Judgment : The petitioners have filed this writ petition for the issue of a writ of certiorarified mandamus to call for the records relating to the order dated 29. 1990 in preliminary orders passed in W.E.A.No.10/88/E5/Mds of the first respondent herein and to quash the same. 2. From the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, the petitioners would contend that they are the mother and son and that respondents 2 and 3 have filed W.A.No.10 of 1988 before the first respondent alleging certain misdeeds in respect of a small wakf and the preliminary objection filed by the petitioners, was not accepted by the first respondent, hence this writ petition; that the preliminary objection raised before the first respondent was a question of res judicata. .3. The further averments of the writ petition are that respondents 2 and 3 are the paternal grand children of one Haji Syed Ismail who founded the wakf called “Haji Syed Ismail Wakf Estate”; that according to respondents 2 and 3, the said persons dedicated the house bearing door No.19, Thayar Sahib Street, Mount Road, Madras, with the object of celebrating Gyarveen in memory of Hazarath Mohdeen Abdul Khader Jeelani and for feeding the poor on the occasion; that when the said property was sold in court auction, the paternal grandfather of respondents 2 and 3, Syed Yousuf purchased the same in the year 1923; that the petitioners would submit that the property being a wakf property, the same could not have been sold in the court auction and no original document creating the wakf has surfaced so far. 4. The case of respondents 2 and 3 according to the writ petitioners that the purchaser once again dedicated the property to the wakf as for the same object; that the first petitioner herein had been mismanaging the wakf and unauthorisedly residing in the said house without paying any rent and removing the Muthavallis, that the respondents 2 and 3 should be appointed as trustees. 5. The further case as put up by the petitioners is that the father of respondents 2 and 3, one Syed Saudduddin who is still alive, filed a similar petition with identical allegations in W.A.No.12 of 1984 before the Wakf Board and the same was dismissed by an order dated 10. 5. The further case as put up by the petitioners is that the father of respondents 2 and 3, one Syed Saudduddin who is still alive, filed a similar petition with identical allegations in W.A.No.12 of 1984 before the Wakf Board and the same was dismissed by an order dated 10. 1987; that on such dismissal of his petition at his instigations, his son and daughter, viz., respondents 2 and 3. have filed the petition in W.A.No.10 of 1988 and the petitioners objected to the same on the principles of res judicata. Besides this preliminary point, the petitioners also contested the petition on merits. However, the preliminary point was taken up for consideration by the first respondent and an order was passed on 29. 1990 thereby dismissing the preliminary objection on untenable grounds posting the main petition for being decided on merits. 6. The petitioners would further allege that their fore-fathers had been traditionally performing certain charities, which are being followed by the petitioners for which there cannot be any documentary evidence; that the order of the first respondent is totally against all legal principles and the principles of natural justice and fair play and the same is liable to be quashed. 7. The petitioners would further allege that their fore-fathers had been traditionally performing certain charities, which are being followed by the petitioners for which there cannot be any documentary evidence; that the order of the first respondent is totally against all legal principles and the principles of natural justice and fair play and the same is liable to be quashed. 7. Inthe counter-affidavit filed by respondents 2 and 3, what comes to be known is that the Wakf has valuable property amounting to Rs.50 lakhs which as originally purchased by their grand-father and dedicated to the Wakf for the performance of ‘Gyariveen’ in memory of the Saint Hazarath Mohideen Abdul Khaderi Jeelani and for feeding the poor; that when the property was brought for sale on court auction, it was their paternal grand-father who purchased and rededicated the same to the Wakf; that the petitioners did not comply with the directions of the Wakf Board regarding the tenants and causing detriment and loss to the Wakf; that the petitioners occupied large extent of the Wakf property without payment of any rent; that there is conflict of interest between the petitioners and the Wakf; that the respondents are genuinely interested in the efficient management of the Wakf which was dedicated by their grand-father and hence they seek to remove the petitioners in the interest of the Wakf; that it is let open to any person interested in the Wakf to seek the removal of a delinquent Muthavalli, like the petitioners; that the principles of res judicata cannot be invoked since the court action does not revolve on the same issue and thus the respondents would ultimately pray for the dismissal of the writ petition. .8. .8. With the claims made on the part of the petitioners herein as per the pleadings, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would not only emphasize on the pleadings of the petition, but also would say that the order passed in the petition filed by the father of the respondents is the final order and the father is very well alive; that what the father failed to achieve in his petition in the year 1983, the son and daughter tried to achieve the same in their petition of the year 1988; that Secs.42, 43 and 44 of the Wakf Act, 1954 are relevant to the present case; that as per their own pleading before the Wakf Board, they allege in para.4 of the affidavit that for 20 years in the past, these petitioners were not carrying on the charity and this petition having been filed in the year 1988, it goes back by 20 yeas within which period, the allegation of mismanagement levelled against the petitioners by the respondents’ father having got dismissed, what is the effect if these petitioners also go on adding petitions of allegations of this naturee 9. The learned counsel continuing to argue on the point of res judicata, would lay emphasis on Sec.11, Explanation (viii) of the C.P.C. which is the recent amendment of the year 1978. At this juncture, the learned counsel would cite a judgment of the Apex Court delivered in M/s.Raag Rang v. General Manager, Delhi Telephones M/s.Raag Rang v. General Manager, Delhi Telephones M/s.Raag Rang v. General Manager, Delhi Telephones A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 2652 wherein it is held: “Admittedly, there is a finding recorded by the Deputy Registrar upholding the misconduct of the petitioner. That constitutes res judicata, No doubt, Sec.11, C.P.C. does not in terms apply because it is not a court, but a tribunal, constituted under the Societies Act is given special jurisdiction. So, the principle laid down thereunder mutatis mutandis squarely applies to the procedure provided under the Act. It operates as res judicata. That constitutes res judicata, No doubt, Sec.11, C.P.C. does not in terms apply because it is not a court, but a tribunal, constituted under the Societies Act is given special jurisdiction. So, the principle laid down thereunder mutatis mutandis squarely applies to the procedure provided under the Act. It operates as res judicata. Thus, we find that the High Court is well justified in holding that the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to decide the dispute once over and the reference itself is bad in law.” The other judgment reported by the learned counsel is one delivered in Church of South India Trust Association v. Telugu Church Council Church of South India Trust Association v. Telugu Church Council Church of South India Trust Association v. Telugu Church Council (1996)2 S.C.C. 520 wherein it is held: “While construing Sec.11 of the present Code, we must bear in mind that the rule of res judicata is founded on considerations of public policy and that it is in the interest of the public at large that a finality should attach to the binding decisions pronounced by courts of competent jurisdiction and that it is also in the public interest that individuals should not be vexed twice over with the same kind of litigation. (See: Daryao v. State of U.P. Daryao v. State of U.P. Daryao v. State of U.P. (1962)1 S.C.R. 574 . The amendments that have been introduced in the present Code by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, indicate an intention on the part of the Legislature to enlarge the field of applicability of the rule of res judicata contained in Sec.11. In this regard, it may be mentioned that in its Fifty-fourth Report on the present Code. The Law Commission has expressed the view that the existence of the conditions regarding the competence of the court to try the subsequent suit to a certain extent detracts from the finality of the judgments and gives rise to a certain amount of multiplicity of proceedings. The Law Commission has expressed the view that the existence of the conditions regarding the competence of the court to try the subsequent suit to a certain extent detracts from the finality of the judgments and gives rise to a certain amount of multiplicity of proceedings. According to the Law Commission, the problem is inherent in co-existence of the courts with limited or unlimited jurisdiction and that it can be solved if a court of limited jurisdiction is required to submit the case to the District Court - which is a court of unlimited jurisdiction - whenever the former is satisfied that the suit involves a question of such a nature that if a suit had been brought for relief based principally on that question, the court would have been incompetent to try the suit. The Law Commission suggested the insertion of Sec.23-A making a provision on these lines. The Law Commission also recommended that the principle of res judicata should be applied to the situations of proceedings in execution and independent proceedings and recommended insertion of Sec.11-A for the that purpose. Instead of inserting Secs.11-A and 23-A the Joint Committee of Parliament suggested insertion of Explanations to Sec.11 and, on the basis of the said report, Explanations VII and VIII have been inserted in Sec.11 by then C.P.C. (Amendment) Act, 1976. By Explanation VII the provisions of Sec.11 have been made applicable to a proceeding for execution of a decree. Explanation VIII which has a bearing on the question under consideration provides as under: ”Explanation VIII: An issue heard and finally decided by a court of limited jurisdiction competent to decide such issue, shall operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit, notwithstanding that such court of limited jurisdiction was not competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised.” “Earlier there was a conflict of views among the High Courts on the meaning of expression “a court of limited Jurisdiction” in Explanation VIII. The Calcutta High Court in Nabin Majhi v. Tela Majhi A.I.R. 1978 Cal. 440 had taken the view that the expression “a court of limited jurisdiction” in Explanation VIII means the courts other than ordinary Civil Courts and refers to Revenue Courts, Land Acquisition Courts, Administrative Courts, Insolvency courts, Guardianship courts, Probate Courts, etc. Which are trying certain specific matters. The Calcutta High Court in Nabin Majhi v. Tela Majhi A.I.R. 1978 Cal. 440 had taken the view that the expression “a court of limited jurisdiction” in Explanation VIII means the courts other than ordinary Civil Courts and refers to Revenue Courts, Land Acquisition Courts, Administrative Courts, Insolvency courts, Guardianship courts, Probate Courts, etc. Which are trying certain specific matters. The High Courts of Kerala, Orissa and Madras placed a wider construction on the said expression and held that it includes limited pecuniary jurisdiction also. The said conflict has now been resolved by this Court in Sulochana Amma v. Narayanan Nair (1994)2 S.C.C. 14 wherein agreeing with the view of the High Courts of Kerala, Orissa and Madras, this Court had held that the expression “court of limited jurisdiction” would also cover a court of limited pecuniary jurisdiction.” “Explanation VIII thus removes the limitations that were placed on the principle of res judicata as applicable in India by the Privy Council in Missir Raghobardial v. Rajah Sheo Baksh Singh I.L.R. 9 Cal. 439. It would be rather incongruous to read a limitation in the applicability of the said principle by construing the competence of the court to mean that the court which has decided the earlier suit must have the territorial jurisdiction to try the subsequent suit. Such a construction would be running against the trend in the development of law in this field. We are, therefore of the opinion that Sec.11 of the present Code (excluding Explanation VIII) envisages that the judgment in a former suit would operate as a res judicata if the court which decided the said suit was competent to try the same by virtue of its pecuniary jurisdiction and the subject-matter to try the subsequent suit and that it is not necessary that the said court should have had territorial jurisdiction to decide the subsequent suit. On that view of the matter, it must be held that the judgment of the Madras High Court in O.S.A.No.20 of 1976 dated 9. On that view of the matter, it must be held that the judgment of the Madras High Court in O.S.A.No.20 of 1976 dated 9. 1976 arising out of second suit (O.S.No.107 of 1971) operates as res judicata inasmuch as Madras High Court had pecuniary jurisdiction as well as jurisdiction over the subject-matter to try the subsequent suit and it cannot be held that the said judgment does not operate as res judicata for the reason that the Madras High Court does not have territorial jurisdiction to try the subsequent suit relating to properties in Andhra Pradesh.” 10. The next judgment cited by the learned counsel is one delivered in Sulochana Amma v. Narayanan Nair A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 152 wherein it is held: “Sec.11 of C.P.C. embodies the rule of conclusiveness as evidence or bars as a plea of an issue tried in an earlier suit founded on a plaint in which the matter is directly and substantially in issue and became final. In a later suit between the same parties or their privies in a competent court to try such subsequent suit in which the issue has been directly and substantially raised and decided in the judgment and decree in the former suit would operate as res judicata.Sec.11 does not create any right or interest in the property, but merely operates as a bar to try the same issue once over. In other words, it aims to prevent multiplicity of the proceedings and accords finality to an issue, which directly and substantially had arisen in the former suit between the same parties or their privies, decided and became final, so that parties are not vexed twice over; vexatious litigation would be put to an end and the valuable time of the court is saved. It is based on public policy, as well as private justice. They would apply, therefore, to all judicial proceedings whether civil or otherwise. It equally applies to quasi-judicial proceedings of the tribunals other than the civil courts. 11. The next judgment cited by the learned counsel is one delivered in Mohan Lal v. Kartar Singh (1995)4 S.C.C. (Supp.) 684 wherein it is held: “So far a the facts of this case are concerned the case of the respondent was that he had obtained possession of the land under a voluntary surrender by the appellant. 11. The next judgment cited by the learned counsel is one delivered in Mohan Lal v. Kartar Singh (1995)4 S.C.C. (Supp.) 684 wherein it is held: “So far a the facts of this case are concerned the case of the respondent was that he had obtained possession of the land under a voluntary surrender by the appellant. It was also contended on his behalf that voluntary surrender of tenancy rights is not prohibited by the Act as already held by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Harnam Singh v. Dalip Singh , (1963)65 Punj L.R. 1133 (Punj.) and Hartej Bahadur Singh But in this case the surrender was disputed by the appellant. Therefore, the question which really arose before the Collector was whether there was a voluntary surrender of tenancy rights. For that reason the two decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent are of no help to him. Once it is held that the question whether the surrender was voluntary or not fell within the jurisdiction of the Collector, it will have to be further held that in view of the bar contained in Sec.47(2) Collectors decision on that point became final and could not have been called in question in the suit. In view of the bar contained in Sec.47(1) the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to consider the same. It is, therefore, not necessary to consider the alternate contention that the decision of the collector operated as res judicata in view of Explanation VIII to Sec.11 and to refer to the decision of this Court in Sulochana Amma v. Narayanan Nair (1994)2 S.C.C. 14 wherein it is held that an order or an issue which had arisen directly or substantially between the parties or their privies and decided finally by a competent court or tribunal, though of limited or special jurisdiction, will operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit or proceeding, notwithstanding the fact that such court of limited or special jurisdiction was not a competent court to try the subsequent suit.” 12. For the above said proposition of law, the learned counsel would cited the following judgments: (i) Kanizan v. Ghulam Nabi A.I.R. 1965 All. 296;(ii) Abdul Sobhan (iii) Corporation of Calcutta v. Sirajuddin A.I.R. 1957 Cal. 399; (iv) Aparnath v. Kamal Lal Aparnath v. Kamal Lal Aparnath v. Kamal Lal A.I.R. 1950 Cal. 300. For the above said proposition of law, the learned counsel would cited the following judgments: (i) Kanizan v. Ghulam Nabi A.I.R. 1965 All. 296;(ii) Abdul Sobhan (iii) Corporation of Calcutta v. Sirajuddin A.I.R. 1957 Cal. 399; (iv) Aparnath v. Kamal Lal Aparnath v. Kamal Lal Aparnath v. Kamal Lal A.I.R. 1950 Cal. 300. All the above judgments have been cited to prove the point that the whole question is the one raised by the father and the same having been decided, it reached finality. During the life time of the father since the son could derive title only from the father, the same question cannot be raised by the son again. The learned counsel would point out that the pith and substance of the claim is that it is hereditary. When the father is alive, when does the question of son and daughter filing another petition of the same nature would arise is up to the respondents to clarify. 13. In reply, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents would cite Sec.3(a) of the Wakf Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) wherein the meaning of the term “beneficiary” is given which is reproduced hereunder: “beneficiary” means a person or object for whose benefit a wakf is created and includes religious, pious and charitable objects and any other objects of public utility.” The learned counsel would clarify that according to the meaning of the term beneficiary irrespective of whether it is the father or son or daughter, they are the beneficiaries within the meaning of the above section; that Sec.44 of the Act provides for an application for inquiry; that Sec.43 speaks of removal of mutawallis. 14. The learned counsel would further contend that the dismissal of the petition filed by the father does not in any manner stand in the way of the son and daughter filing their own petitions as beneficiaries and persons interested in the property. It is not res judicata since the previous petition got dismissed by the Wakf Board. 14. The learned counsel would further contend that the dismissal of the petition filed by the father does not in any manner stand in the way of the son and daughter filing their own petitions as beneficiaries and persons interested in the property. It is not res judicata since the previous petition got dismissed by the Wakf Board. The learned counsel would then cite from the order in W.A.No.12 of 1984 where in it is stated as follows: “We hereby direct the respondents to take steps for augmenting the income of the wakf for carrying out the objects of the Wakf.” that the said petition got dismissed subject to the directions given in the petition and that the present petitioners have nothing to do with any of the said order. 15. In clarification, the learned counsel for the petitioners would say that after two months of the order of the Wakf Boards dated 11. 1987, W.A.No.10 of 1988 had come to be filed on 21. 1988 for which the learned counsel for the first respondent Board would say that as per Sec.44 of the Act, an application for enquiry could be filed at any time by any party whenever mismanagement of the wakf properties take place especially by the interested party, an application could be filed to the Board; that the Wakf Board is the watch dog for all the times and no specific time could be there for making such application for inquiry. 16. The main points that arise for consideration in the whole matter are: (i) whether the petition as filed by respondents 2 and 3 which was the subject matter of the impugned order is maintainablee (ii) whether the said petition in view of the earlier petition filed by the father of respondents 2 and 3 having been disposed of is barred by res judicata, and (iii) whether respondents 2 and 3 have separate locus standi to file a petition of that nature during the life time of their father. 17. 17. Point Nos.1 and 3 above since being connected to each other, they have to be dealt with together, The petitioners case is that since the father of respondents 2 and 3 herein had filed a similar application questioning the validity of the petitioners continuing as Mutawallis of the Wakf called ‘Haji Syed Ismail Wakf Estate’ and the said petition got disposed of with certain directions where no other petition be filed much less by the wife and son of the earlier petitioner, viz., Syed Saudduddin. The petitioners would contend that since the father is alive, son and daughter cannot acquire any independent locus standi and they are legally barred from filing yet another petitioner of the same nature. 18. From the definition clause 3 (a) for the term ‘beneficiary’ and from Sec.44 of the Act, what comes to be known is that any person interested in a Wakf may make an application to the Wakf Commissioner supported by an affidavit to institute an inquiry relating to the administration of the wakf and if the Wakf Commissioner is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the affairs of the wakf are being mismanaged. he shall take such action thereon as he thinks fit. From the wording of the section, it is clear that the term any person interested in a wakf is not restricted in a narrow sense, but has broader connotation and any interested party in the wakf may make an application to the Wakf Commissioner. But for initiating any action on such application being filed, it is left to the satisfaction of the Wakf Commissioner for making inquiry. Absolutely there is no restriction in so far as filing of any application before the Wakf Board or Wakf Commissioner is concerned, the contention of the petitioners that on account of the petition filed by the father having come to be dismissed whether in the recent past or long back, the son or daughter or his near relatives just for the simple reason they are related to him, will not disentitle to file such an application and in that respect. The application filed by respondents 2 and 3 is well maintainable. The application filed by respondents 2 and 3 is well maintainable. Under such circumstances, respondents 2 and 3 have locus standi to file such an application since they come within the meaning of Sec.3(a) and they are also the beneficiaries of the particular wakf which is the subject matter. They have their own independent locus standi to raise such questions on application seeking inquiry into the affairs of the wakf. Hence point No.1 and 3 are answered against the petitioners and in favour of respondents 2 and 3. 19. Toestablish point No.2 that is the petition is barred by res judicata, the learned counsel for the petitioners cited number of judgments, but unfortunately, none of these judgments could be applied to the present case in hand in view of a clear statutory provision providing respondents 2 and 3 to file such applications. Since it is the enactment that gives power for respondents 2 and 3 to file such an application before the authorities mentioned in the Act itself, as against such specific statutory provision, such as, Sec.44, the plea of res judicata cannot be set up and hence this plea of the petitioners is also cannot be accepted and the same has to be rejected. For the foregoing reasons, point No.2 is also decided against the petitioners and in favour of respondents 2 and 3. 20. In result, the above writ petition fails and the same is dismissed. 21. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.