Judgment :- R. JAYASIMHA BABU, J. The husband is before us claiming a right to divorce his wife who is presently living away from him with his two minor children, on the ground that she deserted him, and that she also acted cruelly while she lived with him prior to the desertion. 2. The learned Judge of the Family Court has disbelieved the alleged cruel acts. It was found that no one was examined to speak to those acts. The alleged cruel acts were the use of abusive language by the wife to the husband. The wife had denied having used any such abusive language. No one was examined in support of the assertion that she as a matter of course made the life of the petitioner miserable by use of such language during the time she lived with him. 3. The other ground is one of desertion. The alleged desertion took place in June. 1992. The wife has averred and has also given evidence that in the husbands household, besides the husband, the mother and widowed sister were also living, and those two ladies had ill-treated the respondent-wife making her life so miserable as to force her to leave the matrimonial home with her two small children, the younger one being a baby, of six months. She has averred and also stated before the court that she is more than willing to rejoin her husband and live with him. She has in fact filed a separate petition for restitution of conjugal rights, wherein also, she has categorically expressed her desire to live with her husband. 4. It is stand of the husband that the house in which he lives is his own, that he has a duty to take care of his mother and widowed sister, and cannot abandon them. He is, therefore, unwilling to establish a separate residence with his wife and two children. It is, however, on record that he is in a transferable service. Counsel for the appellant, at the Bar, did not dispute the fact that in case of transfer, the appellant must necessarily live away from his own house at Madras, and for that purpose, he has necessarily to occupy an accommodation either owned by the Government or taken on rent privately. It was submitted before us by the counsel for the appellant that the appellant had in fact been transferred to Namakkal. It was submitted before us by the counsel for the appellant that the appellant had in fact been transferred to Namakkal. Even on such transfer, the appellant made no attempt at all to call his wife and two small children to live with him. The conduct of the husband certainly does not disclose any genuine desire to take care of his wife and his two small children. The excuse put forward that he cannot abandon his mother and his widowed sister appears to be only intended to keep the wife away from the matrimonial home. 5. The woman, on marriage is entitled to look forward to happy matrimonial home with her husband, although in many instances, the home to which she goes on marriage may have other inmates such as the relatives of the husband. The husband cannot on that score alone ill-treat or allow the ill-treatment to his wife and fail to protect the wife and his own children. When life in those conditions becomes intolerable, the wife cannot be faulted, if she insists on the establishment of a separate matrimonial home for her own peace of mind and for the sake of her family, especially when there are children born out of that wedlock. 6. Learned Judge of the Family Court has rightly held that the wife in this case had good reason to be away from the petitioners home, in view of the conduct of the petitioners mother and widowed sister which had made life in this household intolerable. 7. The efforts made by the petitioner to bring back the wife and minor children appear to be ‘nil’. 8. Before us, learned counsel submitted that there are contradictions in the way in which the respondent has pleaded her case by way of defence to the divorce petition, and the way she pleaded her case in her petition for restitution of conjugal rights. The minor discrepancies, if any, cannot be the foundation for disbelieving the case of the wife altogether. We find on perusal of the pleadings that the wife has uniformly expressed her willingness to live with her husband. It is the husband who has refused to resume co-habitation with the wife in a separate matrimonial home. 9. In the absence of mutual consent, under the law as it now stands, divorce can be claimed only on establishing wrong doing on the part of the other spouse. It is the husband who has refused to resume co-habitation with the wife in a separate matrimonial home. 9. In the absence of mutual consent, under the law as it now stands, divorce can be claimed only on establishing wrong doing on the part of the other spouse. We cannot, on the evidence placed before us, hold the wife to be guilty of desertion, so as to entitle the husband to a decree for divorce. The husband cannot by his own conduct create a situation where co-habitation is made impossible, also refuse to obey a decree for restitution of conjugal rights, and thereafter claim right to secure decree for divorce based on his own attitude and stubborn refusal to co-habitation with the wife. 10. The petition for divorce was, therefore, rightly dismissed by the learned Judge of the Family Court. We affirm the dismissal. 11. So far as the petition for restitution of conjugal rights is concerned, the learned Judge has found on evidence that the wife was willing to co-habit but it is the husband who refused to do so. Even before us, counsel for the wife submitted that the wife is ready and willing to rejoin her husband, but that she should have a separate home away from the mother and widowed sister of the petitioner. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, such a desire on her part cannot be said to be so grossly unreasonable as to amount to either cruel conduct or exhibiting total lack of bona fides in her claim that she is willing to live with her husband. We do not find any good ground to interfere with the decree granted by the Family Court for restitution of conjugal rights. The appeal against that decree, is therefore, dismissed. 12. In the result, both the appeals are dismissed. Consequently, C.M.P. No. 17016 of 1999 is dismissed.