Judgment : This civil miscellaneous appeal has been filed against the grant of probate by the District Court, Kanyakumari in O.P.No.82 of 1989 filed by the first respondent herein. 2. A preliminary objection was raised as regards the maintainability of the civil miscellaneous appeal. The learned counsel referred to a number of decisions in support of his contention that only a civil miscellaneous appeal would lie and they are: (i) Mrs.Panzy Fernandas v. M.F.Queoros and others Mrs.Panzy Fernandas v. M.F.Queoros and others Mrs.Panzy Fernandas v. M.F.Queoros and others A.I.R. 1963 All. 153; (ii) Philo Peter and another v. Divyanathan Philo Peter and another v. Divyanathan Philo Peter and another v. Divyanathan A.I.R. 1989 Mad. 111; (iii) Fr. V.M.Skaria and others v. T.George and others Fr. V.M.Skaria and others v. T.George and others Fr. V.M.Skaria and others v. T.George and others A.I.R. 1999 Ker. 320; As against these decisions, the decisions for the contra position are: (i) Perumal Chetty v. W.Kandasamy Chetty Perumal Chetty v. W.Kandasamy Chetty Perumal Chetty v. W.Kandasamy Chetty 44 MLJ. 146; (ii) Noor Mohammad and another v. Mohammad Kareem and another Noor Mohammad and another v. Mohammad Kareem and another Noor Mohammad and another v. Mohammad Kareem and another (1938)1 MLJ. 443 :A.I.R. 1938 Mad. 502; (iii) Florence Chelliah v. Soundararaj Peter and others Florence Chelliah v. Soundararaj Peter and others Florence Chelliah v. Soundararaj Peter and others (1966)2 MLJ. 33 ; (iv) R.Rama Subbarayalu Reddiar v. Rengammal R.Rama Subbarayalu Reddiar v. Rengammal R.Rama Subbarayalu Reddiar v. Rengammal A.I.R. 1962 Mad. 450. 3. Theappeal has been filed under Sec.299 of the Indian Succession Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) Sec.299 of the Act runs as follows: “Every order made by a District Judge by virtue of the powers hereby conferred upon him shall be subject to appeal to the High Court in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) applicable to appeals.” 4. In Mrs.Panzy Fernandas v. M.F.Queoros and others Mrs.Panzy Fernandas v. M.F.Queoros and others Mrs.Panzy Fernandas v. M.F.Queoros and others A.I.R. 1963 All. 153 - Full Bench, it has been held that, “The order on a petition for letters of administration under Sec.278 of the Succession Act is not a decree as the order is not passed in a suit. In Mrs.Panzy Fernandas v. M.F.Queoros and others Mrs.Panzy Fernandas v. M.F.Queoros and others Mrs.Panzy Fernandas v. M.F.Queoros and others A.I.R. 1963 All. 153 - Full Bench, it has been held that, “The order on a petition for letters of administration under Sec.278 of the Succession Act is not a decree as the order is not passed in a suit. Proceedings for letters of administration under the Succession Act are not commenced by the institution of a plaint. On the other hand, as Sec.278 of the said Act shows, they are commenced by an” application or a petition“. The decision appealed against is described in Sec.299 as an” Order“, and not a decree. Thus the decision of a Court in proceedings for letters of administration cannot be described as a decree. The Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court also relied on a decision of the Privy Council in Hansraj Gupta and others v. Dehra Dun-Mussorie Electric Tramway Co. Ltd. Hansraj Gupta and others v. Dehra Dun-Mussorie Electric Tramway Co. Ltd. Hansraj Gupta and others v. Dehra Dun-Mussorie Electric Tramway Co. Ltd. A.I.R. 1933 P.C. 63 wherein it was observed as follows: “The word “suit” ordinarily means, and apart from some context must be taken to mean, a civil proceeding instituted by the presentation of a plaint or an order to qualify to be a decree, it should have the force of a decree. It should be a final adjudication of the rights of the parties”. 5. In Mst.Puinbasi Majhiani v. Shiba Bhue and another Mst.Puinbasi Majhiani v. Shiba Bhue and another Mst.Puinbasi Majhiani v. Shiba Bhue and another A.I.R. 1967 Ori. 41 it has been held by the Orissa High Court that, “A proceeding to obtain probate of a Will cannot be said to be instituted on a plaint nor can be appeal against an order made in such proceeding be said to arise out of any suit.” 6. In Philo Peter and another v. Divyanaihan and others Philo Peter and another v. Divyanaihan and others Philo Peter and another v. Divyanaihan and others (1988)2 MLJ. 19:A.I.R. 1989 Mad. In Philo Peter and another v. Divyanaihan and others Philo Peter and another v. Divyanaihan and others Philo Peter and another v. Divyanaihan and others (1988)2 MLJ. 19:A.I.R. 1989 Mad. 111: (1988)102 L.W. 181 a Bench of this Court held that; “an application under Secs.276, 222 and 295 of the Succession Act for grant of Probate or Letters of Administration even if it becomes contentious cannot be considered to be a suit in the strict sense and that no ad valorem court-fee is payable.” The Bench relied on the Full Bench judgment of the Allahabad High Court already referred to. The Bench referred to the judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court in Flarence Chelliah v. Soundararaj Peter and others Flarence Chelliah v. Soundararaj Peter and others Flarence Chelliah v. Soundararaj Peter and others (1966)2 MLJ. 33 wherein N.Veeraswami, J. (as the learned Judge then was) had occasion to deal with the question and the learned Judge held as follows: The substance of Sec.295 of the Succession Act is that when there is an opposition to an application for probate, it becomes contentious and it is therefore to be tried as a suit. But merely because a caveat is not entered or that it does not bear a stamp, it does not mean that the application for probate when registered as a suit need not bear one half of the scale of court-fee prescribed under the Court-fees Act as laid down in Art.11(k) of the Court-fees Act. “Caveat in probate proceedings is nothing more than a warning that the application is likely to become contentious and will have to be tried as a suit. 7. This was overruled by the Bench in the case of Philo Peter and another v. Divyanathan and others Philo Peter and another v. Divyanathan and others Philo Peter and another v. Divyanathan and others A.I.R. 1989 Mad. 111. The Bench ultimately held with regard to the decision in the case of Flarence Chelliah v. Soundararaj Peter and others Flarence Chelliah v. Soundararaj Peter and others Flarence Chelliah v. Soundararaj Peter and others (1966)2 MLJ. 33 as follows: “As regards the decision of Veeraswami, J. as he then was, in Flarence Chelliah v. Soundararaj Peter Flarence Chelliah v. Soundararaj Peter Flarence Chelliah v. Soundararaj Peter (1966)2 MLJ. 33 as follows: “As regards the decision of Veeraswami, J. as he then was, in Flarence Chelliah v. Soundararaj Peter Flarence Chelliah v. Soundararaj Peter Flarence Chelliah v. Soundararaj Peter (1966)2 MLJ. 33 it is seen that the question was not raised in the form in which it is raised in these proceedings and, therefore, the learned Judge had no opportunity to consider the matter from this angle. The only question that was raised before the learned Judge was whether the filing of a caveat is a condition precedent for treating the proceedings as a suit. It was a case where the objectors were impleaded as respondents in the original petition itself, and, therefore, it was contended that in the absence of a caveat being entered on their behalf, court-fee was not payable. In dealing with this question, the learned Judge came to the conclusion that merely because there was no formal entry of a caveat, it does not mean that the proviso is none the less applicable. Even if it is to be construed that the Judge has taken a different view, we hold that it is no longer a good law”. 8. In a recent decision in Fr.V.M.Skaria and others v. K.T.George and others Fr.V.M.Skaria and others v. K.T.George and others Fr.V.M.Skaria and others v. K.T.George and others A.I.R. 1999 Ker. 320 a learned Judge of the Kerala High Court has held following Mrs.Panzy Fernandas v. Mrs.M.F.Queoros and others Mrs.Panzy Fernandas v. Mrs.M.F.Queoros and others Mrs.Panzy Fernandas v. Mrs.M.F.Queoros and others A.I.R. 1963 All. 153 that the fact that an application on being contentious was converted into a suit would not make an order a decree and that an appeal against such order has to be registered as miscellaneous first appeal and not as suit appeal. There is one other earlier decision of this Court which has to be referred to in this connection. It is the decision in the case of J.M.Rodrigues v. A.M.Mathias and another J.M.Rodrigues v. A.M.Mathias and another J.M.Rodrigues v. A.M.Mathias and another 21 MLJ. 481. In that case, the question as to the proper Court fee payable on the memorandum of appeal against an order in probate proceedings arose for consideration. It was held that the order granting probate is not a decree nor an order having the force of a decree. 481. In that case, the question as to the proper Court fee payable on the memorandum of appeal against an order in probate proceedings arose for consideration. It was held that the order granting probate is not a decree nor an order having the force of a decree. It was held further: “We do not think Art.II of Sch.II applies for the order appealed against undoubtedly has the force of a decree as it decides the representatives title and to this extent we agree with the decisions of this Court in Appeal No.94 of 1900 and Appeal No.54 of 1900. In support of the contention that Art.1 of Sch.II applies, we are referred to the case of Famsang Devabhai v. Goyabhai Kilkhabhai and Upadhya Thakur v. Pershid Singh These decisions undoubtedly support the contention. The question of applicability of Art.1 of Sch.II was not considered in Appeal Nos.54 and 94 of 1900 already referred to, and we are prepared to follow the Calcutta and Bombay decisions. We also think that on principle an ad valorem stamp should not be levied in such cases. The only title which the order appealed against gives to the petitioner is the right to administer the estate and if he has to sue to recover the estate he will have to pay stamp duty on its value. We do not think stamp duty on the value of the estate should be twice exacted. 9. As against these decisions, we have the following decisions taking a contrary view. The first of the decisions is the one reported in Perumal Chetty v. Kandaswamy Chetty 44 MLJ. 146 which is as follows: “The question is whether the decision of a Judge sitting on the Original Side in a contentious probate suit is a final judgment, so that a Memorandum of appeal from it comes under Serial No.35 of Appendix II of the Original Side Rules as being from a” final judgment “ or under Serial No.36 as being from any other judgment or order. The nature of the proceedings in contested probate suit is clear from an examination of the rules on the Original Side. The nature of the proceedings in contested probate suit is clear from an examination of the rules on the Original Side. By R.474, where a caveat had been entered, the petition which had been previously issued by those claiming to be the legal personal representatives to obtain the probate, and the caveat, shall be numbered and registered as a suit, in which the petitioner shall be the plaintiff and the caveator shall be the defendant. Later sections provide that the petition and the caveat are to be taken as the plaint and the written statement of the defendant respectively, and there are provisions made for the bearing of the matter, and for the payment of costs. … There must be a final decision between the parties to a suit. Here by the rule there was a suit. The petition and the caveat were numbered and registered as a suit. The petitioner was the plaintiff and the caveator was the defendant. It follows, in my judgment, that the decision between those parties was a judgment. That it was final I have got the least doubt. It is worth observing that the appeal from that decision must be under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, because it is only there that one finds a right of appeal from the Original Side, and that right to appeal is limited to judgments. From this it follows that, if this decision is not a judgment, there is no appeal and it would indeed be a remarkable thing if no appeal lay from such a decision. Indeed in this case the appellant is driven to contend, that for the purpose of paying court-fees that it is not a judgment at all, but for the purpose of an appeal, it is a judgment”. .10. The next decision is Noor Mohammed and another v. Mohammad Kareem and another Noor Mohammed and another v. Mohammad Kareem and another Noor Mohammed and another v. Mohammad Kareem and another A.I.R. 1938 Mad. 502. The matter arose against the order of the District Court. The District Judge refused to make a full enquiry and against the order of the District Judge, an appeal came to be filed before this Court. 502. The matter arose against the order of the District Court. The District Judge refused to make a full enquiry and against the order of the District Judge, an appeal came to be filed before this Court. It was held by the Division Bench as follows: .“Under Sec.295, Succession Act, where there is contention the proceedings must take the form of a regular suit according to the Civil Procedure Code. There was certainly contention in this case and the learned District Judge could not proceed to decide the matter in a summary fashion, leaving his decision subject to modification in a suit to be filed afterwards. We allow this appeal and sent aside the order of the learned District Judge. The case must be restored to file and dealt with according to law after directing the appellants and respondent 2 to file duly stamped caveats”. 11. In the case of Soundararaja Peter and others v. Florance Chellaiah and others Soundararaja Peter and others v. Florance Chellaiah and others Soundararaja Peter and others v. Florance Chellaiah and others A.I.R. 1975 Mad. 194 the petition under Sec.217 read with Sec.222 of the Indian Succession Act was itself numbered as a suit and against that decision in the suit, regular appeal was entertained by a Bench of this Court. In Inder Chand Nayyar v. Sarvadeshik Arya Pratinidhi Sabha and another Inder Chand Nayyar v. Sarvadeshik Arya Pratinidhi Sabha and another Inder Chand Nayyar v. Sarvadeshik Arya Pratinidhi Sabha and another A.I.R. Delhi 1977 340 a first appeal alone was entertained by the Delhi High Court against the order of the District Judge. .12. In Diwan Brothers v. Central Bank of India A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1503, it was held by the Supreme Court that: .“The decision of the Tribunal constituted under Displaced Perspons (Debts Adjustment) Act either allowing a claim of rejecting a claim, though described as a decree in the Act, does not make it a decree within the meaning of the Court-fees Act. The decision does not fulfil the requirements of a decree within the meaning of Schedule II Art.11 of the Court-fees Act and therefore, ad valorem court-fee need not be paid. The learned counsel Mr.Shanmugavel relies on this decision in support of his contention that the decision of the lower court in the instant case is only an order and not a decree. The learned counsel Mr.Shanmugavel relies on this decision in support of his contention that the decision of the lower court in the instant case is only an order and not a decree. The Supreme Court itself in the citation referred to held that even in cases where the statute specifically states that the order is a decree, it is not a decree. By the same token, it can also he argued that merely because a particular statute states that the decision under the section is an order, it does not mean that it cannot be a decree. Nomenclature is immaterial. There decision of the Supreme Court does not, therefore, advance the case of the appellant”. 13. In Rama Subbarayalu Reddiar v. Rengammal Rama Subbarayalu Reddiar v. Rengammal Rama Subbarayalu Reddiar v. Rengammal (1962)2 MLJ. 318 :A.I.R. 1962 Mad. 450:75 L.W. 452:I.L.R. 1962 Mad. 1001 it has been held by a Full Bench of this Court in paragraph 15 of the judgment as follows: “But if, both the High Court and the Government invest a Subordinate Judge with jurisdiction under Part X of the Indian Succession Act, an event which is not at all likely to happen, there will no doubt be a difficulty in the matter of appeal, for if the Subordinate Judge is held to have exercised jurisdiction under the notification issued under Sec.388 of the Indian Succession Act an appeal will lie to the District Court whereas if it is deemed to exercise jurisdiction under the notification of the High Court under Sec.29 of the Madras Civil Courts Act, the appeal will lie to the High Court”. No doubt, the question whether it was a decree or an order was not directly the issue before the Full Bench. But the fact remains that the Full Bench has observed that an appeal alone will lie against the decision by the Subordinate Court either to the District Court or to the High Court depending on the power exercised by the Government or the High Court as the case may be. 14. From a conspectus of the various decisions referred to already, the question to be decided now is whether an appeal will lie or a civil miscellaneous appeal will lie against the decision or order passed under Sec.295 of the Indian Succession Act. 14. From a conspectus of the various decisions referred to already, the question to be decided now is whether an appeal will lie or a civil miscellaneous appeal will lie against the decision or order passed under Sec.295 of the Indian Succession Act. In the case of J.M.Rodrigues v. A.N.Mathias and another J.M.Rodrigues v. A.N.Mathias and another J.M.Rodrigues v. A.N.Mathias and another 21 MLJ. 481 already referred to, the Division Bench held that in an appeal against the order in probate proceedings, no ad valorem court-fee was payable. In the case of Perumal Chetty v. W.Kandasamy Chetty Perumal Chetty v. W.Kandasamy Chetty Perumal Chetty v. W.Kandasamy Chetty 44 MLJ. 146 it was held that the proceeding out of which the appeal arose was a suit in which the petitioner was the plaintiff and the caveator was the defendant and that the decision in it was therefore a final judgment and not an order. In the judgment in J.M.Rodrigues v. A.M.Mathias and another J.M.Rodrigues v. A.M.Mathias and another J.M.Rodrigues v. A.M.Mathias and another 21 MLJ. 481 there was a reference to two unreported judgments of this Court in Appeal No.94 of 1900 and Appeal No.54 of 1900. In those two appeals, the bench held that the orders passed in probate proceedings were decrees but those passed in succession certificate proceedings were only orders. The Bench which decided the case 21 MLJ. 481, has not followed the unreported judgments of the earlier Division Bench after merely referring to them. In Noor Mohammad and another v. Mohammad Kareem and another Noor Mohammad and another v. Mohammad Kareem and another Noor Mohammad and another v. Mohammad Kareem and another A.I.R. 1933 Mad. 502 it has been held that where there is contending, the proceeding must take the form of a regular suit according to the Civil Procedure Code. 15. All these decisions were before the Court-fees Act of 1955. Even when the position was not clear as to the court-fee payable, at least three Bench decisions and one single Judges decision took the view that the order passed in applications under the Succession Act was a judgment. Only the decision in the case of J.M.Rodrigues v. A.M.Mathias and another J.M.Rodrigues v. A.M.Mathias and another J.M.Rodrigues v. A.M.Mathias and another 21 MLJ. 481 takes a different view. Only the decision in the case of J.M.Rodrigues v. A.M.Mathias and another J.M.Rodrigues v. A.M.Mathias and another J.M.Rodrigues v. A.M.Mathias and another 21 MLJ. 481 takes a different view. However, in the present Court-fees Act, there is no discrimination between the orders passed in probate proceedings and the orders passed in succession certificate proceedings and the appeals arising out of them are chargeable with court-fee one half the ad valorem scale of fee. 16. Havingsteered clear of the earlier view point and having taken note of the fact that where there is contention, the proceeding takes the form of a suit according to the Code of Civil Procedure, the question now to be decided is whether it will be an appeal or civil miscellaneous appeal. The decision of the Bench reported in Philo Peter and another v. Divyanathan and others Philo Peter and another v. Divyanathan and others Philo Peter and another v. Divyanathan and others A.I.R. 1989 Mad. 111 indeed referred to the earlier Bench decision in Noor Mohammad and another v. Mohammad Kareem and another Noor Mohammad and another v. Mohammad Kareem and another Noor Mohammad and another v. Mohammad Kareem and another A.I.R. 1938 Mad. 502 and Flarence Chelliah and gets over those decisions by saying as follows: “We feel that the principles laid down in the said rulings are of no help to the respondents as they have not strictly considered the points that are being projected now in these proceedings. Moreover, we are unable to agree with the reasonings expressed in those decisions.” 17. With great respect, the Bench decision has not adverted to the specific provision in Sec.295 of the Act where it is said that, “Where there is contention, the proceeding must take the form of a regular suit according to the Code of Civil Procedure and once it taken the form of a suit, the order must be deemed to be a decree”. The Bench of the case of Philo Peter and another v. Divyanathan and others Philo Peter and another v. Divyanathan and others Philo Peter and another v. Divyanathan and others A.I.R. 1989 Mad. 111 went into the question as to the proper court-fee payable in the appeal against the order under Sec.295 of the Act. The Bench of the case of Philo Peter and another v. Divyanathan and others Philo Peter and another v. Divyanathan and others Philo Peter and another v. Divyanathan and others A.I.R. 1989 Mad. 111 went into the question as to the proper court-fee payable in the appeal against the order under Sec.295 of the Act. In the present Court-Fees Act, there is no distinction between probate proceedings and succession certificate proceedings and the proviso to Art.11, Sub-clause (k) of Sch.II of the Court-Fees Act says as follows: “Provided that if a caveat is entered and the application is registered as a suit, one half the scale of fee prescribed in Art.1 of Sch.I of the market value of the estate less the fee already paid on the application shall be levied”. 18. Inmy view, there is no escape from the position that when once it becomes contentious, the application has got to be registered as a suit. When once it becomes suit, the order passed becomes a decree and if it is decree, then it can be only an appeal and not a miscellaneous appeal. The Bench in the case of Philo Peter and another v. Divyanathan and another Philo Peter and another v. Divyanathan and another Philo Peter and another v. Divyanathan and another A.I.R. 1989 Mad. 111 went into the question as to the court-fee payable and did not decide the question as to whether against an order in an application under Sec.295 of the Indian Succession Act, an appeal of a miscellaneous appeal would lie. However, having regard to the other Bench decisions, namely, unreported judgments in Appeal Nos.94 of 1900 and 54 of 1900, Noor Mohammad and another v. Mohammad Kareem and another Noor Mohammad and another v. Mohammad Kareem and another Noor Mohammad and another v. Mohammad Kareem and another A.I.R. 1938 Mad. 502, Soundararaja Peter and others I have absolutely no doubt in my mind that the proper remedy is a regular appeal against the the order by the District Court under Sec.295 of the Indian Succession Act. 19. It has been held in Gudavarapur Seshamma v. Kornepati Venkata Narasimha Rao and others Gudavarapur Seshamma v. Kornepati Venkata Narasimha Rao and others Gudavarapur Seshamma v. Kornepati Venkata Narasimha Rao and others (1940)1 MLJ. 19. It has been held in Gudavarapur Seshamma v. Kornepati Venkata Narasimha Rao and others Gudavarapur Seshamma v. Kornepati Venkata Narasimha Rao and others Gudavarapur Seshamma v. Kornepati Venkata Narasimha Rao and others (1940)1 MLJ. 400 by a Full Bench of this Court as follows: “The Division Bench in a final court of appeal in an Indian High Court, unless the case is referred to a Full Bench and one Division Bench should regard itself bound by the decision of another Division Bench on a question of law. If a Division Bench does not accept as correct the decision on a question of law of another Division Bench, the only right and proper course to adopt is to refer the matter to a Full Bench.” 20. In Mahadeolal Kanodia v. The Administrator General of West Bengal A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 936 the Supreme Court has observed as follows: “A Division Bench should not take upon itself to say that an earlier Division Bench ruling of the same High Court cited before it, is wrong, but should follow the usual procedure in case of difference of opinion with an earlier decision, of referring the question to a larger Bench. Judicial decorum, no less than legal propriety forms the basis of judicial procedure. Similarly, a single Judge differing from a decision of another single Judge in a previous case on a question of law should refer the case to a larger Bench instead of deciding the case in accordance with his own view”. It has been further held by the Supreme Court: “It is the uniform practice in all the High Courts in India that if one Division Bench differs from an earlier view on a question of Law of another Division Bench, a reference is made to a large Bench”. 21. In Jai Kaur and others v. Sher Singh and others A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1118 the Supreme Court again stated as follows: “Though a Full Bench decision may not state in so many words that certain cases were wrongly, decided, when a Full Bench decides a question in a particular way every previous decision which had answered the same question in a different way cannot but be held to have been wrongly decided a subsequent Division Bench cannot disagree with a previous decision of the Full Bench of the same court”. 22. 22. In Rama Subbarayalu Reddiar v. Rengammal Rama Subbarayalu Reddiar v. Rengammal Rama Subbarayalu Reddiar v. Rengammal (1966)2 MLJ. 318 :75 L.W.452:A.I.R. 1962 Mad. 450 already referred to, the Full Bench dealing with the question as to what the Subordinate courts are to do when there is a conflict between two decisions of the High Court observed as follows: “Where the conflict is between the judgment of a single Judge and a Bench or between a Bench and a larger Bench the decision of the Bench of the larger Bench, as the case may be, will have to be followed. But where the conflict is between two decisions both pronounced by a Bench consisting of the same number of Judges, and the Subordinate Court after a careful examination of the decisions comes to the conclusion that both of them directly apply to the case before it will then be at liberty to follow that decision which seems to it more correct, whether such decision be the latter or the earlier one”. .23. In Ram Jivan v. Smt.Phholo, (Dead) By L.Rs. and others Ram Jivan v. Smt.Phholo, (Dead) By L.Rs. and others Ram Jivan v. Smt.Phholo, (Dead) By L.Rs. and others A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 844 it has been observed as follows: .“Whether a Division Bench decision is given in an appeal from an original suit or in a writ petition the ratio is binding on the subsequent Division Bench. Merely because the previous Division Bench judgment was given in a suit the subsequent Division Bench cannot refuse to follow the same because it was hearing the proceeding in a writ petition.” .24. In Ayyaswami Gounder and others v. Munnuswamy Gounder and others Ayyaswami Gounder and others v. Munnuswamy Gounder and others Ayyaswami Gounder and others v. Munnuswamy Gounder and others A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1789 the Supreme Court dealing with the question as to what the Single Judge is to do when he did not agree with another single Judges view stated as follows: .“If the learned single Judge did not agree with that decision he should have referred the matter to a larger Bench and the judicial propriety or decorum did not warrant holding contrary to the decision of the same High Court by him.” 25. The rule of judicial precedent is a very salutary one and is aimed at achieving finality and homogeneity of judgments Ram Jivan v. Smt.Phhola (Dead) By L.Rs. and others Ram Jivan v. Smt.Phhola (Dead) By L.Rs. and others Ram Jivan v. Smt.Phhola (Dead) By L.Rs. and others A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 844. 26. As observed by the Full Bench in R.Rama Subbarayalu Reddiar v. Rengammal R.Rama Subbarayalu Reddiar v. Rengammal R.Rama Subbarayalu Reddiar v. Rengammal 74 L.W. 452 though the guidance was addressed to the Subordinate Courts, in my view, this Court also can follow the direction by the Full Bench. .27. The Bench in Philo Peter and another v. Divyanathan and others Philo Peter and another v. Divyanathan and others Philo Peter and another v. Divyanathan and others A.I.R. 1989 Mad. 111 no doubt, has not decided the question as to whether a regular appeal would lie or only a civil miscellaneous appeal would lie. The earlier Bench decision in Noor Mohammad and another v. Mohammad Kareem and another Noor Mohammad and another v. Mohammad Kareem and another Noor Mohammad and another v. Mohammad Kareem and another A.I.R. 1938 Mad. 502 in my view, is directly or the point and I am inclined to follow the same. Consequently, I hold that only an appeal is maintainable. 28. It is seen from the records that the appellant had originally presented the papers only as an appeal and had also paid the necessary court-fee and on the objection raised by the office, the appeal was converted into a civil miscellaneous appeal. Now that I have held that only a regular appeal is competent. So the Office is directed to renumber the civil miscellaneous appeal as a regular appeal and post it for hearing. 29. Having regard to the fact that the papers were presented in the year 1992, the Office is further directed to obtain orders from My Lord, the Honourable the Chief Justice for posting the appeal immediately before the learned Judge dealing in appeals. I particularly direct it this way, having regard to the age of the counsel for the appellant.