Judgment : The appellants are the defendants. Through this second appeal, they seek to set aside the judgment and decree made in A.S.No.67 of 1985 on the file of the learned Subordinate Judge, Ramanathapurm, confirming the judgment and decree passed by the District Munsif, Paramakudi, in O.S.No.120 of 1982. 2. Pappammal alias Savariammal, the first respondent was the plaintiff. She filed O.S.No.120 of 1982 on 12. 1982 before the District Munsif, Paramakudi, for partition and separate possession of her half share in the suit properties, to direct the defendants 1 to 3 to render accounts for 14 years from 11. 1964 and to pay her half share in the income for three years prior to the date of suit and for mesne profits from the date of plaint till the date of possession. 3. According to the plaintiff, the suit properties belonged to her maternal grandmother Thomayee Ammal, who died leaving behind her three sons, viz., Savarimuthu, Irudhayasamy and Jayaraj and four daughters, viz., Thiresammal (mother of the plaintiff), Mariasironmani (first defendant), Mariammal and Arulayee Ammal (fourth defendant). After the death of Thiresammal, the said three sons executed a release deed dated 11. 1964 in favour of their three sisters and the plaintiff, the daughter of another sister Thiresammal. Thus, the plaintiff is entitled to 1/4th share in the suit properties as heir to her mother. 4. On 11. 1964, the plaintiff and other three maternal aunts executed a power of attorney empowering Gnanamuthu Konar, the husband of first defendant Mariasironmani Ammal to manage the suit properties with the power to alienate the properties for necessity of the family. Mariammal, one of the aunts, on 19. 1974 executed a Will bequeathing her 1/4th share in favour of the plaintiff. Consequently, the plaintiff would be entitled 1/2 share in the suit properties. 5. In the meantime, the said Gnanamuthu Konar, the Power of Attorney sold suit item No.1 to 9th defendant on 110. 1967, suit item No.3 to 7th defendant on 26. 1974, suit item No.9 to 6th defendant on 6. 1971 and suit item No.11 to 5th defendant on 28. 1967 respectively even without the knowledge of the plaintiff. Moreover, her Power of Attorney did not render accounts or pay income for 14 years from 11. 1964 till his death on 112. 1978. 6. 1974, suit item No.9 to 6th defendant on 6. 1971 and suit item No.11 to 5th defendant on 28. 1967 respectively even without the knowledge of the plaintiff. Moreover, her Power of Attorney did not render accounts or pay income for 14 years from 11. 1964 till his death on 112. 1978. 6. In the year 1982, the plaintiff sent a notice to the defendants asking for her half share in the suit properties. Reply was sent only on behalf of the defendants 1 to 3 and 5 to 7 with false allegations. As the sale of the above suit items was not known to the plaintiff, they are not binding on her. Hence, the suit for partition and separate possession and for mesne profits. 7. Though written statement has been filed by the defendants 1 to 3 and 5 to 8, the 4th defendant, who is one of the maternal aunts of the plaintiff, did not choose to appear before the court. 8. The defendants 1 to 3 and 5 to 8 resisted the suit by filing two separate written statements. According to them, Mariammal did not execute and never intended to execute any Will in respect of her share in the suit properties in favour of the plaintiff. The alleged Will dated 19. 1974 of Mariammal is not valid. The alienations made in favour of the defendants 5 to 9 in respect of the suit items 1, 3, 9 and 11 by Gnanamuthu Konar, the Power of Attorney, are valid and binding on the plaintiff, since the said alienations were made for necessity of the family, for litigation expenses in O.S.No.402 of 1964 and A.S.No.4 of 1966 in respect of the suit properties, for medical expenses of the husband of Mariammal from 1965 of 1969, for marriage of the 4th defendants daughter, for digging a well and installation of pumpset for the 4th defendant and for the maintenance and family expenses of the plaintiff and Mariammal. The plaintiff is well aware of the said alienations. By her conduct, she acquiesced and accepted the alienations. The defendants 5 to 9 are continuously in separate possession and enjoyment to the knowledge of the plaintiff and they have perfected title by adverse possession. The plaintiff is estopped from questioning the alienations made by her Power of Attorney. The defendants 1 to 3 are not liable for accounts and mesne profits. 9. The defendants 5 to 9 are continuously in separate possession and enjoyment to the knowledge of the plaintiff and they have perfected title by adverse possession. The plaintiff is estopped from questioning the alienations made by her Power of Attorney. The defendants 1 to 3 are not liable for accounts and mesne profits. 9. During the trial, on the plaintiffs side, P.W.1, the plaintiff and P.W.2 were examined and Exs.A-1 to A-9 were marked. On the defendants side, the first defendant was examined as D.W.1 and the 6th defendant was examined as D.W.2 and Exs.B-1 to B-21 were marked. 10. After consideration of the materials, the trial court decreed the suit on 1. 1985 as prayed for. The first appeal preferred by the defendants in A.S.No.67 of 1985 on the file of Sub Court, Ramanathapuram was also dismissed on confirming the decree passed by the trial court. Hence, the second appeal. 11. The findings which have been given by both the courts below on the basis of the various issues framed could be summarised as below: “(1) The Will Ex.A-3 executed by Mariammal in favour of plaintiff Savariammal dated 19. 1974 is a true and valid document. .(2) Thesale deeds Exs.B-6, B-7, B-8 and B-9 dated 28. 1967, 110. 1967, 6. 1971 and 26. 1974 executed by the Power of Attorney in favour of the defendants 5 to 7 and 9 are not binding on the plaintiff, since there are no materials to show that the properties were sold out of necessity of the family. On the other hand, the sale deeds have been created by Power of Attorney Gnanamuthu Konar, in order to defraud the plaintiff and other coparceners. Therefore, those sale deeds are not valid and binding on the plaintiff. .(3) Exs.B-8 and B-9, the sale deeds were executed on 6. 1971 and 26. 1974 respectively. The suit has been filed within 12 years, that is, 12. 1982. Therefore, it is well within the period of limitation. .(4) Regarding the execution of sale deeds Ex.B-6 dated 28. 1967 and Ex.B-7 dated 110. 1967 the plaintiff came to know only after receipt of the notice dated 1. 1982. Therefore, it is also not beyond the period of limitation. .(5) The plaintiff would be entitled to 1/4th share as a heir of Thiresammal and another 1/4th share as a legatee through the Will executed by Mariammal. 1967 and Ex.B-7 dated 110. 1967 the plaintiff came to know only after receipt of the notice dated 1. 1982. Therefore, it is also not beyond the period of limitation. .(5) The plaintiff would be entitled to 1/4th share as a heir of Thiresammal and another 1/4th share as a legatee through the Will executed by Mariammal. She would also be entitled to mesne profits as claimed. 12. Challenging all these findings, the present second appeal has been filed raising various substantial questions of law. 13. At the time of admission of the second appeal, Hon’ble Srinivasan, J. (as he then was) passed a detailed order rejecting the various contentions urged by the counsel even at the stage of admission. As a matter of fact, this Court in the said order dated 12. 1987 would discuss the findings of the courts below in detail and refer to the arguments made by the counsel for the appellants and hold that the Will Ex.A-3 is a genuine document and the same is not a settlement deed and by virtue of Ex.A-3, the share of Mariammal in respect of all the properties was bequeathed to the plaintiff, though the details of some properties were not mentioned in the said Will. 14. However, while rejecting the appeal on the above grounds, Hon’ble Srinivasan, J. admitted this second appeal on the basis of the contention made by the counsel for the appellants that both the courts below have failed to hold that the alienations of items 1, 3, 9 and 11 in favour of the defendants 9, 7, 6 and 5 respectively are binding on the plaintiff, as they were made by Gnanamuthu Konar, the Power of Attorney agent of the plaintiff and the other co-owners and that without considering the evidence properly, the courts below took the wrong view that the alienations were not made for necessity and therefore, not binding on the plaintiff even without the prayer by the plaintiff for setting aside the alienations. 15. 15. On the strength of the above plea, the following order was passed formulating the substantial question of law as under: “Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a share in items 1, 3, 9 and 11 without setting aside the alienations made by her power of attorney agent in favour of defendants 9, 7, 6 and 5 respectively and whether the courts below are right in holding that the alienations are not binding on the plaintiff as they were not supported by necessity. In other respects, the second appeal is dismissed. Admit, Notice.” 16. So, the above order would show that the counsel for the plaintiff would be entitled to argue on the basis of the above substantial question of law alone. 17. Mr.Ramanathan, the learned counsel for the first respondent in the beginning would contend, while referring about the above order, on the strength of the judgments rendered in Ramji v. Krishnarao , A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1223 and Eswariah that the admission of appeal in respect of some points and rejection of appeal in respect of other points may not be proper, in view of the settled position that either the appeal should be admitted wholly or rejected wholly. 18. Regarding this contention, in my opinion, it is not necessary to concentrate much, as this Court is called upon to decide about the validity of the judgment and decree passed by both the courts below in this appeal filed by the defendants/appellants, who are aggrieved by the same. 19. Even assuming that the argument regarding above legal position advanced by the learned counsel for the first respondent is correct and acceptable, then it shall be taken that this appeal has been admitted wholly. 20. However, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants would confine himself to the substantial question of law, which has been formulated by this Court by the order dated 12. 1987 with reference to the question as to whether the alienations are not binding on the plaintiff and whether she is entitled to share in item Nos.1, 3, 9 and 11 without setting aside those alienations. 21. Under those circumstances, it would be appropriate to refer to the arguments of the counsel in respect of the above substantial question of law alone. .22. 21. Under those circumstances, it would be appropriate to refer to the arguments of the counsel in respect of the above substantial question of law alone. .22. Mr.Jayaraman, the learned senior counsel would argue, in elaboration of the substantial question of law, that when the alienations are voidable, the plaintiff ought to have asked for declaration that those documents are not valid and further asked for the setting aside those alienations and mere suit for partition and separate possession without asking for the setting aside the alienations would not make the suit maintainable and that the alienations made under Exs.B-6 to B-9 sale deeds by the Power of Attorney Gnanamuthu Konar were executed only for family necessity and that therefore, they are valid and binding on the plaintiff and without considering those materials available on record, both the courts below have wrongly decreed the suit filed by the plaintiff. 23. In reply to the said submission, Mr.Ramanathan, learned counsel appearing for the first respondent, in support of the findings of the trial court and lower appellate court, would contend that when the sale deeds themselves are void, since they were executed not for the family necessity, they are not binding and there need not be any separate prayer for setting aside those sale deeds ands as such; the suit for partition and separate possession is maintainable. 24. Both the counsel would cite a number of authorities dealing with the various aspects and questions including the point of issue raised this appeal. 25. Though several authorities have been cited, it would be better to refer to a few decisions dealing with this question of law. .26. In Unni v. Kunchi Amma , I.L.R. 14 Mad. 26 it was held thus: .“In the case cited by the District Judge, Raman v. Valia Amma Raman v. Valia Amma Raman v. Valia Amma , S.A. 270 of 1880 which was a case similar to the present, Turner, C.J. and Kernan, J. observed:” If a person not having authority to execute a deed, or having such authority under certain circumstances which did not exist, executes a deed, it is not necessary for persons who are not bound by it to sue to set it aside, for it cannot be used against them. They may treat it as nonexistent and sue for their right as if it did not exist. They may treat it as nonexistent and sue for their right as if it did not exist. “ We entirely agree in is statement of the law.” 27. In Ramaswami v. Rangachariar , (1940)1 MLJ. 52: I.L.R. 1940 Mad. 259 it was observed as follows: “In respect of decrees passed against him in suits in which he had been eo nominee impleaded as a party, it is plain that he must pay the fee prescribed by Sec.7 (iv-A). Such decrees bind him until set aside, and therefore he cannot seek to obtain a decision on the footing that his interest in the joint family property is not affected by them. It makes no difference that the plaintiff is a minor or merely a junior member of the family as the considerations which apply to the decree of a competent court once it is passed are essentially different from those applicable to the transactions of a party. The plaintiff must be held to have impliedly asked for a cancellation of the decrees passed against him and must accordingly stamp his plaint ad valorem on the amount of the decrees and not merely on his share fraction, as his liability is for the full amount, though necessarily limited to the extent of his share in the joint family assets. These remarks apply to items Nos.9 and 10 in the table. The other transactions of the first defendant, whether the plaintiff is made a party thereto or not, stand on a different footing. He is not bound under the substantive law by which he is governed, to sue for a declaration or cancellation in respect of any of them. The legal position has been correctly explained in Unni v. Kunchi Amma , I.L.R. 14 Mad. 26 in the following words which were taken from an unreported decision of this Court: “If a person not having authority to execute a deed or having such authority under certain circumstances which did not exist executes a deed, it is not necessary for persons who are not bound by it, to sue to set it aside, for it cannot be used against them. They may treat it as nonexistent and sue for their right as if it did not exist.” 28. In Jami Appanna v. Jami Venkatappadu , I.L.R. 1955 Mad. They may treat it as nonexistent and sue for their right as if it did not exist.” 28. In Jami Appanna v. Jami Venkatappadu , I.L.R. 1955 Mad. 398 it was held as under: “Now, the authorities have established that for this purpose, there is a distinction between voidable and void transactions and that while the former class of transactions should be set aside, the latter need not be. The reason for this distinction is that in the case of a voidable transfer, the title to the properties vests in the transferee on the execution of the deed and it can revest in the transferor only by a decree of court rescinding the transfer on grounds such as coercion, undue influence or fraud. But different considerations arise when the instrument of transfer is cold and does not operate to vest the title in the transferee. In that case the transferor continues to be the owner of the properties even after the execution of the instrument precisely as before. There is no need in such a case for the transferor to move the court for setting aside the deed, because there is no transfer which the court has to rescind and if the transferor has to recover possession of the properties covered by the deed, he can ignore the deed and recover on the strength of his own title.” 29. In Sankaranarayana Pillai v. Kandasamia Pillai , (1956)2 MLJ. 411 the Full Bench of this Court would observe thus: “Where a minor is eo nominee a party to a sale deed or other document of alienation by a guardian which he seeks to set aside it is not enough for him to merely sue for possession and pay court-fee under Sec.7(v) of the Court-fees Act but he must sue for the cancellation of the document and pay court-fee under Sec.7(iv-a) of the Act. It makes no difference whether the sale deed is executed by the guardian of the minor as guardian or as manager of the joint family. In either case the document has to be set aside. It is not open to the minor to ignore the transaction and seek possession of the property. It makes no difference whether the sale deed is executed by the guardian of the minor as guardian or as manager of the joint family. In either case the document has to be set aside. It is not open to the minor to ignore the transaction and seek possession of the property. But where the minor is not eo nominee a party to the transaction and the transaction is on behalf of a joint family of which the minor was a member, he could always ignore the transaction as not binding on the family and can seek to recover possession. As transactions entered into by a guardian relating to a minors properties is not void but is only voidable at the instance of the erstwhile minor within three years of his attaining majority, the minor is deemed to be a party to the transaction.” 30. In Raju v. Venkataswami Naidu , (1959)1 MLJ. 118 this Court would hold thus: “It is well-settled that in the case of an alienation by the guardian, the minor who claims the property should set aside the transaction before he can obtain relief by way of possession, etc. But what is contended on behalf of the petitioners by Mr.Parthasarathi is that the father is the lawful guardian and so long as he is alive, the mother cannot be the guardian and when the mother describes herself as the guardian of the minor children, she can at best be only a de facto guardian. Therefore, it is contended that the sale is totally void and need not be set aside. “ .31. InGnanamabal Ammal v. Kannappa Pillai Gnanamabal Ammal v. Kannappa Pillai Gnanamabal Ammal v. Kannappa Pillai , (1959)1 MLJ. 355 this Court would hold as under: .”Where a plaintiffs case is that a document is sham and nominal, it need not be set aside, and the suit for relief on that footing is not one for cancellation, so as to attract the application of Sec.40 of the Madras Court-Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955. But even in such a case, if the plaintiff sues for cancellation he would have to pay court-fee on that relief, whether it is necessary to have the deed cancelled or not.“ .32. In Muppudathi Pillai v. Krishnaqswami Pillai Muppudathi Pillai v. Krishnaqswami Pillai Muppudathi Pillai v. Krishnaqswami Pillai , I.L.R. 1959 Mad. But even in such a case, if the plaintiff sues for cancellation he would have to pay court-fee on that relief, whether it is necessary to have the deed cancelled or not.“ .32. In Muppudathi Pillai v. Krishnaqswami Pillai Muppudathi Pillai v. Krishnaqswami Pillai Muppudathi Pillai v. Krishnaqswami Pillai , I.L.R. 1959 Mad. 929 it was observed as follows: .”In Ammani Ammal v. Ramaswami Naidu , (1918)37 MLJ. 113 Napier, J., after referring to the provisions of Secs.39 and 41 of the Specific Relief Act observed at page 121; To my mind it is clear that there is no necessity to have this document cancelled. The illustrations to Sec.39 indicate that it is only where a party cannot get his legal remedy without first having the document set aside that he comes within the section. This is a suit by the true owner to recover possession of the property. The title adverse to him is not one procured from him or from anyone under whom he claims or from anyone who purported to convey an interest of his. It seems to me therefore that there can be no necessity for him to apply to have the document cancelled and further that the court would have no jurisdiction to do so. We accept this statement of the law.“ .33. In Janaki Ammal v. Rangachari , (1960)1 MLJ. 527 this Court would observe as follows: .”If, therefore, under the substantive law, it is necessary for a party to set aside a transaction before obtaining the relief prayed, the court would imply that there was a prayer to set aside the transaction or direct an amendment of the plaint to that effect so as to levy the proper fee. It is equally settled that where it is unnecessary to set aside a transaction, no such prayer can be implied or required to be taken. Even where there is such a prayer, it is considered as unnecessary or a mere surplusage. Vide: Y.G.Gurukul v. Y. Subrahmanyam Vide: Y.G.Gurukul v. Y. Subrahmanyam Vide: Y.G.Gurukul v. Y. Subrahmanyam , 1956 An.W.R. 553). A reading of the plaint would show that the plaintiffs based their title to the suit properties not as heirs of their mother, but as settles under a previous settlement or arrangement.“ 34. Vide: Y.G.Gurukul v. Y. Subrahmanyam Vide: Y.G.Gurukul v. Y. Subrahmanyam Vide: Y.G.Gurukul v. Y. Subrahmanyam , 1956 An.W.R. 553). A reading of the plaint would show that the plaintiffs based their title to the suit properties not as heirs of their mother, but as settles under a previous settlement or arrangement.“ 34. In Krishnaswamy v. Rangaswamy Gounder , 81 L.W. 338 this Court would hold thus: ”The alienation will be a bar to his getting the relief of partition. It being a voidable transaction he must have it set aside.“ 35. From the reading of the above citations, the following factors would broadly emerge: ”(a) If a person not having authority to execute a deed, or having such authority under certain circumstances which did not exist, executes a deed, it is not necessary for persons who are not bound by it to sue to set it aside, for it cannot be used against them. (b) There is a distinction between voidable and void transactions. In the case of voidable sale, the title to the properties vests in the buyer on the execution of the said deed. It can re-vest in the vendor only by a decree of court. When the instrument of sale is void, the title does not vest with the buyer. In that case, the vendor continues to be the owner of the properties. Consequently, there is no need in such a case for the person concerned to move the court for setting aside the said deed because there is no transfer which the court has to rescind and could always ignore the said transaction as not binding and can seek to recover possession on the strength of its own title. In other words, if the sale is totally void and sale is sham and nominal, the same need not be set aside. On the other hand, if it is a voidable transaction, the person concerned must seek for setting aside the same nor remove the bar to get the relief of partition.“ 36. On the strength of the above guidelines, the learned counsel for the first respondent would submit, by pointing out the relevant recitals in the Power of Attorney, that the alienation by the Power of Attorney would be permitted only if the necessity of the family arises. On the strength of the above guidelines, the learned counsel for the first respondent would submit, by pointing out the relevant recitals in the Power of Attorney, that the alienation by the Power of Attorney would be permitted only if the necessity of the family arises. This means, though the Power of Attorney has got some authority to execute a deed, he has no authority to execute the sale deed unless there is contingency or necessity to execute the same. 37. In the light of the principles laid down by the various courts stated supra and taking into consideration the submissions of the learned counsel for the first respondent, we shall look into the facts of the case on hand. 38. Though Gnanamuthu Konar was the Power of Attorney to manage the suit properties and to alienate in times of necessity for the family, it cannot be contended that these sale deeds were executed only out of the unavoidable circumstances or contingencies or necessity for the family, as there is no material for the same. 39. In such a situation, the observation of the Full Bench of this Court in Unni v. Kunchi Amma , I.L.R. 14 Mad. 26 and Ramaswami v. Rangachariar , (1940)1 MLJ. 52: I.L.R. 1940 Mad. 259 to the effect that if a person having authority to execute a deed only under certain circumstances like family necessity which did not exist, executes a deed, then the said deed would not bind the person concerned and consequently, he may straightaway ask for the main relief without asking for setting aside the said sale deed, would be squarely applicable to the present case. .40. Furthermore, both the courts below would hold that the suit for which some expenditure incurred by the Power of Attorney, was disposed of in the year 1966 itself and there was no necessity for selling the items in question by two documents in 1967 and two other documents in 1971 and 1974 respectively. 41. It is also noticed that all the four co-owners were very much available and these sale deeds have been executed even without the knowledge of the co-owners. As already indicated, the 4th defendant, one of the co-owners did not choose to appear before the court. The Power of Attorney Gnanamuthu Konar died in the year 1978. 41. It is also noticed that all the four co-owners were very much available and these sale deeds have been executed even without the knowledge of the co-owners. As already indicated, the 4th defendant, one of the co-owners did not choose to appear before the court. The Power of Attorney Gnanamuthu Konar died in the year 1978. Therefore, except the oral evidence of D.W.1, the first defendant, the wife of the Power of Attorney, there is no other material to show that the properties in question were sold by the Power of Attorney out of necessity of the family. 42. Moreover, though the defendants 5 to 7 and 9 are the alleged purchasers, 6th defendant Devaraj alone was examined as D.W.2. As a matter of fact, the trial court would hold that all these sale documents have been created, in order to defraud the other co-owners including the plaintiff. The relevant observation is this: 43. That apart, in para.16 of the judgment of the trial court and para 10 of the lower appellate courts judgment, both the courts below have elaborately discussed the oral and documentary evidence relating to the sale deeds Exs.B-6 to B-9 and held as a fact that the item Nos.1, 3, 9 and 11 have not been sold by the Power of Attorney out of necessity of the family and that therefore, those sale deeds would not bind the plaintiff as well as other co-owners. 44. Under does circumstances on the strength of the above settled law, as laid down by the various courts and the factual finding of both the courts below on the basis of the materials available on record, the plaintiff is competent to file a suit for partition and separate possession even without asking for the cancellation of the earlier sale deeds, as it cannot be contended that the power of attorney had authority to excuse the sale deeds, as there was no family necessity and consequently, it can be safely held that it is not necessary for the plaintiff, who is not bound by those sale deeds, to sue to set them aside, for they cannot be used against her, as she may treat them as non existent and sue for her right as if they did not exist. 45. 45. In addition to the above substantial question of law, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants would raise one other point. He contended that since there was sale of item No.11 in favour of Durairaj, son of fifth defendant under Ex.B-6 sale deed dated 28. 1967 and sale of item No.1 in favour of 9th defendant under Ex.B-7 sale deed dated 110. 1967, they are continuously in possession and enjoyment of the said items to the knowledge of the plaintiff and thus, they have perfected title by adverse possession. According to him, the courts below should have seen that effect of registration of Exs.B-6 to B-9 itself is a constructive notice in law as contemplated under Transfer of Property Act. In any event, it is stated by the counsel for the appellants that at least in respect of item No.1 under Ex.B-7 was purchased and registered on 110. 1967 and item No.11 under Ex.B-6 was purchased and registered on 28. 1967, the suit is clearly barred by limitation, since the suit has been filed only on 12. 1982. .46. This submission is resisted by the counsel for the first respondent by pointing out the relevant portions of the judgments of the courts below contending that these contentions would fail as they suffer from lack of substance. 47. In this context, it would be relevant to refer to the findings given by the trial court and the lower appellate court with reference to the above question. 48. Before the trial court, there is no issue regarding the adverse possession. The fourth issue framed by the trial court is whether the suit is barred by limitation in respect of items 1, 3, 9 and 11: The trial court, after considering the materials, would give a finding in paragraphs 15 and 20, which is as follows: The whole reading of the judgment would show that there is no reference about the adverse possession and discussion of the same. 49. Inthe lower appellate court judgment also, there is no point of issue raised with reference to the adverse possession. 49. Inthe lower appellate court judgment also, there is no point of issue raised with reference to the adverse possession. As a third issue, the question has been formulated as to whether the suit in respect of items 1, 3, 9 and 11 is barred by limitation: While discussing this issue, the lower appellate court considered the materials and held as a fact that the plaintiff came to know about the sale deeds only after receipt of the reply dated 1. 1982 and as such, the question of limitation would not arise. The following is the relevant extract: Thus, the reading of the above judgment also would make it clear that the lower appellate court would specifically find while dealing with the factual aspects that the plaintiff came to know about the sale deeds only after receipt of the reply dated 1. 1982 from defendants and therefore, the suit in respect of all the items, is within the period of limitation. 50. As indicated above, there is no issue raised as regards the adverse possession. It is settled law that unless there is a specific plea and proof that the defendant asserted hostile title and possession to the knowledge of the plaintiff within the statutory period and the latter acquiesced to it, the defendant cannot succeed to have it established that he perfected his right of title by adverse possession. 51. In other words, in order to constitute adverse possession the other co-owners out of possession must be proved to have had notice of the assertion of hostile title and exclusive possession ousting them with the requisite animus for the statutory period. Further, it shall be pleaded and proved. 52. As a matter of course the plaintiff cannot be fixed with knowledge of the sale documents simply because of the fact that they are registered documents. Registration of the documents by itself cannot operate as a notice to the plaintiff, that the defendant was holding the property adverse to him and dealing with it as full owner. Knowledge of ouster and exclusive possession with the requisite animus are facts to be alleged and proved by the defendant who pleaded adverse possession. 53. The burden is heavily on the defendant to prove adverse possession and prescription of title. The starting point of limitation is when possession becomes adverse. 54. Knowledge of ouster and exclusive possession with the requisite animus are facts to be alleged and proved by the defendant who pleaded adverse possession. 53. The burden is heavily on the defendant to prove adverse possession and prescription of title. The starting point of limitation is when possession becomes adverse. 54. The plea of adverse possession ins not a pure question of law but a mixed question of fact and law. The party pleading adverse possession shall state with sufficient clarity as to when his adverse possession commenced and the nature of its possession. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all the facts necessary to establish his adverse possession. 55. The mere assertion regarding the uninterrupted and continued possession without the animus to continue in possession hostile to the rights of the real owner will not constitute adverse possession in law. 56. The above principles have been laid down in the following decisions: (1) M.Sidhiqu v. Mohd. K.P.Kutty M.Sidhiqu v. Mohd. K.P.Kutty M.Sidhiqu v. Mohd. K.P.Kutty , A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 1003 ; (2) Ramachandran and 2 others v. Valliammal and two others Ramachandran and 2 others v. Valliammal and two others Ramachandran and 2 others v. Valliammal and two others , (1992)2 L.W. 470 ; (3) Doraiswami Mudaliar v. Balasubramaniam , 80 L.W. 248; (4) Dr.Mahesh Chand Sharma v. Rai Kumari Sharma Dr.Mahesh Chand Sharma v. Rai Kumari Sharma Dr.Mahesh Chand Sharma v. Rai Kumari Sharma , (1996)8 S.C.C. 128 ; (5) D.N.Venkatarayappa v. State of Karnataka D.N.Venkatarayappa v. State of Karnataka D.N.Venkatarayappa v. State of Karnataka , (1997)7 S.C.C. 567 . 57. In the light of the above principles, if we look at the present facts, it is quite clear that there is not only not argued regarding adverse possession before both the courts below but also not materials were placed before the courts to show that the defendants have perfected title by adverse possession and when the adverse possession to the knowledge of the plaintiff commenced. For raising the ground of adverse possession and limitation, the mere plea would not do. There cannot be any question of adverse possession or limitation, unless the plea of the ouster is raised and successfully proved. 58. For raising the ground of adverse possession and limitation, the mere plea would not do. There cannot be any question of adverse possession or limitation, unless the plea of the ouster is raised and successfully proved. 58. On going through the records depicting the materials placed by both the parties and the reasonings given by both the courts below to pass decree in favour of the plaintiff, I do not find any reason to hold that both the courts below have committed error. 59. Under Sec.100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, this Court is not expected to re-appreciate the evidence. This Court is only concerned with the question whether the finding of the lower appellate court is based on evidence, and whether the same has been arrived at in accordance with law. 60. Applying those principles to the present facts of the case, I am not able to hold that the findings of the courts below are, in any way, incorrect or any interference is called for by this Court. 61. This Court, while exercising its jurisdiction in second appeal, will not interfere with pure findings of fact, by substituting its own assessment of the evidence. As a matter of fact, in Ramachandra v. Ramalinga , A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 302 the Apex Court would hold that the High Court cannot interfere with the conclusion of fact recorded by the appellate court, however, erroneous the said conclusions may appear to be to the High Court. 62. However, as indicated above, I cannot even say, the conclusion of fact recorded by the courts below in the present case are erroneous, as, in my view, both the courts below would give a correct finding of fact by making a proper appreciation of the entire evidence on record. 63. In the result, the second appeal is dismissed. Consequently, the judgments and decrees of both the courts below and confirmed. No costs.