Research › Browse › Judgment

Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

1999 DIGILAW 281 (HP)

LAND ACQUISITION COLLECTOR v. SATYA BHUSHAN

1999-12-20

D.RAJU, LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA

body1999
JUDGMENT D. Raju, C. J.—The above appeal has been filed against the award of compensation made by the learned District Judge, Solan in his award dated 14.10.1992 in Land Reference No. 61-S/4 of 1992 made at the instance of the claimant/owner of the land acquired. The acquisition as a whole was by the Public Works Department for the purpose of constructing the road known as Solan-Jaunaji-Dharja road, which passes through the lands of ten villages, namely, Sheely, Sheel Shamlog, Mashiwar, Bhajon, Fagon, Layan, Kotla, Nahar, Bagur and Ser-Banera. The land in question are situated in village Ser-Banera. The notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was issued in respect of this land on 25.2.1989, but published in the Himachal Pradesh Rajpatra on 15.4.1989 and in the daily Newspaper on 7.5.1989. The Land Acquisition Officer assessed the market value of the acquired land by classifying it in different categories. The claimant was not satisfied with the quantum of compensation determined and awarded for the lands acquired and consequently he sought for reference under Section 18 of the Act and it is in such circumstances, the reference case came to be entertained by the learned District Judge, Solan. 2. The learned District Judge, Solan came to the conclusion that having regard to the last date of publication, namely, the publication in the Newspaper, the market value of the acquired lands is to be assessed on 7.5.1989. Relying upon the copy of the award marked in the case as Ex. PY rendered in respect of another item of land in the village and dealt with by a different award, the learned District Judge fixed the market value of the land in question also at Rs. 45,000/- per Bigha. In addition to such determination of the market value of the land acquired at Rs. PY rendered in respect of another item of land in the village and dealt with by a different award, the learned District Judge fixed the market value of the land in question also at Rs. 45,000/- per Bigha. In addition to such determination of the market value of the land acquired at Rs. 45,000/- per Bigha, the learned District Judge awarded the following sum: "(a) Compulsory acquisition charges at the rate of 30% on the market value assessed above; (b) Additional compulsory acquisition charges at the rate of 12% per annum on the market value assessed above with effect from the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894, that is, 7.5.1989, till the date of the award, that is, 31.1.1991; (c) Interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the compensation assessed above with effect from 18.12.1968 till the date of payment of the amount of compensation in terms of the orders of the Honble High Court in CWP No. 147 of 1988; (d) Interest at the rate of 9% per annum on the enhanced compensation from the date of possession, that is, 18.12.1968 till the expiry of one year thereafter, that is, 17.12.1969; (e) Interest at the rate of 15% per annum on the enhanced amount with effect from 18.12.1969 till the date of payment of the amount of Court." 3. Aggrieved, the State has filed the above appeal. Heard the learned Advocate General for the appellants and Mr. Praneet Gupta, learned counsel for the respondent-claimant. Though the learned Advocate General was vehemently challenging the rate of land fixed by the Court below at Rs. 45,000/- per Bigha on the ground that the reasoning of the learned District Judge to apply the principles enshrined in Section 28-A of the Act is not correct and the same could not have been applied to the case on hand and that there was no evidence as such to prove that the lands which were the subject matter of acquisition under the award marked as Ex. PY and the present lands were similar and identical in nature. The learned Advocate General, in our view, to some extent is correct in objecting to the reasoning of the learned District Judge based on the provisions of Section 28-A of the Act. PY and the present lands were similar and identical in nature. The learned Advocate General, in our view, to some extent is correct in objecting to the reasoning of the learned District Judge based on the provisions of Section 28-A of the Act. Section 28-A while providing for re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of an earlier award of the Court covered by the same notification under Section 4(1) of the Act also stipulates under sub-section (3) that any person, who has not accepted the said award may seek for the determination by the Court and in which case the provision of Sections 18 to 28 shall so far as may be apply to such Reference as they apply to a Reference under Section 18 and consequently to a case where a specific request for enhancement has been sought for under Section 18 of the Act, as in this case, the earlier award could not have been relied upon straightway to fix the value of compensation at that rate. But the submission in this regard overlooks the fact that though the claimant in this case has sought for enhancment for more than Rs. 45,000/-, which was the amount determined in the earlier award, the learned District Judge apparently thought that since he is allowing not more than Rs. 45,000/- per Bigha, it was permissible for him to rely upon the earlier award. Consequently, the objection taken in this regard by the learned Advocate General need not detain us in considering the reasonableness or otherwise and the sufficiency of the amount fixed as market value of the compensation in this case. As indicated earlier, the acquisition in these cases was for construction of road and if, as noticed by the learned District Judge in this case, the lands acquired in the very village, Ser-Banera was the subject matter of the award marked as Ex. PY in which the market value has been fixed at Rs. 45,000/- Per Bigha. We are of the view that the challenge to the rate of market value has to be rejected, as of no merit. PY in which the market value has been fixed at Rs. 45,000/- Per Bigha. We are of the view that the challenge to the rate of market value has to be rejected, as of no merit. Having regard to the location of the land and taking into account the reasonableness of the prevailing prices and the market value in the said area, even judicial notice can be taken note of and that is what we find the learned District Judge has done in this case to apply the rate of market value determined under the earlier award to a land acquired for the identical purpose in the very village. 4. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that the market value of the land fixed at Rs. 45,000/- per Bigha seems to be reasonable and not either arbitrary or unreasonable to call for our interference in this appeal. Hence, the challenge to the same is rejected. So far as other amounts awarded in paragraph 14 of the award of the Court below in addition to the rate of market value of compensation fixed as noticed above, we are of the view that no exception could be taken to the award of 30% under the heading of solatium under paragraph 14(a). So far as the additional amount awarded in terms of Section 23(1-A) of the Act is concerned, the same has been awarded only from the date of notification under Section 4(1), namely, 7.5.1989 till the date of award and we find no infirmity also in the said determination and the same does not call for interference in our hands. So far as the award of ex-gratia amount by way of interest at 12% per annum on the compensation awarded, relying upon an earlier order of this Court in C.W.P. No. 147/88 is concerned, the same, in our view, cannot be justified or sustained in the light of the subsequent decision of the apex Court reported in State of Himachal Pradesh and others v. Dharam Dass, AIR 1996 S.C. 127, where under the principle laid down in CWP No. 147/88 was not approved and a contra view was taken holding that there cannot be any amount awarded by way of interest on equitable grounds except the one envisaged either under Section 23(1-A) of the Act or under any of the provisions of the Act. In view of this, the amount awarded in paragraoh 14(c) is hereby set aside as not sustainable in law. So far as the interest awarded at 9% per annum on the enhanced compensation from the date of taking possession which was taken to be 18.12.1968 till the expiry of one year under Section 28 of the Act is concerned, we are of the view that the learned District Judge committed an error in adopting the date of commencement for computing interest for such an award of interest to be 18.12.1968 the date on which actual physical possession was taken. The very learned District Judge, for the purpose of Section 23(1-A) has adopted the date only as 7.5.1989, which is the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. Having regard to the decision of the apex Court reported in Special Tehsildar v. M.A. Jabbar, (1995) 2 S.C.C. 142 and Union of India v. Budh Singh and others, (1995) 6 S.C.C. 233? the date of possession if in a given case is shown to have been taken long before Section 4(1) notification itself, the claimant would be entitled to interest only from the date of notification and not from the date of such taking over of possession on a date anterior to the date of notification under Section 4(1), The apex Court has also held that the Court has no jurisdiction to award interest in excess of the rate prescribed under the Act and/or for the period anterior to Section 4(1) notification, the Act being a self-contained Code, and common law principle of justice, equity and good conscience not being attracted to such a case. Consequently, the interest awarded from 18.12.1968 till the expiry of one year thereafter is hereby set aside and that the respondent-claimant would be entitled to payment of such interest under Section 28 only from 7.5.1989 till the expiry of one year, thereafter. 5. So far as the interest for the period beyond the expiry of one year from 7.5.1989 is concerned, which has been dealt with under paragraph 14(e), the same cannot, in view of the principles noticed above, sustained but is liable to be set aside and modified so as to allow interest at the rate of 15% per annum on the enhanced amount w.e.f., 7.5.1990 till the date of payment of the amount in Court. The appeal is partly allowed only to the extent indicated above. In other respects, the appeal shall stand dismissed. No costs. Appeal partly allowed.