Judgment : The landlord is the revision petitioner. He sought the eviction of the respondent under Secs.10(2)(ii)(a) and 10(2)(vi) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on the grounds of unauthorised subletting and the tenant ceasing to occupy the premises. The allegations in support of the two grounds are as under; The first respondent became a tenant in respect of Door No.8, C.B.Road, Chidambaram Nagar V Lane, Madras-21 under the landlord on a monthly rent of Rs.200 exclusive of electricity charges, the tenancy being for non-residential purposes namely, running a flour mill from September, 1981. In January, 1989 the first respondent unauthorisedly sublet the portion to the second respondent on a monthly rent of Rs.500. This was without the written consent of the landlord and against express prohibition contained in the terms of the agreement. In fact, second respondent preferred a police complaint against the first respondent on 9. 1989 and the same was enquired into by the police authorities. There was a notice issued by the landlord on 19. 1989 calling upon the respondent to vacate the property. Though the first respondent received the notice he did not send any reply nor did he comply with the demand therein. Again in view of the disputes between the first and the second respondents, the first respondent had virtually kept the premises under lock and key from September, 1989 and the same was not being used. Thus, the respondents had become liable to be evicted. 2. The first respondent resisted the eviction petition on the following grounds: Ever since the lease in her favour she had been running the flour mill in the premises. She had not sublet the premises to the second respondent on the alleged rent of Rs.500. The second respondent was a broker in chillies business. He was one of the customers of the first respondent who used to bring large quantities of chillies for powdering the same in the flour mill of the first respondent. The second respondent did not pay the mill charges of chillies amounting to Rs.755. The first respondent was constrained to press him for the payment of the said amount. The second respondent therefore became inimical to the first respondent and went to the extent of lodging a false complaint against the first respondent in the police station. The second respondent did not pay the mill charges of chillies amounting to Rs.755. The first respondent was constrained to press him for the payment of the said amount. The second respondent therefore became inimical to the first respondent and went to the extent of lodging a false complaint against the first respondent in the police station. When the police were appraised of the true facts, the matter was closed. After the receipt of the lawyers notice, first respondents husband approached the landlord who was also residing in the same premises and appraised him of the true and full facts regarding the disputes between the first and the second respondents, the landlord told the first respondents husband that he had been wrongly informed by Narayanaswamy that the first respondent had sublet the property and therefore he was constrained to issue lawyers notice. After knowing the full facts through the husband of the first respondent, the landlord told him to pay Rs.120 being the cost of the lawyers notice. He also expressed regret for his hasty action. The first respondent bona fide felt that there was no need to give a reply notice. The subletting was a moonshine and the first respondent had not sublet the premises to the second respondent. The story had been invented with ulterior motive. It was also false to state that she had kept the petition premises under lock and key at any time much less from. September, 1989. This ground also had been invented for evicting the first respondent. The primary object of the landlord was to evict the first respondent and let out the property for higher rent after getting enormous pagidi. The petition was liable to be dismissed. 3. The second respondent filed a counter to the following effect. He became tenant under the first respondents husband one Natarajan form 21. 1989 by paying an advance of Rs.2,000 and agreeing to pay a monthly rent of Rs.500. He got possession of the property on 21. 1989 from the first respondents husband. Since then he had been paying the monthly rent regularly to the first respondents husband. This respondent had employed three persons for operating the flour mill business from 21. 1989. On 24. 1989 he spent Rs.2,150 for rewinding the motor coil and a further sum of Rs,2,000 on 7. 1989 for the second time. 1989 from the first respondents husband. Since then he had been paying the monthly rent regularly to the first respondents husband. This respondent had employed three persons for operating the flour mill business from 21. 1989. On 24. 1989 he spent Rs.2,150 for rewinding the motor coil and a further sum of Rs,2,000 on 7. 1989 for the second time. This respondent was led to believe that Natarajan was the owner of the flour mill. Therefore he was making payment of monthly rent of Rs.500 and electricity consumption charges to Natarajan. In due course the landlord came to know about the subletting to this respondent by Natarajan and the repairing of the Motor by this respondent. Subsequently, this respondent was asked to vacate the property by Natarajan within two months thereafter. In view of the huge moneys spent by him in the business, this respondent refused to vacate the petition premises so suddenly. However, Natarajan purposely overlooked the petition premises on 9. 1989 in the evening. On 9. 1989 this respondent lodged a complaint with the police of the high handedness of the husband of the first respondent. The Police authority warned this respondent and asked him to vacate the petition premises on 9. 1989. Both on 9. 1989 and 9. 1989 the police officials came to the petition premises and threatened this respondent to vacate the premises as otherwise he would be arrested. This respondent was forced to vacate the premises on 9. 1989 because of the intervention of the husband of the first respondent and the continuous threatening by the police people. In view of the disturbance caused to this respondent by the husband of the first respondent and the police department and also the heavy loss incurred by him due to the immediate vacating of the petition premises, this respondent sent a copy of the police complaint preferred by him by registered post with acknowledgement due to the landlord. This respondent had no dealings with the landlord on any occasion from 21. 1989 to 9. 1989 the date on which he delivered possession of the property. From 9. 1989 till 5. 1990 the petition premises were kept locked and only from 5. 1990 the flour mill was functioning. This respondent was not personally aware of the written agreement between the landlord and the first respondent. The petition deserved to be dismissed. 4. 1989 to 9. 1989 the date on which he delivered possession of the property. From 9. 1989 till 5. 1990 the petition premises were kept locked and only from 5. 1990 the flour mill was functioning. This respondent was not personally aware of the written agreement between the landlord and the first respondent. The petition deserved to be dismissed. 4. The landlord himself as P.W.1 and one Vasanthi as P.W.2 and marked documents P1 to P-5 on his side. The first respondent examined her brother one Narasimhan as R.W.1 and one Madanagopal as R.W.2 and marked Exs.R-1 to R-4. The second respondent examine himself as R.W.3 and marked Exs.R-5 to R-7 on his side. 5. The learned Rent controller framed the necessary points for consideration, relied on the documents filed on the side of the landlord and also counter filed by the second respondent, his documents as also his oral evidence rejected the case of the first respondent, found that there was unauthorised subletting by the first respondent in favour of the second respondent, that the first respondent had ceased to occupy the property from November, 1989 to April, 1990 and kept it under lock and key that both the grounds of unauthorised subletting and the property being kept under lock and key without being put to use had been made out and by order dated 28. 1992 directed the eviction of the respondents. 6. However, on appeal in R.C.A.No.1092 of 1992 the learned Appellate Authority by his decision dated 22. 1994 reversed the findings reached by the learned Rent Controller, set aside his order and dismissed the application for eviction holding that neither of the grounds for eviction had been made out. In coming to this conclusion the Appellate Authority found that there was collusion between the landlord and the second respondent, that the complaint alleged to have been given by the respondent was a make believe affair, that the contends of the complaint had not been substantiated by the second respondent, that the second respondent had been set up for the purpose of the case, that there was neither subletting nor did the first respondent comes to occupy the property. 7. Aggrieved by this reversal by the Appellate Authority the present C.R.P. has been filed by the landlord. 7. Aggrieved by this reversal by the Appellate Authority the present C.R.P. has been filed by the landlord. Mr.N.S.Varadachari learned counsel for the revision petitioner raised the following points: .• (i) The Appellate Authority failed to take note of the admission by the second respondent that he was a sub-lessee. .• (ii) The first respondent had not sent any reply to the notice issued on behalf of the landlord and this conduct would show that there had been subletting without the written consent of the landlord. .• (iii) The first respondent had admitted that there was an complaint lodged by the second respondent against the first respondent and in the complaint it is been specifically stated that the property had been let out by the first respondents husband one Natarajan to the second respondent on a monthly rent of Rs.500 and the second respondent had paid a sum of Rs.2,000 as advance and that the first respondents husband Natarajan had overlooked the premises and this would itself clearly show that there was parting of physical possession by the first respondent to the second respondent and there had therefore been subletting. .• (iv) The electricity consumption card would clearly show that the mill had not been running for a considerably long period and that therefore the second ground had also been made out. 8. Mr.A.Chenchurama Reddy learned counsel for the first respondent submitted as follows: .• (i) The landlord had been living in the same property, that his case was that there was subletting from January, 1989 till September, 1989 and he had not taken any steps. .• (ii) The basic ingredient to make out a case of subletting namely parting of possession had not been established in this case. .• (iii) The notice Ex.P-3 is dated 19. 1989 and having regard to the tenor of the notice the petition for eviction ought to have been filed soon. Thereafter, but the petition came to be filed only after nearly six months. .• (iv) The Appellate Authority had exercised powers under Sec.23 of the Act and this Court sitting in revision under Sec.25 of the Act cannot interfere with the factual finding of the Appellate Authority, learned counsel also relied on a number of decisions. The support of his contentions and they will be referred to in the course of the order. 9. The support of his contentions and they will be referred to in the course of the order. 9. Before proceeding further let us recapitulate the scope of Sec.25 of the Act with reference to decided authorities. (i) In Hari Shankar and others v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury Hari Shankar and others v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury Hari Shankar and others v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury , A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 698: (1962)1 S.C.R. (Supp.) 933 dealing with Sec.35 of the Delhi and Ajmar Rent Control Act, 1952 the Supreme Court set out the scope of the Revisional Powers of the High Court as under; “The section is thus framed to confer larger powers than the power to correct error of jurisdiction to which Sec.115 is limited. But it must not be overlooked that the section in spite of its apparent width of language where it confers a power on the High Court to pass such order as the High Court might think fit, is controlled by the opening words, where it says that the High Court may send for the record of the case to satisfy itself that the decision is recording to law. It stands to regard that if it was considered necessary that there should be a rehearing a right of appeal would be a more appropriate remedy, but the Act says that there is to be no further appeal.“ (ii) In Malini Ayyappa Naicker (died) by His Legal Representatives etc. v. Seth Manghraj Udavdas Firm By Managing Partner and others Malini Ayyappa Naicker (died) by His Legal Representatives etc. v. Seth Manghraj Udavdas Firm By Managing Partner and others Malini Ayyappa Naicker (died) by His Legal Representatives etc. v. Seth Manghraj Udavdas Firm By Managing Partner and others , A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1344 : (1969)1 S.C.C. 688 the Supreme Court while dealing with a similarly worded proviso in Sec.75(1) of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 catalogued some of the instances in which a High Court may interfere under the said proviso,” they are cases in which the court which made the order had no jurisdiction or in which the court has based its decision on evidence which should not have been admitted or cases where the unsuccessful party has not been given a proper opportunity of being heard, or the burden of proof has been placed on the wrong shoulders. Whenever the court comes to the conclusion that the unsuccessful party has not had a proper trial according to law, then the court can interfere.“ (iii) In Rukmani v. Deivasigamani , 1973 T.N.L.J. 172 it was held by this Court that,” though the power conferred on the revisional court under Sec.25 is wider than the power conferred on the High Court under Sec.115, C.P.C., the revisional court acting under Sec.25 of the Act will not be justified in re-appreciating the oral evidence. It may be open to the revisional court to reverse the finding of fact on oral evidence, if, there was no material whatever on which the appellate court would have arrived at the finding or on the ground that the finding was perverse.“ .(iv) In Dattopant Gopalrao v. Vithalrao Maruthi Rao , A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1111 dealing with Sec.50 of the Mysore Rent Control Act the Supreme Court observed as follows: .”Though the power conferred on the High Court under Sec.50 is not as narrow as the revisional power of the High Court under Sec.115 of the C.P.C. it was not wide enough to make the High Court the second court of first appeal. “ Where the findings of fact recorded by the Appellate Court were not found to be such by the High Court as to justify the exercise of its revisional power under Sec.50, it was held by the Supreme Court that,” there were no such passing grounds which would justify the Supreme Court upsetting the views of the High Court confirming those of the lower appellate court.“ .(v) In A.Ganesan v. Amaravatheeammal A.Ganesan v. Amaravatheeammal A.Ganesan v. Amaravatheeammal , (1983)2 MLJ. 505 a learned single Judge of this Court after referring to the observations of the Supreme Court in Sri Rajalakshmi Dyeing Works v. Rengasamy Sri Rajalakshmi Dyeing Works v. Rengasamy Sri Rajalakshmi Dyeing Works v. Rengasamy , A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1253 held that,” wherever two views are possible on the same set of facts it will not be correct for the High Court sitting in revision to reverse the view of the Appellate Authority passed on the same set of facts under Sec.25 of the Tamil Nadu Act XVIII of 1960.“ .(vi) In Sri Balaganesan Metals v. M.N.Shanmugham Chetty and others Sri Balaganesan Metals v. M.N.Shanmugham Chetty and others Sri Balaganesan Metals v. M.N.Shanmugham Chetty and others , A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1668 the Supreme Court dealing with the scope of Sec.25 of the Act observed as follows: .”Wherever the Appellate Authority had applied wrong tests and had also failed to give effect to unchallenged findings of the Rent Controller, the order of the Appellate Authority suffered from Manifest errors in the exercise of its jurisdiction and the High Court therefore entitled to interfere in revision.“ .(v) In Hiralal Kapur v. Prabhu Choudhary Hiralal Kapur v. Prabhu Choudhary Hiralal Kapur v. Prabhu Choudhary (1998)2 S.C.C. 172, dealing with the scope of Sec.25(B)(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 the Supreme Court held that, “even in mixed question of fact and law the High Court was not justified in reversing the finding of the fact of the Rent Controller.” .(vi) In N.L.Adinarayanan v. B.Krishanamurthy N.L.Adinarayanan v. B.Krishanamurthy N.L.Adinarayanan v. B.Krishanamurthy , (1990)2 MLJ. 34 Nainar Sundaram, J. as the learned Judge then was observed that merely because there is a possibility of saying that the question is a mixed question of fact and law, it is not sufficient to warrant the exercise of revisional powers. (vii) In Arumugha Chettiar v. Jayaraman , (1995)2 MLJ. 282 on the scope of Sec.25 of the Rent Control Act S.S.Subramani, J. stated the law on the subject as follows: “It empowers the High Court to interfere in the orders of the Appellate Authority in case the said order is irregular, illegal or improper. When the Appellate Authority has not taken into consideration the binding precedents of this Court and has also not taken into consideration the evidence that is let in, it can be said that the order of the Appellate Authority is improper. When the Appellate Authority has not taken into consideration the binding precedents of this Court and has also not taken into consideration the evidence that is let in, it can be said that the order of the Appellate Authority is improper. The Appellate Authority has also not entered findings on many points which have been considered by the Rent controller. The procedure adopted by the Appellate Authority can be said to be irregular. For all these reasons it must be held that the finding of the Appellate Authority is illegal, improper and irregular and thus court is entitled to revise the order. This court is not re-appreciating the evidence. It is only bringing to the notice of the parties that such an evidence has been letting, and on the basis of the evidence and binding precedents only such a conclusion could he arrived at”. (viii) In Sherwood Educational Society v. Abid Namazie and two others Sherwood Educational Society v. Abid Namazie and two others Sherwood Educational Society v. Abid Namazie and two others , (1997)1 MLJ. 445 S.S.Subramani, J. has in the same principles. .(ix) In Sarala Ahuja v. United India Insurance Company Ltd. Sarala Ahuja v. United India Insurance Company Ltd. Sarala Ahuja v. United India Insurance Company Ltd. , (1998)3 C.T.C. 679: A.I.R. 1998 S.C.W. 3451 the Supreme Court pointed out the distinction between revisional power and appellate power. Where as the power of revision is supervisory in nature and is intended to ensure that Rent Controller conforms to law when he passes order and the High Court while perusing records of Rent Controller must confine itself to seeing whether the order has been passed according to law. It is not permissible for the High Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction to enter a different finding on fact unless finding arrived at by the Rent Controller is so unreasonable that no Rent Controller could have reached such finding on the materials available. The revisional power is ordinarily power of supervision keeping subordinate tribunals within bounds of law. Expansion or construction of such revisional power would depend on how statute had couched such power. Reappreciation of evidence afresh to reach different conclusion when such reappraisal was not for the limited purpose to see whether finding of fact was wholly unreasonable amounts to overstepping revisional jurisdiction. Expansion or construction of such revisional power would depend on how statute had couched such power. Reappreciation of evidence afresh to reach different conclusion when such reappraisal was not for the limited purpose to see whether finding of fact was wholly unreasonable amounts to overstepping revisional jurisdiction. .(x) S.S.Subramani, J. again in T.S.Subramania Iyer v. P.K.Srinivasan by Power Agent, B.Ramu T.S.Subramania Iyer v. P.K.Srinivasan by Power Agent, B.Ramu T.S.Subramania Iyer v. P.K.Srinivasan by Power Agent, B.Ramu , (1999)3 MLJ. 391 after referring to several decisions of the Supreme Court has observed as follows: “Even though this Court is entitled to look into the evidence, that can only be for the purpose of considering whether the authorities below, and in this case, the Appellate Authority, has exercised the discretion properly and whether the reasoning of the Appellate Authority in the circumstances of the case, is reasonable, Merely because this Court on a reappreciation of evidence can come to a different conclusion, it cannot be held that the judgment of the Appellate Authority is not correct.” This decision is very strongly relied upon by Mr.Chenchurama Reddy learned counsel for the first respondent. .(xi) In Dev Kumar v. Swaran Lata , (1996)1 S.C.C. 25 after referring to (i) Rajbir Kaur v. S.Chokesiri & Co Rajbir Kaur v. S.Chokesiri & Co Rajbir Kaur v. S.Chokesiri & Co , (1989)1 S.C.C. 19 : (1988)2 S.C.R. (Supp.) 310; (ii) Nanakchand v. Inderjit Nanakchand v. Inderjit Nanakchand v. Inderjit , 1969 Rent.C.J. 881: 1969 Rent.C.R. 887; (iii) Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander , (1988)3 S.C.C. 131 : (1988)1 S.C.R. (Supp.) 239 which have laid down the parameters of the High Courts jurisdiction under Sec.15(5) of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act which is in pari materia with Sec.25 of the Tamil Nadu Act, the Supreme Court observed as follows: “The jurisdiction of the High Court under Sub-sec.(9) of Sec.15 of the Act, therefore would entitle the court to examine the legality and propriety of a conclusion of the Appellate Authority and is thus much wider than the revisional jurisdiction under Sec.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it has to be exercised subject to the well known limitations inherent in all revisional jurisdictions and cannot be equated with an appellate jurisdiction. This being the position, unless there is a perversity in the matter of appreciation of evidence by the Appellate Authority or unless the Appellate Authority has arrived at a conclusion which on the materials, no reasonable man can come to the High Court will not interfere with the same. In the same decision it has been held by the Supreme Court that the conclusion on the question of subletting is a conclusion on a question of law derived from the findings on materials on record as to the transfer of exclusive possession and as to the said transfer of possession being for consideration. In this connection the Supreme Court referred to its earlier decisions in (i) Jagdish Prasad v. Angoori Devi , (1984)2 S.C.C. 590 : (1984)3 S.C.R. 216 ; (ii) Shalimar Tar Products Limited v. H.C. Sharma Shalimar Tar Products Limited v. H.C. Sharma Shalimar Tar Products Limited v. H.C. Sharma , (1988)1 S.C.C. 70 : (1988)1 S.C.R. 1023 and (iii) Rajbirkaur v. S.Chokesiri & Co. Rajbirkaur v. S.Chokesiri & Co. Rajbirkaur v. S.Chokesiri & Co. , (1989)1 S.C.C.19: (1988)2 S.C.R. (Supp.) 310. The principles emanating are: ”Merely from the presence of the person other than the tenant in the shop subletting cannot be presumed if the control over the premises is kept by the tenant and the business run in the premises is that of the tenant; the allegation of subletting has to be proved by the landlord; there must be parting of legal possession by the tenant which means parting of possession with the right to include and also the right to exclude others.“” ….. the transaction of subletting in the guise of licences are in their every nature clandestine arrangements between the tenant and the sub-tenant and it would be difficult to get direct evidence on the same. If exclusive possession of the alleged sub-tenant is established then it may not be impermissible for the court to draw an inference that the transaction was entered into with mandatory (monetary) consideration in mind.“ So the basic ingredient to prove the case of subletting is parting with possession. (xii) Thus the finding regarding parting with possession for purposes of showing subletting is a question of law and even in case where the finding is concurrent the revisional court is competent to reverse the finding. (xii) Thus the finding regarding parting with possession for purposes of showing subletting is a question of law and even in case where the finding is concurrent the revisional court is competent to reverse the finding. Vide: S.K.Raffudin and others v. N.Yeswantha Rao and others Vide: S.K.Raffudin and others v. N.Yeswantha Rao and others Vide: S.K.Raffudin and others v. N.Yeswantha Rao and others , (1997)1 MLJ. 581 : (1997)2 L.W. 66 . 10. Let us now see whether the Appellate Authority in the instant case has, on the oral and documentary evidence reached the proper conclusion. The materials in this regard are supplied in the shape of the counter filed by the second respondent, Ex.P-2 which is the copy of the complaint given by the second respondent against the first respondent to the police and the evidence of P.W.2 and R.W.3 (R-2). There is no pleading by the first respondent that there was collusion between the landlord and the second respondent. The counter of the first respondent does not anywhere say that the landlord and the second respondent had colluded and created the complaint Ex.R-2, The specific case in the counter with regard to the complaint by the first respondent is that after receipt of the notice Ex.P-3 from the landlords lawyer her husband approached the landlord and appraised him the full facts regarding the dispute between her and the second respondent and that the landlord accepted the explanation offered in this behalf. In the oral evidence by Janakiraman the brother of the first respondent as R.W.1 it is specifically admitted that the landlord asked the first respondents husband and the witness about the contents of the complaint Ex.R-2. It was not spoken to by R.W.1 that the complaint had been engineered by the landlord and the second respondent. However, the Appellate Authority in paragraph 7 of his judgment finds that the first respondent not having kept her word to vacate the property had enlisted the support of the second respondent and created Ex.R-2 complaint and the eviction petition had been filed. As already noticed it is not the case in the counter that Ex.R-2 is a cooked up document. The Appellate Authority has travelled beyond the pleadings and found a new case for the first respondent on the basis of something trotted out in the course of arguments. As already noticed it is not the case in the counter that Ex.R-2 is a cooked up document. The Appellate Authority has travelled beyond the pleadings and found a new case for the first respondent on the basis of something trotted out in the course of arguments. The complaint given by the second respondent to the police against the first respondent has nowhere been disputed by the first respondent. The circumstances under which such a complaint came to be given were, according to the case of the first respondent, explained to the landlord and the explanation thus offered was accepted by the landlord. The complaint was given on 9. 1989 alleging that the first respondent had in a high handed manner overlooked the premises in which the second respondent was running the flour mill. A copy of the complaint had been marked to the landlord. A notice was issued under Ex.P-3 on 19. 1989 for there was no reply issued. There was reference to subletting. The explanation offered on behalf of the first respondent as to why no reply was sent to the notice was not accepted by the Rent Controller. But the Appellate Authority has gone as a tangent and observed that the claim made by the second respondent in the complaint to the police that he was a tenant under the first respondent at Rs.500 per month and that he had paid an advance of Rs.2,000 to the first respondent had not been substantiated by him. The first respondent had claimed that there were arrears payable by the second respondent towards chilli powdering charges that there was a demand made by her to the second respondent and this prompted the second respondent to lodge a false complaint. By the same token the Appellate Authority ought to have seen whether this case of the first respondent had been substantiated by him. This aspect of the matter had been lost sight of by the appellate authority. He has found a new case not pleaded by the parties. In fact, he has even gone to the extent of holding that the second respondent had been set up by the landlord for the purpose of this case. This again is not the case pleaded by the first respondent. He has found a new case not pleaded by the parties. In fact, he has even gone to the extent of holding that the second respondent had been set up by the landlord for the purpose of this case. This again is not the case pleaded by the first respondent. The Appellate Authority finds that there was enmity between the first and the second respondents and that that was the reason why the second respondent had contested the case and given evidence. 11. The Appellate Authority further finds that in as much as the second respondent had not produced materials to show his having paid Rs.2,000 as advance to the first respondent his stand was a false stand. In this connection the Appellate Authority clearly overlooked that in evidence it is admitted that the first and the second respondents are related. In matters of subletting it would be difficult to have direct evidence even where strangers are involved. This is a surreptitious thing done without the knowledge of the owner and every attempt would be made to conceal it. This will be particularly so where the main tenant and the sub-tenant are relations. One cannot also expect relations to have written documents to evidence payment of advance or the quantum of rent. There cannot be direct evidence of subletting. The complaint supported by the pleadings of the second respondent, the oral evidence of P.W.2 and of P.W.3 clearly show that there was parting of exclusive possession by the first respondent in favour of the second respondent. The overlocking by the first respondent of the premises also clearly points to this fact. The Appellate Authority has clearly misread the oral and the documentary evidence and come to a wrong conclusion. He had assumed without any basis being laid that there was collusion, between the owner and the second respondent and this has clouded his approach. 12. In S.K.Raffudin and others v. N.Yeshwantha Rao and others S.K.Raffudin and others v. N.Yeshwantha Rao and others S.K.Raffudin and others v. N.Yeshwantha Rao and others , (1997)2 L.W. 66 relied on by the learned counsel for the first respondent, S.S.Subramani, J. has held that the alleged sub-tenant must be in a position to exclude others from interfering with the enjoyment of the building. The entire premises must be under his control and only under him the other person can be inducted within the premises. The entire premises must be under his control and only under him the other person can be inducted within the premises. Having regard to the facts of that case, the learned Judge held that evidence with regard to subletting was absolutely lacking and that the basic ingredient to prove the case of sub-lease namely., parting with possession was absent. The learned Judge held that even though the finding of the authorities below was concurrent the High Court was entitled to interfere in revision. In the instant case, the Appellate Authority has clearly misappreciated and misdirected himself when he found that the subletting had not been established. The decision relied on by the learned counsel, instead of assisting him is against his contention. 13. In P.Senniappan and others v. Kannammal and two others P.Senniappan and others v. Kannammal and two others P.Senniappan and others v. Kannammal and two others , (1998)2 MLJ. 509 K.Govindarajan, J. dealing with the case of subletting has held that a tenant can be said to sub-let the demised premises to a third party only if the tenant had permitted the third party to occupy the premises and had divested himself completely of the possession of the premises or part thereof. In other words, there must be transfer of exclusive right to enjoy the demised premises by a tenant in favour of third party and the said right must be in lieu of payment of compensation or rent. If a tenant had permitted a third party to use the premises along with him and the tenant retains the legal possession, it will not amount to sub-letting. There cannot be a subletting under the lessee if he has not parted with legal possession. A grant in favour of a third party only of the right to use the premises without being entitled to exclusive possession thereof operates as mere licence only. To impose the penalty of preclosure on the ground of sub-letting, it has to be proved that the tenant has parted with legal possession and such parting is in lieu of monetary consideration. “ There is absolutely no quarrel over the proposition of law set out in the decision of the learned Judge. To impose the penalty of preclosure on the ground of sub-letting, it has to be proved that the tenant has parted with legal possession and such parting is in lieu of monetary consideration. “ There is absolutely no quarrel over the proposition of law set out in the decision of the learned Judge. However, in the instant case it has been clearly established that the second respondent was doing his business exclusively and with all rights as has been laid down in M/s.Bharat Sales Ltd. v. L.I.C. of India M/s.Bharat Sales Ltd. v. L.I.C. of India M/s.Bharat Sales Ltd. v. L.I.C. of India , (1998)2 Supreme. 91 . ”Sub-tenancy or subletting comes into existence when the tenant gives up possession of the tenanted accommodation, or in part, and puts another person in exclusive possession thereof. This arrangement comes about obviously under a mutual agreement or understanding between the tenant and the person to whom the possession is so delivered. In this process, the landlord is kept out of the scale. Rather the scene is enacted behind the back of the landlord, concealing the overtacts and transferring possession cladestinely to a person who is an utter stranger to the landlord, in the sense that the landlord had not let out the premises to that person nor had he allowed or consented to his entering into possession over the demised property. It is the actual physical and exclusive possession of that person, instead of the tenant, which ultimately reveals to the landlord that the tenant to whom the property was let out has put some other person into possession of that property. In such a situation it would be difficult for the landlord to prove, by direct evidence, the contract or agreement or understanding between the tenant and the sub-tenant. It would also be difficult for the landlord to prove, by direct evidence, that the person to whom the property had been sub-let had paid monetary consideration to the tenant. Payment of rent, undoubtedly, is an essential element of lease or sub-lease. It may be paid in cash or in kind or may have been paid or promised to be paid. It may be paid in lump sum in advance covering the period for which the premises is let out or sub-let, or it may have been paid or promised to be paid periodically. It may be paid in cash or in kind or may have been paid or promised to be paid. It may be paid in lump sum in advance covering the period for which the premises is let out or sub-let, or it may have been paid or promised to be paid periodically. Since payment of rent or monetary consideration may have been made secretly, the law does not require such payment to be proved by affirmative evidence and the court is permitted to draw its own inference upon the facts of the case proved at the trial, including the delivery of exclusive possession to infer that the premises were sublet.“ 14. A similar view had been taken by M.N.Chandukkar, C.J. in Subramanian v. Malar Selvi Subramanian v. Malar Selvi Subramanian v. Malar Selvi , 1999 L.W. 1064. 15. It has been clearly established in the instant case that the first respondent had sublet the premises to the second respondent. The Appellate Authority in the language of the Supreme Court that appreciated the evidence in a wholly unreasonable manner and had decided the matter on mere conjectures and surmises not supported by pleadings. As regards the other question of the tenant ceasing to occupy the property, the primary burden of proving the ingredient of the relevant section viz., 10(2)(vi) is on the landlord. He has attempted to prove this by relying on the electricity meter reading. It is seen from the electricity meter card that during the relevant period, the consumer had been charged only the minimum which would show that the mill was not running. The conclusion is therefore inevitable that the criterion for invoking Sec.10(2)(vi) has been satisfied. Both the grounds are therefore made out. The decision to the contrary by the Appellate Authority is therefore erroneous. In these circumstances, the order of the Appellate Authority cannot stand. The C.R.P. will stand allowed. The order of the Appellate Authority is set aside and that of the Rent Controller restored. The tenant will have three months time to vacate the premises. There will be no order as to costs.