Jameela Beevi and others v. The State of Tamil Nadu and another
1999-12-15
K.G.BALAKRISHNAN, K.P.SIVASUBRAMANIAM
body1999
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- K.P.Sivasubramaniam, J. This writ appeal is directed against the order of the learned single Judge in W.P.No.12598 of 1991, dated 17. 1999. 2. In the writ petition, the petitioners/appellants sought for quashing the notification of the first respondent under Sec.4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) in G.O.Ms.No.126, Home Department, dated 21. 1974, and declaration under Sec.6 of the Act in G.O.Ms.No.1267, Home Department, dated 18. 1991. 3. According to the petitioners, they belong to the same family, being the joint owners of the Lands in Survey No.1293/1 part and S.No.1295/3 of Narasinganallur Village, Tirunelveli Taluk, Tirunelveli District. The impugned notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act was issued to acquire the said lands for the purpose of constructing quarters for police subordinate of Pettai police station. After conducting an enquiry and over-ruling the objections, the first respondent made a declaration under Sec.6 of the Act on 21. 1999 An ward was passed on 4. 1982. The petitioners thereupon filed W.P.No.975 of 1982 to quash the declaration. The said writ petition was ultimately allowed by an order dated 17. 1990 by this Court with liberty to the respondents to proceed afresh from the stage of enquiry under Sec.5-A. An enquiry was conducted on 27. 1991 and on behalf of the petitioners their power agent Thiru Abdul Hameed appeared for the enquiry and objected to the acquisition proceedings. The petitioners contend that there was no compliance of Rule 3(b) of the Tamil Nadu Land Acquisition Rules (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules’) framed under Sec.55(1) of the Act. The remarks of the requisitioning body was never forwarded to them and there was no proper enquiry after forwarding of the remarks of the acquiring authority. Therefore, the entire, proceedings are liable to be set aside. 4. It is not necessary to refer to the other allegations contained in the affidavit, having regard to the scope of the disposal of the present writ appeal. 5. With reference to the allegation of non-compliance of Rule 3(b) of the Rules, in the counter filed to the writ petition, the respondents had contended that according to Sec.5-A of the Act, if any objection petition was received within thirty days from the date of the publication of the notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act, an opportunity has to be given to the objector as per Rule 3(b) of the Rules.
In the present case, notification under Sec.4(1), of the Act was published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette dated 12. 1974. In the present case, the High Court had issued direction to the effect that the Land Acquisition Officer can proceed afresh that the Land Acquisition Officer can proceed afresh from the stage of enquiry under Sec.5-A of the Act. Therefore, according to the respondents, the petitioners ought to have filed their their objections before the Land Acquisition Officer immediately after the pronouncement of the judgment of the High Court. But the petitioners did not sent their objections within the time stipulated under Sec.5-A of the Act. Further, the petitioners did not send their objections within the time stipulated as per the public notice issued by the Revenue Divisional Officer on 26. 1991 and therefore, the remarks of the requisitioning body on the objections were communicated to the petitioners through the proceedings under Sec.5-A of the Act. 6. Learned single Judge who heard the matter, agreed with the contentions raised by the respondents and dismissed the writ petition. Hence, the present writ appeal. 7. A perusal of the stand taken by the respondents in the counter as stated above, with reference to the compliance of Rule 3(b) of the Rules shows that the defence is twofold. ‘Firstly, the objections were not sent within thirty days from the publication of Sec.4 (1) notification of the Act and that, secondly, at any rate, the objections were not sent within the time stipulated as per notice issued by the Revenue Divisional Officer for enquiry on 26. 1991. 8. We are unable to agree with the contentions raised by the respondents. Inasmuch as the declaration under Sec.6 of the Act was quashed by this Court in the earlier proceedings and in W.P.No.9750 of 1982, it was specifically ordered that the declaration made under Sec.6 of the Act was quashed, and that the respondents can proceed afresh from the stage of enquiry under Sec.5-A of the Act and to complete the enquiry in accordance with law. When once the earlier, declaration under Sec.6 of the Act had been quashed, it would be irrelevant to refer the time limit provided under Sec.4 (1) of the Act. The very purpose of giving liberty to the respondents to initiate fresh proceedings, was to afford proper opportunity to the land owners to object to the acquisition of land.
When once the earlier, declaration under Sec.6 of the Act had been quashed, it would be irrelevant to refer the time limit provided under Sec.4 (1) of the Act. The very purpose of giving liberty to the respondents to initiate fresh proceedings, was to afford proper opportunity to the land owners to object to the acquisition of land. Their contention that the objections should have been made within thirty days from the date of Sec.4(1) notification or from the date of the judgment cannot be sustained. While allowing W.P.No.9750 of 1982, this Court has specifically recorded a finding that there was no proper proof forth coming from the side of the respondents as regards proper publication of Sec.4(1) notification in the locality. It was also further found that there was no proof that individual notices were served, for the award enquiry. Therefore, in the face of the said finding, it is idle on the part of the respondents, to contend that the land owners ought to have filed their objections within thirty days from the date of Sec.4(1) notification, or from the date of judgment. 9. The contention that even otherwise, the land owners did not file their objections within the stipulated time in response to the Public notice issued by the Revenue Divisional Officer, on 26. 1991, is also found to be factually incorrect on a perusal of the file. 10. Following are the relevant dates as could be gathered from the file: .• (i) Service of notice under Rule 3 of the Rules framed under Sec.55(1) of the Act (7 to 12)…10th, 11th and 12th July, 1991. .• (ii) Time given for filing objections .. 15 days. .• (iii) Objections on behalf of the petitioners (Page 19) ..27. 1991 .• (iv) Sec.5-A enquiry conducted ..37. 1991 .• (v) Remarks of the acquiring authority (page 79) ..8. 1991. .• (vi) Enquiry report (Page 81)…8. 1991. 11. A perusal of the above mentioned dates discloses that atleast on two aspects, there is non-compliance of Rule 3(b) of the Rules. Firstly, the objections have been forwarded to the enquiring authority within the permitted limit of 15 days and the contentions of the respondents otherwise are not correct. Secondly, Sec.5-A enquiry was closed on 37. 1991 and the remarks of the acquiring authority were received only on 8.
Firstly, the objections have been forwarded to the enquiring authority within the permitted limit of 15 days and the contentions of the respondents otherwise are not correct. Secondly, Sec.5-A enquiry was closed on 37. 1991 and the remarks of the acquiring authority were received only on 8. 1991, namely, after the closure of the enquiry Sec.5-A enquiry report is also dated the same day as that of the remarks of the acquiring authority. 12. Therefore, for reasons best known to the respondents there is failure on their part is glaring on the face of the record, amounting to total disregard of Rule 3(b) of the Rules. The said Rules have been framed by the State Government and this Court has emphasised strict compliance in very many rulings. In the present case, the respondents had not complied with the proceedings even earlier, requiring the quashing of Sec.6 declaration and even so, again the respondents had chosen to adopt a very careless attitude even in complying with the basic statutory requirements, which leaves us with no other alternative except to quash the declaration under Sec.6 of the Act again. The authorities cannot treat the statutory requirements as empty formality. If really, of the acquisition proceedings, are seriously by the respondents, the glaring defect and committed by them not do justify any serious regard for either the public interest involved or for the valuable rights of the land owners. 13. With the result, the above writ appeal is allowed and the declaration under Sec.6 of the Act is quashed, with liberty to the respondents to proceed further in accordance with law. No costs. Consequently, C.M.P.No.13879 of 1999 is closed.