JUDGMENT 1. The petitioner, erstwhile Officer-in-Charge of Kalyani Police Station, has challenged in the instant writ proceedings the recommendation of the West Bengal Human Rights Commission contained in its order dated 12th January, 1998, against the writ petitioner. 2. The writ petitioner, inter alia, has prayed for issue of a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the aforesaid recommendation of West Bengal Human Rights Commission (hereinafter referred to as the said Commission) and also for issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to forebear from giving any effect to such recommendation. 3. The Secretary, Ranaghat Branch of the Association for Protection of Democratic Rights lodged a complaint to the said Human Rights Commission on 20th May, 1997 alleging, inter alia, that the writ petitioner Sri Sankar Chatterjee, Officer-in-Charge, Kalyani Police Station in Association with Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police, Ajoy Roy and other Police personnel took one Khagen Majhi in his custody around 3 A.M. on 30th April, 1997 from his house and later on shot him death in a fake encounter. It was further alleged that the Police Officers of the Kalyani Police Station used to extract money from the said Khagen Majhi. Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police, Ajoy Roy through a Police informer Kartik Sarkar had carried on negotiation for the surrender of Khagen Majhi on payment of Rs. 50,000/- to the Police and Rs. 5,000/- to the informer Kartik Sarkar, the local Police as a part of the deal had promised that Khagen Majhi would not be tortured and he would be forwarded to the Court on petty charges and would soon be released on bail. But after taking him into a custody he was eliminated in the manner aforesaid making out a story of false encounter and bomb attack by the miscreants which is wholly fabricated. 4. On such complaint, the said Commission initially called a report from the Superintendent of Police, Nadia, subsequently, the Commission investigated into the matter by its own Investigation Branch. 5. After considering the statement of witnesses, evidence presented during investigation by the Commission and all other materials on records including postmortem report and report of the autopsy surgeon, the Commission found Sri Sankar Chatterjee, Officer-in-Charge, Kalyani Police Station and Assistant Sub-Inspector, Ajoy Roy guilty of cold blooded murder of Khagen Majhi. 5. After considering the statement of witnesses, evidence presented during investigation by the Commission and all other materials on records including postmortem report and report of the autopsy surgeon, the Commission found Sri Sankar Chatterjee, Officer-in-Charge, Kalyani Police Station and Assistant Sub-Inspector, Ajoy Roy guilty of cold blooded murder of Khagen Majhi. In view of such finding as aforesaid as also in view of the fact that the writ petitioner Sri Sankar Chatterjee in an earlier occasion was found guilty of gross negligence of his duty as public servant and brutal violation of human rights resulting in death of one Khagen Majhi of Charmultarpur in custody, the Commission recommended that criminal prosecution should be started against Sri Sankar Chatterjee and Sri Ajoy Roy, Sri Sankar Chatterjee should not be entrusted with any investigation works in future should not be allowed to hold charge of any Police Station and Sri Ajoy Roy should not be assigned with any investigation work for next five years. It was further recommended that the displeasure of the Commission should be communicated in writing to Sri S. Chanda, S.D.P.O., Kalyani for attempting to mislead the Commission by his report which was not in alignment with facts. 6. It is the aforesaid recommendation of the Commission which is under challenge in the writ application on several grounds. 7. Factually, it is the case of the petitioner that in discharge of his official duties he accompanied by the Circle Inspector, Kalyani and other Police personnel on receiving a source Information on 30.4.97 at about 2.30 hours left for Barohat Colony under the jurisdiction of Kalyani Police Station to apprehend a gang of criminals who has assembled thereunder the leadership of a notorious criminal namely Khagen Majhi, on their way to Barohat Colony near Elenbury Factory, 10/12 miscreants attacked them by hurling bombs, brickbats etc. because of which Head Constable Ramji Pandey, Constable Bimal Krishna Das sustained injuries from such hurling of such bombs and brickbats. 8. Ultimately, the petitioner and other Police personnel were compelled to open fire whereby Khagen Majhi sustained bullet injury and ultimately succumbed to his injuries. 9. because of which Head Constable Ramji Pandey, Constable Bimal Krishna Das sustained injuries from such hurling of such bombs and brickbats. 8. Ultimately, the petitioner and other Police personnel were compelled to open fire whereby Khagen Majhi sustained bullet injury and ultimately succumbed to his injuries. 9. It is, however, not for the writ Court to decide factually as to whether the version of the petitioner or that of the complainant before the Human Rights Commission about the death of said Khagen Majhi is a correct one or to sit an appeal over the finding of the said Commission. 10. It appears to this Court that the Commission is exercise of its power under Section 12 of Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) enquired into the complaint made by the said Association for Protection of Democratic Rights (hereinafter referred to as A.P.D.R.) and after considering the evidence has come to a finding that Sri Sankar Chatterjee and said Sri Ajoy Roy are guilty of cold blooded murder of Khagen Majhi and on such finding made a number of recommendations through the State Government as aforesaid. 11. It is not for this Court to interfere with such finding of the said Commission unless the Court is satisfied there has been any legal infraction in the process of coming to such finding or there is any perversity in the finding of the Commission or reasonable opportunity for hearing has been denied to the person against whom a recommendation ultimately has been made by the Commission. 12. The recommendation of the Commission however has been assailed by the writ petitioner firstly on the ground that reasonable opportunity of being heard as contemplated in Section 16 of the said Act has been denied to the petitioner. 13. Mr. S.B. Mukherjee followed by Mr. Pradip Ghosh, the learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the writ petitioner has submitted, inter alia, that the Commission did not comply with the principles of natural Justice in course of enquiry. It is alleged that the petitioner was not given the names of the witnesses who were produced in support of charges against the writ petitioner, all such witnesses were examined in absence of the petitioner who was never given any opportunity to cross-examine any witness. It is alleged that the petitioner was not given the names of the witnesses who were produced in support of charges against the writ petitioner, all such witnesses were examined in absence of the petitioner who was never given any opportunity to cross-examine any witness. It has also been alleged that the petitioner was not given any opportunity of hearing and to produce witnesses, documents and materials in support of his defence. It has been submitted that because of such denial of reasonable opportunity of hearing to the petitioner in the manner aforesaid the entire proceedings before the said Commission was vitiated. 14. Section 16 of the said Act provides that if at any stage of enquiry, the Commission considers that it is necessary to enquire into the conduct of any person or it is of the opinion that the reputation of any person is likely to be prejudicially affected by enquiry, the Commission is required to give such a person a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the enquiry and to produce evidence in his defence. 15. There cannot, however, be strait-jacket formula for determining the ingredients of reasonable opportunity of hearing. What would be the reasonable opportunity of hearing would depend upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case and may differ from one case to another. Such position of law has been acknowledged judicially. 16. It is, however, not really necessary for this Court in the instant case to determine what would be the scope of such reasonable opportunity of being heard under Section 16 of the said Act and whether such opportunity would include the rights of cross-examination of witness. 17. The self-same question was gone into the details by Hon'ble Justice Mrs. Ruma Pal in the case of Champak Mukherjee vs. State of West Bengal & other, W.P. No. 2808 of 1998 (unreported) upon which reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel appearing for the Commission. 18. It appears to this Court in the aforesaid case of Champak Mukherjee after relying on a number of decisions of the Supreme Court and other High Courts as also on careful examination of the various provisions of the Act, his Lordship was of the view that there is no provision in the Act which requires a party to be given any right to cross-examine any witness. 19. 19. In this connection, it will be worthwhile to quote hereunder the relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment in the case of Champak Mukherjee where His Lordship considered the scope of natural Justice as envisaged in the said Act: – "Three basic premises must be kept in mind while dealing with the questions of natural Justice. The first is that: – The rules of natural Justice vary with the varying Constitution of statutory bodies and the rules prescribed by the Act under which they function and the question whether or not any rules of natural Justice had been contravened should be decided not under any pre-conceived notions, but in the light of the statutory rules and provisions. This view has been held by the Supreme Court in New Prakash Transport Co. Ltd. vs. New Suwarna Transport Co. Ltd., AIR 1957 SC 98, and reiterated in Nagendra Nath Bora vs. Commr. of Hills Division & Appeals Assam, AIR 1958 SC 398 at page 409." The second premise is: – The degree of proximity between the investigation in question and an act or decision directly adverse to the interests of the person claiming entitlement to be heard may be important. Thus, a person empowered to required to conduct a preliminary investigation with a view to recommending or deciding whether a formal inquiry or hearing (which led to a binding an adverse decision) should take place is not normally under any obligation to comply with the rules of fairness. (See: De Smith, Woolf and Jowell: Judicial Review of Administrative Action (5th Edn.) p. 492.) Thus, in Meenglas Tea Estate vs. The Workmen, AIR 1963 SC 1219, cited by the petitioner, where the result of an inquiry was accepted without more and penal action taken on the basis thereof it was held: – "It is an elementary principle that a person who is required to answer a charge must know not only the accusation but also the testimony by which the accusation is supported. He must be given a fair chance to hear the evidence in support of the charge and to put such relevant questions by way of cross-examination as he desires. Then he must be given a chance to rebut the evidence led against him. He must be given a fair chance to hear the evidence in support of the charge and to put such relevant questions by way of cross-examination as he desires. Then he must be given a chance to rebut the evidence led against him. This is the barest requirement of an enquiry of this character and this requirement must be substantially fulfilled before the result of the enquiry can be accepted." (Emphasis mine) In the light of the decision in Meenglas Tea Estate, it is doubtful that the .observations of he Privy Council in University of Ceylon vs. Fernando, (1960) 1 All ER 631 (P.C.), cited by the respondents would apply in the University of Ceylon had suspended a student on the basis of an enquiry. The student challenged the inquiry in the ground that the evidence of various witnesses who appeared before the Commission of inquiry was taken in his absence and he was not aware of what evidence was led against him, and that, in the circumstances, one of the essential elements of natural Justice was not observed. Although the finding of the Commission was accepted and acted on by the Vice Chancellor (who himself sat in the Commission of inquiry), it was held that the requirements of natural Justice had sufficiently been complied with. However, it cannot be doubted that where the action does not by itself result in penal action it is not necessary to follow the principles noted in the Meenglas Tea Estate's case. This was clarified in State of Jammu & Kashmir vs. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, AIR 1967 SC 122 , where the Supreme Court was considering a challenge to an enquiry report under the Jammu & Kashmir Commission of inquiry Act, 1962. The Supreme Court negated the submission that the report was vitiated because no opportunity was given to cross-examine persons who had sworn affidavits against the party. It was held: – "In Meenglas Tea Estate's case, 1964 (2) SCR 165 : AIR 1963 SC 1719 , the Court was not dealing with a fact finding body as we are. Rules of natural Justice require that a party against whom an allegation is being inquired into should be given a hearing. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad was certainly given that. It was said that the right to hearing included a right to cross-examine. We are unable to agree that is so. Rules of natural Justice require that a party against whom an allegation is being inquired into should be given a hearing. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad was certainly given that. It was said that the right to hearing included a right to cross-examine. We are unable to agree that is so. The right must depend upon the circumstances of each case and must also depend on the statute under which the allegations are being inquired into. We have to remember that we are dealing with a statute which permits a Commission of inquiry to be set up for fact-finding purposes. The report of the Commission has no force proprio vigore. This aspect of the matter is important in deciding the rules of natural Justice reasonably applicable in the proceedings of the commission of inquiry under the Act." 20. The third premise is a corollary to the second viz., when the proceeding is merely investigative. There can be no right in any person to be informed midway, during an investigation, of the material collected in the case against him (See: I.J. Rao vs. Bibhuti Bhusan Bagh, AIR 1989 SC 1184). 21. As far as the first premise is concerned, there is no provision in the 1993 Act which requires the party to be given any right to cross-examine any witness or to obtain a copy of the inquiry report. 22. As far as the second and third premises are concerned it is clear from a scrutiny of the provisions of the 1993 Act that the function of the Commission is investigative and recommendatory. It investigates and recommends action on the basis of its enquiry report. As said in State of Bihar vs. J.A.C. Saldanna, AIR 1980 SC 326 : – "There is a clear-cut and well demarcated sphere of activity in the field of crime detection and crime punishment. Investigation of an offence is the field exclusively reserved for the executive through the Police department" (It is for the) Court to take cognizance. The adjudicatory function of the judiciary (is) to determine and to award adequate punishment according to law for the offence proved to the satisfaction of the Court." "The Commission has no power to directly enforce its recommendation. That power has been given to Human Right Courts. The adjudicatory function of the judiciary (is) to determine and to award adequate punishment according to law for the offence proved to the satisfaction of the Court." "The Commission has no power to directly enforce its recommendation. That power has been given to Human Right Courts. All that the Commission can do is to recommend the steps to be taken to the State and it is for the State to take steps on the basis of the recommendations or not. It is true that in terms of Section 18(5), the State Government is required to give its comments on the report as well as the action taken or proposed to be taken thereon to the Commission within the time specified. This only ensures that the State Government cannot shelve the recommendation to gather dust. If the State Government does not accept the recommendation it must give its reasons. These are then to be published along with the recommendation under Section 18(6). The person against whom action is recommended will therefore be entitled to the full advantage of a trial if the State accepts the recommendation. The Commission can also approach the regular Courts for implementation of its recommendation and it is the Court which may take action on the recommendation under Section 18(2) as it may deem necessary. There is no compulsion on the State Government on the Court to implement the recommendation of the Commission. There is thus, no lis before the Commission and the Commission does not itself act in a judicial capacity. It is a fact finding body manned by persons of experience appointed by the State Government. While their recommendation must be given due weight, the recommendation remains in the end just that namely recommendatory in nature. The submission of the writ petitioner that the recommendation of the Commission was not a mere recommendation cannot thus be supported. Therefore, apart from the fact that Section 16 does not expressly provide for furnishing of a copy of the complaint, applying to three premises enunciated earlier. It is clear that there was no question of making available the enquiry report or allowing the petitioner to cross-examine the witnesses who had made statements either before the Investigating Officer or the Commission. In the circumstances, compliance with the rules of natural Justice as claimed by the petitioner is not required." 23. It is clear that there was no question of making available the enquiry report or allowing the petitioner to cross-examine the witnesses who had made statements either before the Investigating Officer or the Commission. In the circumstances, compliance with the rules of natural Justice as claimed by the petitioner is not required." 23. I fully agree with the aforesaid reasoning and finding of His Lordship rendered in the said case of Champak Mukherjee and following the same I hold that reasonable opportunity of being heard as provided in Section 16 of the Act does not require making available the enquiry report or allowing the person against whom complaint has been made before the Human Rights Commission to cross-examine the witness who made statement either before the Investigating Officer or before the Commission. 24. I am of the view that it was not necessary for the Commission to furnish copies of the statement of the witness made during investigation or before the Commission itself, to the writ petitioner he, having no right to cross-examine any such witness. 25. The said Human Rights Commission like an enquiry Commission constituted under the Commission of Enquiry Act, is really a body for finding out the facts and therefore, for the purpose of finding out such fact can certainly examine witnesses before the Commission itself or during investigation in absence of persons against whom a complaint has been filed in absence of his right of cross-examination. 26. As to the other contention of the writ petitioner that reasonable opportunity of being heard has been denied to him as no opportunity was given to him to lead evidence in his support is wholly misconceived. 27. On examination of the original records of the case produced by the Commission before the Court, it appears the Commission inter alia, through its own investigating agency investigated into the matter when a number of witnesses were examined and in course of such investigation the petitioner himself was also examined and he made a statement before the Investigating Officer. 27. On examination of the original records of the case produced by the Commission before the Court, it appears the Commission inter alia, through its own investigating agency investigated into the matter when a number of witnesses were examined and in course of such investigation the petitioner himself was also examined and he made a statement before the Investigating Officer. A perusal of the statement made by the petitioner during such investigation will clearly indicate that he was fully aware of the allegation against him of killing Khagen Majhi by staging a fake encounter after taking him into his custody and when a specific question was put to him by the Investigating Officer to that effect, he specifically denied such allegation and in details he gave a statement indicating therein what according to him the correct version of Khagen Majhi's death. 28. It further appears from the records that neither during such investigation nor even after appearing before the Commission, he ever wanted to lead his own evidence oral or documentary in support of his version either before the investigating authority or before the Commission itself. 29. It will appear from the records, after the Commission issued a summon to the writ petitioner and asked him to appear before the Commission, the petitioner again was quite aware that he was being given an opportunity of being heard on the allegation of killing Khagen Majhi in a fake encounter as in the summon itself the allegation of killing in a fake encounter was mentioned. After appearing before the Commission, the petitioner reiterated the stand taken by him before the investigating authority and, never wanted to lead any evidence, oral or documentary in support of his defence. 30. Under such circumstances, the question of denial of reasonable opportunity of hearing by not giving opportunity to the writ petitioner to lead evidence in support of his defence could not arise. 31. It may also be noted in this connection, the petitioner also at no stage of the proceedings either before the investigating authority during the investigation or before the Commission itself ever made any prayer that he should be allowed to cross-examine the witness who have made statement against him. 32. It appears to this Court that such points which are now being raised by the petitioner after recommendation of the Commission is really speculative in nature. 33. 32. It appears to this Court that such points which are now being raised by the petitioner after recommendation of the Commission is really speculative in nature. 33. The complaint of the writ petitioner therefore, of violation of principles of natural Justice fails and the same is hereby rejected. 34. It has also been strenuously argued that the entire proceeding is vitiated as under the Regulation framed under the Act, the Commission could not have investigated the matter as a criminal case is already pending against the writ petitioner on the complaint of the mother of deceased Khagen Majhi, inter alia, under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. 35. It may be noted in this connection that from the recommendation of the Commission itself it will appear that during the investigation into the complaint by the Commission itself through its own Investigating Officer, the Commission was informed that it has been alleged that such a criminal case is pending in the Ranaghat Court but on enquiry the Court Inspector informed that no such case is traceable in the Ranaghat Court. 36. During the pendency of the present writ application on query from this Court, it is ultimately informed that such a criminal case is pending. 37. Mr. Mukherjee, the learned Counsel appearing for the writ petitioner has submitted that in view of the Regulation 7(2) of the West Bengal Human Rights Commission (Procedure) Regulations, the Commission could not have entertained the complaint or investigate into it because of pendency of the said criminal case against the petitioner being complaint case no. 138 of 1997 in the Court of the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Kalyani, Regulation 7(2)(a) provide that ordinarily complains will not be entertained by the said Commission with regard to the matters which are sub judice. 38. Elaborate submission has been made by Mr. Mukherjee in this regard. Firstly, it is contended in view of the aforesaid provisions of the Regulation, the Commission had no jurisdiction to the complaint and investigate into it as the matter is sub judice in the aforesaid complaint case no. 138 of 1997 pending in the Court of learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Kalyani and therefore, entire proceeding before the Commission and including the recommendation made by it are without jurisdiction and are vitiated. 39. It has also been submitted by Mr. 138 of 1997 pending in the Court of learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Kalyani and therefore, entire proceeding before the Commission and including the recommendation made by it are without jurisdiction and are vitiated. 39. It has also been submitted by Mr. Mukherjee since it has been provided in the said Regulation that the Commission ordinarily will not entertain a complaint with regard to matters which are sub judice, although it may have the power to entertain a complaint if in a case when the matter is sub judice, in such case reason has to be recorded by the Commission why the ordinary procedure laid down under the said Regulation is being deviated from. Mr. Mukherjee in this connection has relied on a number of decisions. He has also referred to a number of judicial dictionaries for explaining what would be the implication of the expression ordinarily. 40. Mr. Samaraditya Pal, the learned Counsel appearing for the Commission on the other hand has submitted, inter alia, that Section 12 of the Act read with Section 29 thereof will indicate what are the functions of the Human Rights Commission. One of the functions is to enquire into the complaint of the nature specified in Section 12(a) of the Act by a public servant regarding violation of Human Rights. Section 21(5) indicates the area of the enquiry of a State Commission and only limitation in the area of enquiry of the State Commission are contained in the first proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 21 of the Act and sub-section (2) of Section 36 of the Act, There is no provision in the Act which curtails any area at portion of the functions of the Human Rights Commission where a matter is sub judice in the Court. It has been submitted that Regulation 7 is really in the nature of administrative instruction issued by the said Commission for the purpose of regulating its own procedure and does not even have the status of delegated legislation as contemplated by Section 40 or Section 41 of the Act and in any view of the matter cannot override the Act and curtail the power and the functions of the Human Rights Commission in an area although no such restriction has been imposed under the Act. It has been further submitted that such a Regulation at the highest can be considered as a declaration in the nature of self-imposed discretionary guideline and is not capable of being considered as a jurisdictional or functional bar. 41. Mr. Pal as also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Kailash Chandra vs. The Union of India, AIR 1961 SC 1346 , and Krishan Gopal vs. Shri Prakash Chandra & other, 1974(1) SCC 128 , for the purpose of contending that the expression ordinarily imports flexibility and negatives an absolute approach. 42. After considering the respective submissions of the parties, I am, however, of the view that it has rightly been contended by Mr. Pal that no provision of the Act limits the power of the Commission to entertain and investigate a complaint relating to the matter which is sub judice. The aforesaid provision of the said Regulation certainly cannot takes a way the jurisdiction of the Commission to entertain and investigate a complaint even in a case where the matter is sub judice. 43. That apart from the expression ordinarily as used in the aforesaid provision of the said Regulation itself imports flexibility and negatives an absolute approach and therefore, notwithstanding the aforesaid provision of the Regulation it is certainly open to the Commission to entertain and investigate into a complaint even in a case where the matter is sub judice. It was also correct as pointed out by Mr. Pal that the aforesaid Regulations are not even delegated legislations but really are in the nature of administrative instruction issued by the said Commission regulating its own procedure under Section 10(2) of the Act. 44. In the matter of framing such procedural Regulation 7(2)(a), the Commission has chosen to frame a guideline that ordinarily it will not entertain any complaint in a case, the matter is sub judice. The expression ordinarily used there no doubt itself indicates that the Commission has not abdicated its power to entertain a complaint even in a case where the matter is sub judice. But since it decided in the Regulation that ordinarily it will not do so in fitness of things if in a particular case it decides to entertain such a complaint, reason should be recorded for deviating from the normal procedure. 45. Admittedly, no reason has been recorded. 46. But since it decided in the Regulation that ordinarily it will not do so in fitness of things if in a particular case it decides to entertain such a complaint, reason should be recorded for deviating from the normal procedure. 45. Admittedly, no reason has been recorded. 46. But for the aforesaid reasons certainly the entire procedure of the Commission and the recommendation made by it cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. 47. As it will appear from the records it was reported to the Commission by its own investigating agency that reportedly such a case was pending but on enquiry the Court Inspector informed that such case is not traceable. The Commission, therefore, obviously proceeded on the footing that the matter was not sub judice before any Court of law. The question therefore of recording reasons for deviating from the normal procedure by the Commission did not arise. 48. Mr. Mukherjee, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, however, submitted, inter alia that under the provisions of the said Act a Commission has got a duty to find out the correctness of the complaint and it should have ascertained the correct position through its own investigating agency which it failed through its own investigating agency which it failed and neglected to do. 49. I am unable to accept such contention of Mr. Mukherjee. 50. It is true that under Section 14(5) of the Act, the Commission is required to satisfy itself about the correctness of the facts stated and the conclusion, if any, arrived at in the reports submitted to it under sub-section (4) of Section 13 and for such purpose the Commission makes such enquiry as it thinks fit. 51. But it appears in the instant case, the Commission relied not of the report of the other investigating agency but of the report submitted by its own Investigating Officer which reported inter alia that as per the Court Inspector no such case is traceable. It cannot be said, therefore, any illegality was committed by the Commission by accepting such report and proceeding on the footing that no case was pending. 52. It cannot be said, therefore, any illegality was committed by the Commission by accepting such report and proceeding on the footing that no case was pending. 52. That apart it appears to this Court although the writ petitioner is now vociferous about the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the Commission• to entertain any such complaint because of pendency of the criminal case, at no stage either before the investigating authority or before the Commission itself the writ petitioner ever drew the attention of the Commission that such a complaint case is already pending against him. It has rightly been contended by the learned Counsel appearing for the Commission that no duty is cast upon the Commission to find out whether the matter is sub judice. 53. In view of such position as aforesaid certainly it cannot be said that the proceeding before the Commission was vitiated. 54. Since the finding of the Commission is recommendatory in nature it is for the State Government to decide in view of the pendency of the aforesaid case whether the recommendation made by the Commission to initiate a proceeding for prosecuting the writ petitioner is redundant. 55. It has also been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that under Section 12(1) of the Act if enquiry by the Commission discloses the Commission of violation of Human Rights or negligence in the prevention of violation of Human Rights by a public servant, it may under Section 18(1) of the Act either recommend to the concerned Government or authority the initiation of proceeding for prosecution against the concerned person or take such other action as a Commission may deem fit, but not both. 56. Under Section 18(1) of the Act, the Commission is empowered in case of violation of Human Rights or negligence in the prevention of violation of Human Rights by a public servant, to recommend to the Government concerned for initiation of proceeding for prosecution of such a person or such other action as the Commission may deem fit against the concerned person or persons. It has been submitted by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner that the word or in the said section is disjunctive and not conjunctive and therefore, either of such action is open to the Commission but not both. 57. It has been submitted by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner that the word or in the said section is disjunctive and not conjunctive and therefore, either of such action is open to the Commission but not both. 57. I do not find any reason, however, to make such a narrow interpretation of the power of the Commission in the matter of making recommendation under Section 18(1) of the Act, as suggested by the petitioner. 58. The very object of the Act and the scheme of the Act militates against such narrow interpretation of the power of the Commission. 59. The object of the Act is to provide for the Constitution of National Human Rights Commission etc. for better protection of Human Rights and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. 60. Section 12(a) of the said Act, requires the Commission to enquire into a complaint regarding violation of Human Rights or negligence in the prevention of such violation by a public servant. 61. Under Section 12(b) of the said Act, the Commission can intervene in any proceeding involving any allegation of violation of Human Rights pending before a Court with the approval of such Court; under Section 12(c) of the said Act, it is empowered to visit any jailor any other institution under the control of the State Government, where persons are detained or lodged for purposes of treatment, reformation or protection to study the living conditions of the inmates and make recommendations thereon; under Section 12(d), it is empowered to review the safeguards provided by or under the Constitution or any law for the time being in force for the protection of Human Rights and recommend measures for their effective implementation. Under Section 12(e) of the said Act, the Commission is empowered to review the factors, including acts of terrorism that inhibit the enjoyment of Human Rights and recommend appropriate remedial measures; under Section 12(f) of the said Act, it is empowered to study treaties and other international instruments on Human Rights and make recommendation for their effective implementation, and under Section 12(g) of the said Act, it is empowered to research in the field of Human Rights; under Section 12(h) of the said Act, it is empowered to spread Human Rights literacy among various sections of society and promote awareness of the safeguards available for the protection of these rights through publications the media, seminars and other available means; under Section 12(i) of the said Act, it is empowered to encourage the efforts of non-governmental organizations and institutions working in the field of Human Rights and under Section 12(j) of the said Act, the Commission is empowered to resort to such other functions as it may consider necessary for the promotion of Human Rights. 62. The object of the Act read with Section 12 of the said Act which lays down the various functions of the Commission as also the entire schemes of the Act when read together clearly indicates that the role and function of the Human Rights Commission in the matter of protection of Human Rights is not only to take remedial steps in case of violation of Human Rights, but also to take steps for prevention of violation of Human Rights. 63. The purpose of the enquiry into a complaint by the Human Rights Commission and subsequently to make appropriate recommendation, therefore, obviously is to facilitate remedial Justice as also preventive Justice and such being the position, the power of the Commission to make recommendation under Section 18(1) of the Act should not be given a narrow interpretation, but such power should be given the widest amplitude. The power of the Commission, therefore, under Section 18(1) of the Act to recommend to the concerned Government or authority initiation for proceeding for prosecution is not in exclusion of the power of the Commission to make recommendation such other action as the Commission may deem fit against the concerned person, but in addition the same and to its power under sub-section (1) of Section 18 to recommend to the concerned Government or authority for the grant of such immediate interim relief to the victim or the members of his family as the Commission may consider necessary. 64. Mr. Pal has rightly submitted relying on the decision of the Supreme Court reported n State of Bombay vs. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala & another, AIR 1957 SC 699 ; Gopinder Singh vs. The Forest Department of Himachal Pradesh & other, AIR 1991 SC 433 and (1974) 2 All ER 97(at page 110 to 112), that a purposive interpretation rather than restrictive and .literal interpretation is called for of Section 18(1) of the said Act in view of the object and purpose of the Act for constituting the Human Rights Commission. 65. No wrong, therefore, has been committed by the Commission by making recommendation other than the recommendation for criminal prosecution and the same was wholly within the jurisdiction and power of the Commission. 66. The recommendations made by the Commission have also been attacked inter alia, on the ground that the observation made by the Commission would seriously prejudice the writ petitioner in the criminal proceedings and the recommendation of the Commission that the writ petitioner should not in future be entrusted with any investigative work and should not held charge of a Police Station, without specifying any period for the same, is arbitrary. 67. I am unable to accept such contention of the petitioner. The enquiry by such a Commission is not a judicial enquiry and the scope of an enquiry by such a Commission is different from judicial enquiry, which will be clear from the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Ram Krishna Dalmia vs. S.R. Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538 . Report of such Commission cannot be used as evidence in judicial proceedings. In this connection the decision reported in 1979 Cr. LJ 1211, may be referred to. Report of such Commission cannot be used as evidence in judicial proceedings. In this connection the decision reported in 1979 Cr. LJ 1211, may be referred to. Such report of enquiry however, no doubt can be used against the petitioner in the event the State Government chooses to initiate a disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner on such finding of the Human Rights Commission. But, at such a disciplinary proceeding also the petitioner will have ample opportunity to defend himself, inter alia, by leading his own evidence. 68. It is true that the Commission in case of Ajoy Roy, the A.S.I. attached has made recommendation that he should not be associated with any investigative work for the next 5 years, in case of writ petitioner, the Commission recommended that in future he should not be entrusted with any investigative work and should not hold charge of a Police Station without specifying any period and therefore, the same may very well mean the recommendation of the Commission is that never in future the petitioner should be entrusted with any investigative work and should be allowed to hold charge of a Police Station. But it appears to this Court that such recommendation has been made by the Commission in view of the gravity and seriousness of the nature of Violation of Human Rights and also in view of the fact that the petitioner previously also was found guilty of serious violation of Human Rights. The Commission, therefore, if in view of the seriousness of the matter as aforesaid has made such recommendation haying found that whenever he is entrusted with investigative work and is given duty as an Officer-in-Charge of a Police Station he habitually is resorting to such actions resulting in serious violation of Human Rights, it cannot at all be said that such recommendation made by the Commission is unreasonable or arbitrary. 69. An attempt has also been made by the petitioner to contend that the finding of the Commission is wholly perverse and no reasonable man would have come to the conclusion, as arrived at by the Commission on the evidence and materials on records. 70. I, however, do not find any perversity in the finding of the Commission. 71. 69. An attempt has also been made by the petitioner to contend that the finding of the Commission is wholly perverse and no reasonable man would have come to the conclusion, as arrived at by the Commission on the evidence and materials on records. 70. I, however, do not find any perversity in the finding of the Commission. 71. It appears to this Court that the Commission has accepted the case of the complainant relying on the evidence and rejected that of the writ petitioner namely mainly on the following grounds: – (A) The report of Doctor Niranjan Roy Autopsy Surgeon, Ranaghat Sub-division Hospital indicated that there was gun shot injury ½" diameter with a ring of scorching and blackening of skin immediately surrounding the almost round hole with lacerated, inserted edge with bleeding situated on the forehead at the middle and the bullet was lodged just under the fractured occipital bone which according to the doctor was because of the distance of the victim from firing was within one foot and there was firing from point blank ranges the same therefore, the case of the writ petitioner that during encounter with Khagen Majhi, Khagen Majhi with his associates attacked the police party and went on hurling bombs for which the police had to open fire resulting in death of Khagen Majhi. (B) The postmortem report indicated that the police had opened fire on Khagen Majhi from a very close range of about one foot or even less which belies the claim of the police that the miscreants had hurled the bomb at them and they had to open fire in self-defence. (C) The injuries found upon the writ petitioner, Head Constable Ramji Pandey and Constable Bimal Krishna Das were found by the doctor not to be splinter injuries which may result in case of hurling bombs but lacerated injury which may very well be caused by scratching of nails or striking with some small and blunt objects and possibly were self-inclicted injuries. (D) General Diary Book at Kalyani Police Station was manipulated and tampered with for which no satisfactory explanation could be offered by the local police and therefore, it was reasonable to suspect that the incriminatory entries on these two pages were removed with some purpose. (D) General Diary Book at Kalyani Police Station was manipulated and tampered with for which no satisfactory explanation could be offered by the local police and therefore, it was reasonable to suspect that the incriminatory entries on these two pages were removed with some purpose. (E) There was evidence of number of persons who witnesses payment of money to the police and the fact that the said Khagen Majhi was shot at by the petitioner. (F) Darwan of the Himalyan Rubber Products Pvt. Ltd., who was on duty on the relevant day heard a sound of firing in the early morning but did not hear the sound of any bomb explosion as claimed by the police. 72. On such materials and evidence as stated above as also other evidence relied upon by the Commission as indicated in the impugned order, it was quite possible to come to a conclusion that the Khagen Majhi was killed by the petitioner by firing at point blank range and he was not killed in an encounter' when the police were compelled to open fire for their self-defence as Khagen Majhi and others were hurling bombs against them. Such conclusion of the Commission, therefore, appears to this Court to be reasonable and not at all perverse or arbitrary. 73. Mr. Pradip Ghosh, the learned Senior Counsel also appearing for the petitioner at the stage of replying to the submission made by the Commission contended that no affidavit having been filed by the Commission denying the allegation made in the writ application, the allegation made in the writ petition not being uncontroverted must be deemed to have been accepted. 74. It may, however, be recorded the question of any admission of the allegation made by the writ petitioner by the Commission does not and cannot arise in view of the fact that this Court being of the view that the question involving in the present writ petition being clearly a question of law can be disposed of without affidavits, did not give any direction for affidavit and permitted the Commission to produce the entire records and permitted both the parties to address the Court on question of law relying on such records of the case. 75. 75. That apart the doctrine of non-traverse cannot also apply in the instant case in view of the fact, the case made out by the writ petitioner in the writ petition is nothing but repetition of his version that Khagen Majhi died because the police was compelled to open fire during an encounter in which Khagen Majhi and others were hurling bombs, has already been found on enquiry by not to be acceptable. His allegation that no opportunity was given to him to lead evidence is also belied from the records of the case, as pointed out hereinbefore, wherefrom it will appear that at no stage either before the Commission or before examination by the agency of the Commission he wanted to lead evidence in his support. 76. For the reasons stated above all the contentions raised by the petitioner challenging the recommendation fail. 77. It may be recorded, however, in course of hearing it was also contended by the petitioner that copy of the recommendation although applied for was not supplied to the petitioner. But, in course of hearing, copy of such recommendation was supplied to the petitioner. 78. I am, however, of the view that there is no reason why a copy of the order which is ultimately passed making a recommendation against a person for violation of Human Rights shall not be supplied to him when he applies for the same. 79. Although Regulation 12 of the West Bengal Human Rights Commission (Procedure) Regulation provides for supplying of copy of the orders passed by the Commission finally disposing of matters free of cost to the complainant or his representative, and copies of other documents are to be supplied to the complainant on payment of fees under regulation 12(3) of the said regulation, a person against whom a complaint has been made before the Human Rights Commission will certainly be entitled to a copy of the order finally passed by the Commission on the basis of a complaint including the recommendation made therein, if an application is made by him in respect thereof. 80. The writ application, therefore, fails and. the same is hereby dismissed. All interim orders stand vacated. There will be no order as to costs. In view of such dismissal of the writ petition and vacating of all the interim orders, the State Government will be at liberty to implement the recommendation of the Commission.