JUDGMENT D. Raju, C. J.—The above writ petition has been filed seeking for the following reliefs: "(i) A writ of quo-warranto may kindly be issued holding that the election/appointment of respondents 3 and 4 to the post of Mayor or Deputy Mayor, respectively is illegal and violative of the statutory provisions, and the same may kindly be quashed and set aside. (ii) A writ of mandamus may kindly be issued against respondents 1 and 2 directing them to hold elections to the post of Mayor/Deputy Mayor in accordance with the statutory provisions and rules. (iii) That respondents 3 and 4 may kindly be restrained from holding the office of Mayor/Deputy Mayor." 2. The petitioner claims himself to be an elected Municipal Councillor from the reserved Ward No. 11 of Shimla Municipal Corporation. Admittedly, the 3rd respondent was elected as a Councillor from Municipal Ward No. 4 and the 4th respondent as a Councillor from Municipal Ward No. 9 of the Municipal Corporation in question. Though information as to the party affiliation of the petitioner and the private respondents No. 3 and 4 has not been furnished, on being questioned on this aspect the learned Counsel for the petitioner would state that they also belong to and are affiliated to the political party to which the petitioner himself belong - Congress. 3. The grievance of the petitioner in substance is that he was served with a notice under Rule 5 of the Himachal Pradesh Municipal Corporation (Reservation and Elections to the office of Mayor and Deputy Mayor) Rules, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the Election Rules), convening the meeting of the Councillors of the Corporation at 4.00 p.m. in the Town Hall of the Corporation to fill up the office of Mayor from the category of women and the office of the Deputy Mayor from the open candidates - open to all. There is no dispute that this notice as in the case of the other Councillors was served upon him on 1st December, 1999 at 6.00 p.m. According to the petitioner, he could not inspite of efforts made contact the 2nd respondent with reference to enquiries about the notice, yet he did participate in the meeting held pursuant to the notice referred to above, that he raised objections about the infirmities involved in the convening of the meeting and want of sufficient time but since his objections were not heeded to, he protested and made "walk-. out and that later he came to know that the 3rd respondent was unanimously elected as a Mayor and the 4th respondent was unanimously elected as Deputy Mayor, Shimla Municipal Corporation. The present writ petition has been filed in the Court on 20.12. 1999 for the reliefs noticed supra. 4. Mr. Vinay Kumar Kuthiala, learned Counsel for the petitioner while reiterating the facts referred to above contended that since there was no proper notice and no proper convening of the meeting, and thereby no sufficient time to mobilise his support the election held as also the ultimate result of the election declaring the 3rd and 4th respondents elected to the office of Mayor and Deputy Mayor, respectively, .stood vitiated and they cannot be said to be holding the respective offices for which they have been elected, legally, validly and as a consequence thereof they must be considered to be usurpers in the office entitling the petitioner to file this writ petition seeking for a writ of quo-warranto. The writ petition itself is not in the proper form of a writ of quo-warranto. 5. We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned Counsel for the petitioner. In our view, the writ petition is not only a mis-conceived one, but the move of the petitioner ought not to be countenanced in the form of the writ, of quo-warranto under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. First of all, under the Election Rules in question, the petitioner is entitled to file an election petitio and as per rules contained in Rule 9 of the Election Rules, sue i petition will be presented and dealt with in the same manner as the election petitions and appeals in relation to the office of the Councillors. First of all, under the Election Rules in question, the petitioner is entitled to file an election petitio and as per rules contained in Rule 9 of the Election Rules, sue i petition will be presented and dealt with in the same manner as the election petitions and appeals in relation to the office of the Councillors. Consequently, the election petition could have been filed by the petitioner before the Deputy Commissioner of the territorial jurisdiction, the designated authority for entertaining such petitions. In order to explain the conduct of the petitioner in not availing of such remedy, it is stated that against the order of the Deputy Commissioner, which may be passed on the election petition, the appellate remedy is provided to the Director, who is the person, who has convened the very meeting and conducted the election and, therefore, the appellate remedy would be a futile exercise and, therefore, even without going to the original authority under the election petition, the petitioner was well within his right to approach this Court even at the first instance. We are unable to appreciate and accept this stand. Whatever may be the justification or otherwise to by-pass the Appellate Authority, there is no justification to by-pass the filing of an election petition before the designated original authority. 6. The perusal of the various averments contained in the writ petition that it was a surprise thrown upon him and that he was not able to moblise his supporters to support his candidature for the post of Mayor or Deputy Mayor and that the whole affair was a stage managed one, gives room for the impression that he was never in the thought of or made any preparations for contesting the election till the notice has been received despite the fact that a vacancy has occurred in the offices in question and that the ultimate object, as it appears to be of the petitioner, is to ventilate his only internal grievance inside the political parties and not really to espouse or vindicate any genuine cause in the larger public interest or in fair manner. If as indicated supra, the petitioner as well as the Contesting private party respondents belong to the same political party they could not have been projected as candidates unless there was already a decision taken in this regard, which the petitioner could not pretend to ignore and in the absence of such it is beyond comprehension how their election could have gone on unanimous, except perhaps to the displeasure of the petitioner. It is not a case where anyone else raised any objection or protested about the manner bf the election or the candidature proposed in the election or ultimately the result of the election or even attempted to offer themselves as candidates. These aspects we are highlighting not to approve of any of the alleged infirmity which could otherwise be said to have happened, but only to indicate that the move of the petitioner does not appear to be a genuine or bonafide one. The person approaching the Court with a writ of quo-warranto must come with clean hands and for a bonafide purpose and not with an oblique or ulterior motive. That apart, it is surprising that the petitioner should have slept over the matter from 2nd December, 1999 to 20th December, 1999 without any protest in writing about the grievance now made when the writ petition came to be filed. Since the elections went on peacefully and the same was unanimous, no useful purpose would be served, even assuming any infirmity to exist in the issue of notice for the meeting in question, in setting aside the same or declaring the offices vacant, except for repeating the performance once again to satisfy his whim and create disharmony in the smooth administration of Corporation, and thereby allow him an opportunity to fish in troubled waters. 7. For all these reasons, neither the petitioner nor his writ petition really inspire any confidence in us, that he is fighting a genuine or real cause. This further obliges not to permit the petitioner to by-pass the statutory remedy of the election petition envisaged under the statutory rules. 8. The grievance about the reservation point also does not merit acceptance. For all these reasons, neither the petitioner nor his writ petition really inspire any confidence in us, that he is fighting a genuine or real cause. This further obliges not to permit the petitioner to by-pass the statutory remedy of the election petition envisaged under the statutory rules. 8. The grievance about the reservation point also does not merit acceptance. The reservation made Division wise, if the first turn (in the place of year wise division which came to be replaced subsequently by a larger term) is to go for the general, the second turn has to be reserved for women only and that is what appears to have been indicated in the notice that the office 6f Mayor shall be filled up from the category of women. No exception, in our view, could, therefore, be taken to the said move and the mere assertion that it should have been in favour of the Scheduled Caste candidate has no basis or meaning and it has no basis or support of law - the relevant reservation rules. 9. Further, the fact remains that the erstwhile Mayor and Deputy Mayors term has expired and they did vacate their offices and the persons who were found to have been elected unanimously in a body which comprises members belonging to more than one political parties in office, and that respondents No. 3 and 4 also belong to the same political party to which the petitioner belonged to and otherwise respondents No. 3 and 4 do not suffer any disqualification to hold the respective offices, there is no need to allow the petitioner to adopt any short circuit method to dislodge such persons from their offices, to satisfy the whim of the petitioner based on, as we can see, from the disappointment that he was not supported by his own party. That appears to be the real grouse and, as indicated earlier, such should not be the cause for a type of litigation, which should be allowed to be encouraged in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 10. For all the reasons stated above, the writ petition falls and shall stand dismissed. The dismissal of the writ petition shall not stand in the way of the petitioner, if he so desires, to vindicate his remedy in an appropriate forum in an appropriate manner known to law. CMP No. 1036/99: Allowed. 10. For all the reasons stated above, the writ petition falls and shall stand dismissed. The dismissal of the writ petition shall not stand in the way of the petitioner, if he so desires, to vindicate his remedy in an appropriate forum in an appropriate manner known to law. CMP No. 1036/99: Allowed. CMP No. 1035/99: 11. In view of the dismissal of the writ petition, this application is also dismissed. Petition dismissed.