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1999 DIGILAW 2833 (MAD)

H. Md. Sultan and another v. Tamil Nadu Wakf Board through its Secretary, Chennai and others

1999-12-17

V.KANAGARAJ

body1999
ORDER: The applicants have filed this contempt application seeking to punish the respondents for violating the orders of this Court passe in W.M.P.No.5912 of 1994 in W.P.No.3683 of 1994 dated 11.8.1995. 2. From the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition and from the arguments of the learned counsel for the applicants what comes to be known is that the applicants filed the Writ Petition No.3683 of 1994 praying to issue a writ of mandamus directing the first respondent to conduct the elections to the Committee members in respect of Hydharadhul Alia Madhar Ka Jamaith, Paramakudi Ramanathapuram District and constitute a committee to administer the properties of the said Jamaith; that with the said writ petition, the applicants herein also filed W.M.P.No.5912 of 1994 praying for an order of injunction restraining respondents 2 to 4 from in any way administering the Jamath and appoint any teacher or any staff to the Madarasa, pending disposal of the writ petition. 3. The further case of the applicants is that on 3.3.1994, this Court granted interim injunction in respect of the respondents 2 to 4 from administering the Jamaith and appointing any teacher or any staff to the Madarasa pending disposal of the writ petition and the said interim injunction order was made absolute on 11.8.1995. That the respondents in utter disregard to the order of this Court, started appointing teachers to the Jamath School and a specific instance of the appointment of one Jhansi Rani to the school run by the Jamath was brought to the notice of the applicants; that the applicants issued a legal notice to the respondents on 5.6.1997 and 12.9.1997, but the respondents continued to violate the orders of this Court dated 11.8.1995 and hence issuing an ultimate notice dated 2.7.1999, the applicants have come forward to file this contempt application not only against the respondents 2 to 4 but also against the first respondent and respondents 5 and 6 since in spite of knowledge of the order of this Court being violated, they did not initiate action and in fact, respondents 5 and 6 granted approval to the appointments effected by respondents 2 to 4. 4. 4. In the separate counter affidavits filed by respondents 2 to 4, they would unequivocally contend that the contempt application is not maintainable on ground of delay and latches; that the order of injunction restraining from appointing any teacher or staff to Madarasa has nothing to do with the Higher Elementary school which is under different management, that there has been no willful disobedience of the order of this Court and would pray for the dismissal of the above contempt application, but, however, without prejudice to the contentions of the counter, all the three respondents i.e., respondents 2 to 4 would tender their unconditional apology to this Court in the event this Court arrives at the conclusion that its order has been disobeyed in any other manner. 5. During arguments, the learned counsel for the applicants besides confirming what has been pleaded in the contempt application would also supplement citing two judgments, the first one delivered in Sukhdev Singh v. Hon’ble C.J., S. Teja Singh and the Hon’ble Judges of the Pepsu High Court at Patiala, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 186, wherein dealing with the nature of jurisdiction to punish for contempt, the Apex Court held: “The High Court can deal with it summarily and adopt its own procedure. All that is necessary is that the procedure is fair and that the contemner is made aware of the charge against him and given a fair and reasonable opportunity to define himself.” The other judgment cited by the learned counsel for the applicants is one delivered in Pritam Pal v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur, through Registrar, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 904, wherein dealing with power of Supreme Court and High Court to punish contempt the Apex Court held: “The power of the Supreme Court and the High Court being the courts of Record as embodied under Arts. 129 and 215 respectively cannot be restricted and trammelled by any ordinary legislation including the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act... The caution that has to be observed in exercising this inherent power by summary procedure is that the power should be used sparingly that the procedure to be followed should be fair and that the contemner should be made aware of the charge against him and given a reasonable opportunity to defined himself.” 6. The caution that has to be observed in exercising this inherent power by summary procedure is that the power should be used sparingly that the procedure to be followed should be fair and that the contemner should be made aware of the charge against him and given a reasonable opportunity to defined himself.” 6. On perusal of the pleadings and counter pleadings and having regard to the materials placed on record and upon hearing the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners and the respondents 1 to 4 as well, what comes to be known is that the applicants herein have filed this contempt application seeking to punish the respondents numbering six named in the contempt application, out of whom the first respondent is the wakf Board, respondents 2 to 4 being responsible for the management of the wakf properties and respondents 5 and 6 being the officials of Elementary Educational Department and responsible for violating the orders of this Court passed in W.M.P.No.5912 of 1994 in W.P.No.3683 of 1994, dated 11.8.1995. 7. A perusal of the records would show that the applicants herein filed W.P.No.3683 of 1994 praying for a writ of mandamus directing the first respondent to conduct election to the Committee Members in respect of Hydharadhul Alia Madhar Ka Jamaith, Paramakudi, Ramanathapuram District and constitute a committee to administer the properties of the said Jamaith and along with the said writ petition. They have also field W.M.P.No.5912 of 1994 praying for an order of interim injunction restraining respondents 2 to 4 from in any way administering the Jamaith and appoint any teacher or any staff to the Madarasa, pending disposal of the writ petition. They have also field W.M.P.No.5912 of 1994 praying for an order of interim injunction restraining respondents 2 to 4 from in any way administering the Jamaith and appoint any teacher or any staff to the Madarasa, pending disposal of the writ petition. It is only in this W.M.P., three orders seem to have been passed stage by stage, the one at the time that the writ petition came up for admission on 3.3.1994, wherein the learned single Judge had passed an order of interim injunction for four weeks against respondents 2 to 4 herein and the said order had come to be extended until further orders as per the orders of this Court dated 31.3.1994 and again while disposing of the said W.M.P., yet another single Judge of this Court has made the interim injunction absolute as per the order dated 11.8.1995 and it is the case of the applicants that these orders have been wilfully disobeyed by the respondents and hence are liable for punishment. 8. So far as respondents 5 and 6 of the Contempt Application are concerned, since no prima facie case was made out against them, this Court has declined even to issue notice against them in the above contempt application and hence notices were issued only to respondents 2 to 4 and these respondents besides appearing before this Court in person also engaged their counsel to appear on their behalf, as a result of which their personal attendance on future hearings had been dispensed with. 9. In the light of the above facts and in the context of the position of law, if the subject has to be dealt with, the points that arise for consideration are: 1. Whether the above contempt application is maintainable on account of delay? and 2. Whether the respondents are liable for being punished for contempt of court? 10.Points Nos. 1 and 2: The pith and marrow of the contempt application is that by the appointment of one Jhansi Rani as the Physical Education Teacher for one of the institutions of the Jaimath School as on 1.6.1997, the respondents 2 to 4 have committed the contempt of the order of injunction granted by this Court in W.M.P.No.5912 of 1994. 1 and 2: The pith and marrow of the contempt application is that by the appointment of one Jhansi Rani as the Physical Education Teacher for one of the institutions of the Jaimath School as on 1.6.1997, the respondents 2 to 4 have committed the contempt of the order of injunction granted by this Court in W.M.P.No.5912 of 1994. Though generalised allegations of many appointments being periodically effected are seen throughout the contempt application, the specific instance has been brought forth only relating to the appointment of one Jhansi Rani as on 1.6.1997, which had come to be approved at a later stage by the respondents 5 and 6. But, both the alleged appointment and the approval had been done in the year 1997 and this Contempt Application has been taken on file on 20.7.1999 and thus the same is hopelessly time barred within the meaning of Sec.20 of the Contempt of Court Act. Needless to answer the second point framed supra, since at this legal ground itself, the above contempt application becomes liable to be dismissed in limine. 11. No other valid or tangible instances of the respondents 2 to 4 having committed the contempt of this Court’s order have been brought forth in the application in a legal manner so as to be considered for the purpose of the application and its prayer as a result of which, this Court is left with no option but to answer the prayers of the applicants in the negative. 12. In result, the above contempt application, for the above reasons assigned, is not maintainable and it fails and the same is dismissed. 13. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.