Judgment :- E. PADMANABHAN, J. In W.P. No. 17938 of 1998, the writ-petitioner Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd., Ranipet, prays for the issue of a writ of mandamus forbearing the first respondent Deputy Chief Inspector of Factories, Vellore, from in any manner continuing with the proceedings No. 3775 of 1998, dated May 19, 1998 and No. 6151 of 1997, dated July 23, 1998. W.P. No. 263 of 1989, has been filed by the BHEL Thuppuravu Thozhilalar Sangam, BHEL Ltd. Ranipet, praying for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the respondent namely the management of BHEL, Ranipet, to implement the notification in G.O.Ms. No. 2082, issued by the Government of Tamil Nadu, Labour and Employment Department, dated September 19, 1998 and also to regularise all the existing workmen employed for sweeping and scavenging and to fix them in the regular scales of pay, with effect from October 1, 1998. W.P. No. 20325 of 1993 has been filed by the BHEL Thozhilaga Thuppuravu Thozhilalar Sangam, praying for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to implement the notification of the Government of Tamil Nadu in G.O.Ms. No. 2082, Labour and Employment, dated September 19, 1988, and regularise the services of the members of the petitioner-sangam in the second respondent-management extending to them all benefits and privileges to which they are legitimately entitled from October 1, 1988. All the three writ petitions are consolidated and taken up for hearing. For convenience, the petitioner in W.P. No. 17938 of 1998, namely the "management of BHEL", will be referred as the employer and that petitioners in the other two writ petitions will be referred as contract labourers. Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd., Ranipet is a public sector undertaking, wholly owned by the Government of India and it is an "other authority" as falling within the scope of Art. 12 of the Constitution of India. The BHEL, Ranipet, is engaged in the manufacture of heavy boilers, auxiliaries and has a number of manufacturing units and operational divisions. The BHEL has a number of employees and for the maintaining of the sanitation work, such as cleaning, sweeping, scavenging and maintaining their factory, engaged workers through contractors.The BHEL on account of the nature of work involved cannot employ regular workmen for the said activities and therefore acts have been entered into with the contractors and it has been in force for the past 11 years. The BHEL had entered into contract with two contractors to carry out cleaning work in the factory premises and also in the residential areas owned by BHEL. One of such contractors is a registered society known as INDCOSERVE society for the factory premises and the other contractor is an individual by name Gnanam Engineering Associates engaged for residential area. The two contractors employ number of workers on this part. The Government of Tamil Nadu issued a notification in G.O.Ms. No. 2082, Labour and Employment, dated September 19, 1998, in exercise of powers conferred under Sec. 10 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970. By the said notification factories/establishments employing fifty or more workers are prohibited from engaging contract labour in the work of sweeping and scavenging. The BHEL Thuppuravu Thozhilalar Sangam sought for implementation of the said G.O.Ms. No. 2082, dated August 19, 1988, and filed W.P. No. 263 of 1989 on the file of this Court. Various objections were raised and also BHEL opposed the application for regularisation of the members of the union from October 1, 1988. BHEL Thozhilaga Thuppuravu Thozhilalar Sangam, another section of the union claiming to represent the contract labourers, also filed W.P. No. 20325 of 1993, seeking for the same relief as was proved in W.P. No. 263 of 1989. In the said two it petitions, interim orders were passed directing an Advocate Commissioner to be appointed to go into the matter and report within six months from that date. The Commissioner was appointed with the consent of either side. Sri. N. Mohandoss, a retired District Judge was appointed as the Commissioner las on December 19, 1997 and he had also submitted his report. At that stage, the first respondent in W.P. No. 17938 of 1998 called upon the BHEL to file their objections to the applications made by the respondents in the said writ petitions seeking permanency of the petitioners. BHEL raised objections by filing reply and also brought to the notice of the first respondent about the pendency of the proceedings. Hence mandamus has been sought for in this writ petition namely W.P. No. 17938 of 1998, forbearing the first respondent, the Deputy Chief Inspector of Factories from proceedings with the application taken out for regularisation of service.Heard Sri Sanjay Mohan for S. Ramasubramaniam Associates for BHEL management Sri. Hence mandamus has been sought for in this writ petition namely W.P. No. 17938 of 1998, forbearing the first respondent, the Deputy Chief Inspector of Factories from proceedings with the application taken out for regularisation of service.Heard Sri Sanjay Mohan for S. Ramasubramaniam Associates for BHEL management Sri. V. Dhanapalan for contract labourers and their union as well as Sri R. Chandrasekaran for the contract labourers. Very many contentions were raised by the counsel for either side and detailed arguments were advanced by either side besides the report of Sri Mohandoss, the learned Advocate Commissioner was also challenged by BHEL. The first and foremost of the contention raised by Sri Sanjay Mohan appearing for BHEL management is being the question of jurisdiction and the authority of the State Government to issue a notification, in question. According to Sri Sanjay Mohan for BHEL, the State Government is not the appropriate authority and therefore the notification issued by the State Government will have no application and consequently the writ petitions filed for the benefit of the contract labourers through their respective unions have to be dismissed and the writ petition filed by the management of BHEL forbearing the competent authority from proceeding further has to be allowed. It may be necessary to take up the other contentions only if this Court rejects the jurisdictional issue or plea raised by BHEL. If this jurisdictional issue is answered in favour of the BHEL, it would not be necessary to go into any other aspects. If this jurisdictional issue is answered in favour of the contract labourers, it would be necessary to go into the other issues and decide further directions to be issued and steps to be taken. The Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (Central Act 37/70) hereinafter called "the Act" has been enacted to regulate the employment of contract labour in certain establishments and to provide for the abolition in certain circumstances and for matters connected therewith. Section 2(1)(a) defines the expression "appropriate Government". Sec. 2(1)(c) defines the "contractor". Sec. 2(1)(e) defines the expression "establishment". Section 2(1)(b) declares that a workman shall be deemed to be employed as "contract labour" in or in connection with the work of an establishment when he is hired in or in connection with such work by or through a contractor, with or without the knowledge of the principal employer. Sec. 2(1)(e) defines the expression "establishment". Section 2(1)(b) declares that a workman shall be deemed to be employed as "contract labour" in or in connection with the work of an establishment when he is hired in or in connection with such work by or through a contractor, with or without the knowledge of the principal employer. Section 2(1)(i) defines the expression "workman".Chapter IV of the Act provides for licensing of contractors. Section 10 of the Act provides that the appropriate Government may after consultation with the Central Board or as the case may be a State Board, prohibit, by notification in the Official Gazette, employment of contract labour in any process, operation or other work in any establishment. Section 10(2) prescribes the procedure to be followed before issuing a notification under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 10. In exercise of power conferred under Sec. 35 of the Act, the Central Government had framed the rules. The State of Tamil Nadu had also framed Tamil Nadu Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Rules, 1975, in exercise of power conferred by Sec. 35 of the Act. The State of Tamil Nadu had issued number of notifications under Sec. 10(1) or 10(2) of the Act. In the present case the Notification issued under Sec. 10(1) of the Act in G.O.Ms. No. 2082, Labour and Employment dated September 19, 1988, is the relevant notification, which requires a reference. The notification relied upon and sought to be enforced or based upon which the reliefs are sought for by the contract labourers reads thus : "Government of Tamil Nadu Labour and Employment Department Abolition of contract labour system in processes of sweeping and scavenging in the establishments/factories employing 50 or more workmen. G.O.Ms. No. 2082, Labour and Employment, September 19, 1988. G.O.Ms. No. 2082, Labour and Employment, September 19, 1988. No. 11(2)LE/5352/88 - In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Sec. 10 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (Central Act XXXVII of 1970), the Governor of Tamil Nadu after consultation with the State Advisory Board on contract labour and after having regard to the conditions of work and benefits provided for the contract labour and other relevant factors in the establishment/factories referred to in Clause (a) to (d) of sub-section (2) of the said section, hereby prohibits the employment of contract labour in the processes of sweeping and scavenging in the establishments/factories which are employing 50 or more workmen.A. P. Muthuswamy Commissioner and Secretary to Government." Based upon the above notification only, the contract labourers through their respective unions have sought for a writ of mandamus directing the respondent-BHEL management to regularise their services in their respective writ petitions and extend them all privileges and benefits. It is persistently contended by Sri Sanjay Mohan that the said notification issued by the State of Tamil Nadu will not apply to "BHEL" as the State Government is not the appropriate Government with respect to BHEL. BHEL is wholly owned by Union of India and it has branches/establishments throughout the country. Section 2(1)(a) defines the expression "appropriate Government" and it reads thus : (a) 'appropriate Government' means - (i) in relation to an establishment in respect of which the appropriate Government under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), is the Central Government, the Central Government. (ii) in relation to any other establishment, the Government of the State in which that other establishment is situated. In relation to an establishment in respect of which as defined in the Industrial Disputes Act if the Central Government is the appropriate Government then for the purpose of Contract Labour Act, 1970, the Central Government is the appropriate Government. In respect of any other establishment, the Government of the State in which those establishments are situate is the appropriate authority. It is essential to refer to the definition clause in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In respect of any other establishment, the Government of the State in which those establishments are situate is the appropriate authority. It is essential to refer to the definition clause in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Section 2(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 Sri Dhanapalan, learned counsel appearing for the contract labourers/union referred to the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. v. Government of Tamil Nadu, reported in 1997 (3) LLN 495, wherein the Division Bench of this Court held that the very same notification of G.O. Ms. No. 2082 issued by the State Government is within the powers of the Government and that it is valid and, enforceable. In that context, the Division Bench held thus, in Paras 7, 8 and 9 at pages 500 and 501. "7. The provision contained in Sec. 10 of the Act enabling the issue of notification pertaining to employment of contract labour in any process, operation or other work in any establishment cannot be construed by the mere use of language 'any establishment' to comprehend the issue of notifications for any one of individual establishment only or as precluding the Government from issuing a consolidated or a compounding form of notification to cover more than one establishment based on the consideration of process, operation and nature of work in such establishments. The emphasis in this regard is more with reference to the process, operation or other work, rather than any particular or individual establishment. Consequently, we see no merit in the challenge made to the notification on this ground.Equally, we are unable to agree with the learned Senior Counsel in his submission that the Government have failed to have regard to the conditions of work and benefits provided for contract labour in the appellant's industry. The statutory requirement as we could see is to have regard to the conditions of work and benefits for the contract labour under the class or category of industries when the consideration undertaken was industry wise or process wise as a whole. It is in those context, the grievance of the appellant with reference to the alleged non-compliance with the requirements of sub-sec. (2) also requires to be dealt with. The learned single Judge has adverted to the particulars available from the files produced before him and the method of consideration undertaken before coming to the conclusion that the requirements of sub-sec. It is in those context, the grievance of the appellant with reference to the alleged non-compliance with the requirements of sub-sec. (2) also requires to be dealt with. The learned single Judge has adverted to the particulars available from the files produced before him and the method of consideration undertaken before coming to the conclusion that the requirements of sub-sec. (2) have been fully satisfied before the issue of notification. The respective unions, apart from the State, also in their counter-affidavits, have reiterated the stand that the contract labourers, though acted through co-operative societies, despite their long number of years of service, were not being treated on par with the regular workmen in the industries, for extending the various labour welfare-oriented benefits and conditions of service. As a matter of fact, the sub-committee constituted to study the prevalence of contract labour system in engineering industry also, in its report, which has been made available before us, adverted to this aspect by pointing out that though contract workers were engaged in many cases, for the work which is continuous in nature and which is perennial such as watch and ward, sweeping, loading and unloading, packaging, cleaning, etc., while the industry provided canteen washing facilities, etc., to their regular workmen, neither the principal employer nor the contractor is willing to provide these facilities to the contract workmen in such organisations. Though the contract workers were found working along with the regular workmen in many processes of work, their employers, either the principal employer or the contractor, have not evinced any interest in ameliorating the conditions of their service. If these aspects have projected a need for the Government to interfere and eradicate the imbalances between the regular workmen and contractual workmen, as a matter of policy and in perpetuation of labour welfare measures, it is not given to the Courts to sit in appeal over such decisions. If these aspects have projected a need for the Government to interfere and eradicate the imbalances between the regular workmen and contractual workmen, as a matter of policy and in perpetuation of labour welfare measures, it is not given to the Courts to sit in appeal over such decisions. However, in such cases, as rightly pointed out in the earlier Division Bench judgment also, the area of judicial enquiry is confined to the question whether the findings of fact were reasonably based upon evidence and whether the findings of conclusions are consistent with an overall and broad-based consideration by the Government of the factors mentioned in Sec. 10 of the Act, and that judicial function in respect of such matters has been invariably held to be exhausted when a rational basis or reasonable nexus has been found of the conclusions with the materials available and the guidelines and formula postulated under the Act. In the teeth of the materials adverted to by the learned Single Judge from the relevant files and the reports referred to and brought to our notice at the time of hearing from the typed set of papers, we are of the view that the impugned notification suffers no infirmity in law or otherwise on this account.The contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant on the ground that the numerical strength of workmen in any industry could not form the basis of a classification for the issue of a notification for prohibiting the employment of contract labour also does not appeal to us. The notification has been issued, as pointed out earlier, in respect of the process of sweeping and scavenging in establishments and factories in general. But, at the same time, the further stipulation contained therein to make such prohibition, applicable only in respect of establishments and factories employing more than 50 is meant to virtually exclude the small establishments employing less than 50 from its rigour and, therefore, it cannot be legitimately contended that a classification has been drawn with reference to the numerical strength only. Therefore, we are not persuaded to agree with the learned Senior Counsel that there is any infirmity in the notification on this account." It is to be noted that in the said decision, the Division Bench had not examined the issue as to whether the "appropriate Government" is the State Government in respect of the BHEL, or the Central Government and as to whether the notification issued by the State Government would apply to or govern BHEL. Sri Sanjay Mohan, per contra referred to the decisions of the Apex Court in Air India Statutory Corporation v. United Labour Union, reported in (1997-I-LLJ-1113) (SC), and contended that this later pronouncement of the Apex Court wherein the very point had been decided. This pronouncement according to Sri Sanjay Mohan, learned counsel for the management of BHEL, is on the point and this pronouncement is to be applied and requires to be followed in this case. The learned counsel referred to the said judgment of the Apex Court and relied upon the following passage. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court also laid down the tests to be applied to find out as to who is the "appropriate Government". Their Lordships of the Apex Court held thus, at pp 1127, 1128 & 1129 : "21. It must be remembered that the Constitution adopted mixed economy and control over the industry, in its establishment, working and production of goods and services. After recent liberalised free economy private and multi-national entrepreneurship has gained ascendancy and entrenched into wider commercial production and services, domestic consumption goods and large scale industrial productions. Even some of the public Corporations are thrown open to the private national and multi-national investments. It is axiomatic, whether or not industry is controlled by Government or public Corporations by statutory form or administrative clutch or private agents, juristic persons, Corporation whole or Corporation sole, their constitution, control and working would also be subject to the same constitutional limitations in the trinity, viz., preamble, the fundamental rights and the directive principles. They throw open an element of public interest in its working. They share the burden and shoulder constitutional obligations to provide facilities and opportunities enjoined in the Directive Principles, the preamble and the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution. They throw open an element of public interest in its working. They share the burden and shoulder constitutional obligations to provide facilities and opportunities enjoined in the Directive Principles, the preamble and the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution. The word "controlled" therefore, requires to be interpreted in the changing commercial scenario broadly in keeping with the aforesaid constitutional goals and perspectives." From the above discussion, the following principles would emerge : (1) The Constitution of the Corporation or instrumentality or agency or Corporation aggregate or Corporation sole is not of sole material relevance to decide whether it is by or under the control of the appropriate Government under the Act. (2) If it is a statutory Corporation, it is an instrumentality or agency of this State. If it is a company owned wholly or partially by a share capital, floated from public exchequer, it gives indicia that it is controlled by or under the authority of the appropriate Government.(3) In commercial activities carried on by a Corporation established by or under the control of the appropriate Government having protection under Arts. 14 and 19(2), it is an instrumentality or agency of the State. (4) The State is a service Corporation. It acts through its instrumentalities, agencies or persons - natural or juridical. (5) The governing power, wherever located, must be subject to the fundamental constitutional limitations and abide by the principles laid in the directive principles. (6) The framework of service regulations made in the appropriate rules or regulations should be consistent with and subject to the same public law principles and limitations. (7) Though the instrumentality, agency or person conducts commercial activities according to business principles and are separately accountable under their appropriate bye-laws or memorandum of association, they become the arm of the Government. (8) The existence of deep and pervasive State control depends upon the facts and circumstances in a given situation and in the altered situation it is not the sole criterion to decide whether the agency or instrumentality or persons is by or under the control of the appropriate Government. (9) Functions of an instrumentality, agency or person are of public importance following public interest element. (9) Functions of an instrumentality, agency or person are of public importance following public interest element. (10) The instrumentality, agency or person must have an element of authority or ability to effect the relations with its employees or public by virtue of power vested in it by law, memorandum of association or bye-laws or articles of association. (11) The instrumentality, agency or person renders an element of public service and is accountable to health and strength of the workers, men and women, adequate means of livelihood, the security for payment of living wages, reasonable conditions of work, decent standard of life and opportunity to enjoy full leisure and social and cultural activities to the workmen.(12) Every action of the public authority, agency or instrumentality or the person acting in public interest or any act that gives rise to public element should be guided by public interest in exercise of public power or action hedged with public element and is open to challenge. It must meet the test of reasonableness, fairness and justness. (13) If the exercise of the power is arbitrary, unjust and unfair, the public authority, instrumentality, agency or the person acting in public interest, though in the field of private law, is not free to prescribe any unconstitutional conditions or limitations in their actions. "In my considered view, as laid down in the pronouncement of the Supreme Court and on the admitted facts, it is clear that in respect of BHEL, the Central Government is the "appropriate Government" and not the State of Tamil Nadu. Applying the appropriate tests to the facts of the present case, in the light of the above pronouncement of the Apex Court, the earlier judgment of this Court in Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. v. Government of Tamil Nadu (supra), and other judgments taking a contrary view is no longer good law. Once this Court accepts the contention of Sri Sanjay Mohan, learned counsel for the management that the State of Tamil Nadu is not the appropriate Government, it follows that the notification which is said to be enforced by the contract labourers issued by the State of Tamil Nadu will have no application at all. This point has to be decided with utmost care and consideration, less this decision may attract adverse comment. This Court also realise the onerous responsibility in answering this jurisdictional issue. This point has to be decided with utmost care and consideration, less this decision may attract adverse comment. This Court also realise the onerous responsibility in answering this jurisdictional issue. Sri Sanjay Mohan, learned counsel, referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in N. S. Giri v. Corporation of City of Mangalore & Ors. reported in (1999-II-LLJ-690) (SC) in support of his contention that the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court or a decision of a Bench of more strength cannot be overlooked to treat a later decision by a Bench of lesser strength as a binding authority. In this respect LAHOTI, J. speaking for the three Judges Bench held thus, at p 694 :" 12. The abovesaid decision does support the proposition canvassed by learned counsel for the appellant that an industrial settlement would operate even by overrding a statutory provision to the contrary. However, suffice it to observe that the Constitution Bench decision in New Manech Chowk Spinning & Weaving Company Ltd. (1961-I-LLJ-521) (SC) and also the decision of this Court in Hindustan Times Ltd. (1963-I-LLJ-108) (SC) which is four Judge Bench decision, were not placed before the learned Judges deciding Life Insurance Corporation of India, case (1981-I-LLJ-1) (SC). A decision by the Constitution Bench and a decision by a Bench of more strength cannot be overlooked to treat a later decision by a Bench of lesser strength ....... "Sri Dhanapalan, learned Counsel for the union/sangam, raised the contention that the earlier Division Bench judgment of this Court between the same parties wherein the validity of very same notification has been upheld would constitute res judicata. This contention also deserves consideration and it cannot be brushed aside as a matter of routine. In meeting this contention, Sri Sanjay Mohan, learned counsel for the management of BHEL, relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Isabella Johnson v. M. A. Susai, reported in. KANIA, J., speaking for the Bench, on the point relating to res judicata, held thus :" 5. In meeting this contention, Sri Sanjay Mohan, learned counsel for the management of BHEL, relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Isabella Johnson v. M. A. Susai, reported in. KANIA, J., speaking for the Bench, on the point relating to res judicata, held thus :" 5. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned Judge of the High Court was in error, as the earlier decisions of the Rent Controller to the effect that it was the City Civil Court and not the Rent Controller who had the Jurisdiction to entertain the suit for eviction filed by the appellant against the respondent, constituted res judicata between the parties on the question of jurisdiction. It was submitted by him that, even if that decision was wrong, the issue of jurisdiction was finally decided between the parties and that decision was that it was the civil Court and not the Rent Controller that had the jurisdiction to entertain and dispose of the suit for eviction. He further submitted that the respondent could not be permitted to take inconsistent pleas as he was barred by the principles of estoppel from taking up the plea before the Civil Court that it was the Rent Controller who had the exclusive jurisdiction to entertain the suit. He placed reliance on a decision rendered by a Division Bench comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Avtar Singh v. Jagjit Singh, which took the view that the Civil Court's decision regarding lack of jurisdiction will operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit. In that case the Civil Court declined jurisdiction. The Civil Court took the view that it had no jurisdiction to try the suit in question and directed the return of the plaint for representation to the appropriate Revenue Court. When the claim was filed in the Revenue Court, the Court took the view it had no jurisdiction to try the claim. Thereupon, a suit was again instituted in the Civil Court for the same relief. This suit failed throughout on the ground of res judicata. The high Court affirmed the dismissal and the Division Bench of this Court took the view that the High Court was right in taking the view that the principles of res judicata were applicable to the issue of Jurisdiction. In our opinion, the contention of learned counsel for the appellant cannot be upheld. The high Court affirmed the dismissal and the Division Bench of this Court took the view that the High Court was right in taking the view that the principles of res judicata were applicable to the issue of Jurisdiction. In our opinion, the contention of learned counsel for the appellant cannot be upheld. We find that in Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N. B. Jeejeebhoy, a Bench comprising three learned Judges of this Court has taken the view that a decision on the question of jurisdiction of the Court or a pure question of law unrelated to the right of the parties to a previous suit, is not res judicata, in the subsequent suit. The Court observed : "It is true that in determining the application of a rule of res judicata the Court is not concerned with the correctness or otherwise of the earlier judgment. The matter in issue, if it is one purely of fact, decided in the earlier proceeding by competent Court must in a subsequent litigation between the same parties be regarded as finally decided and cannot be reopened. A mixed question of law and fact determined in the earlier proceeding between the same parties may not, for the same reason, be question in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties. But, where the decision is on a question of law i.e., the interpretation of a statute, it will be res judicata in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties where the cause of action is the same, for the expression 'the matter in issue' in Sec. 11, Code of Civil Procedure means the right litigated between the same parties, i.e., the facts on which the right is claimed or denied and the law applicable to the determination of that issue. Where, however, the question is one purely of law and it relates to the jurisdiction of the Court or a decision of the Court sanctioning something which is illegal, by resort to the rule of res judicata a party affected by the decision will not be precluded from challenging the validity of that order under the rule of res judicata, for a rule of procedure cannot supersede the law of the land. The same view has been reiterated by a Bench comprising three learned Judges of this Court in Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra. The same view has been reiterated by a Bench comprising three learned Judges of this Court in Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra. We find that the decision of three learned Judges of this Court in Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N. B. Jeejeebhoy has not been noticed at all by the Division Bench comprising two learned Judges of this Court which delivered the judgment in Avtar Singh v. Jagjit Singh, and hence, to the extent, that the judgment in Avtar Singh v. Jagjit Singh takes the view that the principle of res judicata is applicable to an erroneous decision on jurisdiction, it cannot be regarded as good law. In our opinion a Court which has no jurisdiction in law cannot be conferred with the jurisdiction by applying principles of res judicata. It is well-settled that there can be no estoppel on a pure question of law and in this case the question of jurisdiction is a pure question of law.Sri Sanjay Mohan, learned counsel for the management also referred to the decision of the Apex Court in State of Bihar & Ors. v. Ramdeo Yadav & Ors. reported in, wherein it has been held that when public interest is involved even if the earlier decision has not been challenged, and when it leads to the interpretation given by the High Court following earlier order which involves larger public interest, the question of res judicata will not apply. In this respect the Apex Court held thus;" 4. Sri B. B. Singh, the learned counsel for the appellants, contended that though an appeal against the earlier order of the High Court has not been filed, since larger public interest is involved in the interpretation given by the High Court following its earlier judgment, the matter requires consideration by this Court. We find force in this contention. In the similar circumstances, this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Digambar and in State of West Bengal v. Debdas Kumar had held that though an appeal was not filed against an earlier order, when public interest is involved in interpretation of law, the Court is entitled to go into the question." In my considered view in the light of these two pronouncements the contention that the jurisdictional issue raised is barred by res judicata has to be necessarily rejected. Sri Dhanapalan, learned counsel for the contract labourers/union referred to the decision of the Apex Court in Secretary, Haryana State Electricity Board v. Suresh, reported in (1999-I-LLJ-1086) (SC) and emphasized that this Court should issue a writ of mandamus as prayed for and also to enforce the notification issued by the State Government in respect of BHEL. In my considered view, this pronouncement of their Lordships of the Apex Court is one the principle of issuing the writ of mandamus to enforce the provisions of the Act and not on the plea of "res judicata". The learned counsel for the contract labourers have not cited any decision to the contra.In the light of the above discussions it follows that the State of Tamil Nadu is not the appropriate Government with respect to BHEL and the notification issued under Sec. 10(1) or Sec. 10(2) of the Act will have no application to BHEL. Hence it follows automatically that the said notification cannot be enforced by issue of a writ of mandamus. It may be that it may work hardship to the contract labourers. But the realities of the situation has to be taken note and intervened by the appropriate Government, namely, the Central Government. The Central Government has to come to the rescue of the contract labourers employed in BHEL and the State of Tamil Nadu not being the appropriate authority in respect of BHEL has no jurisdiction at all and the notification has no application. The earlier Division Bench where the validity of the notification has been upheld is of no avail in the light of the later pronouncement of the Apex Court and the principle of res judicata has no application to the facts and law raised. In the circumstances, it is not necessary to go into any other contention or points raised and argued. In the circumstances, W.P. No. 20325 of 1993 and W.P. No. 263 of 1989 deserve to be dismissed. W.P. No. 17938 of 1998, has to be allowed. The earlier direction appointing an Advocate Commissioner for getting a report and all other connected directions is of no avail to the contract labourers in the absence of any notification by the Central Government. It is for the contract labourers to move the Central Government for issue of necessary notification and other reliefs. The earlier direction appointing an Advocate Commissioner for getting a report and all other connected directions is of no avail to the contract labourers in the absence of any notification by the Central Government. It is for the contract labourers to move the Central Government for issue of necessary notification and other reliefs. The question involved in this writ petition is intricate and it goes to the root of jurisdiction of the State of Tamil Nadu to issue a notification. In the light of the later pronouncement of the Apex Court, with respect, this Court has to hold that the two unions who have taken up the causes of the contract labourers employed in BHEL, Ranipet, have to fall and they have to move the Central Government for appropriate notification so that the contract labourers employed in BHEL, Ranipet, could be benefited and the provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, social legislation could be enforced.In the result : (i) W.P. Nos. 263 of 1989 and 20325 of 1993 are dismissed. (ii) W.P. No. 19738 of 1998 is allowed. Consequently, all the connected pending W.M.Ps. are dismissed. Parties shall bear their respective costs in this writ petition.