Judgment : The petitioner has filed this writ petition praying to issue a writ of certiorari to call for the records pertaining to G.O.Ms.No.543, (Industries (MIJ I), dated 23. 1988 and G.O.Ms.No.361, Industries (MID 2), dated 4. 1990 and R.C.No.36 of 1988 and Award No.4 of 1992, dated 24. 1992 on the file of the 3rd respondent, insofar as the petitioners land in S.No.271/5 of an extent of 0.11 cents is concerned and to quash the same. 2. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondents. .3. The case of the petitioner as projected in her affidavit filed in support of the writ petition is that she purchased 0.11 cents in S.No.271/5 and 270/6B in Pappankuppam village of Gummidipoondi Taluk, Chingleput District, on 6. 1983 for a valid consideration and from then onwards, she is in effective possession and enjoyment of the same; that the property is a house site; that while so on 20.4.1988, the first respondent caused a publication of the notification under Sec.4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act in G.O.Ms.No.543, Industries (MIJ.I), dated 23. 1988 and also caused to be published the same notice in two Tamil dailies viz., Dhinamani and Dhinathanthi both dated 24. 1988; that he had no knowledge of this notice must less for the scheme of SIPCOT complex; that thereafter, Form 3-A notice had been sent to the petitioner on 10. 1988 calling for her to appear before the third respondent on 210. 1988 and putforward his objections, if any; that he objected the very scheme of acquisition. 4. The further case of the petitioner is that in the proposed notification, her property had been described as though belonging to his vendor, viz., M.Kumaraswamy Pillai in spite of the petitioner having purchased the same on 6. 1983; that again, she received a notice from the third respondent on 3. 1992 as per his Roc.No.36/88-A-90, dated 22. 1992 calling for her to appear before him on 2. 1992; that on 3. 1992, she sent her objections seeking higher compensation; that a declaration under Sec.6 of the Act was purported to be published on 24. 1990 in G.O.Ms.No.361, Industries (MID 2), dated 4. 1990 even describing as though belonging to her vendor M.Kumarasamy Pillai himself and on Ramalinga Achari; that on 24. 1992; that on 3. 1992, she sent her objections seeking higher compensation; that a declaration under Sec.6 of the Act was purported to be published on 24. 1990 in G.O.Ms.No.361, Industries (MID 2), dated 4. 1990 even describing as though belonging to her vendor M.Kumarasamy Pillai himself and on Ramalinga Achari; that on 24. 1992, she received yet another notice in Form 9 of the Act intimating the Award No.4 of 1992 having been passed on 24. 1992; that she sent her objections to the Award passed on 6. 1992 and 6. 1992; that by virtue of proviso to Sec.6, the very Award passed since after two years on 6. 1992 and 6. 1992 after Sec.6 declaration which was on 4. 1990 and published on 24. 1990; that even for Sec.6 declaration which had to be made within one year, after the publication of the notification under Sec.4(1), which was on 20.4.1988, but the declaration under Sec.6 has been made on 4. 1990 which should have been before 14. 1989 and under this score, also subsequent thereto and in pursuance of the same are invalid. .5. The further contention of the petitioner is that she was not served with individual notice regarding the declaration under Sec.6 of the Act as a result of which, she was not able to question the validity of the acquisition proceedings immediately after the declaration and would ultimately pray for the relief as sought for in the writ petition. 6. In the counter filed on behalf of the respondents, it would be contended that the petitioner has not at all made any objection to the acquisition proceedings, nor did she produce any record. But, however, the sales statistics records revealed that she had purchased an extent of 0.11 cents on 6. 1983 under a sale deed based on which, notices for 5-A enquiry had been sent to the address mentioned in the deed. But no representation was made nor did she attend the enquiry; that till the time of passing the Award, the land stood in the name of M.Kumaraswamy Pillai under Patta No.354 and that the land was lying waste; that in spite of a notice having been sent in Form 3-A dated 10. 1988 calling for the petitioner to appear for the 5-A enquiry on 210. 1988 calling for the petitioner to appear for the 5-A enquiry on 210. 1988, admittedly to her knowledge, she did not attend the same, nor did she make any representation; that due notice of Award enquiry has been sent to her as interested person and the same had been served on her on 2. 1992. But there was no representation or appearance made for the enquiry dated 22. 1992, but later sent a petition dated 3. 1992 claiming compensation at Rs.1 lakh per acre and in case of lower amount requesting the authorities to refer the matter under Sec.18 of the Act to the Sub Court; that the possession of the lands have been taken over and handed over to the SIPCOT on 5. 1992; that long after the said date on 6. 1992, she made another representation. .7. Regarding the delay said to have been caused, it would be answered in the counter affidavit stating thereby that Sec.4(1) notification was made on 23. 1988, got published on 20.4.1988 and the declaration under Sec.6 was made on 4. 1990 and published on 24. 1990. It would be answered that a fresh draft 4(1) notification was approved in G.O.Ms.No.720, Industries (MID.2) Department, dated 10. 1989 and published in the Gazette on 11. 1989 further publishing the same in two Tamil Nadu dailies on 11. 1989 and the substance of the notification got published in the locality on 11. 1989; that the petitioner had not objected to the land acquisition proceedings either for the notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act or for the fresh notification under the same Section published on 11. 1989. Hence, it was construed that she had no objection to the acquisition of the land; that Sec.6 declaration was made on 4. 1990 and published on 24. 1990 in Tamil dailies and in the Government Gazette on 24. 1990 and in the locality on 5. 1990; that in pursuance of these notifications, the award was passed on 24. 1992 that is within the stipulated time of two years from the date of publication in the locality which was on 5. 1990. 8. 1990 and published on 24. 1990 in Tamil dailies and in the Government Gazette on 24. 1990 and in the locality on 5. 1990; that in pursuance of these notifications, the award was passed on 24. 1992 that is within the stipulated time of two years from the date of publication in the locality which was on 5. 1990. 8. The further contentions of the counter affidavit are that it is an admitted case of the petitioner that she was issued with a notice under Form 3-A calling for 5-A enquiry, but she neither attended the enquiry, nor sent any representation; that after observing all formalities and services of due notices, the award was passed on 24. 1992 under Award No.4/92 and even thereafter, due notices under Sec.12(2) of the Act was served on the petitioner on 24. 1992 ultimately handing over possession of the lands to the SIPCOT on 5. 1992; that after two months that is after the entire proceedings were over, the petitioner has come forward to file this writ petition and she deserves no merit. 9. During arguments, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would sum up that notification under Sec.4(1) was published in the Government Gazette on 20.4.1988 and the same was made in G.O.Ms.No.543, Industries (MIJ.I), dated 23. 1988 and that the same got published in Tamil dailies on 24. 1988; that Form 3-A enquiry notice had been sent to the petitioner on 10. 1988; that the date of hearing was on 210. 1988 and on 12. 1988; that the declaration under Sec.6 was made on 24. 1990; that the Award was made on 24. 1992 and the same was informed on 24. 1992; that possession was taken from the petitioner on 5. 1992 and handed over to the SIPCOT; that the petitioner being a Rajasthani lady, she has no knowledge about Tamil language and the question of publication in the local Tamil dailies do not have any impact on her; that it is the Government that is to take steps to inform her in the language known to her; that the mandatory enquiry under Sec.5-A gives power to agitate; that any notification which is subsequently followed by 5-A enquiry will initiate the proceeding; that the entire proceeding start from the publication of the notification under Sec.4(1); that Sec.6 declaration has to be taken with reference to the earlier notification under Sec.4(1). .10. .10. At this juncture, the learned counsel would cite a judgment delivered in Mandir Sita Ramji v. Governor of Delhi , A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1868 wherein it is held that it is the 5-A enquiry which is mandatory and gives opportunity for the land owner. The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted hereunder: .“A decision by the Government on the objection, when the collector afforded no opportunity of being heard to the objector, would not be proper. The power to hear the objection under Sec.5-A is that of the Collector and not of the appropriate Government. It is no doubt true that the recommendation of the Land Acquisition Collector is not binding on the Government. The Government may choose either to accept the recommendation or to reject it; but the mandatory requirement of the section is that when a persons property is proposed to be acquired, he must be given an opportunity to show cause against it. The fact that the Collector is not the authority to decide the objection does not exonerate him from his duty to hear the objector on the objection and make the recommendation.” .11. The other judgment cited by the learned counsel is delivered in Farid Ahmed v. Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad , (1976)3 S.C.C. 719 and this judgment is also cited for the same proposition of holding 5-A enquiry mandatory. The relevant portion of the Judgment is extracted hereunder: .“We are clearly of opinion that Sec.5-A of the Land Acquisition Act is applicable in the matter of acquisition of land in this case and since no personal hearing had been given to the appellants by the Commissioner with regard to their written objections the order of acquisition and the resultant confirmation order of the State Government with respect to the land of the appellants are invalid under the law and the same are quashed. It should be pointed out, it is not a case of failure of the rules of natural justice as such as appeared to be the only concern of the High Court and also of the City Civil Court. It is a case of absolute non-compliance with a mandatory provision under Sec.5-A of the Land Acquisition Act which is clearly applicable in the matter of acquisition under the Bombay Act.” 12. It is a case of absolute non-compliance with a mandatory provision under Sec.5-A of the Land Acquisition Act which is clearly applicable in the matter of acquisition under the Bombay Act.” 12. In reply, the learned Government Advocate (on the writ side) would contend that since the petitioners name was not found in the revenue records, the notice would not have been sent in her name, but in the name of her predecessor in title; that Form 3-A notice had been sent on 10. 1988 that is six months after the notification under Sec.4 (1); that the Award enquiry notice was also sent on 10. 1988 calling for her to attend the 5-A enquiry; that neither the petitioner appeared in person nor objected to the acquisition in any other manner till the passing of the Award; that the enquiry was published on 2. 1994; that no objection was raised during enquiry on 22. 1992 by the petitioner. But she has only sent an application for enhancement of the compensation; that the Award had been passed and possession had been taken over; that even if there are laches on the part of the petitioner in passing of the Award, it cannot vitiate the whole proceedings; that for this proposition of law, the learned counsel would cite the following judgments: (i) Mahavir v. The Rural Institute, Amravathi Mahavir v. The Rural Institute, Amravathi Mahavir v. The Rural Institute, Amravathi , (1988)1 C.T.C. 180 (ii) H.M.Kelogirao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh H.M.Kelogirao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh H.M.Kelogirao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh , (1997)7 S.C.C. 722 (iii) Municipal Corporation, Greater Bombay v. I.D.I. Co. Pvt. Limited Municipal Corporation, Greater Bombay v. I.D.I. Co. Pvt. Limited Municipal Corporation, Greater Bombay v. I.D.I. Co. Pvt. Limited , A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 482. (iv) State of Haryana v. Dewan Singh , A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 675, that the petitioner has not made any objection to the acquisition at the relevant time, but only sought for enhancement of compensation and this fact is discussed in the Award itself. 13. Pvt. Limited Municipal Corporation, Greater Bombay v. I.D.I. Co. Pvt. Limited , A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 482. (iv) State of Haryana v. Dewan Singh , A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 675, that the petitioner has not made any objection to the acquisition at the relevant time, but only sought for enhancement of compensation and this fact is discussed in the Award itself. 13. So far as the first judgment cited above is concerned, it is held as follows: “Encumbrance made by owner after issue of notice under Sec.4(1) - Acquisition is complete when Government take possession of acquired land - Title of original owner of lands extinguished - Encumbrance made by owner after 4(1) notice does not bind Government.” So far as the second judgment cited above is concerned, it is held as follows: “Possession of land taken after notification under Sec.4(1) and declaration under Sec.6 - Land stood vested in State free from all encumbrances - Proceedings cannot be quashed - However, since the appellants neither accepted the award nor taken recourse to reference under Sec.18 they permitted to seek reference with six weeks No objection with regard to limitation shall be raised against them.” So far as the third judgment cited above is concerned, it is held as follows: “Land in question de-reserved for specified public purpose and went out of earmarked purpose - Challenge to notification under Sec.126 by interested person - Should be made before acquisition becomes final and conclusive under Sec.12(1) of Land Acquisition Act.” So far as the fourth and last judgment cited above is concerned, it is held as follows: “Sec.11 - Land Acquisition - Compensation - Award of Collector - Challenge to Notification under Sec.4 and declaration under Sec.6 after making of award Impermissible.” .14. In clarification, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would contend that the first notice was sent by the respondent on 2. 1994 and it was superseded by the second notice, but no opportunity was given to her. The other judgment cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is one delivered in Lonappan v. Sub Collector, Palghat , A.I.R. 1959 Ker. 1994 and it was superseded by the second notice, but no opportunity was given to her. The other judgment cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is one delivered in Lonappan v. Sub Collector, Palghat , A.I.R. 1959 Ker. 343 wherein it is held: .“Land Acquisition Act (1894), Secs.4-A, 6 - Final order for acquisition passed without giving notice of objections to Government Department requiring land - Order is without jurisdiction - Interference under Art.226, Constitution of India - Writ Petition No.839 of 1953 (Mad.) Reversed (Constitution of India, Art.226) (Madras Land Acquisition Rules, R.3(b).” .15. Assessing the entire case in hand in the facts and circumstances and the position of law in the context of the scope of jurisdiction of this Court to interfere with, two grounds have been raised on the part of the petitioner in testifying the validity of the acquisition viz., non-compliance of the mandatory provision of the period of one year within which Sec.6 declaration regarding the acquisition to be made immediately after the publication of the notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act and the other mandatory limitation of two years within which the award should be made after Sec.6 declaration. So far as the case in hand is concerned, Sec.4(1) had been published in the Government Gazette on 20.4.1988 as per G.O.Ms.No.543, dated 23. 1988 that declaration under Sec.6 had been made on 24. 1990 with intimation to the petitioner on 24. 1992 and possession had been taken and handed over to the SIPCOT on 5. 1992. 16. From the above sequence it is clear that Sec.6 declaration had been made later than the prescribed period of law. But so far as the award from the time of Sec.6 declaration is concerned, it had been made well in time, but only the intimation had been given to the petitioner a little later that is in a span of one week from the date of the award which could be presumed a reasonable time. However, though so far as the delay is caused on the part of the respondents in making the declaration under Sec.6 of the acquisition proceedings from the date of publication of the notification under Sec.4 (1) thus exceeding the time limit provided by law, the Award had been made in time from the date of Sec.6 declaration. 17. However, though so far as the delay is caused on the part of the respondents in making the declaration under Sec.6 of the acquisition proceedings from the date of publication of the notification under Sec.4 (1) thus exceeding the time limit provided by law, the Award had been made in time from the date of Sec.6 declaration. 17. It has been time and again held by different High Courts that the best time to testify the acquisition proceeding on any ground is after the declaration is made under Sec.6 of the Land Acquisition Act. Equally, the upper forums of law including that of the Apex Court have held in more than one judgment thus the law coming to be well-settled that once the award is made, challenging the same or testifying the validity of the acquisition proceeding should be discredited as this proposition of law also come to be established in the above four Judgments cited on the part of the respondents. The reason being much water would have flowed by the time award is made and many things regarding the acquisition proceedings including the purpose for which the acquisition is sought to be made becoming settled. Hence, disturbing such an acquisition proceeding after the award is made whereafter the only formality remains to be done is to complete the entire process of acquisition handing over possession of the land with the requisitioning body or authority. 18. It is a case where in the award had been made on 24. 1992 and possession had also been handed over to the SIPCOT, the requisitioning body as early as on 5. 1992 and the above writ petition challenging the acquisition proceeding had been filed on 30.6.1992 that is not only after the award was made but even after handing over possession of the land with the requisitioning body. Hence, it could safely be concluded that the petitioner having been slept for over a couple of years after possession had been taken and handed over by the respondents in favour of the SIPCOT and as a result of afterthought, has come forward to institute the above writ petition challenging the entire acquisition proceedings thus miserably missing the bus in so far as the timing as arrived at by the different upper forums of law. 19. 19. Moreover, it is a clear cut case wherein the petitioner has been seeking only the enhancement of compensation at the initial stages of acquisition which she had made clear in her representation thereby praying with the authorities concerned to refer the matter to the court of Reference for enhancement of compensation since in her considered opinion, it was only the compensation that was inadequate thereby making it clear that she was not very much concerned about the very acquisition of her lands by the said proceedings. It is only of late, probably having been advised in a different manner, she might have come forward to challenge the very acquisition proceedings and hence this Court is not in a position to concede the request answering the prayers in the affirmative. No other valid or tangible reason or ground exits so as to consider the claim of the petitioner thus causing interference with the acquisition proceedings. In result, for the foregoing reasons the above writ petition fails and the same is dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.