perused the charge sheet in the enquiry now sought to be proceeded against the petitioner. The allegations are very simple and they are not complicated. Under these circumstances, we do not think that the failure to permit the petitioner to engage an Advocate is violative of the principles of natural justice.“ 48.
We have perused the charge sheet in the enquiry now sought to be proceeded against the petitioner. The allegations are very simple and they are not complicated. Under these circumstances, we do not think that the failure to permit the petitioner to engage an Advocate is violative of the principles of natural justice.“ 48. In Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Ltd. v. Ram Naresh Tripathi, (1993)1 L.L.J. 907 , the Full Bench of the Apex Court would hold as follows: ”It is, therefore, clear from the above case law that the right to be represented through counsel or agent can be restricted, controlled or regulated by statute, rules, regulations or Standing Orders. A delinquent has no right to be represented through counsel or agent unless the law specifically confers such a right. The requirement of the rule of natural justice insofar as the delinquent’s right of hearing is concerned, cannot and does not extend to a right to be represented through counsel or agent.“ 49. In the light of the above principles, I am of the view that the Enquiry Officer complied with the provisions contemplated under Rule 19(a)(vi) of the Standing Orders and from the beginning the attitude of the delinquent, as found in the record, would show that he himself wanted to conduct the case and he never felt difficulty in cross-examining the witnesses produced by the Management and in giving the detailed reply to the second show cause notice in the matter of proposed punishment. 50. Under these circumstances, the contention of the petitioner that there is violation of principles of natural justice by not having given an opportunity to engage a lawyer to defend his case, does not deserve acceptance and therefore, it has to fail. 51. Furthermore, on going through the enquiry report dated 19.9.1984 and the Labour Court award dated 16.8.1991, it is clear that both the forums have discussed the oral evidence of the six witnesses produced by the Management and documents filed by both parties during the course of enquiry and the oral evidence of W.W-1 and the documentary evidence of Exs.W-1 and W-4 and Exs.M-1 to M-44 adduced before the Labour Court, in a more detailed manner and correctly concluded that the charges have been proved. 52.
52. Even before this Court, the learned counsel for the petitioner would not say that the charges are false and on the other hand, it is argued that the petitioner had only helped the customers in getting the registration soon by satisfying the Motor Vehicles Inspector through “speed money” and that he never had any money for himself. 53. The above submission on the basis of the deposition of the delinquent before the Enquiry Officer itself would show that the petitioner was acting as a ‘speed broker’ between the customers and the Motor Vehicles Inspector, who ‘speedily’ registered the vehicle for ‘speedy’ use of the vehicle on getting the ‘speed money’. 54. However, it shall be mentioned that the enquiry conducted by the Enquiry Officer was not so ‘speedy’, since the Enquiry Officer gave full opportunity to the delinquent by adjourning the matter to several dates and ultimately, it took one year for the disposal of the enquiry. 55. As stated above, the enquiry commenced on 30.6.1983 and it was concluded only on 12.6.1984 and the enquiry report was submitted on 19.9.1984 and after observing formalities, the Management passed the discharge order on 6.12.1984. After two years the petitioner filed claim petition before the Labour Court, Madurai and the same was taken on file in I.D.No.34 of 1986 and it took four years to finish the enquiry and ultimately, the Labour Court passed the award on 16.8.1991 confirming the order of discharge. 56. In view of the above situation, I am of the opinion that, enough opportunity was given by both the Enquiry Officer and the Labour Court and ultimately, the charge framed against the delinquent in 1983 relating to the ‘speed money’ was held to be proved by the award passed by the Labour Court in the year 1991. 57. It is settled law that in a writ of certiorari under Art.226 of the Constitution for quashing an award of an Industrial Tribunal, the jurisdiction of the High Court is limited. It can quash the award only when the Tribunal has committed an error of law apparent on the face of the record or when the finding of facts of the Tribunal is perverse.
It can quash the award only when the Tribunal has committed an error of law apparent on the face of the record or when the finding of facts of the Tribunal is perverse. But, I am not able to hold, in view of the discussion made above, that there is an error of law apparent on the face of the record or the findings of facts of the Labour Court are perverse. 58. Under these circumstances, I do not find any merit in the writ petition. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed and the order of discharge passed by the Management as upheld by the Labour Court is sustained. No costs.