Judgment 1. Petitioner No. 1 is a company engaged in the manufacture and sale of sugar; petitioner No. 2 is one of its share-holders. They seek to challenge the demand for payment of a sum of Rs. 66,88,298.50 paise as contained in the letter dated February 25, 1999 (Annexure 15) issued by the Under Secretary to the Government of India in the Ministry of Food and Consumer Affairs. The disputed amount is interest @ 15% of the differential amount paid by the Central Government to the petitioner company on the basis of the higher price for levy sugar for the year, 1982-83 fixed by the Delhi High Court by an interim order passed in a case which was eventually transferred to the Supreme Court and where it was dismissed. 2. The Central Government fixed the price of levy sugar for the year, 1982-83 as provided under Sec. 3(3C) of the Essential Commodities Act. The petitioner-company challenged the price fixed by the Central Government before the Delhi High Court in C.W.P. No. 1390/1983 as being unreasonably low and not being in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 3(3C) of the Essential Commodities Act. In that case the petitioner-company sought an interim direction from the Court for payment of a higher price as computed by it for the levy sugar for the year in question. The Delhi High Court by an interim order dated August 8, 1983 allowed the petitioner prayer subject to certain conditions. The relevant portions from that order may be extracted as follows : "At the last hearing we had suggested that taking the Government statistics as to recovery etc. the figures may be worked out so that the increase in price, if any, can be given by way of interim relief. To our suggestion petitioners have filed the calculations Annexures A/1 to A/3 along with the affidavit. As at present advised, we find that no exception can be taken to these calculations. Therefore, confining ourselves only to the requirements of Sec. 3(3C) at this stage, we are of the view that the petitioners will be entitled to addition in the sale price of levy sugar as per Annexure A/1. With regards to mills in North Bihar they will also be entitled to additions in the sale price as per Annexure A/2 as well. We are not inclined to accept the calculations in Annexure A/3 at this stage." 3. With regards to mills in North Bihar they will also be entitled to additions in the sale price as per Annexure A/2 as well. We are not inclined to accept the calculations in Annexure A/3 at this stage." 3. The Court then made the payment of the higher price subject to certain conditions as follows :"Learned counsel for the petitioner stated that any additional price received by the petitioner would be paid either to the "sugar cane Growers" or used for clearing the dues of the petitioner of Financial Institutions and for payment of the taxes due to the State Government. The additional price so received will not be utilised for any other purpose whatsoever. We think that the offer is quite fair. We accept it. The price accordingly will be re-fixed in accordance with the calculations to be made as per the order passed today. The petitioner will be bound by the undertaking not to utilise the additional price received by virtue of our present order for any other purpose than the purposes which have been stated in the Court today. In case ultimately, the rule is discharged the petitioner will make good the additional price received by them by future allocation of free sale sugar. The petitioners will also give a bank guarantee for the difference in price to be worked out as per our order of today. The bank guarantee may be given each month for the release and additional price recoverably whether recovered or not for the previous month. The bank guarantee will be given month by month not later than 10th of each succeeding month. The bank guarantee will be given to the satisfaction of the authority issuing release order from time to time." 4. It is an admitted position that on the basis of the interim order passed by the Delhi High Court, the petitioner-company received the price of levy sugar from the Central Government at the higher rate and according to its case it also followed the conditions laid down in that order. The aforesaid C.W.P. No. 1390/1983 was eventually transferred to the Supreme Court along with a large number of similar cases. There, the petitioners case was dismissed by order dated August 19, 1998 (Annexure 7) passed in I.C. (Civil) Nos. 15-17 of 1993 with T.C. (C) Nos. 21, 22, 29, 31, 38 and 40 of 1993. The aforesaid C.W.P. No. 1390/1983 was eventually transferred to the Supreme Court along with a large number of similar cases. There, the petitioners case was dismissed by order dated August 19, 1998 (Annexure 7) passed in I.C. (Civil) Nos. 15-17 of 1993 with T.C. (C) Nos. 21, 22, 29, 31, 38 and 40 of 1993. Following the dismissal of the case, the Central Government is said to have encashed the bank guarantee furnished by the petitioner-company in terms of the interim order passed by the Delhi High Court and it followed it by raising the demand for interest which is sought to be challenged before this Court in this writ petition. 5. Mr. Y. V. Giri, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the Supreme Court dismissed the petitioners case on the basis of an additional affidavit dated 11-6-98 filed on behalf of Government of India setting out the manner in which the minimum price of levy sugar for 1982-83 was determined. Mr. Giri vehemently tried to argue that the averments made in the additional affidavit were incorrect and misleading. I am, however, unable to see how can he be allowed to take such a line of argument as it would mean trying to review the order passed by the Supreme Court. I accordingly refused to hear him on that issue. 6. Coming then to the question of the demand for interest raised by the Central Government, Mr. Giri submitted that in the interim order passed by the Delhi High Court, there was no such direction that in the event the case was finally disallowed, the petitioner will have to pay any interest on the differential amount. He further submitted that the petitioner-company had faithfully followed all the conditions laid down in the interim order passed by the Delhi High Court; it had given a bank guarantee as directed by the Delhi High Court which was encashed by the Central Government no sooner the case was dismissed by the Supreme Court. According to him, therefore, the demand for interest raised by the Central Government was neither sanctioned by any direction of any Court nor could it be said to be on any reasonable or equitable ground. 7. Before proceeding to consider Mr. Giri submissions it may be noted that earlier to this stage this controversy had never come before this Court. According to him, therefore, the demand for interest raised by the Central Government was neither sanctioned by any direction of any Court nor could it be said to be on any reasonable or equitable ground. 7. Before proceeding to consider Mr. Giri submissions it may be noted that earlier to this stage this controversy had never come before this Court. It is also to be borne in mind that it is not a case where the petitioner-company, withholding some payments to the Government had been able to retain its own money with itself. On the contrary, it is a case where on the basis of an interim order passed by a Court the Government was made to part with an additional sum of money and the petitioner realised from the Government an additional sum as far as in 1983-84 and retained the additional money received from the Government all these years. I am, therefore, plainly of the view that on equitable considerations also the Central Government is fully justified in raising the demand for interest on the differential amount. 8. I must, however, hasten to add that any equitable considerations are hardly of much relevance in this case as the demand made by the Central Government is squarely supported by the statutory provisions as contained in the Levy Sugar Price Equalisation Fund Act, 1976 . Sec. 2(b) of the Act defines excess realisation which in so far as relevant for our present purpose is as follows : "2(b) "Excess realisation" in relation to each grade of levy sugar-(i) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .(a) to (b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .(ii) includes any realisation representing the difference between the controlled price and the price allowed by the Court by an interim order, if such interim order is set aside, whether by the Court which made the order or in appeal or revision." 9. Sec. 3 of the Act then provides for levy of interest on the amount of excess realisation. Mr. Sec. 3 of the Act then provides for levy of interest on the amount of excess realisation. Mr. Giri submitted that the differential amount received by the petitioner in this case will not be covered by the definition of "excess realisation" because the interim order passed in this case was set aside neither by the Court which made the order nor in appeal or revision. Mr. Giri pointed out that the interim order was passed by the Delhi High Court and it could be said to be vacated only after the case was dismissed by the Supreme Court on being transferred there. The interim order, therefore, was not set aside either by the Court which made the order or in appeal or revision. 10. I am unable to accept the submission. Any possibility of the interim order passed by the Delhi High Court being vacated or set aside by that Court ceased to exist on the case being transferred to the Supreme Court. After the transfer of the case any order confirming, modifying or setting aside the interim order passed in the case could only be passed by the Supreme Court and therefore the setting aside of the interim order by the final dismissal of the case by the Supreme Court would fully satisfy the definition of excess realisation within the meaning of Sec. 2(b)(ii) of the Equalisation Fund Act. 11. The question may be viewed from another angle. Supposing in exercise of powers under Article 139A(2) of the Constitution the Supreme Court were to transfer the case from Delhi High Court to this Court and this Court on receiving the case on transfer were to set aside or vacate the interim order passed by the Delhi High Court or to finally dismiss the case. Could the objection, in that case, be raised that the interim order was not set aside by the Court which made the Order? In my view the answer can only be in the negative. That being the position such an objection can hardly be entertained in this case where the interim order passed by the Delhi High Court stood set aside by the dismissal of the case by the Supreme Court on its being transferred there. 12. For the reasons discussed above, I find no merit in this writ petition and it is accordingly dismissed with cost amounting to Rs. 2,500.00 . 12. For the reasons discussed above, I find no merit in this writ petition and it is accordingly dismissed with cost amounting to Rs. 2,500.00 . A receipt showing payment of cost to the Bihar Legal Aid Services Authority must be filed in this Court within three weeks from today.Petition dismissed.