JUDGMENT D. Raju, C.J.—The above appeal has been filed by the State under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the judgment dated 30.12.1994 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bilaspur in Case No. 131-1 of 1993, whereunder the Court below chose to acquit the respondent of the charge under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. The case of the prosecution before the Court below was that at about 12 noon on 19.10.1993 when Smt. Gita Devi, wife of Sukh Ram was cutting grass in her Ghasni at village Baghi accused Ram Dass came on the spot, caught hold of her from her arms and threw her sickle on one side and gagged her mouth with one hand and with the other hand, he caught her breast with an intention to outrage her modesty. On such action, the victim was said to have raised an alarm and on hearing her cries, M/s. Shyam Lai and Nand Lai, who were just passing nearby came to the spot and on seeing them coming, Ram Dass also ran away from the spot. The victim who was said to be by then weeping, narrated the entire story as to what happened and but for the timely appearance of those two persons, the accused Ram Dass would have further outraged her modesty. On the basis of the complaint given and statement of the victim recorded under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a case has been registered under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code against the accused at the Police Station, Sadar, Bilaspur. During the course of investigation, the Investigating Officer was said to have taken possession of some broken bangles stated to have been worn by the victim at the time when accused Ram Dass caught her from her arms and on account of which some of her bangles were broken in the process of her attempt to rescue herself. The broken pieces of bangles were said to have been taken into possession by a recovery memo in the presence of M/s. Shyam Lai and Dila Ram. A spot map was also said to have been prepared and after complying with all the formalities, the accused was sent to face trial for the commission of the offence punishable under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code. 3. A spot map was also said to have been prepared and after complying with all the formalities, the accused was sent to face trial for the commission of the offence punishable under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code. 3. On the appearance of the accused before the Court, he was said to have been supplied with all the relevant papers and documents as required under Section 207, Cr.P.C. Since a prima-facie case was found to have been made out for the commission of the offence in question against the accused, the accused was put on notice of accusation for the commission of the said offence and since the accused pleaded not guilty, the case was set for trial. 4. On the side of the prosecution, PWs 1 to 5 were examined and there was no witness produced on the side of the accused. The victim Gita Devi was examined as PW-1 and Shyam Lai and Nand Lal, who arrived on the spot immediately on the happening of the occurrence, were examined as PWs 2 and 3 and the Investigating Officer was examined as PW-5. On considering the materials on record, the learned trial Judge, as noticed earlier, returned a finding of acquittal, on the view that the version given by PWs 2 and 3 did not help the prosecution case and that neither the recovery of the bangles could be said to connect the same with the commission of the offence by the accused nor the recovery could be said to be a real fact. The learned trial Judge was carried away by the fact that there was 3 days of delay in lodging the report by the victim and the delay was not properly explained and the defence taken by the accused that he has been falsely implicated by the victim since her husband was prosecuted in the Court in a criminal case on the complaint of the accuseds wife, appears to be quite probable and, therefore, there are reasons for the victim to lodge a false complaint in order to take revenge as her husband has been engaged in a criminal prosecution on the complaint of accuseds wife. On the above, the learned trial Judge came to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond any reasonable doubt. 5. Not satisfied, the State has approached this Court. Mr. On the above, the learned trial Judge came to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond any reasonable doubt. 5. Not satisfied, the State has approached this Court. Mr. M.S. Guleria, learned Deputy Advocate-General while inviting my attention to the materials on record, contended that the conclusions arrived at by the learned trial Judge are merely on surmises and conjectures and also on the basis of the mis-reading of the evidence by ever-looking vital materials on record and that, therefore, the finding of acquittal recorded cannot be sustained in law. Argued, the learned counsel for the appellant-State that the learned trial Judge has also failed to properly appreciate the material with reference to the nature of the offence and the reasonable probabilities of the case and that he further also omitted to take into account all the relevant circumstances which will go to explain the delay to be not fatal to the prosecution case. 6. Per contra, Mr. J.L. Bhardwaj, learned counsel appearing for the accused-respondent, while adopting the reasoning of the learned trial Judge, vehemently contended that not only the delay of 3 days has not been properly explained to convince the genuineness of the allegations made against the accused, which according to the learned counsel was merely a manipulation and was a counterblast to wreak vengeance against the accused for the alleged complaint said to have been instituted by the wife of the accused against the husband of the victim, but the materials on record also sufficiently do not lead to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and at any rate, this is a fit case warranting the grant of benefit of doubt to the accused. Consequently, according to learned counsel for the respondent, no interference is called for with the order of acquittal particularly after the long lapse of time from the date of the so called occurrence. 7. Both the learned counsel appearing on either side invited my attention to the evidence on record by reading them in Hindi and providing simultaneous translation of the relevant portions in support of their respective stand point. 8. It would be appropriate to consider, at the first instance, the question of unexplained delay that has been set up in defence which weighed with the learned trial Judge also. 8. It would be appropriate to consider, at the first instance, the question of unexplained delay that has been set up in defence which weighed with the learned trial Judge also. The occurrence was at a place different from the one where the husband of the victim was working and the victim has explained the position that after the occurrence, she went to the husbands place of work and thereafter they deliberated over the matter and reported the occurrence to the police on 22.10.1993. Having regard to the nature of the incident which has serious impact oft the very character and credibility of the woman and also the family reputation which is likely to be in stake, necessarily the parties could have thought twice over the matter before going to the police for reporting the occurrence and as such, no serious infirmity on that account alone could be attributed either to the case given against the accused or on that account, could it reasonably be presumed that it was a manipulated allegation. If that were to be so, the date of occurrence could also have been manipulated so as to eliminate any delay in the reporting of the occurrence to the police. Therefore, the reasoning of the learned trial Judge that the delay has not been properly explained, does not either accord with reason or with the normal reaction that is expected of a person placed in such situation, in view of the nature of on-slaught that has been made on a woman. 9. Coming to the question of recovery of the broken bangles, which were said to have been recovered on the spot of occurrence, the learned trial Judge cannot be said to have properly looked into the evidence, while commenting that even while appearing as PW-1 during the trial of the case, she has not stated the fact that her bangles were broken at the time of occurrence. The learned Deputy Advocate General has specifically read to me the relevant portion of the evidence in Hindi and translated the same which will go to show that PW-1 did specifically state about the said fact during trial though it was not found recorded in the statement under Section 154, Cr.P.C. This aspect of an omission in the statement recorded under Section 154, Cr.P.C, does not as is expected of the defence seem to have been put in question specifically to the Investigating Officer when he was in the box examined as PW-5 and in the absence of any cross-examination in this regard, PW-1 could not be accused as having not spoken about the said fact during trial also and thereby condemn the recovery of broken bangles on the spot in the presence of PW-2. Without condemning PW-2 or rejecting his evidence as false, the Court below could not have merely on a surmise come to the conclusion that the recovery was a manipulated one for the simple reason that there was no mention about the broken bangles in the statement recorded under Section 154, Cr.P.C. 10. Yet another serious infirmity, in my view, which has crept into the consideration of the matter by the learned trial Judge and which seriously undermines the finding of acquittal recorded by him, is about his surmising the defence plea of the present prosecution being one by way of a counter blast to the alleged revenge, for the reason that the husband of the victim has been engaged in a criminal prosecution by the accuseds wife. There is absolutely no iota of evidence to even give any credence to such a theory. Neither any case number has been put to anyone of the witnesses particularly PW-1 and PW-5 nor the wife of the accused or anyone for that matter has been examined to speak about such enemity or the reasons for the enemity. While that be the position, it is beyond comprehension as to how the Court below could have readily accepted such a theory and used it as a strong ground to denounce the case specifically pleaded and in my view, in unmistakable terms proved in this case by the evidence of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3. The Court below had no reason to condemn or reject their evidence. The Court below had no reason to condemn or reject their evidence. No enemity, as such, is even suggested and no reason has been projected to even indicate as to why they should volunteer to speak or depose falsely against the accused. The consistent case of the prosecution is that immediately after the occurrence (and as a matter of fact, the accused was said to have run away on seeing the witnesses PW-2 and PW-3 approaching and that it is as soon as the accused ran away from the spot) that the PWs 2 and 3 arrived, the victim who was weeping, was said to have narrated the whole of the incident to them and they have also spoken about the version given to them immediately after the occurrence, during their examination before the court as also during the course of investigation. Such an evidence has been held to be admissible and also constitute relevant piece of material in view of Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act. 11. In AIR 1983 SC 911, Sheikh Zakir v. State of Bihar, their Lordships of the Apex Court, while dealing with the proof in respect of a charge under Section 375, IPC observed that statement made by victim prosecutrix to her husband immediately after the incident is admissible under Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act and has corroborative value. Consequently, the evidence of PW-2 and PW-3 could not have been brushed aside without any sufficient reason to condemn them or their evidence. 12. Yet another assumption of the learned trial Judge to disbelieve the occurrence appears to be that if there was really an occurrence and the victim cried or raised shouts ovalarm, those residing in the nearby house would have come to her rescue on hearing her cries. This is yet another surmise made by the court below without any justification. Neither is there on record anything as to the distance from place of occurrence or the location of any such house nor there was any material to show as to whether there was any possibility of anyone seeing the occurrence from such place or hear the cries of the victim from inside the house. Neither is there on record anything as to the distance from place of occurrence or the location of any such house nor there was any material to show as to whether there was any possibility of anyone seeing the occurrence from such place or hear the cries of the victim from inside the house. In the absence of any materials in this regard, one cannot expect the inmates of that house to come to the rescue as though they would have been waiting for something to happen and somebody to call for their rescue. A careful perusal of the judgment of the Court below would go to show that the entire reasoning of the learned Judge appears to have been based on misreading of the evidence as also perfunctory, improper and irrelevant consideration of all the relevant materials and the Court below was prepared to surmise rather than properly sift, analyse and assess the materials on their merits before arriving at a factual finding, in an objective manner. 13. The charge against the accused-respondent is under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code which is attracted when anyone assaults or uses criminal force to any woman intending to outrage or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby outrage her modesty. The consistent case pleaded and which, in my view, very much stood substantiated is about the accused coming on the spot where the victim was cutting grass, holding her arms by throwing the sickle in her hand and gagging her mouth with one hand, holding her breast with the other hand. This act of the accused, in my view, would sufficiently constitute an offence under Section 354, IPC. Holding a woman by her breast by a person who is not her husband in public and particularly by a person who is an utter stranger, will be an act very much likely to outrage the modesty of a woman. As noticed earlier, the evidence of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 overwhelmingly prove the charge levelled against the accused that he did commit the act attributed to him with the object of outraging the modesty of the victim in this case. The submission of the learned counsel for the respondent by placing reliance upon AIR 1996 SC 2478, Dhanna etc. v. State of Madhya Pradesh does not appeal to me in any manner. The submission of the learned counsel for the respondent by placing reliance upon AIR 1996 SC 2478, Dhanna etc. v. State of Madhya Pradesh does not appeal to me in any manner. In the said decision while dealing with the scope of interference in an appeal from an acquittal or in an appeal from conviction, the Apex Court observed that while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the Appellate Court has to bear in mind first, that there is a general presumption in favour of the innocence of the person accused in criminal cases and that presumption is only strengthened by the acquittal and that every accused is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt regarding his guilt and he would retain the benefit of such acquittal even in the appellate court also and consequently, the appellate court in appeals against acquittals has to proceed more cautiously and only if there is absolute assurance of the guilt of the accused, upon the evidence on record, that the order of acquittal should be interfered with or disturbed. Keeping in view with the said principles also if the evidence on record is considered, there is, as indicated earlier, overwhelming materials in the form of evidence of PWs 1 to 3 which prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and but for the Court below proceeding to deal with the matter on surmises and assumptions and also by misreading the evidence on record on vital aspects, the finding of acquittal could not have been returned by the learned trial Judge. Consequently, the order of acquittal is hereby set aside and I hold the respondent-accused guilty of the offence under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code and further hold that he is liable to be punished for the same. 14. Coming to the question of sentence, the learned counsel for the respondent-accused has been heard and he would submit that having regard to the long lapse of time, a lenient view may be taken. 14. Coming to the question of sentence, the learned counsel for the respondent-accused has been heard and he would submit that having regard to the long lapse of time, a lenient view may be taken. Having regard to the seriousness of the offence and the fact that such offences against women are on the increase and that it has been committed against a woman whose image in public, family life and reputation has thereby been put into stake, even taking a lenient view of the matter, I am of the view that the respondent-accused shall not go unpunished and I direct the imposition of a fine of Rs. 1,000/- (Rupees one thousand only) upon the respondent. The respondent shall pay the same within eight weeks failing which he shall undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days. The appeal is allowed on the above terms. No costs. Appeal allowed. -