Judgment : The petitioners have filed this writ petition, praying to issue a writ of certiorarified mandamus to call for the records to the land acquisition proceedings pertaining to S.Nos.12/2, 13/1 and 16/2 commenced pursuant to the Sec.4(1) notification bearing G.O.Ms.No.857, Housing and Urban Development, dated 28. 1985 of the first respondent and culminating in the award bearing No.2/88 Vanagaram dated 30.9.1988 and consequential impugned notice to deliver possession bearing No.Nil dated 30.9.1988 of the third respondent and to quash the same and further directing to forbear the respondents from proceeding in any manner with the said acquisition proceedings as regard the lands of the petitioners. 2. Thecase as put up by the petitioners in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition is that the first petitioner is carrying on the business of printing press through his proprietary concern, viz., M/s.Madras Litho Press at Vanagaram village; that the second petitioner, it carry on the business of printing press, purchased part of the premises in S.Nos.12/2, 13/1 and 16/2 situate in Poonamallee High Road, Vanagaram village; that by G.O.Ms.No.837, Housing, dated 16. 1976, the first respondent revealed that four categories of lands would be excluded from acquisition, viz.: .• (i)All areas covered by lay outs approved by the Director of Town Planning: .• (ii) All built-up areas: .• (iii) All village sites; and .• (iv) All areas covered by factories. 3. The further case of the petitioners is that by another G.O.Ms.No.413, dated 3. 1979 passed by the first respondent, it re-examined the policy decision in such a way that while items No.(ii) to (iv) quoted in G.O.Ms.No.837, dated 16. 1976 would continue to be excluded from the acquisition category (i) mentioned therein would be excluded subject to certain guidelines, viz.: .• (a) that the lay-out should have been approved by the competent authorities prior to the publication of notification under Sec.4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act; and .• (b) that the lay-out should be on the fringe of the scheme area without affecting the scheme in any manner and not be a pocket in the scheme area. 4. While so, the first respondent issued yet another G.O.Ms.No.583, dated 13. 4. While so, the first respondent issued yet another G.O.Ms.No.583, dated 13. 1983 in and by which, the guide lines contained in G.O.Ms.Nos.837/76 and 413/79 were reconsidered and ordered that such guidelines while helpful to screen applications would not enjoin any responsibility on the second respondent, nor would it create any right in the landowners since the said guidelines were only an exercise of discretion; that it was further ordered that the test should be whether such exclusion would adversely affect the scheme and jeopardize the fulfillment of the public purpose for which the lands were originally notified to decide the satisfaction of the guide lines and accordingly, the aforementioned guide lines stood cancelled; that it is relevant to note here that G.O.Ms.No.583/83 only purported to cancel the guidelines in G.O.Ms.Nos.837/76 and 413/79 and did not purport to cancel or supersede the Government Orders themselves; that since the reference was to the conditions/guide lines dealing with the exclusion of areas covered by lay outs approved by the Director of Town Planning, guidelines were given for such categories and not for other categories, viz., built up areas, village sites and areas covered by the factories, which were excluded by the Government Orders de hors any guidelines and the Government Orders themselves ordering such executing had not been cancelled or superseded; that in fact the present policy of the Government is that industries should include housing as an integral part of their plans and lands usable for such purpose should not be acquired. .5. While such is the state of affairs, the first respondent by G.O.Ms.No.857, Housing, dated 28. 1985 issued notification under Sec.4(1) published in the Government Gazette on 29. 1985 notifying the acquisition for purposes of Maduravoyal Neighbourhood scheme lands which included the first petitioners land bearing Nos.12/2, 13/1 and 16/2 in Vanagaram village measuring in all 1.84 acres. Then notice of 5-A enquiry was issued and the first petitioner raised objections as per letter dated 30.4.1986; that on 111. 1985 notifying the acquisition for purposes of Maduravoyal Neighbourhood scheme lands which included the first petitioners land bearing Nos.12/2, 13/1 and 16/2 in Vanagaram village measuring in all 1.84 acres. Then notice of 5-A enquiry was issued and the first petitioner raised objections as per letter dated 30.4.1986; that on 111. 1985 the first petitioner attended the inquiry and put forth his objections; that 3 of the Land Acquisition Rules framed under Sec.55(1) of the Land Acquisition Act had not been complied with which is fatal to the acquisition proceedings as per ratio of the decision made in the State of Mysore v. A.K.Kangan State of Mysore v. A.K.Kangan State of Mysore v. A.K.Kangan A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2190, and in the case of Sinnaiyan v. The Union Territory of Pondicherry (1971)1 MLJ. 342 . At this juncture, the petitioners would point out that the first respondent under G.O.Ms.No.14, Transport, dated 1. 1986 issued a Sec.4(1) notification for the acquisition of the same lands for the Transport Department belonging to the first petitioner in S.Nos.12/2 and 13/1 measuring 26 cents and 14 cents respectively, in all 40 cents, which were already covered within the notified lands by Sec.4(1) notification in G.O.Ms.No.857/85, dated 28. 1985 of the first respondent acquisition for the second respondent, despite this not following the provisos of Rule 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Rules, the third respondent apparently approved the acquisition of the entire notified area and recommended acquisition thereafter to the Government. 6. The further case of the petitioners is that the first respondent thereupon issued declaration under Sec.6, vide G.O.Ms.No.1525, dated 29. 1986 and thereafter acquisition of part of the notified area continued pursuant to the Sec.4(1) notification of the Transport Department, thus the substantial part of the lands having come to be notified by the first respondent through two contemporaneous and wholly separate proceedings, one for the second respondent and the other for Transport Department, ultimately the acquisition proceedings vide G.O.Ms.No.857/85 of the first respondent pursuant to Sec.4(1) notification and G.O.Ms.No.1525/86 suffer a total non-application of mind, which is apparent from the anomalous and parallel proceedings taken by separate wings of the first respondent. This anomalous situation continued till the withdrawal of part of the lands from acquisition in exercise of powers under Sec.48 and published in the Government Letter No.31222/87-2, dated 12. 1987. This anomalous situation continued till the withdrawal of part of the lands from acquisition in exercise of powers under Sec.48 and published in the Government Letter No.31222/87-2, dated 12. 1987. While so, the petitioners were served with the Award Enquiry Notice under Sec.9 of the Act on 8. 1988 calling them for hearing on 38. 1988 followed by yet another notice dated 9. 1988 and in spite of the petitioners requesting for an adjournment for perusal of papers, no further communication were received. 7. The petitioners would ascertain stating that under Sec.11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, an Award is mandatorily to be made within two years from the date of last publication under Sec.6, lest, the entire proceeding shall lapse; that in this case, the last publication of Sec.6 declaration being on 10. 1986, it is incumbent to make the award on or before 10. 1988 but they received the notice of Award passed by the third respondent only on 210. 1988, which got posted on 210. 1988, put purported to have been signed on 30.9.1988 itself; that many anomalies regarding the date of the notice of award are patent on record leading to the irresistible conclusion that the Award was never signed on 30.9.1988 but later the same had been ante-dated to get over the requirements of the Sec.11-A of the Act and to rejuvenate the proceedings which had mandatorily lapsed; that Sec.12(2) makes immediate notice of Award to the interested persons; that in any event the entire acquisition proceedings have lapsed in terms of Sec.11-A of the Act inasmuch as the Award cannot be taken to have been made before 210. 1988 i.e., the date of the second petitioner being informed of the same which is beyond the time of two years and in these circumstances, the petitioner would conclude praying for the relief mentioned above. .8. Inthe counter filed on behalf of the respondents 1 and 3 besides generally denying the allegations of the petition, it would be specifically mentioned that Sec.4(1) notification was published in the gazette on 29. 1985 with reference to G.O.Ms.No.857, Housing and Urban Development Department, dated 28. .8. Inthe counter filed on behalf of the respondents 1 and 3 besides generally denying the allegations of the petition, it would be specifically mentioned that Sec.4(1) notification was published in the gazette on 29. 1985 with reference to G.O.Ms.No.857, Housing and Urban Development Department, dated 28. 1985 further publishing the same in the ‘Dinathanthi’ (Tamil) and News Today (English) newspapers on 30.9.1985 as per the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act; that the gist of the notification is published in the village by beat of tom tom in and around the locality; that notice under Sec.5-A was served on the interested persons; that the enquiry under Rule 3(b) was conducted on 14. 1986 and 15. 1986; that overruling the objections, orders were issued in the third respondents proceeding in Rc.5847/81, dated 26. 1986 to the landowners and the interested persons; that the draft declaration under Sec.6 was approved in G.O.Ms.No.1525, Housing and Urban Development Department, dated 29. 1986 and published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, dated 29. 1986. 9. It would be further averred in the counter affidavit that the subsequent acquisition proceedings initiated for the Transport Department had been withdrawn on 12. 1987 publishing the notification in the Gazette dated 30.12.1987; that out of a total extent of 1.84 acres noted in the writ petition, the Housing Board acquired only an extent of 1.44 acres; that at this stage the petitioner filed a writ petition in the High Court and obtained interim stay orders restraining the Land Acquisition Officer to proceed further on the petitioners land; that it is true on the part of the Government to have ordered to exclude the four categories of lands mentioned in para No.4 of the affidavit as per G.O.Ms.No.837, Housing, dated 16. 1975; that on a further G.O., further restrictions were imposed and ordered that the lay out should have been approved before the publication of Sec.4(1) notification and that the lay outs should be in the fringe of the scheme area. .10. As an answer to the allegation that G.O.Ms.No.583, dated 13. 1975; that on a further G.O., further restrictions were imposed and ordered that the lay out should have been approved before the publication of Sec.4(1) notification and that the lay outs should be in the fringe of the scheme area. .10. As an answer to the allegation that G.O.Ms.No.583, dated 13. 1983 only purported to cancel the guidelines in G.O.Ms.Nos.837/76 and 413/79 and did not purport to cancel or superceed the said Government Orders themselves, it would be answered in the counter that it is true that the above Government order is operative on the Neighbourhood Scheme sponsored by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board; that the Government have acquired the lands required for public purposes under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the Government can reject the request of the petitioner for dropping the proposal also if the request is not genuine and if the land is essentially required for public purposes and the above contention of the petitioners deserves no consideration; that the Government in G.O.Ms.No.857, Housing and Urban Development Department, dated 28. 1985 have approved the Sec.4(1) notification including the first petitioners land bearing S.Nos.12/2, 13/1 and 16/2 further publishing the same in the gazette dated 29. 1985, then posting the matter for Sec.5-A enquiry on 111. 1985, notice was issued to the petitioner on 210. 1985, which the first petitioner received on 30.10.1985; that the first petitioner did not attend the enquiry but sent an objection letter on 20.11.1985 to the Land Acquisition Officer and the said objections were overruled by the requisitioning body; that an enquiry under Rule 3(b) of the Rules framed under Sec.55(1) of the Land Acquisition Act posted to 15. 1986 was communicated to the petitioner on 5. 1986; that the first petitioner did not attend the enquiry and the enquiry was conducted on 15. 1986 and it is false to say on the part of the petitioner that there was no enquiry at all; that though originally the first petitioners land was notified under Secs.4(1) and 6 for the formation of Maduravoyal Neighbourhood Scheme since the petitioners land was required for the formation of the National Highways road connection National Highways 4,5 and 45, which is more essential for the public and the lands came to be notified by the Transport Department as per G.O.Ms.No.122, Transport, dated 12. 1987 as a result of which the Housing and Urban Development Department published the withdrawal notification in the gazette dated 30.12.1987. 11. It would be further contended in the counter that on verification of the encumbrance certificate, the lands in question, it came to be known that the lands in question have been purchased by the second petitioner from the first petitioner before award enquiry and hence under Secs.9(3) and 10 notices were served to the second petitioner on 8. 1988, posting the same for award enquiry on 38. 1988 and ultimately the award enquiry was held on 9. 1988; that the petitioner did not avail the opportunity for raising objections and there is no provision to consider the objects after the publication of the draft declaration under Sec.6 of the Act and hence award was passed on 30.9.1988; that no specific violation of any rule has been shown but only sweeping allegations have been made that the proceedings are contrary to law and without jurisdiction; that all the procedure have been thoroughly and systematically followed and the contentions of the petitioners are baseless. With the above contentions, it would be prayed in the counter-affidavit to dismiss the writ petition with costs. 12. During arguments, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners would contend that it is under G.O.Ms.No.857, Housing and Urban Development, dated 28. 1985, the first respondent/Government issued the acquisition proceedings pertaining to the lands in question pursuant to which Sec.4(1) notification was issued on 29. 1985 and later Sec.6 declaration had been made under G.O.Ms.No.1525, Housing and Urban Development Department, dated 29. 1986 and published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, dated 29. 1986; that the said G.O.Ms.No.857, Housing and Urban Development, dated 28. 1985 had been quashed by this Court in the case delivered in A.Vembuli Naicker v. State of Tamil Nadu and others A.Vembuli Naicker v. State of Tamil Nadu and others A.Vembuli Naicker v. State of Tamil Nadu and others (1992)1 MLJ. 26 , by the order dated 28. 1991 and against this no appeal was preferred by the Government and hence it has become final. In the said case, the petitioner contended that the public purpose specified in the Sec.4(1) notification viz., for the formation of Maduravoyal Neighbourhood Scheme is vague and indefinite and consequently Sec.4(1) Notification has to be quashed. 26 , by the order dated 28. 1991 and against this no appeal was preferred by the Government and hence it has become final. In the said case, the petitioner contended that the public purpose specified in the Sec.4(1) notification viz., for the formation of Maduravoyal Neighbourhood Scheme is vague and indefinite and consequently Sec.4(1) Notification has to be quashed. Secondly, the learned counsel for the petitioner therein contended that the procedure prescribed under Rule 1 of the Rules framed under Sec.55(1) of the Act for giving public notice of the substance of the Notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act is mandatory. In that case, public notice of the substance of the Sec.4(1) Notification was not given at convenient place in the locality as contemplated under Rule 1 of the Rules framed under Sec.55 of the Act and consequently the acquisition proceedings are vitiated and the procedure prescribed under Rule 3(b) of the Rule for holding an enquiry under Sec.5-A of the Act has not been followed properly and the learned counsel for the petitioner therein raised an objection that the Sec.6 declaration was published only on 29. 1986 after expiry of one year from the date of the publication of Sec.4(1) Notification in the Government Gazette on 29. 1985 and on this ground also, the proceedings are liable to be quashed. 13. The learned single Judge of this Court in the above said case, citing a Division Bench judgment of this Court delivered in L.Krishnan v. State of Tamil Nadu L.Krishnan v. State of Tamil Nadu L.Krishnan v. State of Tamil Nadu (1991)2 MLJ. 150 , wherein this Court had occasion to consider the ‘public purpose’ that was specified in the Sec.4(1) Notification in the light of another Division Bench decision of this Court delivered in The State of Tamil Nadu v. A.Mohammed Yousuf and others The State of Tamil Nadu v. A.Mohammed Yousuf and others The State of Tamil Nadu v. A.Mohammed Yousuf and others (1990)2 MLJ. 149 , and also the decision of the Supreme Court delivered in Munshi Singh v. Union of India A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1150, where the Sec.4(1) Notification was quashed on the ground of vagueness, has held: “In the instant case also, the Notification does not specify the public purpose with sufficient particulars and clarity. 149 , and also the decision of the Supreme Court delivered in Munshi Singh v. Union of India A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1150, where the Sec.4(1) Notification was quashed on the ground of vagueness, has held: “In the instant case also, the Notification does not specify the public purpose with sufficient particulars and clarity. In view of the above contention and following the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench referred to hereinabove, the impugned Notification under Sec.4(1) is liable to be quashed.” 14. Citing Rule 1 of the Rules, the learned single Judge in the above said judgment, remarking that there is nothing on record to show that the respondent has followed the prescribed procedure for giving public notice of the substance of the Notification in the locality viz., publication of the notice at convenient places in the said locality and affixing copies thereof in the offices of the Collector, the Tahsildar and in the nearest Police Station held that: “Having regard to the aforesaid peculiar circumstances of the case, the impugned proceedings are liable to be quashed.” It has been further held in that judgment that: “In the instant case, though the Sec.4(1) Notification was published on 29. 1985, the publication of declaration under Sec.6 of the Act was made only on 29. 1986 admittedly beyond a period of one year… Since the declaration under Sec.6 of the Act was published beyond the period of one year from the date of the publication of Sec.4(1) Notification in the instant case, the proceedings in so far as it relates to the petitioners lands are concerned are vitiated.” 15. Citing the above judgment, the learned senior counsel for the petitioners would exhort that Sec.4 (1) Notification is universal and once it is quashed for non-compliance, the entire proceeding goes; that the finding of vagueness is the final decision; that if it is argued on behalf of the Government that it would have been relevant in 1991 and not at the present and it can be reissued, the answer is that since the Sec.4(1) Notification was specifically set aside on a final judgment, the Government is not permitted to justify on ground of vagueness. 16. 16. The learned senior counsel would further point out that the mandatory conditions of affixure in the office of the Collector, the Tahsildar and in the nearest police station having not been followed, as decided in the above said judgment, the entire proceeding is vitiated; that the State itself had decided not to challenge it further; that it is a finally concluded question and in spite of these, if it is reopened, it is nothing but hostile discrimination against the petitioner under Art.14 of the Constitution of India. .17. The learned senior counsel for the petitioners would then point out that the same notification had been dealt with in W.P.No.11407 of 1988 by a single Judge of this Court (K.Sampath, J.) in K.Kumar Naicher v. State of Tamil Nadu represented by Commissioner and Secretary to Government, Housing and Urban Development Department K.Kumar Naicher v. State of Tamil Nadu represented by Commissioner and Secretary to Government, Housing and Urban Development Department K.Kumar Naicher v. State of Tamil Nadu represented by Commissioner and Secretary to Government, Housing and Urban Development Department (1998)1 L.A.C.C. 389 wherein the learned Judge citing the already decided case in Valleswarar Temple, Nerkundram represented by Sole Trustee Kasiviswanathan v. The State of Tamil Nadu represented by the Secretary to Government, Housing and Urban Development and another Valleswarar Temple, Nerkundram represented by Sole Trustee Kasiviswanathan v. The State of Tamil Nadu represented by the Secretary to Government, Housing and Urban Development and another Valleswarar Temple, Nerkundram represented by Sole Trustee Kasiviswanathan v. The State of Tamil Nadu represented by the Secretary to Government, Housing and Urban Development and another (1999)2 MLJ. 142, held as follows: .“It is clear from the above decision that the procedure prescribed under Rule (1) of its rule framed under Sec.55 of the Act for giving public notice of the substance of the 4(1) Notification is mandatory and failure to follow the procedure will vitiate the entire proceedings. In the instant case, except the averments that public notice of the substance of the notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act publication was given in the locality by beat of tom-tom under rules on 10. In the instant case, except the averments that public notice of the substance of the notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act publication was given in the locality by beat of tom-tom under rules on 10. 1985, there is nothing on record to show that the respondent has followed the procedure for giving notice of the substance of the Notification in the locality viz., publication of the notice at convenience places in the said locality viz., publication of the notice at convenient places in the said locality and affixing copies thereof in the offices of the Collector, in the Tahsildar and in the nearest police station. Having regard to the aforesaid peculiar circumstances of the case, the impugned proceedings are liable to be quashed.” 18. The learned senior counsel for the petitioners would point out that it is only prospective for the cases to arise thereafter and when once a procedure is quashed so far as one party is concerned, it cannot be said to hold good for the other party and that there is no Sec.4(1) Notification alive, which has been struck down. .19. In reply, Mr.P.M.Rajavel, the learned Special Government Pleader (Land Acquisition) appearing on behalf of the respondents would contend that he has to meet the charges (i) vagueness, (ii) non-publication of Sec.4(1) Notification in the locality and in the relevant places; and (iii) Sec.6 Draft Declaration was made beyond the period of one year; that before answering these grounds, he would like to explain the facts of the case, which are that the scheme was known as Maduravoyal Neighbourhood Scheme and the extent of land, which has to be acquired was 54.65 acres, out of which the extent acquired from the petitioners is only 1.44 acres; that it is not the case of the acquisition of one piece of land, but various lands from various survey numbers belonging to various petitioners; that the first petitioner was the owner of this piece of land at the time of initiation of the acquisition proceedings; that admittedly, Sec.6 draft declaration was published on 29. 1986; that the second petitioner purchased the land on 17. 1986; that the second petitioner purchased the land on 17. 1988 just at the time when the award was about to be passed, nearly after two years from the time of Sec.6 declaration; that as such, the writ petition came to be filed some times in October, 1988; that as on the date of filing of the writ petition, the first petitioner ceased to be the owner having no interest at all in the land and therefore he has no locus standi to challenge the acquisition after selling away the property in favour of the second petitioner. 20. The learned Special Government Pleader would further contend that the second petitioner, the subsequent purchaser, after the Sec.6 draft declaration, has no right to challenge the validity as per the various decisions of our High Court; that if at all, he could only enter into the shoes of the first petitioner but both cannot challenge the validity of the acquisition proceeding and a subsequent purchaser is not entitled to challenge the acquisition proceeding as a whole. At this juncture, the learned Special Government Pleader would cite two judgments reported in (i) U.P.Jal Nigam v. Kalra Properties Ltd. U.P.Jal Nigam v. Kalra Properties Ltd. U.P.Jal Nigam v. Kalra Properties Ltd. (1996)2 C.T.C. 60 and (ii) Ajay Krishan Singhal v. Union of India (1997)1 C.T.C. 156, and would contend that challenging the acquisition proceeding in the above said manner, as per the above judgments, can neither be entertained nor sustainable in law and that this writ petition itself had been filed after the Award was passed and at this score itself, the writ petition becomes liable to be rejected in limine on grounds of latches. 21. Continuing his argument, the learned Special Government Pleader would further contend that in this case, Sec.4(1) Notification was approved on 28. 1985 and gazette publication was made on 29. 1985 and the paper publication was effected on 30.9.1985 and locality publication was done as required by Rules on 10. 1985. Offering the above details, the learned Special Government Pleader would focus his attention towards the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner reported in A.Vembuli Naicker v. State of Tamil Nadu and others A.Vembuli Naicker v. State of Tamil Nadu and others A.Vembuli Naicker v. State of Tamil Nadu and others (1992)1 MLJ. 1985. Offering the above details, the learned Special Government Pleader would focus his attention towards the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner reported in A.Vembuli Naicker v. State of Tamil Nadu and others A.Vembuli Naicker v. State of Tamil Nadu and others A.Vembuli Naicker v. State of Tamil Nadu and others (1992)1 MLJ. 26 , and would contend that at the time of hearing of that case, no record was produced resultantly the case was decided differently. 22. Citing therelevant pages from the connected file the learned Special Government Pleader would contend that tom-tom was beaten at the Taluk Office, at the Collectors Office and also at the Land Acquisition Office on one and the same date i.e., 10. 1985; that affixure had also been done at all these places including that of the Sub Registrar and that a single Judge of this Court (Sathasivam, J.) held in a case that beat of tom-tom is sufficient; that since tom-tom was beaten, it is false to say that there was no local publication at all; that in this case, even though the landlord having come to be noted, had filed his objection on 111. 1985 and the first petitioner appeared for Sec.5-A enquiry on 20.11.1985 and on the second occasion on 15. 1986, he did not appear and therefore he was not at all in the picture and the draft declaration under Sec.6 of the Act, overruling the objections got published on 29. 1986 and the locality publication effect on 30.9.1986. The learned Special Government Pleader would further contend that the plea that Sec.6 declaration was not made in one year is no longer available or relevant in the sense that from the date of gazette publication, it is well within one year and that the last mode of publication shall be taken as the cut off date for the purpose of making declaration and hence it is in time. 23. Comingto vagueness, the learned Special Government Pleader would contend that there is no vagueness at all and would contend that the judgment relied upon by the other side i.e., A.Vembuli Naicker v. State of Tamil Nadu and others i.e., A.Vembuli Naicker v. State of Tamil Nadu and others i.e., A.Vembuli Naicker v. State of Tamil Nadu and others (1992)1 MLJ. Comingto vagueness, the learned Special Government Pleader would contend that there is no vagueness at all and would contend that the judgment relied upon by the other side i.e., A.Vembuli Naicker v. State of Tamil Nadu and others i.e., A.Vembuli Naicker v. State of Tamil Nadu and others i.e., A.Vembuli Naicker v. State of Tamil Nadu and others (1992)1 MLJ. 26 , is passed following the earlier decisions of this Court reported in (1) Krishnan v. State of Tamil Nadu Krishnan v. State of Tamil Nadu Krishnan v. State of Tamil Nadu (1991)2 MLJ. 150 and (2) State of Tamil Nadu v. Mohammed Yousuf State of Tamil Nadu v. Mohammed Yousuf State of Tamil Nadu v. Mohammed Yousuf (1990)2 MLJ. 149 , and these cases went on appeal to the Supreme Court and the judgment reported in (1991)2 MLJ. 150 got reversed as per the judgment of the Apex Court reported in State of Tamil Nadu v. W.Krishnan State of Tamil Nadu v. W.Krishnan State of Tamil Nadu v. W.Krishnan (1996(1 S.C.C. 250: A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 498; that the other in (1990)2 MLJ. 149 went on appeal to the Supreme Court at the instigation of the State and the Supreme Court confirmed it, but subsequently held it ‘no longer a good law’; that since the case cited by the other side i.e., (1992)1 MLJ. 26 is based on two cases, out of which one got reversed and the other held to be per incuriam, the question of vagueness is no longer available to the other side to allege. He would further contend that the case of the petitioner in W.P.No.14014 of 1988, dated 28. 1991 which is reported in (1992) 1 MLJ. 26 was allowed on a different basis but so far as it relates to the petitioners lands, the same principle cannot be applied and by the time that judgment was delivered, all the proceedings were over. 24. Dealing with the judgment cited by the other side reported in (1997)2 L.A.C.C. 384 and K.Kumar Naicker v. State of Tamil Nadu K.Kumar Naicker v. State of Tamil Nadu K.Kumar Naicker v. State of Tamil Nadu (1998)1 L.A.C.C. 389, the learned Special Government Pleader would contend that they are rendered in writ petitions and it has to be verified, whether any appeal is preferred against them. 25. 25. Dealing with the point of discrimination, the learned Special Government Pleader would say that if the Government excludes one land, it cannot en route to the other lands; that the Apex Court has held this to be correct, even if it locates in the same area; that no valid or tangible reasons are shown or given warranting interference by this Court. The learned Special Government Pleader would further contend that in a judgment reported in Om Prakash v. State of U.P. Om Prakash v. State of U.P. Om Prakash v. State of U.P. (1998)6 S.C.C. 1 : A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 2504 the challenge was for about 1/10th of the total extent and 9/10th of the land got acquired and the Apex Court held that challenge in respect of 1/10th of acquisition cannot be set aside even though the public purpose is not specified stated. He would further contend that on this ground also, this writ petition becomes liable to be dismissed. 26. In clarification, the learned senior counsel for the petitioners would contend that Sec.4(1) Notification once quashed, stands no longer; that Sec.6 declaration could be applied for the petitioners but not Sec.4(1) Notification and when once it is quashed, the same cannot be revived for any other purpose and further laying emphasis on the earlier quoted judgments reported in A.Vembuli Naicker v. State of Tamil Nadu and others A.Vembuli Naicker v. State of Tamil Nadu and others A.Vembuli Naicker v. State of Tamil Nadu and others , (1992)1 MLJ. 26 and State of Tamil Nadu he would say that these two decisions are totally in his favour. Regarding title, the learned counsel would point out that if it does not vest with the second petitioner, it vests with the first petitioner since both are parties to the proceeding. 27. It is a case of land acquisition initiated by the first respondent/State of Tamil Nadu for the public purpose of the second respondent/Tamil Nadu Housing Board, who is the requisitioning authority for the purpose of implementing the scheme known as Maduravoyal Neighbourhood Scheme, in which the third respondent/the Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition) is designated as the Land Acquisition Officer. For the entire scheme to be implemented, an extent of 54.55 acres of land was to be acquired, out of which the extent acquired from the petitioner is 1.84 acres which lies in S.Nos.12/2, 13/1 and 16/2 of Vanagaram village. For the entire scheme to be implemented, an extent of 54.55 acres of land was to be acquired, out of which the extent acquired from the petitioner is 1.84 acres which lies in S.Nos.12/2, 13/1 and 16/2 of Vanagaram village. 28. The case of the petitioners is that the first respondent/Government by G.O.Ms.No.837, Housing, dated 16. 1976, revealed that the following four categories of lands would be excluded from acquisition, viz.: .• (i)All areas covered by lay outs approved by the Director of Town Planning; .• (ii) All built-up areas; .• (iii) All village sites; and (iv) All areas covered by factories. The further case of the petitioners is that the petitioners purchased the lands in question for the proprietary concerned M/s.Madras Litho Press to be carried on through the second petitioner and their case falls under the fourth exception stated above, but the first respondent re-examined the policy decision in another G.O.Ms.No.413, dated 3. 1979 revealing thereby that category Nos.(ii) to (iv) quoted in G.O.Ms.No.837, dated 16. 1976 would continue to be excluded from the acquisition and category No.(i) would be excluded subject to certain guidelines. 29. The further case of the petitioners is that in and by another G.O.Ms.No.583, dated 13. 1983, the first respondent reconsidered the guidelines issued in G.O.Ms.No.837, dated 16. 1976 as aforementioned and ordered that such guidelines will help in scrutinizing the applications and would not enjoin any responsibility on the second respondent nor would it create any right in the landowners since the said guidelines were only an exercise of discretion, thereby purporting to cancel the guidelines issued in both the G.O.Ms.Nos.837/76 and 413/79 without cancelling or superseding the Government Orders themselves. 30. It is the case of the petitioners that in the above circumstances, the Notification under Sec.4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act came to be issued by the first respondent as per G.O.Ms.No.857, Housing, dated 28. 1985, which came to be published in the Government Gazette on 29. 1985, thereby notifying the acquisition for the purpose of Maduravoyal Neighbourhood Scheme, which included the first petitioners lands also; that in the subsequent Sec.5-A enquiry, the first petitioner attended on 111. 1985 and put forth his objections and without compliance of the Rule 13 of the Land Acquisition Rules framed under Sec.55(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, the acquisition proceeding was carried on. 31. 1985 and put forth his objections and without compliance of the Rule 13 of the Land Acquisition Rules framed under Sec.55(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, the acquisition proceeding was carried on. 31. The further contentions of the petitioners are that yet another Notification under Sec.4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was issued by the first respondent under G.O.Ms.No.14, Transport, dated 1. 1986 in and by which it was revealed that part of the lands of the petitioner were to be acquired for the purpose of the Transport Department, which were already covered by the Sec.4(1) Notification issued under G.O.Ms.No.857/85 for the purpose of the said Neighbourhood Scheme of the second respondent; that besides these anomalies, without following the provisions of Rule 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Rules, the third respondent/L.A.O. apparently approved the acquisition of the notified area including that of the lands of the petitioner and recommended the acquisition to the Government. 32. The further case of the petitioner is that under Sec.11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, the Award has to be mandatorily made within two years from the date of last publication under Sec.6, lest, the entire proceeding shall lapse; that while such being the position of law, in the case in hand, the last publication of Sec.6 declaration being on 10. 1986, it is incumbent on the part of the respondents to make the Award on or before 10. 1988 but the petitioners received the notice of the Award on 210. 1988 having posted the same on 210. 1988, but purported to have singed on 30.9.1988 itself thereby leading to the irresistible conclusion that the Award was never signed on 30.9.1988 but later with an antedate to get over the impediment of Sec.11-A of the Act and that under Sec.12(2) of the Act, immediate notice of Award to the interested persons is a must. 33. The last ground on which the case of the petitioners was put forth is that the public notice of the substance of the Notification issued under Sec.4(1) of the Act was not made at convenient places in the locality as contemplated under Rule 1 of the Rules framed under Sec.55 of the Act. 33. The last ground on which the case of the petitioners was put forth is that the public notice of the substance of the Notification issued under Sec.4(1) of the Act was not made at convenient places in the locality as contemplated under Rule 1 of the Rules framed under Sec.55 of the Act. For the above point, the petitioners would heavily rely upon the case reported in K.Kumar Naicker v. State of Tamil Nadu K.Kumar Naicker v. State of Tamil Nadu K.Kumar Naicker v. State of Tamil Nadu (1998) 1 L.A.C.C. 389, wherein the learned Judge relying on an earlier judgment reported in Valeswarar Temple, Nerukundram v. State of Tamil Nadu Valeswarar Temple, Nerukundram v. State of Tamil Nadu Valeswarar Temple, Nerukundram v. State of Tamil Nadu (1990)2 MLJ. 142, held ‘Public Notice of the substance of the Sec.4(1) Notification is mandatory and failure to follow the procedure will vitiate the entire proceeding’ and since ‘publication of the notice at convenient places in the locality affixing copies thereof in the offices of the Collector, Tahsildar and the nearest Police Station’ have not been met, quashed the impugned proceedings therein. 34. The other judgment entirely relied upon by the petitioners is one reported in A.Vembuli Naicker v. State of Tamil Nadu and others A.Vembuli Naicker v. State of Tamil Nadu and others A.Vembuli Naicker v. State of Tamil Nadu and others (1992)1 MLJ. 26 , which is nothing but a case in which the very G.O.Ms.No.857, Housing and Urban Development, dated 28. 1985, under which Notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act was issued had been quashed against which no appeal had been preferred and thus the said order became final. 35. On the part of the first and third respondents it would be contended that on the date of filing of the writ petition in October, 1988, the first petitioner ceased to be the owner since he had sold out the property in question in favour of the second petitioner; that the subsequent purchaser after the Sec.6 draft declaration has no right to challenge the validity and that if at all he could only enter into the shoes of the first petitioner and both cannot challenge the acquisition proceedings as a whole. In support of this contention, two judgments would be cited respectively reported in (1) U.P.Jal Nigam v. Kalra Properties Ltd. U.P.Jal Nigam v. Kalra Properties Ltd. U.P.Jal Nigam v. Kalra Properties Ltd. (1996)2 C.T.C. 60, and (2) Ajay Krishan Singhal v. Union of India (1997)1 C.T.C. 156. So far as the first judgment above is concerned, it is thereby contended that: “Purchaser of land after publication of 4(1) Notification cannot challenge validity of 4(1) Notification or regularity of taking possession of land before publication of declaration under Sec.6.” In the subsequent judgment cited above, it has been held that, “person purchasing property after declaration under Sec.6 does not get right to challenge validity of notification under Sec.4(1) and title of such person to property is void and he can only claim compensation in respect of lands acquired based on title of his vendor.” 36. The main legal contentions raised on the part of the petitioners are: (1) vagueness, (2) non-publication of Sec.4(1) Notification in the locality and in the places and (3) Sec.6 draft declaration made beyond the statutory period. Regarding vagueness, the answer on the part of the respondents would be that the other acquisition proceedings initiated to acquire the part of the lands for the Transport Department vide G.O.Ms.No.1525, dated 29. 1986 was later on withdrawn as per the Government Letter No.31222/87-2, dated 12. 1987 and hence the cloud was cast off. 37. For the local publication, the respondents would offer their explanations to the effect that Sec.4 (1) Notification was approved on 28. 1985 and gazette publication was made on 29. 1985 and the paper publication was effected on 30.9.1985 and the locality publication was done as required by Rules on 10. 1985; that tom-tom was beaten at the Taluk Office and the Collectors Office and also at the Land Acquisition Office on one and the same date i.e., 10. 1985; that affixure also been made at all important places including that of the Sub Registrars Office; that a recent judgment of the single Judge of this Court says that beat of tom-tom is sufficient and hence it is false to say that there is no local publication at all; that only having noted the publication, the landlord had filed his objections on 111. 1985 and had appeared for the Sec.5-A enquiry on 20.11.1985; that since at the time of hearing of the case cited by the other side reported in A.Vembuli Naicker v. State of Tamil Nadu and others A.Vembuli Naicker v. State of Tamil Nadu and others A.Vembuli Naicker v. State of Tamil Nadu and others (1992)1 MLJ. 26 , no record was produced, that case was decided in a different manner. 38. So far as the other ground that Sec.6 draft declaration was published only on 29. 1986 after expiry of one year from the date of publication of Sec.4(1) Notification in the Government Gazette on 29. 1985, it would be contended by the respondents 1 and 2 that the last mode of publication shall only be taken into account; that the paper publication was effected on 30.9.1985 and the draft declaration was made under Sec.6 of the Act got published on 29. 1986 and hence it is in time. 39. For the other allegation of the petitioners that under Sec.11-A of the Act, the Award has to be made mandatorily within two years from the date of last publication under Sec.6, it would be contended by the respondents 1 and 2 that Sec.6 declaration being on 10. 1986, the Award had been made on 30.9.1988 and hence it is well within the period of two years from the date of publication of the draft declaration under Sec.6 of the Act. 40. Taking into account the pleading and the counter pleading, the arguments advanced for the against, the main points that are to be determined are: .• 1. Whether the petitioners are not entitled to maintain the writ petition jointly in the circumstances of the casee .• 2. Whether the acquisition proceeding initiated by the first respondent is vaguee .• 3. Whether the publication of Sec.4(1) Notification in the locality and in the relevant places have been effected as required by lawe .• 4. Whether the draft declaration under Sec.6 of the Act was made beyond the period of one yeare and .• 5. Whether the Award was passed within the limitation of two years from the date of the draft declaration under Sec.6 of the Acte 41. Point No.1: So far as this point is concerned, the writ petition has been filed both by the original owner and the subsequent purchaser, petitioners 1 and 2 respectively. Whether the Award was passed within the limitation of two years from the date of the draft declaration under Sec.6 of the Acte 41. Point No.1: So far as this point is concerned, the writ petition has been filed both by the original owner and the subsequent purchaser, petitioners 1 and 2 respectively. The argument of the respondents that the first petitioner ceased to be the owner since he had sold out the property in favour of the second petitioner is nothing but the recognition of the title of the second petitioner. The further argument that the subsequent purchaser after the Sec.6 declaration has no right to challenge the validity of the proceeding is also not a acceptable in the light of the fact that it is not the case wherein the acquisition proceeding is only being challenged by the subsequent purchaser after the Sec.6 declaration but the original owner/the first petitioner is also very well present and the continuity or the live-link is not lost. Hence, both the judgments cited by the respondents since relevant to either the previous owner or the subsequent purchaser and dealing with only a part of the whole episode, are not applicable to the facts of the present case. Hence, the argument of the respondents on this ground that the petitioners cannot maintain the writ petition is wrong. It may be correct to argue that either or the other of the petitioners cannot independently maintain a writ petition of this Court but it is not acceptable that both the petitioners jointly cannot maintain such a petition at all since the second petitioner stepping into the shoes of the first petitioner and both together can very well file a writ petition of this nature and it is well maintainable. Hence, this point is answered in favour of the petitioners and against the respondents. 42. Point No.2: So far as the second point, vagueness of the acquisition proceedings, is concerned, it is the admitted case on the part of the first respondent that in G.O.Ms.No.837, Housing, dated 16. 1976, the first respondent revealed that four categories of lands would be excluded from acquisition, viz.: .• (i)All areas covered by lay outs approved by the Director of Town Planning; .• (ii) All built-up areas; .• (iii) All village sites; and .• (iv) All areas covered by factories. The first respondent by introducing another G.O.Ms.No.413, dated 3. 1976, the first respondent revealed that four categories of lands would be excluded from acquisition, viz.: .• (i)All areas covered by lay outs approved by the Director of Town Planning; .• (ii) All built-up areas; .• (iii) All village sites; and .• (iv) All areas covered by factories. The first respondent by introducing another G.O.Ms.No.413, dated 3. 1979 re-examined the policy decision stating that items Nos.(ii) to (iv) mentioned in the G.O.Ms.No.837, Housing, dated 16. 1976 would continue to be excluded from the acquisition and item No.(i) mentioned therein would be excluded subject to certain guidelines. Ultimately, by yet another G.O.Ms.No.583, dated 13. 1983, it has been ordered that the guidelines mentioned in G.O.Ms.No.837 and G.O.Ms.No.413 will be helpful to screen applications and would not enjoin any responsibility on the second respondent nor would it create any right in the landowners since the said guidelines were only an exercise of discretion. This is nothing but a chorus die or total deviation from the avowed object of exempting four categories as proclaimed under G.O.Ms.No.837, Housing, dated 16. 1976 and hence no doubt, these varying stands adopted by the first respondent had caused great confusion to the landowners and so far as the petitioners are concerned, had there not been such confusion caused by the introduction of these G.Os., they would not have gone in further purchase of the lands in question. Humpty number of judgment are there pronounced by various upper forums of law that in such event, the Government have no reason to cause confusion to the landowners and the definite stand of the Government should be spelt out. In this respect, vagueness is widely prevalent causing great confusion to the landowners. 43. That apart, the first respondent/Government also by issuing two different G.Os., one in G.O.Ms.No.857, Housing and Urban Development Department, dated 28. 1985 thereby issuing the Notification under Sec.4(1) for the purpose of acquisition of the disputed lands of the petitioners along with others for the purpose of the second respondent and while acquisition proceedings are on, issuing yet another G.O.Ms.No.1525, Transport Department, dated 29. 1985 thereby issuing the Notification under Sec.4(1) for the purpose of acquisition of the disputed lands of the petitioners along with others for the purpose of the second respondent and while acquisition proceedings are on, issuing yet another G.O.Ms.No.1525, Transport Department, dated 29. 1986 thereby issuing Sec.4(1) Notification for the purpose of acquiring the property for the Transport Department and ultimately after certain period having come forward to withdraw the second G.O., has not only shown that he has been vague and indefinite and ambiguous regarding the acquisition of the property for any particular public purpose so that the landowner would be assured of as to what purpose his valuable lands are being acquired since he has got a right to know the objects to be achieved by such acquisition proceedings. Hence, vagueness is seen in all forms. Hence, the Division Bench decision of this Court delivered in The State of Tamil Nadu v. A.Mohammed Yousuf and others The State of Tamil Nadu v. A.Mohammed Yousuf and others The State of Tamil Nadu v. A.Mohammed Yousuf and others (1990)2 MLJ. 149 , and also the decision of the Supreme Court delivered in Munshi Singh v. Union of India A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1150, and yet another Division Bench judgment of this Court delivered in L.Krishanan v. State of Tamil Nadu L.Krishanan v. State of Tamil Nadu L.Krishanan v. State of Tamil Nadu (1991)2 MLJ. 150 , thereby considering ‘public purpose’ and quashing the Sec.4(1) Notification on ground of vagueness squarely apply to the case in hand. Therefore, this point has to be decided against the respondents and in favour of the petitioners and it is decided accordingly. 44. Point No.3: The next question is pertaining to the publication of Sec.4(1) Notification in the locality and in the relevant places. The petitioners would greatly rely upon the judgment delivered by a single Judge of this Court in the same subject with which the present writ petition is concerned, reported in A.Vembuli Naicker v. State of Tamil Nadu and others A.Vembuli Naicker v. State of Tamil Nadu and others A.Vembuli Naicker v. State of Tamil Nadu and others (1992)1 MLJ. 26 , wherein dealing with the publication of Sec.4(1) Notification in the locality and in the conspicuous places, the learned single Judge struck down the G.O.Ms.No.857, Housing and Urban Development Department, dated 28. 1985, whereby Sec.4(1) notification was issued by the first respondent/Government. 26 , wherein dealing with the publication of Sec.4(1) Notification in the locality and in the conspicuous places, the learned single Judge struck down the G.O.Ms.No.857, Housing and Urban Development Department, dated 28. 1985, whereby Sec.4(1) notification was issued by the first respondent/Government. There is no denying of the fact that the said order was neither challenged in appeal nor in any other manner and the same has become final. At this juncture, the argument advanced on the part of the learned senior counsel for the petitioners to the effect that so far as Sec.4(1) Notification is concerned, it is universal and is not only applicable to the petitioner in the case cited above but to every one concerned with the acquisition proceeding including the petitioners herein and this argument cannot so easily be brushed aside. Moreover, the reasons assigned by the learned Judge also are quite convincing and acceptable in the sense that non-publication by affixure in the Collectorate, Taluk Office and the nearest police station and by beat of tom-tom has affected the case in no small measure and the learned single Judge has held such acquisition bad in law and had ultimately quashed the very G.O. under which the Notification under Sec.4(1) had been issued for the acquisition of many properties including those which are belonging to the petitioners in the case in hand. 45. On the part of the respondents, so far as this point is concerned, the learned Special Government Pleader (L.A.) would contend that the judgment relied upon by the other side i.e., A.Vembuli Naicker v. State of Tamil Nadu and others i.e., A.Vembuli Naicker v. State of Tamil Nadu and others i.e., A.Vembuli Naicker v. State of Tamil Nadu and others (1992)1 MLJ. 26 is passed followed the earlier decisions of this Court reported in (i) Krishnan v. State of Tamil Nadu Krishnan v. State of Tamil Nadu Krishnan v. State of Tamil Nadu (1991)2 MLJ. 150 and (ii) State of Tamil Nadu v. Mohammed Yousuf State of Tamil Nadu v. Mohammed Yousuf State of Tamil Nadu v. Mohammed Yousuf (1990)2 MLJ. 149 , and these cases went on appeal to the Supreme Court and the judgment reported in (1991)2 MLJ. 150 and (ii) State of Tamil Nadu v. Mohammed Yousuf State of Tamil Nadu v. Mohammed Yousuf State of Tamil Nadu v. Mohammed Yousuf (1990)2 MLJ. 149 , and these cases went on appeal to the Supreme Court and the judgment reported in (1991)2 MLJ. 150 got reversed as per the judgment of the Apex Court reported in State of Tamil Nadu v. W.Krishnan State of Tamil Nadu v. W.Krishnan State of Tamil Nadu v. W.Krishnan (1996)1 S.C.C. 250 : A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 498; that the other in (1990)2 MLJ. 149 went on appeal to the Supreme Court at the instigation of the State and the Supreme Court confirmed it, but subsequently held it ‘no longer a good law’; that the case cited by the other side i.e., (1992)1 MLJ. 26 . is based on two cases, out of which one one got reversed and the other held to be per incuriam and ultimately the learned Special Government Pleader would submit that the case of the petitioner in (1992)1 MLJ. 26 was allowed on a different basis and the same principle cannot be applied to the case in hand. 46. This argument of the learned Special Government Pleader cannot be accepted in the sense that the said judgment was not referred in any other case having similar set of facts but the very G.O. under which the Notification under Sec.4(1) was issued, which is the subject matter of the case in hand was also the subject matter in the earlier writ petition. Hence, unless the said judgment is testified and set aside, it holds good for all purposes. 47. The other argument of the respondents that the judgment in A.Vembuli Naicker v. State of Tamil Nadu and others A.Vembuli Naicker v. State of Tamil Nadu and others A.Vembuli Naicker v. State of Tamil Nadu and others (1992)1 MLJ. 26 was passed following the earlier decisions of this Court and that those cases went on appeal to the Supreme Court where one got reversed and the other was held to be per incuriam and hence the same would not hold good, is not only far-fetched but also unacceptable. 26 was passed following the earlier decisions of this Court and that those cases went on appeal to the Supreme Court where one got reversed and the other was held to be per incuriam and hence the same would not hold good, is not only far-fetched but also unacceptable. Since the said judgment has become final without being challenged by anyone much less the respondents herein, it is not only the reasoning but the very decision still holds good and this Court is in full agreement with the decision rendered by the learned single Judge in the said case and the same is ascertained herein, thus answering point No.3 also in favour of the petitioners and against the petitioners quashing the very G.O.Ms.No.857, Housing and Urban Development, dated 28. 1985. 48. Point No.4: So far as point No.4 is concerned, it is the contention of the petitioners that Notification under Sec.4(1) was issued on 29. 1985 and later declaration under Sec.6 had been made on 29. 1986 beyond the period of one year fixed by law and at this score also, the acquisition proceeding is liable to be quashed. In reply, on the part of the respondents it would be contended that Sec.4(1) Notification having come to be approved on 28. 1985, the Gazette Publication was made on 29. 1985 and the paper publication was effected on 30.9.1985 and the locality publication was done as required by rules on 10. 1985 and would stress that it was the last publication effected that should be taken into account as the date to be reckoned and since in this case the locality publication was effected on 10. 1985, the draft declaration was made under Sec.6 on 29. 1986 was in time. But, the learned counsel has not substantiated his claim so as to reckon the date of last publication for the purpose of calculation. 1985, the draft declaration was made under Sec.6 on 29. 1986 was in time. But, the learned counsel has not substantiated his claim so as to reckon the date of last publication for the purpose of calculation. It is relevant to extract proviso (ii) to Sec.6 of the Act wherein the period of one year is fixed to pass Sec.6 declaration from the date of Sec.4(1) Notification; “..no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a notification under Sec.4, Sub-sec.(1) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of one year from the date of the publication of the notification.” The language employed in this section in the proviso would indicate that section is negative in approach that “no declaration shall be made after the expiry of one year from the date of publication of the Notification under Sec.4(1).” It is relevant to note that proviso deals with only “publication of notification”. Hence, we could safely rely upon this and declare that it is only the publication of Sec.4 (1) Notification and not any other publication whether in the newspaper or in the locality or by affixure at important places etc. which may vary from case to case and in certain cases such publications practically carried out may even go beyond the period of one year from the date of publication of the Notification under Sec.4(1) and hence such publication practically effected cannot be construed as the “publication of notification” meant by section and hence it has to be concluded that “by publication of notification” itself mean only the publication of the Notification under Sec.4(1) in the Official Gazette and none else. In so far as the case in hand is concerned, such publication of the Notification under Sec.4(1) in the gazette having been effected on 29. 1985 and the Sec.6 declaration having been made on 29. 1986, it could safely be concluded that the period of one year has gone by. Thus, this point is also decided in favour of the petitioners and against the respondents. 49. Point No.5: So far as the last point, whether the award was passed within two years from the date of draft declaration under Sec.6 of the Act, is concerned, it is the contention of the petitioners that the last mode of publication of Sec.6 declaration was made on 10. 49. Point No.5: So far as the last point, whether the award was passed within two years from the date of draft declaration under Sec.6 of the Act, is concerned, it is the contention of the petitioners that the last mode of publication of Sec.6 declaration was made on 10. 1986 and the Award was intimated to the petitioners on 210. 1988, having posted the same on 210. 1988, but purported to have signed on 30.9.1988. On the part of the respondents, it would be maintained that the Award was on 30.9.1988, but on account of certain enforcing circumstances, the intimation had been made with the delay and hence it could be ignored. But, such of the argument would be strongly opposed by the petitioners on ground that the Award made as per the provisions of the law should be immediately intimated to the landowners and since the same had been intimated on 210. 1988, it is a sure case wherein in order to get over the problem of the requirement of the law that the award should be made within two years from the date of draft declaration with an antedate of 30.9.1988 by manipulation of records, the respondents have acted and such a long delay could never be attributed for any reasonableness. This contention of the petitioners has to be accepted in the sense that it is not a delay of day or two but 25 days which is inordinate and unacceptable. Hence, the irresistible conclusion that could be arrived at is that the award had been passed over and beyond the mandatory period of two years. In result, this point is also decided in favour of the petitioners. 50. From out of the judgments cited by both sides, since the judgments other than those which have been taken up and considered in the discussion, as above, are neither having any bearing or application to the facts and circumstances covering the case in hand, they become inapplicable. 51. For all the foregoing discussions held, the only decision that could be arrived at in the context of the position of law is the writ petitioners have established their case substantially so as to be accepted in all respects. 52. In result, the above writ petition succeeds and the same is allowed. 53. G.O.Ms.No.857, Housing and Urban Development, dated 28. For all the foregoing discussions held, the only decision that could be arrived at in the context of the position of law is the writ petitioners have established their case substantially so as to be accepted in all respects. 52. In result, the above writ petition succeeds and the same is allowed. 53. G.O.Ms.No.857, Housing and Urban Development, dated 28. 1985 issued by the first respondent culminating in the Award bearing No.2/88 Vanagaram dated 30.9.1988 and consequential impugned notice dated 30.9.1988 of the third respondent so far as they are concerned with the lands of the petitioners are hereby quashed. 54. Respondents are hereby restrained from proceeding further in any manner with the said acquisition proceedings as regards the lands of the petitioners comprised in S.Nos.12/2, 13/1 and 16/2 of Vanagaram village, Saidapet Taluk, Chingleput District. 55. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.