Judgment : The tenants are the revision petitioners. The first revision petitioner is the concern and the other petitioners are the partners of the first petitioner/concern. The respondents 1 to 3 sought the eviction of the revision petitioners under Sec.10(3)(a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 as amended by Act 23 of 1973 and hereinafter referred to as ‘The Act’. 2. Having regard to the contentions raised by the rival parties, it is necessary to set-out the pleadings rather elaborately. .3. Therespondents are the owners of house, ground and premises bearing door No.22/2, Lal Kutty Street, Periamet, Madras-3. The revision petitioners are tenants in respect of the entire ground floor and the first floor non-residential portion on a monthly rent of Rs.2,200 i.e., Rs.1,400 for the entire ground floor and Rs.800 for the first floor, the rent being payable according to English calendar month exclusive of electric energy charges. The respondents have been doing partnership business for several years, prior to the filing of R.C.O.P. under the name and style of ‘M/s.Natesa Chetty Sons’. Wholesale and retail dealers in Avaram and Konam Bark, etc., and commission agents at No.2, Muthu Gramani Street, Periamet Madras-3, for over 70 years. The second respondent, who is the son of the first respondent, is anxious to set up an independent business of his own in his own premises namely No.22/2, Lal Kutty Street, Periamet, Madras-3, which is the petitioner property under the name and style of ‘M/s.Mani and Co., as a sole proprietory concern, dealing in hides, leather and tanned chemicals business. The portion in the occupation of the revision petitioners is more convenient and suitable for the said purpose. They have already obtained Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Number and Central Sales Tax Number for the purpose of second respondents own business. The kind of business, which the second respondents wants to do is now more in demand. The chemicals for colouring the leather have to be kept in a compact and separate premises to maintain its quality, without storing them with other goods like salt and pungam oils which would spoil the chemicals’ quality. Dampness of the oils is also spoiling the quality of the chemicals stored alongwith other goods in one and the same premises. The chemicals for colouring the leather have to be kept in a compact and separate premises to maintain its quality, without storing them with other goods like salt and pungam oils which would spoil the chemicals’ quality. Dampness of the oils is also spoiling the quality of the chemicals stored alongwith other goods in one and the same premises. The tenants/revision petitioners are also aware that the building portion in the possession of the first respondent is not sufficient to carry on the business. The Sales Tax Enforcement Squad also during their inspection in objecting to the second respondent carrying on the business in chemicals along with the commodities in the premises. Confusion and chaos are created because of mingling of two kinds of good by being stored in the same place. There is also difficulty in maintaining the office and the accounts. In these circumstances, the new business under the name and style of M/s.Mani & Co., dealing in tanned chemicals for adding colours to the hides and leathers is a distinct and separate trade from the business run in the premises already by the respondents. Their premises, in the occupation of the revision petitioners, is required for the own occupation of the new business of the second respondent. The respondents also caused a lawyers notice to be issued on 12. 1990, calling upon the revision petitioners to quit and deliver vacant possession of the non-residential portion under their occupation. There was a reply, sent by the revision petitioners, containing false and frivolous allegations and refusing to vacate the property. The eviction petition had therefore been filed. .4. Therevision petitioners filed a counter on the following lines: .The alleged requirement is not bona fide but motivated and made-out only for the purpose of evicting the revision petitioners somehow or the other. The respondents are doing their business in their own building at Muthugramani Street, Periamet, Madras, jointly under the name and style of M/s.P.Natesa Chetty and Sons and the second respondent is not doing any independent business of his own. When two portions in the petition building fell vacant, the respondents did not choose to occupy the same, but leased out the same to a third party on a high premium and exorbitant rent. The requirement of the respondents is therefore not bona fide. When two portions in the petition building fell vacant, the respondents did not choose to occupy the same, but leased out the same to a third party on a high premium and exorbitant rent. The requirement of the respondents is therefore not bona fide. The respondents demanded an enhanced rate of rent of Rs.4,000 by issuing a lawyers notice dated 35. 1989 and the petitioners having refused to pay the higher rent demanded, the petition for eviction came to be filed with mala fide motivation. The respondents have already filed an application for fixation of fair rent and the same is pending. They have two more houses of their own in the City of Madras and carrying on business in their own building. The balance of convenience is only in favour of the revision petitioners and the petition is liable to be dismissed. 5. The learned Rent Controller framed necessary points for consideration and held that the respondents had not proved their bona fides, that there was contradiction between the case put forward in the petition and spoken to in evidence, and that they were not entitled to an order of eviction. 6. However, on appeal in R.C.A.No.1210 of 1992, the Appellate Authority reversed the decision of the Rent Controller and held that the respondents bona fide required the premises for their own occupation, that this was for the further expansion of their business, and that they were entitled to an order of eviction. 7. As against this the present C.R.P. has been filed. 8. Mr.R.Sivaraman learned counsel for the revision petitioners vehemently contended that there is an ocean of difference between what has been pleaded and what was sought to be proved in evidence. He submitted that in the pleadings the respondents had stated that it was for a new business that they required the portions in the occupation of the revision petitioners, but in the course of evidence it transpired that the new business, respondents were taking about, was an already running business. This would clearly show that the respondents lacked bona fides. He submitted that in the pleadings the respondents had stated that it was for a new business that they required the portions in the occupation of the revision petitioners, but in the course of evidence it transpired that the new business, respondents were taking about, was an already running business. This would clearly show that the respondents lacked bona fides. The learned counsel further submitted that just prior to the filing of the eviction petition, two portions fell vacant and the respondents instead of occupying them for their own personal use, chose to let them out to third parties and this action on the part of the respondents would bear ample testimony at the lack of bona fides in their case. 9. The learned counsel relied on a number of decisions in support of his contentions. They will be referred to in the course of this order. 10. Mr.G.Viswanathan, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the business of the second respondent had already commenced, that the Sales Tax Enforcement Squad had objected to the business of the second respondent being carried on in the premises of M/s.Natesa Chetty Sons, having regard to the fact that the chemicals used in the new business of the second respondents are likely to get mixed with the oil business run by the respondents and the same should not be allowed to continue. The learned counsel submitted that the petition itself had been inartistically worded, but a complete reading of the eviction petition would clearly show that the respondents had made a proper plea with regard to the purpose for which the portion in the occupation of the revision petitioners was required, that the revision petitioners also understood the case of the respondents and had made the defence and this would be clear from the counter filed by the revision petitioners that the parties had understood the cases of each other and had proceeded to enquiry and that the appellate authority had rightly found that the case for eviction had been made out by the respondents against the revision petitioners and no exception could be taken to the decision reached by the appellate authority. As regards the allegation made by the revision petitioners that the respondents acted mala fide in letting out portions, which fell vacant just prior to the filing of the eviction petition, the learned counsel submitted that indeed portions fell vacant, but they were several years before the eviction petition and those portions were much smaller portions and they would not have been adequate for the purpose for which the second respondent required the premises in the occupation of the revision petitioners. .11. The pleadings in the instant case read as a whole would clearly show that the business for which the second respondent required the portions in the occupation of the revision petitioners is a running business and not a new business in the manner the court is called upon to understand. 12. It is pleaded and also spoken to in evidence that the second respondent had commenced a business under the name and style of M/s.Mani and Company, in the premises in which M/s.Natesa Chetty Sons were operating, that there is a serious risk of the chemicals mixing up with the oil of which M/s.Natesa Chetty Sons are dealing in. 13. The revision petitioners have in their counter not disputed that the second respondent is already running a business. They have not stated in the counter that the second respondent does not intend to start a new business. What the counter says is that the second respondent is not doing any independent business of his own. The counter further states that the respondents are doing their business at their own building at Muthugramani Street, Periamet, jointly under the name and style of M/s.P.Natesa Chetty and Sons, It is nowhere disputed in the counter that there is a business under the name and style of M/s.Mani and Company, run in the property. This new business has been there for over seven years is clearly demonstrated by the respondents by filing documents and leading oral evidence. On abundant materials, the appellate authority had held that the requirement of the respondents was bona fide. No doubt, the appellate authority has stated that the portions in the occupation of the revision petitioners were required for the expansion of the business of the respondents, may be the order of the appellate authority could have been better worded. 14. Let us now refer to the various authorities relied on by the counsel. 15. No doubt, the appellate authority has stated that the portions in the occupation of the revision petitioners were required for the expansion of the business of the respondents, may be the order of the appellate authority could have been better worded. 14. Let us now refer to the various authorities relied on by the counsel. 15. In Nathella Sampathu Chetty v. Sha Vajingjee Bapulal Nathella Sampathu Chetty v. Sha Vajingjee Bapulal Nathella Sampathu Chetty v. Sha Vajingjee Bapulal , (1967)1 MLJ. 299 a Bench of this Court has held that Sec.10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act allows a landlord to apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put him in possession of the building if the landlord is not occupying for purposes of business which he is carrying on a non-residential building which is his own. If the conditions of the provisions are satisfied the Controller may make an order as prayed for by the landlord provided he is further satisfied that the claim of the landlord is bona fide. This requirement that the claim of the landlord should be bona fide is necessary not only for this section but also for several other sections in the Act which provide for eviction of tenants. The expression bona fide therefore will have to be understood in the context, but subject to that, it means in cases under Sec.10(3)(a), that the landlord honestly desires to occupy the premises from which eviction is sought and his claim is not a device to serve an oblique purpose. It was further stated by the Bench: “That the landlord has made certain allegations or claims in some earlier proceedings may either be relevant nor could they effect his bona fide in a later claim so long as it is proved that the landlord honestly desires to occupy the premises for carrying on his business. The fact that he owned several other buildings, which were not mentioned in the petition, is of no consequences as it is entirely open to a landlord to choose which building he would require for his business. So long as the evidence does not justify a finding that the claim is a device and is intended to serve an oblique purpose, it will go a long way towards the claim being honest. So long as the evidence does not justify a finding that the claim is a device and is intended to serve an oblique purpose, it will go a long way towards the claim being honest. In other words, when once it is clear that the claim is not a device very little evidence might be required to find that the claim is an honest one.“ Both the counsel very strongly relied on this case. The ratio in this case is that the landlords requirement should be bona fide and should not serve an oblique purpose. 16. The learned counsel for the revision petitioners wants this Court to infer from the alleged discrepancy between the pleading and the proof i.e., the pleading is for a new business to be started, whereas the proof is with regard to a business already in existence that the requirement is not bona fide, but to serve an oblique purpose. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner has relied on just one sentence in the petition for holding that the business of the second respondent was not already in existence. But, as already noticed, a comprehensive and a thorough reading of the pleadings would show that the case of the respondents is that they need the property i.e., portions in the occupation of the revision petitioners, for the purpose of a new business which has already been started and operating from the premises where all the respondents are running another business for over seventy years. Perhaps, as compared to a seventy years old business, a seven years old business is a new business. It is well settled that: ”In construing a plea in any pleading, courts must keep in mind that a plea is not an expression of art and science but an expression through words to place fact and law of ones case for a relief. Such an expression may be pointed, precise, some times vague but still could be gathered what he wants to convey through only by reading the whole pleading, depends on the person drafting a plea. ….Thus, to gather true spirit behind a plea it should be read as a whole. “ Syed Dastagir v. T.R.Gopalakrishna Setty Syed Dastagir v. T.R.Gopalakrishna Setty Syed Dastagir v. T.R.Gopalakrishna Setty , A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 3029. 17. It has also been held in Thayammal v. K.Subramaniam Thayammal v. K.Subramaniam Thayammal v. K.Subramaniam , (1989)1 MLJ. ….Thus, to gather true spirit behind a plea it should be read as a whole. “ Syed Dastagir v. T.R.Gopalakrishna Setty Syed Dastagir v. T.R.Gopalakrishna Setty Syed Dastagir v. T.R.Gopalakrishna Setty , A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 3029. 17. It has also been held in Thayammal v. K.Subramaniam Thayammal v. K.Subramaniam Thayammal v. K.Subramaniam , (1989)1 MLJ. 407 by Srinivasan, J. (as the learned Judge than was) that having raised a specific plea in the counter statement, it is not open to the person to change his case in the course of evidence. At the risk of repetition it has to be stated that the revised petitioners have understood the case of the respondents correctly and had admitted in their counter, but thereafter have attempted to pick holes in the pleadings vis-a-vis the evidence of the respondents. As regards the bona fide requirement the learned counsel for the revision petitioners relied on a judgment of the Supreme Court in Hameedia Hardware Stores v. Mohan Lal Sowcar , A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1060 where it has been held that a landlord seeking eviction of a tenant from a non-residential premises under Sec.10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act in order to succeed in his petition should establish that he bona fide requires the premises in addition to proving the other ingredients referred to therein. The learned counsel placed reliance on para 13 of the said judgment, wherein it is stated as follows: ”If the requirement of “claim” being “bona fide” as contained in Sec.10(3)(a) is construed to mean that genuineness of the need of the landlord for the non-residential building is not to be considered and the circumstance that the landlord on the date of making the application is factually carrying on business and has no non-residential building of his own in his occupation in the city, town or village concerned is to be construed sufficient to make his claim bona fide, the tenancy of no non-residential building will be secure. It will be preposterous to attribute such an intention to the legislature. Such a contingency should be avoided as it would be against the very object of the Act itself. The need of the landlord should be genuine. That is the object of enacting clause (e) of Sec.10(3) of the Act. When once we reach the above conclusion it is not enough that the landlord should merely desire to use or occupy the premises. The need of the landlord should be genuine. That is the object of enacting clause (e) of Sec.10(3) of the Act. When once we reach the above conclusion it is not enough that the landlord should merely desire to use or occupy the premises. What is necessary is that he should bona fide need them for his own use and occupation or for occupation by any of the members of his family as held by this Court in Phiroze Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M.Patel Phiroze Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M.Patel Phiroze Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M.Patel , (1974)3 S.C.R. 267 : A.I.R. 1974 S.C 1059 and Mattulal v. Radhe Lal , (1975) 1 S.C.R. 127 : A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1596. It is for the court to find out whether the need of the landlord is genuine. In the instant case the abundant materials produced on the side of the respondents would show that the second respondent required the property for his own occupation. Exs.P-5 to P-31 filed before the Rent Controller and Exs.P-32 to P-35 filed before the Appellate Authority clearly show the bona fides of the case of the respondents. When bona fides of their requirement had been demonstrated by the respondents, the revision petitioners changed track and started harping on the alleged contradiction between pleading and proof. 18. The learned counsel for the revision petitioners also wanted this Court to infer from the contents of Exs.R-5 and R-6, the correspondence between the parties that the respondents were keen about increasing rent and did not bona fide require for own occupation. A reading of those two exhibits does not in any way belittle the stand of the respondents, they show that a fair rent application had been filed by the respondents and the petitioners would do well to pay rent as per the claim made in the fair rent petition. In fact, the said fair rent petition had already been filed and was pending at the time eviction proceedings were commenced. 19. The other decision relied on by the learned counsel for the revision petitioners is Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr.Mahesh Chand Gupta Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr.Mahesh Chand Gupta Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr.Mahesh Chand Gupta , (1996)6 S.C.C. 222. 19. The other decision relied on by the learned counsel for the revision petitioners is Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr.Mahesh Chand Gupta Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr.Mahesh Chand Gupta Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr.Mahesh Chand Gupta , (1996)6 S.C.C. 222. There again the Supreme Court has held that where on the facts substantiated by the landlord the need to occupy the tenanted premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere and honest the need is bona fide The learned counsel places particular reliance on the contents of para.13 of the said judgment. ”Thus the term bona fide or genuinely refers to a state of mind. Requirement is not a mere desire. The degree of intensity contemplated by “requires” is must (more) higher than in mere desire. The phrase “required bona fide” is suggestive of legislative intent that a mere desire which is the outcome of whim or fancy is not taken note of by the rent control legislation. A requirement in the sense of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere, honest desire, in contra distinction with a mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant, on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the family would entitle him to seek ejectment of the tenant. Looked at from this angle, any setting of the facts and circumstances protruding the need of the landlord and its bona fides would be capable of successfully withstanding the test of objective determination by the court. The Judge of facts should place himself in the armchair of the landlord and then ask the question to himself - whether in the given facts substantiated by the landlord the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere, honest. If the answer be in the positive, the need is bona fide. The failure on the part of the landlord to substantiate the pleaded need, or, in a give case, positive material brought on record by the tenant enabling the court drawing an inference that the reality was to the contrary and the landlord was merely attempting at finding out a pretence or pretext for getting rid of the tenant, would be enough to persuade the court certainly to deny its judicial assistance to the landlord. Once the court is satisfied of the bona fides of the need of the landlord for the premises or additional premises by applying objective standards then in the matter of choosing out of more than one accommodation available to the landlord his subjective choice shall be respected by the court. The court would permit the landlord to satisfy the proven need by choosing the accommodation which the landlord feels would be most suited for the purpose; the court would not in such a case thrust its own wisdom upon the choice of the landlord by holding that not one but the other accommodation must be accepted by the landlord to satisfy his such need. In short, the concept of bona fide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by the realities of life. An approach either too liberal or too conservative or pedantic must be guarded against.“ 20. In my view, the Appellate Authority had indeed placed himself in the armchair of the landlord, has asked the necessary question to himself and found the answer in favour of the landlord. The decision of the Supreme Court instead of assisting the case of the revision petitioners, is only in favour of the respondents. Coming again to the pleadings in Ragupathy v. Dr.K.Shankar Ragupathy v. Dr.K.Shankar Ragupathy v. Dr.K.Shankar , (1996)2 L.W. 494 it has been held by S.S.Subramani, J. that when parties are aware of the main issue, the lack of pleadings cannot be given the same importance as pleadings before the civil courts. The present case is one where the revision petitioners/tenants are fully aware of the case put forward by the respondents/landlords and their own counter would bear ample testimony to this aspect. 21. No other point is urged before me. 22. The conclusion reached by the appellate authority is therefore correct and sound. In revision under Sec.25 of the Act there is no ground made-out warranting interference. The C.R.P. is dismissed, however, there will be no order as to costs. 23. The revision petitioners will have six months to quit and deliver vacant possession subject to their filing an affidavit of under-taking with the usual default clause within a period of two weeks from today. Consequently, C.M.P.No.10377 of 1996 is also dismissed.